[New Year Special Commentary Series] ① Trumpist Foreign Policy Strategy and the Future of World Order, ROK-US Relations

I. An Era of Insufficient Global Leadership

The second term of Donald Trump's administration will commence in two weeks. When President Trump was first elected in 2016, the new America was considered merely an aberration, but with the impending launch of his second term, the foreign policy strategy of the US under President Trump has solidified into a consistent trend. In the 2024 US presidential election, the Republican Party secured overwhelming victories not only in the seven swing states but also nationwide. The Republican Party surpassed the Democratic Party not only in electoral votes but also in the total popular vote, and increased its vote count in over 90% of counties.

President Trump's vote share increased across diverse racial groups, including Black and Hispanic voters, fundamentally shaking the Democratic Party's coalition of voters based on racial minorities and ethnic groups. It remains to be seen whether the 2024 election will hold the significance of a critical election, which occurs approximately every 40 years (Seo Jeong-geon 2024).

If the Republican Party has succeeded in collapsing the existing coalition of voters that brought victory to the Democratic Party and forming a broader base of support—an alliance encompassing race, class, religion, and education—then Trumpist domestic and foreign policies will become an even stronger current (Ha Sang-eung 2024).

The implications of the second Trump administration for the international order are significant, as President Trump explicitly refuses to provide the international public goods necessary for maintaining it. Moreover, the international community's bewilderment is considerable, given that the current international order requires global leadership more than ever. Looking back at 2024, the planet experienced its hottest year on record, with temperatures rising by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels, temporarily exceeding the long-term target set by the Paris Agreement. While humanity placed hope in generative artificial intelligence for solving many problems, Geoffrey Hinton, who received the Nobel Prize in Physics for his contributions to AI, grimly concluded that there is a 10% to 20% chance of humanity becoming extinct due to AI within the next 30 years. The war in Ukraine has led Russia to become increasingly fixated on the use of nuclear weapons, and it modified its nuclear strategy in November of last year to lower the threshold for their use.

The limitations of the sovereign state system are starkly evident in the face of existential threats to humanity. The liberal, rules-based order led by the United States after World War II, while not achieving complete global governance, can be described as a system that combined American power and the rule of law. After 30 years of a unipolar hegemonic system, American power has been depleted, and the American public's weariness and concern regarding the singular hegemonic project have reached their peak.

Humanity has entered a new era where American leadership is at its weakest, precisely when global public goods are most needed. Many scholars argue that we are entering a new Cold War era driven by US-China strategic competition, or a multipolar system based on alliances among multiple great powers or states. Reflecting on the past Cold War, while it appeared to be an unlimited power struggle between the US and the Soviet Union, there were various forms of hostile interdependence and agreements within it. The key question is whether a similar framework can be established between the US and China that does not lead to catastrophe.

A multipolar system presents an even more challenging situation. World War I and World War II resulted in total war not only due to the absence of hegemony but also within a multipolarizing world order. The multipolar system of 18th-century Europe, which achieved a balance of power, was a rare exception where stability was maintained through war as a means of system maintenance. The balance of power in 18th-century Europe was sustained by a shared cultural consensus and a common vision for international politics, where even military power operated under strong normative agreements.

If a multipolar system emerges, it is highly unlikely that the current great powers possess the cultural foundation or common vision to establish such normative agreements. This is because the so-called axes of revisionism do not possess the norms required to maintain a multipolar system while jointly creating agreements for human preservation and international order with liberal forces. In this context, the nature of President Trump's foreign policy is of paramount importance.

II. Diverse Interpretations of Trumpist Foreign Policy Strategy

A package of domestic and foreign policies led by President Trump, commonly referred to as Trumpism, does exist. The policies pursued by President Trump during his first term and the campaign promises made during the recent election exhibit considerable consistency, and the rate of fulfillment of these promises was very high, as evidenced by the first term. However, because President Trump himself does not exhibit a clear philosophy or systematic thinking regarding domestic politics and foreign policy, it remains questionable whether his various policy promises constitute a coherent 'ism' (Lee Hye-jeong 2024).

The core components of Trumpist foreign policy include a package of economic nationalist policies aimed at reviving the weakened US economy; a restrained foreign policy strategy focused on preventing new wars and ending existing ones to prevent the depletion of US power; and policies designed to achieve agreements with adversaries and pressure allies to foster American economic prosperity and a stable international environment. These Trumpist policy packages encompass economic nationalism, peace through negotiation backed by overwhelming military power, unilateral foreign policy over multilateralism, and the maximization of US national interests through transactional diplomacy rather than broad rule-based diplomacy, along with the creation of a domestic political environment to support these aims.

