[Global NK Russia-China Triangle Series] Strengthening North Korea-Russia Relations and China: A Geopolitical Perspective

I. China's Reaction to Strengthening North Korea-Russia Cooperation

In June 2024, North Korea and Russia elevated their relationship to a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" and signed a treaty stipulating that "if one party is subjected to armed aggression, the other shall provide military and other assistance without delay." China's official response to this was principled. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs consistently maintained a stance of distancing itself, considering it a matter of sovereign choice for North Korea and Russia.

On June 19, 2024, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated, "North Korea and Russia are friendly neighbors and need to exchange and cooperate. High-level exchanges are matters for two sovereign states." At a press conference on June 20, he was asked about China's position on the impact of the establishment of the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" and military alliance between North Korea and Russia on peace in the Korean Peninsula and Eurasia, as well as North Korea-Russia military cooperation and Putin's request to revise UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. He replied, "Cooperation between North Korea and Russia is a matter for two sovereign states, and we will not comment on it. China believes that maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and promoting a political settlement are in the common interests of all parties." He added, "The issue of the Korean Peninsula cannot be resolved by sanctions and pressure alone; a political settlement is the only way." (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Korea 2024). At a press conference on October 24, he stated regarding North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia, "China is unaware of the relevant situation." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2024a).

In contrast, on October 22, at a reception commemorating the 32nd anniversary of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China held in Beijing, former Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Qiu Guohong remarked, while suggesting that the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia might not be factual, "We view North Korea-Russia military cooperation very seriously, as it could provide a pretext for the United States to further strengthen trilateral military cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan." (<Kyunghyang Shinmun> 2024). Comparing these remarks with the positive assessment of the strengthening of North Korea-Russia cooperation contributing to regional peace and stability by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson in 2019, it appears that China has recently shifted to a more passive and less positive stance on the strengthening of North Korea-Russia cooperation.

Major Chinese media outlets tended to report on the treaty signing and strengthening of cooperation between North Korea and Russia through straight news articles (<Global Times> 2024) or by introducing reports from other countries' media (<Global Times> 2023, 2023a), rather than publishing editorials. Even the <Global Times>, which expresses more active and direct opinions than the government, adopted a cautious approach to the development of North Korea-Russia relations. In 2023, the <Global Times> published a critical column arguing against interpreting the trend of strengthening cooperation between China-Russia and North Korea-Russia as a "North Korea-China-Russia vs. South Korea-US-Japan" dynamic (<Global Times> 2023b). This column asserted that bilateral cooperation within North Korea-China-Russia is unrelated to a new Cold War structure and that China does not desire such a dynamic. Instead, it pointed to forces seeking to strengthen South Korea-US-Japan cooperation as creating a new Cold War structure. In summary, China appears to be maintaining a cautious stance, conscious of the potential for the strengthening of North Korea-Russia relations to deepen the "North Korea-China-Russia vs. South Korea-US-Japan" dynamic.

II. Historical Cases of Strengthening North Korea-Russia Cooperation

Historically, there have been three instances of strengthened cooperation between the Soviet Union and North Korea. The first was from the end of World War II until the mid-1950s. From the Soviet perspective, North Korea held significant geopolitical importance as a bridgehead for managing its sphere of influence and for subsequent expansion into the Asia-Pacific region. From North Korea's perspective, Soviet support was crucial for establishing its government and for post-Korean War reconstruction.

However, this context of cooperation could not continue after the 3rd Plenary Session of the 2nd Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in 1956. This was around the time of the so-called "factional incident" when China and the Soviet Union considered replacing Kim Il-sung (Lorenz 2010). However, their interests did not align. At that time, from China's perspective, North Korea's value as a buffer zone was paramount, and its collapse was undesirable, thus China had little incentive to interfere in North Korea's internal affairs. The Soviet Union, however, aiming for regional expansion, needed to lease North Korean ports, implying the necessity of fostering pro-Soviet factions within North Korea. Consequently, after this period, as Kim Il-sung consolidated his control over North Korea and emphasized "Juche," the significance of North Korea-Soviet cooperation in this context diminished.