President Trump is pursuing a "peace through strength" strategy, aiming for a swift end or ceasefire in the ongoing war in Ukraine and a rapid resolution to the instability in the Middle East stemming from the Israel-Palestine conflict. To this end, he has pledged to seek compromise with Russia, realize pro-Israel and anti-Iran policies, and advance the stalled Middle East détente process. While some anticipate that Trump's bilateral transactional diplomacy will be effective, leveraging America's formidable military power and influence, this outlook is not entirely optimistic.

Numerous conditions surrounding the end of the Ukraine war remain unresolved, including future commitments to Ukraine's security, concerns about the future of the European security architecture or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), addressing Russia's sense of threat stemming from the West's eastward expansion culminating in the Ukraine crisis, the post-conflict handling of occupied Ukrainian territories and populations, and issues of war reparations and war crimes. The Middle East landscape is also undergoing significant changes, such as the potential fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the weakening of the axis of resistance comprising Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran, the future of Israel's assertive diplomacy under right-wing nationalist leadership, and the Middle East peace formula.

Among these, the US strategy toward China presents the most formidable challenge. President Trump is implementing a policy to economically contain China, its strongest competitor, through a substantial 60% tariff. Furthermore, he is continuing a strategy to pressure China militarily, based on the extensive military innovations initiated during his first term. This strategy has, in fact, been inherited by the Biden administration, which is pursuing a competitive strategy to suppress China—a geopolitical, geo-economic, and techno-political rival—while simultaneously pursuing economic nationalism.

It is a critical question whether the Biden administration's strategy of "de-risking" will shift to a strategy of full economic decoupling. The ultimate goal of this strategy toward China remains uncertain. In his first press conference after winning the election, President Trump emphasized his personal relationship with President Xi Jinping rather than discussing pressure on China. While showcasing personal relationships between leaders while pursuing national pressure policies is part of Trump's diplomatic style, it presents a more complex challenge when anticipating the final state of US-China relations.

At the US-China summit in Lima, Peru, last November, President Biden emphasized that the US-China relationship over the past four years had been one of cooperation and management based on shared interests, rather than confrontation and crisis (The White House 2024). This perspective prioritizes the existence of areas for cooperation and compromise alongside areas of competition and confrontation. It remains unclear whether President Trump will maintain this dual relationship of competition and cooperation in future relations with China, and what the ultimate state of the US strategy toward China will be in that process.

When considering these individual policies collectively, the fundamental nature of Trumpist diplomacy is of great importance. Four interpretations are possible. First, Trumpism is interpreted as an intermittent unilateral foreign policy strategy of the United States. Since World War II, while pursuing a hegemonic strategy, the US has periodically adopted unilateralist strategies when the power base of its hegemony was depleted (Jeon Jae-seong 2019). The strategies of President Richard Nixon in the early 1970s and President Ronald Reagan in the mid-1980s demonstrated unilateral shifts aimed at accumulating US power by extracting economic concessions from allies based on security public goods provided by the US, and readjusting the framework of existing US multilateral policies.

Although the liberal, rules-based order is a consensual order based on multilateralism, if the liberal order fundamentally requires global leadership, then the hegemonic power of the United States has always necessitated the accumulation of power through intermittent unilateralism. Currently, after 30 years of a unipolar system, US power has been depleted to its extreme. The annual interest on the national debt alone now exceeds the total US defense budget. While the US is currently managing its national debt, trade deficits, and fiscal deficits within the dollar-based reserve currency system, if the reliability of the dollar is lost due to the depletion of US power, the current hegemonic system will become unsustainable.

Therefore, President Trump's actions can be interpreted as demonstrating aspects of coercive diplomacy aimed at accumulating US power. Various peace strategies, such as pressuring allies and reducing defense spending, are intended to prevent the depletion of US power and lay the economic foundation for re-emerging as a hegemonic power. Even if President Trump himself does not consciously recognize this hegemonic framework, the slogan "Make America Great Again" can be interpreted as a repetitive pattern of intermittent unilateralism for the restoration of American hegemony.

Second, it is viewed as a fundamental shift from benevolent hegemony to coercive hegemony (Gilpin 1981; Gilpin 1987). Since World War II, the US has never completely abandoned the framework of its hegemonic era. This is because, based on its immense power, the US has continuously and voluntarily produced the global public goods required by the international community. The US has maintained the multilateral security system necessary for the liberal international order, the economic foundation for maintaining an open liberal international economic order, and the normative stance on democracy and human rights, which are core to the liberal order.