The second instance occurred during the 1960s, overlapping with the Sino-Soviet split and the Vietnam War. These two issues were closely linked. From the early 1960s, Khrushchev pursued a strategy of supporting Ho Chi Minh's attack on South Vietnam to bring China under Soviet influence (Westad 2005). In other words, he sought to create a situation similar to the Korean War, where US forces would intervene in the Vietnam War, and China would become involved. However, unlike the Korean War, US forces did not cross the 17th parallel. Furthermore, as border conflicts between China and the Soviet Union intensified from the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union strengthened relations with China's neighbors, including Vietnam, North Korea, and India, and increased pressure on China. During this period, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with MiG-21 fighter jets. This decision was based on the strategic consideration that North Korea, being adjacent to Beijing, China's capital, could pose a significant burden to China.

On the other hand, North Korea's reasons for cooperating with the Soviet Union, beyond acquiring fighter jets, included significant skepticism about China's support in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. One of the key reasons for the Sino-Soviet split in 1966 was Mao Zedong's opposition to the Soviet approach to supporting the Vietnam War. Soviet aid had to pass through China, creating a dilemma for China between the pretext of communist bloc support and the risk of exposing sensitive domestic issues to Russia. Moreover, Mao Zedong perceived the formation of a unified state directly below China as contrary to China's national interests, and thus did not actively support Vietnamese unification. This stance by China engendered distrust in North Korea. The complex interplay of these interests led to strengthened cooperation between Russia and North Korea. However, Russian support for North Korea was largely limited, except for this period.

The third instance occurred during the period when the Reagan administration actively pursued the containment of the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration (1981-1989) revived a hardline containment policy aimed at the collapse of the Soviet Union. The period from 1983 to 1986, in particular, saw a significant deterioration in US-Soviet relations due to this policy. During this time, the United States sought to curb Soviet expansion through various means, including intensifying the arms race and announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In response to these US containment policies, the Soviet Union strengthened its relationship with North Korea to protect its sphere of influence (Garthoff 1994). During this period, Russia provided North Korea with aircraft such as the MiG-23, Su-25, and MiG-29. North Korea also allowed Soviet aircraft to fly over its airspace.

III. Assessment of Recent North Korea-China-Russia Relations: North Korea and Russia's Efforts to Mitigate Asymmetry with China

It is unlikely that Russia, significantly weakened economically since the end of the Cold War, possesses the conditions and capabilities to pursue expansion in Northeast Asia at present. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the United States, currently engaged in strategic competition with China, is pursuing a containment policy aimed at Russia's collapse. While the US has identified China and Russia as major threats, its strategic priority remains focused on China. Therefore, applying the first and third historical cases to interpret the current strengthening of North Korea-Russia relations is not appropriate. However, the second case offers a valid explanation for the closer ties between North Korea and Russia in the context of Russia strengthening relations with China's neighbors to enhance its leverage over China.

China and Russia are adjusting the level of their cooperation while valuing their bilateral relationship. In particular, as Russia has faced strong sanctions due to the Crimean crisis and the Russia-Ukraine war since 2014, their economic interdependence has deepened, centered on energy and raw materials. Russia, which transformed into a food exporter after 2014, has rapidly become a major food supplier to China (Zuenko 2024), and Russia's energy exports to China have increased approximately fivefold over the past decade. From China's perspective, diversifying its supply of strategic materials aligns with its goal of establishing a stable strategic environment. However, China maintains a strict stance on price negotiations, generally holding a strategic advantage within the bilateral relationship.

Furthermore, the prolonged Russia-Ukraine war has expanded Russia's strategic vacuum in Eastern Siberia, compelling Russia to increase China's participation in development. Russia lacks the population and development capital to independently develop and utilize the resources in this region. In contrast, China, with a population of 1.4 billion, desperately needs essential resources and raw materials such as water and energy. This region is rich in such resources. Originally, Russia valued its relationship with South Korea, anticipating its role as a balancer in the region, considering potential cooperation possibilities (Lukin & Pugacheva 2022). However, as South Korea strengthened its ties with NATO and adopted a clear policy of hostility towards Russia, Russia began seeking alternatives.

In North Korea's case, its nuclear armament, driven by its own perceived needs, has altered North Korea's geopolitical characteristic as a Chinese buffer zone. Specifically, North Korea's nuclear armament has effectively blocked traditional invasion routes into China. This paradoxically reduces China's incentive to provide extensive support to North Korea beyond preventing sudden collapse, significantly weakening North Korea's leverage over China. This suggests that despite North Korea's intention to reduce its dependence on China and enhance regime stability, it may lead to strategic isolation and increased economic dependence, potentially resulting in China's strengthened control over North Korea in the long term. Consequently, North Korea is pursuing a strengthening of relations with Russia to reduce its dependence on China.

Against this backdrop, there are three main pieces of evidence suggesting that Russia and North Korea are pursuing efforts to mitigate asymmetry with China and enhance their leverage. First is the plan to build a new bridge across the Tumen River estuary mentioned in the North Korea-Russia treaty. In the joint statement of the China-Russia summit in May, it was stated that "the two sides will engage in constructive dialogue with North Korea on the issue of Chinese vessels navigating the lower reaches of the Tumen River to the sea." However, at the North Korea-Russia summit in June, instead of discussing China's access to the East Sea, it was announced that the North Korean Minister of Land and Environment Protection and the Russian Minister of Transport had signed an "Agreement on the Construction of a Road Bridge across the Tumen River" (Lee Je-hoon 2024). This implies the construction of an additional bridge connecting Tumen River Station in North Korea and Khasan Station in Russia, in addition to the existing "Friendship Bridge." The Tumen River estuary is silted up due to lack of maintenance, and the existing Tumen River railway bridge, at 7 meters high, obstructs the passage of large vessels. Therefore, the plan for a new bridge can be interpreted as a North Korea-Russia cooperation aimed at blocking China's access to the East Sea.

China's access to the East Sea via the Tumen River estuary is a critical issue involving its strategic intention to alter the status quo in its Asia-Pacific strategy and is also part of China's "Northern Sea Route" initiative, which the Chinese government has strategically pursued. China reacted sensitively to this announcement of the North Korea-Russia plan for an additional bridge. Immediately after the announcement by North Korea and Russia, China constructed an additional road extending eastward from the Fangchuan observation post in the Tumen River estuary and installed numerous facilities along the road, the purpose of which remains unclear. Furthermore, a new pier facility was constructed only 800 meters from the observation post ( 2024). The Tumen River estuary serves as an indicator of trilateral cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia. However, the announcement of the North Korea-Russia plan for an additional bridge construction, made within the framework of bilateral cooperation rather than trilateral cooperation, strongly suggests an intention to secure negotiation power and leverage for North Korea and Russia in their dealings with China.

Second is Putin's diplomatic activities. Russia's recent diplomatic moves show similarities to the period in the 1960s when it strengthened cooperation with China's neighbors to secure leverage over China. Following his summit with Kim Jong-un in June, Putin immediately visited Vietnam and held a summit with the Vietnamese President. Vietnam, which had experienced strategic isolation from the West and China due to its invasion of Cambodia, heavily relied on the Soviet Union at the time. Even now, Russian military equipment constitutes a significant portion of its arsenal, and it cooperates with Russian oil companies in oil exploration in the South China Sea. Consequently, despite Vietnam's friendly relations with Ukraine, it has consistently abstained from UN resolutions related to the Russia-Ukraine war. This does not mean Vietnam adheres to a pro-Russian stance; rather, it indicates an intention to maximize its strategic space between the US and China, and to strengthen its leverage over China by reinforcing relations with Russia.