Coercive hegemony is an order that maintains all these systems through US power. Even amidst intermittent unilateral policy shifts, the US voluntarily provided the framework of security through alliances and extracted economic concessions in return. If the US compels its allies to contribute to security while extracting economic concessions, the costs borne by the allies will rapidly increase relative to the benefits provided by the US. Allies will not calculate the balance between the benefits provided by the US and the costs they incur, but rather the costs of being denied the many benefits that the US has historically provided as a hegemonic power. In an order where the US remains a coercive hegemon, the concerns of allies and partner nations will inevitably deepen amidst the relationship between the benefits and the ever-increasing costs. The international community has never experienced coercive hegemony within the liberal order, making it difficult to clearly understand the essence of the current Trumpist diplomacy.

Third, it is a strategy of the US as a normal great power, often confused with coercive hegemony. If Trumpism represents the abandonment of the hegemonic strategy itself and a shift to a strategy of a normal great power, this has profound implications for the international order. Hegemony, even coercive hegemony, maintains the international order and preserves the basic framework established by the US. For example, the dollar-based reserve currency system, the non-proliferation regime based on near-monopoly of nuclear weapons, and multilateral international institutions, even if based on selective unilateralism, are fundamental characteristics of a hegemonic system.

If the US abandons its hegemonic system and adjusts its foreign policy as a normal great power, the framework of the reserve currency system, nuclear monopoly, and US-led multilateral international institutions will fundamentally collapse. Even if the US remains a significantly stronger power than other great powers, abandoning the foreign policy strategy of a hegemonic state is an entirely different matter.

There are two ways to interpret the US strategy of primacy: one as a hegemonic strategy, and the other as a strategy of a normal state that is significantly ahead of other nations. If the US pursues a strategy of primacy as a normal great power, it will bring about immense changes in the international order. Furthermore, when transitioning from coercive hegemony to a normal great power strategy, the US may face significant internal turmoil upon realizing that it must abandon the status of the dollar as the reserve currency, the strong bargaining leverage over allies maintained through extended nuclear deterrence, and the leadership of multilateral international institutions it has spearheaded.

Trumpist foreign policy strategy clearly exhibits characteristics of a restraint strategy. It involves retreating from regions not critical to core interests and selectively intervening only as necessary in areas vital to US interests. However, it remains unclear whether this restraint strategy is underpinned by a hegemonic strategy or represents a retreat from a hegemonic strategy to a normal great power strategy. It is also unclear what form of combination it pursues among realist strategy, conservatism, or nationalism as the basis for its restraint strategy (Priebe et al. 2024).

The ambiguity of Trumpism stems not only from the uncertainty surrounding President Trump's personal foreign policy but also from the various factions within the Republican Party. The traditional conservative wing of the Republican Party still exists, advocating for what can be called conservative internationalism. This group considers the maintenance of a strong US hegemonic policy as a crucial policy objective (Kwon Boram 2024; Schake 2024). They believe that despite the US facing economic difficulties, the Biden administration's repeated failures in deterrence cannot be sustained. To this end, they advocate for a defense spending target of approximately 5% of GDP and a robust global military intervention strategy. This contradicts the restraint strategy, as they argue for maximizing the structural national interests the US gains through comprehensive intervention.

In direct opposition to this are the neo-conservative forces. They argue that the US's unipolar hegemonic system over the past 30 years has not only depleted US national strength but also led to the decline of American spirit and culture. They advocate for restoring traditional values, strengthening social democracy over liberal democracy, and reviving traditional conservative values to restore American national strength. They oppose US support for the war in Ukraine and strongly advocate for pursuing a strategy of restraint. This represents the foreign policy stance advocated by Vice President-elect J. D. Vance and the anti-liberal forces (Cha Taeseo 2024).

President Trump finds himself positioned between these factions. He exhibits a diplomatic balance, pursuing a US hegemonic strategy while simultaneously exercising restraint against excessive intervention. He prioritizes maximizing US national interests through economic means rather than forceful military intervention.

The future landscape of these factions will depend on changes in US domestic politics, shifts in public opinion, and the responses of other countries. If the US realizes the limitations of a restraint strategy, and further, a normal great power strategy, recognizing that a certain level of global leadership benefits US national interests, and that a foreign policy of selective intervention rather than neo-isolationism is necessary, the direction of Trumpism could change. However, if public opinion favoring economic means over military intervention and strengthening neo-isolationist tendencies over global engagement prevails, the trajectory of Trumpist foreign policy will significantly alter. It is crucial for South Korea and the international community to anticipate the changes in President Trump's foreign policy over the next four years.

III. Potential Twists and Turns in the Second Trump Administration's Four Years

Immediately upon taking office, President Trump is expected to implement his long-promised tariff policies, accelerate immigration policies, reform the domestic system referred to as the "deep state," break away from the multilateral diplomacy pursued by the Biden administration, fundamentally alter existing energy policies such as those concerning climate change, and bring about an end to the war in Ukraine, peace in the Middle East, and pressure on allies regarding burden-sharing. In particular, tariff policy is a core foreign policy issue for President Trump to restore the US economy. He has already indicated expectations of a 60% tariff on China, a 25% special tariff on Canada and Mexico, and a universal 10% tariff.

In this process, President Trump is attempting to create a favorable negotiation environment for the US through unprecedented pressure, employing his characteristic negotiation tactics. His pronouncements about purchasing Greenland, acquiring the Panama Canal, and incorporating Canada as the 51st US state can be seen, on one hand, as policy expressions of concern about China's growing influence in the Arctic and South America, but also as negotiation tactics to preemptively exert undue pressure on other countries to gain advantageous positions in bilateral negotiations.

While many of President Trump's campaign promises are likely to be realized, there is also a tactical element aimed at creating a favorable negotiation environment. Therefore, as negotiations progress, the overall policy framework may be maintained, but the specific details are subject to change.

Many countries that experienced Trump's first term do not view Trump's policies as uncertain. The content of the policies President Trump will pursue has become clear. However, unpredictability remains. It is still unpredictable in what form and under what specific negotiation terms President Trump will pursue negotiations. This unpredictability is not an inherent problem but rather a matter of negotiation tactics, and the expectation that it will be unpredictable is itself quite predictable.

Many countries are attempting to preemptively offer concessions to President Trump to secure favorable negotiation outcomes. On the other hand, questions also exist about the sustainability of the US's tariff-centered economic policy. The weakening of the US economy stems from the previous economic strategy focused on finance and services rather than manufacturing, the globalization strategy that relatively weakened political considerations within neoliberal globalization, and the consequent significant decline in US manufacturing competitiveness. Disruptions in supply chains due to geopolitical factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic, US-China strategic competition, and the war in Ukraine have led the US to desire self-sufficient manufacturing supply chains. However, fundamental questions remain: whether pursuing such supply chains is economically viable, whether the US can and should invest in manufacturing to achieve results, and whether tariff policies truly contribute to enhancing US competitiveness.

Furthermore, there are numerous obstacles, including potential consumer price increases resulting from tariff policies, the weakening of key US sectors due to retaliatory tariffs from major countries, and backlash from other nations. If the tariff policy leads to significant economic damage domestically and ultimately fails to enhance US competitiveness, it will yield negative results within a few years (Yang Jun-seok 2024).

While industrial policy is an area the US has traditionally pursued, the specifics of how it will be maintained are uncertain, given the nature of the US economic system, which is not accustomed to government intervention. The Biden administration has established frameworks for industrial policy through legislative acts such as the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act. It remains unclear what framework for industrial policy President Trump will adopt and on what legislative basis he will maintain it (Jeong Young-woo 2024). The Biden administration pursued a strategy of technological decoupling with China under the guise of "de-risking," but the full scope of the Trump administration's technology policy toward China has not yet been revealed.

In this situation, we must wait and see over the next two years, leading up to the midterm elections, what the US tariff policy will look like and what changes industrial policy will undergo. Many countries will seek various avenues to avoid the initial attacks from the Trump administration while maintaining cooperative relations with the US in the long term. Furthermore, they will closely monitor the future shape of US foreign strategy after the Trump administration and focus all their efforts on understanding the nature of the second Trump administration.

IV. Future ROK-US Relations

With the nature of Trumpist foreign policy strategy still unclear, South Korea's response is challenging. If the US pursues an intermittent unilateral foreign policy, South Korea should focus on adjusting its cooperation strategy with the US by observing changes in US hegemonic strategy.

If the US is shifting towards a coercive hegemonic strategy, South Korea must seek significant changes in its foreign policy, anticipating the future of the changing international order and maximizing the benefits it can derive from the US within the altered ROK-US relationship. If the US itself pursues a normal great power strategy and inevitably accepts the transition of the international order from a hegemonic system to a multipolar one, South Korea's foreign policy will inevitably become highly realist.

Currently, South Korea's foreign policy is predicated on the strong military and economic leadership of the US and considers the preservation and development of the liberal international order as a key foreign policy objective. In this context, the Washington Declaration and the Camp David Accords, pursued by the Biden administration and South Korea, can be considered the two pillars of South Korea's strategy toward the US. The core of South Korea's foreign policy is to deter North Korea's offensive military strategy and prepare for China's attempts to alter the status quo and its geopolitical strategies by strengthening the ROK-US alliance. In particular, reinforcing the commitment to extended nuclear deterrence and strongly demanding US assurance policies, while simultaneously enhancing deterrence, forms the core of the ROK-US alliance. However, as discussed earlier, amidst the overall ambiguity of US foreign policy and Trumpist foreign policy, various rational proposals for South Korea's nuclear armament and discussions on changes in North Korean nuclear strategy are also emerging.

Voices are also being raised arguing that South Korea's nuclear armament could ultimately benefit, rather than harm, the ROK-US military cooperation relationship, and that it would not necessarily weaken global denuclearization and the extended deterrence system (Kelly and Kim 2024). Another argument suggests that since North Korea is the weakest link the US can target to weaken the axis of revisionism comprising China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, a comprehensive peace agreement with Kim Jong Un should be pursued through a North Korea-US summit, seeking a strategic compromise based on North Korea's nuclear freeze (Alperovitch and Radchenko 2024).

South Korea should continue to strongly demand the US's extended nuclear deterrence commitment and emphasize to the US that global nuclear non-proliferation serves not only South Korea's interests but also the security order in Northeast Asia and US security interests. Although figures within the US such as Assistant Secretary of Defense nominee Elbridge A. Colby and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have occasionally made statements suggesting consideration of South Korea's nuclear armament, it is clear that the prerequisite is how the US will pursue the nuclear order in its own national interest.

Second, as an open trading nation and a liberal democracy, South Korea has made significant efforts to maintain the liberal international order. The current liberal international order faces numerous challenges. Above all, its reliance on a hegemonic system means that the direction of the international order is fundamentally subject to change based on US policy shifts. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for any single nation to exercise global leadership due to the immense demand for global public goods. The various hardships experienced by the US during the 30-year unipolar era attest to this. Even if China were to succeed in the US-China strategic competition, it would be difficult for China to become a unipolar hegemon capable of leading the world on its own.

Therefore, it is crucial to consider how to form a coalition of ruling powers with various developed nations and, furthermore, how to create a liberal and democratic international order that encompasses the Global South. Currently, South Korea lacks confidence that revisionist states like China and Russia, excluding the US, can inclusively lead the world.

If the US fails to create a leadership framework that can appropriately embrace other nations while maintaining the liberal international order, South Korea must explore the possibility of a liberal international order without the US and consider whether a leadership alliance without hegemony is feasible. Of course, the US considers South Korea, with its strong military power, innovative economy, and cultural leadership, as a most important partner nation. Considering the weakening European nations, and Japan and Australia, which still lack sufficient military capabilities, South Korea's value as an ally is exceptionally high.

In this context, South Korea is well-positioned to advocate for the future of US global leadership. At the same time, it needs to further explore cooperation possibilities with East Asian partners, particularly Japan and Australia, who strive for a liberal international order despite facing various challenges. It is predictable that the Trump administration will show little interest in the multilateral consultations pursued by the Biden administration. However, the trilateral consultations between South Korea, the US, and Japan, established through agreements like the Camp David Accords, offer a platform for solidarity for the liberal international order, not just trilateral cooperation. South Korea can thus rethink the value of cooperation for the international order.

Third, cooperation in new technology fields between South Korea and the US is crucial in this process. South Korea's rise as an advanced nation and its ability to exercise leadership have been significantly driven by economic development through technological innovation, the role of corporations, and the efforts of its citizens. Even if Trump's foreign policy leads to a weakening of the international order, the necessity for South Korea to effectively utilize the innovative technologies possessed by the US remains.

Finally, and most importantly, South Korea must contemplate what form of leadership it should exercise for the future of the international community, especially when the US itself cannot present a clear vision. South Korea is also experiencing significant domestic political upheaval amidst changes in the international order and global trends. Domestic politics and international politics now move as one, and there is no way to maintain a domestic system immune to the currents of international politics. It is time to consider South Korea's own form of leadership to prevent the collapse of the international order, while keeping in mind the interaction between domestic and international politics and strengthening domestic democracy.

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■ Jeon, Jae-seong_Director of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park, Han-soo_EAI Researcher

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