Immediately after his tour of Vietnam, Putin invited Indian Prime Minister Modi to Russia in July for a summit. India has been a major importer of Russian arms since the Soviet era. Since the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, bilateral relations have also become closer economically, with India emerging as a major purchaser of Russian crude oil that lost its markets due to Western sanctions. In 2023, bilateral trade increased by 76% compared to the previous year, reaching $65 billion (approximately 89 trillion won), driven by increased energy trade. While India superficially calls for an end to the Russia-Ukraine war, it has not voted in favor of UN resolutions condemning Russia's aggression. India, amidst territorial disputes with China in the Himalayas and competition for influence in the Indian Ocean, considers managing its relationship with Russia a crucial element of its strategy towards China. However, this does not imply India's exclusively pro-Russian diplomacy. India also cooperates with Western countries, including the United States, and seeks to secure an advantageous position in its relations with China through close ties with Russia.

Third are the classified Russian military documents leaked in 2024 (Seddon & Cook 2024). These documents include details on Russia's nuclear weapon use criteria, tactical nuclear weapon training exercises simulating the initial stages of conflict with major powers, war scenarios drafted between 2008 and 2014, and naval exercise plans. Of particular note is a scenario prepared for a potential Chinese invasion. Although China and Russia agreed in 2001 not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, these documents show that despite their strengthening relations, Russia has continued training for a potential Chinese invasion in its eastern regions. The strategy of using nuclear weapons in case of conflict employs an "Escalate to De-escalate" approach, intending to terminate conflicts early by using small-scale nuclear weapons in the initial stages. This scenario mentions the use of tactical nuclear weapons in cases of Chinese invasion, significant damage to Russian strategic assets, or failure to achieve desired outcomes with conventional weapons. Specifically, it states that Russia could deter a Chinese advance with a nuclear strike if China deploys a large number of troops.

Although it has not been confirmed whether these classified documents were intentionally leaked, their content carries significant implications for Russia's relationship with China. In particular, by indicating the location of Russian nuclear forces near the Sino-Russian border, including Eastern Siberia, the documents convey a warning message about the possibility of China exploiting the strategic vacuum in that region. This suggests that nuclear weapons are considered a crucial element of strategic defense and reflects Russia's serious concerns about the strategic vacuum in Eastern Siberia.

China recognizes that the strengthening of cooperation between North Korea and Russia aims to mitigate asymmetry with China. As China's repeated reactions indicate, closer ties between North Korea and Russia are perceived as carrying the risk of China being criticized as an "authoritarian" regime along with them, bearing the burden of the "China's role" narrative, or escalating regional tensions centered on US-China strategic competition. However, from a broader perspective, the strengthening of North Korea-Russia relations also reveals a trend of declining US influence and opposition to the US-led order, which relatively offsets the need for China to actively prevent it at the cost of damaging its relations with them. Ultimately, North Korea, China, and Russia can be seen as maintaining their relationships within this framework.

Additionally, North Korea appears to be seeking to secure its own strategic space not only by maximizing its strategic room for maneuver between the US and China through cooperation with Russia but also within the China-Russia relationship itself. Since 2019, there have only been exchanges of letters between the leaders of North Korea and China, with no face-to-face meetings. However, Kim Jong-un and Putin have held two summit meetings in the past year. Amid concerns that increased dependence on China could pose a threat to the regime, North Korea seems to be prioritizing and strengthening its relationship with Russia, thereby pursuing strategic space between China and Russia.

IV. Prospects for North Korea-China-Russia Relations

At the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev adopted peaceful coexistence with the United States as the basic line, foreshadowing a conflict of lines with China. Although the theory of peaceful coexistence did not immediately lead to an improvement in US-Soviet relations, China feared that this line would relatively sideline it in the US-China-Soviet triangle. (Central Party Literature Research Office of the CPC Central Committee 2013). Furthermore, the Taiwan Strait crisis in the late 1950s and the Sino-Indian border conflict highlighted the geopolitical differences in perception between China and the Soviet Union. Ahead of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1959, the Soviet Union halted its support for China's nuclear weapons development and sought to place China under its nuclear umbrella. Thus, the divergence of interests between China and the Soviet Union grew, but due to China's economic difficulties and the stalemate in Soviet-US diplomacy, the Sino-Soviet relationship exhibited soft competition rather than outright conflict. During this period, both countries sought to maintain their influence by providing aid to communist countries, with China continuing to provide substantial aid to North Korea despite its economic hardships. This was partly because North Korea played a crucial role in the founding process of the Chinese Communist Party, but also because North Korea was a strategically valuable country for China's defense, sharing the threat posed by the US forces in South Korea.

This security environment served as an opportunity for North Korea. North Korea maintained strategic ambiguity, avoiding entanglement in the Sino-Soviet competition and not aligning with either side. By leveraging the soft competition between the two countries, it was able to sign alliances with the Soviet Union and China in 1961, respectively. This allowed North Korea to mitigate the dilemma of "security-autonomy exchange" that could arise from asymmetrical alliances and reduce the risk of being abandoned by both sides simultaneously. North Korea has experience in creating strategic space through such "equidistant" diplomacy.

However, North Korea's current security environment is significantly different from the past. As mentioned earlier, North Korea pursued nuclear armament not at China's behest but out of its own perceived necessity. As a result, North Korea's attainment of minimum deterrence has solidified China's buffer zone in the Korean Peninsula region. This, paradoxically, has weakened China's incentive to support North Korea. Furthermore, since 2019, North Korea has attempted to escape strategic isolation through improving relations with South Korea and normalizing relations with the United States, but these efforts have been frustrated. In this situation, North Korea has no choice but to seek to strengthen relations with Russia as an alternative to alleviate its dependence on China. However, unlike in the past, the current China-Russia relationship is structurally deeply interconnected, with China holding a strategic advantage. Therefore, even if North Korea-Russia relations develop, North Korea's efforts to create strategic space between China and Russia will have limitations in fundamentally resolving the issue of its increasing dependence on China.

Some evaluate North Korea's military support in the Russia-Ukraine war as an economic decision to write off debt, rather than a strategic one (Cha 2022). However, considering that Russia already wrote off 90% of North Korea's debt in 2014, and the remaining 10% was agreed to be repaid in installments over 20 years every six months (<Yonhap News> 2015), this argument lacks persuasiveness. While economic motives cannot be excluded, they are unlikely to be the decisive factor. North Korea is likely fully aware of the limited effects of improving relations with Russia and may have used the strengthening of relations with Russia not merely as a means of financial gain but as a "starting point" for its strategic planning.

In other words, North Korea may have made strategic decisions considering the possibility of changes in the international situation, such as the readjustment of US-Russia relations linked to an exit strategy from the Russia-Ukraine war and shifts in the dynamics among the US, China, and Russia. North Korea may have pursued the strengthening of North Korea-Russia relations as an initial step in a strategy to link the conclusion of the Russia-Ukraine war with its own strategic position. This is because the manner in which the Russia-Ukraine war concludes is likely to be perceived as an indicator of the future direction of US-China competition, and depending on the conclusion, the possibility of an alternative international order being promoted cannot be ruled out. From North Korea's perspective, while integration into the international economic system previously meant only establishing North Korea-US relations, in this scenario, it could seek integration into an alternative economic system beyond the failure experienced in Hanoi.

North Korea, China, and Russia all think and act from the geopolitical perspective of major powers, implying strategies of mutual utilization and checks and balances, with US-China strategic competition at their core. The structure of North Korea-China-Russia relations shows that US-China strategic competition is at the highest level, followed by China-Russia relations, and then influenced by relations with North Korea.

From this perspective, the possibility of Russia providing advanced weapons to North Korea warrants examination. Historically, Russia's provision of advanced weapons of the time, such as fighter jets, was limited to the period of intensified Sino-Soviet conflict from 1966 to 1969 and the period of intense US-Soviet confrontation in the mid-to-late 1980s. As examined in the historical cases, these two periods were when the former Soviet Union faced a conflict situation with China, including the possibility of nuclear use, or when the United States pursued full-scale containment aimed at the collapse of the Soviet Union, i.e., when it faced a "vital interest" crisis. In other words, the Soviet Union did not provide advanced weapons like fighter jets to North Korea except in situations of existential crisis between major powers. Furthermore, Russia currently lacks the capacity and conditions to utilize North Korea as a bridgehead for power projection. The US strategic focus is on China rather than Russia. Considering these contexts, the assertion that Russia is highly likely to provide advanced weapons to North Korea based solely on North Korea's military support to Russia lacks sufficient grounds.

However, given that North Korea has concluded an "alliance" with Russia and continues to provide military support, the possibility of corresponding support remains. Depending on changes in the security environment and Russia's judgment, the level of support could also change. The possibility of Russia using North Korea as leverage against South Korea, proportional to the deterioration of South Korea-Russia relations, cannot be ruled out. Moreover, the importance of North Korea's military support to Russia could vary depending on the progress of the war. However, even considering all these factors, fundamentally, North Korea's support in terms of ammunition, shells, and personnel does not equate to advanced weapons such as submarines, satellites, or stealth fighters, and neither the current progress of the Russia-Ukraine war nor North Korea's support to Russia can be considered Russia's "vital interest."

In fact, Russia has sold strategic submarines and other assets to other countries very rarely, and even then, only to geographically distant nations like India. The provision method was also through leases spanning several years. In the case of diesel submarines sold to China, core noise reduction technology was excluded. The agreement between China and Russia regarding the sale of the S-400 air defense system in 2014 was due to the changed security environment caused by the Crimean crisis, as well as Russia's plan to transition to the next-generation S-500 air defense system in 2012 (Mezey 2024). North Korea may be more interested in advanced weapon systems that align with its asymmetric strategy, but it is unlikely that Russia, essentially a European power, would provide nuclear weapons or advanced missile technology to North Korea without a background involving the "vital interests" of major powers. There is a possibility of providing weapons systems one or two generations old, such as the S-300 air defense system and fourth-generation fighter jets. However, even these are unlikely to be of significant meaning to South Korea in the short term, as building conventional forces with such weapon systems requires specialized expertise and enormous budgets from North Korea's perspective.

Increased economic cooperation is also possible, but it is difficult to expect significant synergy between the two countries. It is uncertain whether North Korea's main exports, such as minerals and fishery products, will create competitive demand within Russia. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Russia will prioritize unilateral aid to North Korea over trade relations. Russia's interest is likely to be greater in the labor force and ammunition-focused military supplies that North Korea can provide. However, once the Russia-Ukraine war ends, demand for military supplies is likely to decrease sharply. Ultimately, the North Korea-Russia relationship is strengthened not by specific synergies but by the shared dimension of asymmetry in relations with China and the strategic framework of preparing for potential changes in the global order in an uncertain future.

V. Policy Implications

Countries worldwide, including North Korea, China, and Russia, are continuously striving to maximize their national interests within the geopolitical dynamics centered on strategic competition among major powers. Currently, our own strategies also necessitate a deeper analysis of the tendency for major powers to instrumentalize the Korean Peninsula and to reflect this in policy. To prepare for an uncertain future, we need an approach that establishes strategic autonomy by proactively creating the most favorable environment based on flexible thinking and by strengthening logic and leverage that can impose inefficiencies and side effects on them if they cause harm to us.

When formulating strategies, it is crucial to first understand that the risk of the Korean Peninsula being instrumentalized in the context of major power international politics has increased more than any other factor. This means recognizing that even the North Korean nuclear issue can be instrumentalized and "strategically" utilized by major powers. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the front line currently forming between the US and China is geopolitically different from the front line formed between the US and the Soviet Union in the past. Policy formulation based on these two elements is urgently needed. Primarily, in order to prepare for an uncertain future and strengthen our external leverage, it is necessary to restore a state of soft balance through communication (re-communication) with all neighboring countries.

References

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■ Jeon Jae-woo _Senior Researcher, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ Contact and Editing:Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr