[Global NK Russia-China-North Korea Triangle Series] Prospects for Russia-China-North Korea Trilateral Cooperation under the Trump Administration and Responses

I. Trump's Return and the Variability of Russia-China-North Korea Alignment

It remains uncertain how the foreign policy of the Trump administration will affect the Russia-China-North Korea alignment. The changes in US-Russia, US-China, and US-North Korea relations during a potential Trump term will influence the level of Russia-China-North Korea alignment, as the bilateral relationships among these three are currently highly variable.

If Trump, as he emphasized during his campaign, leads to an early end to the war in Ukraine and improves US-Russia relations to some extent, Russia's reliance on North Korean military support will inevitably decrease, slowing down the pace of close Russia-North Korea ties that have been a driving force for Russia-China-North Korea alignment, and significantly reducing the possibility of such alignment. Furthermore, if the Trump administration, as some argue, seeks to isolate Russia from China by intensifying pressure on China, this trend could accelerate.

Additionally, if US-North Korea relations enter a negotiation phase similar to Trump's first term, North Korea may refrain from rapidly deepening its ties with Russia, potentially reducing the influence of China and Russia over North Korea, and cooling the atmosphere for Russia-China-North Korea alignment.

Conversely, if US-China tensions escalate due to intensified pressure on China under the Trump administration, as expected, China's stance on closer Russia-North Korea ties and Russia-China-North Korea alignment could change. The fundamental reason China has shown a somewhat passive stance on Russia-China-North Korea alignment is that it sought to avoid entanglement with rogue states like Russia and North Korea by violating international sanctions, while needing to negotiate key agendas with the US, such as trade issues. However, if US-China relations deteriorate significantly under the Trump administration, China may increasingly utilize North Korea and Russia as leverage against the US, potentially activating Russia-China-North Korea alignment, even at an informal level.

This paper aims to diagnose the current nature of Russia-China-North Korea relations, predict changes in these relations under the Trump administration's foreign policy based on the variability of US-Russia, US-China, and US-North Korea relations, and propose our response strategies accordingly.

II. The Current Incomplete Russia-China-North Korea Triangle

The Russia-China-North Korea alignment rapidly progressed after Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's visit to Pyongyang in August of last year, when Russia began to overtly seek military support from North Korea amidst the protracted war of attrition in Ukraine. It gained prominence as Russia raised the necessity of this alignment with China and North Korea, culminating in the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the DPRK and Russia" on June 19th of this year, reaching the level of a military alliance. The current Russia-China-North Korea relationship is being led by Russia, driven by closer Russia-North Korea ties, rather than by agreement among the three nations. North Korea is motivated to reduce its dependence on China through its relationship with Russia, while China is uncomfortable with Russia sharing influence over North Korea, which was within China's sphere of influence. Therefore, the key variables affecting the solidity and sustainability of the Russia-China-North Korea alignment are the sustainability of Russia-North Korea relations and China's stance on Russia-North Korea and Russia-China-North Korea alignment.

Regarding the nature of the Russia-China-North Korea alignment, there are two main arguments: one posits that although the triangle is not yet institutionalized, a virtuous cycle mechanism is being formed through the activation of bilateral relations within a closed triangle, giving the impression of institutionalized trilateral cooperation; the other argues that structural flaws exist in each bilateral relationship, preventing a virtuous cycle and resulting in an unstable cohabitation model of the three parties.

If Russia-North Korea relations become very close, China will inevitably strengthen its relations with North Korea and Russia to avoid an unfavorable position. This process may also influence Russia-North Korea relations, leading to a period where a virtuous cycle mechanism appears to be in play. However, due to the structural flaws in each bilateral relationship, it will be difficult to achieve a solid level of institutionalization that allows for micro-level policy coordination among the three countries on key issues.

Firstly, regarding Russia-North Korea relations, it is difficult to align their demands and expectations. North Korea's demands for advanced military technology, recognition of its status as a nuclear-weapon state, and the nullification of sanctions against Russia place a significant burden on Russia as a UN Security Council member. It is difficult for Russia, a pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, to condone the de facto collapse of the NPT regime, and it would be too burdensome to nullify UN sanctions to which it is a party as a Security Council member. The Russia-China relationship also shows vulnerabilities, at least in the security domain. Although they signed a military alliance treaty in 1961, the specific provisions have not been disclosed since the treaty's renewal in 2021, and more importantly, there have been no joint military exercises since 1961, indicating a lack of practical military cooperation.

The war in Ukraine has revealed the political and economic limitations of Sino-Russian cooperation. China has not provided military support to Russia, and some Chinese companies have hesitated to cooperate with Russia due to the risk of losing access to Western technology. Post-war, China's exports of manufactured goods to Russia have increased, while Russia's resource-centric exports to China have grown, exacerbating the asymmetry in their economic cooperation. Russia is also strengthening strategic cooperation with India and Vietnam, countries that share border disputes with China, to reduce its dependence on China. Through its visit to Vietnam (June 19th), it signed an agreement for joint oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea, causing unease for China. Furthermore, through Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Moscow (July 16th), President Putin approved a draft logistics agreement to promote joint military exercises, training, and mutual access to military facilities.

Although Russia, China, and North Korea all view the United States as a threat and could form an anti-US alliance, structural flaws in their bilateral relationships and China's lukewarm stance make it difficult to reach an institutionalized level. Therefore, the current Russia-China-North Korea triangle appears to be closer to a temporary and weakly cohesive strategic coalition rather than an alignment. Due to the structural flaws in bilateral relations, micro-level strategic coordination among the three countries will also be difficult, thus its solidity will be weak. While some issues may be resolvable through bilateral Russia-North Korea relations alone, adjustments in the three countries' positions are difficult due to differences in China's views.

III. Trump Administration's Russia Policy and Prospects for US-Russia Relations

Trump has repeatedly stated during his campaign that he would resolve the war in Ukraine within 24 hours, and he attempted to improve US-Russia relations during his first term. Therefore, there is a possibility of improved US-Russia relations compared to the Biden administration. Of course, the content and timing of the war's end in Ukraine will determine the direction of US-Russia relations in Trump's second term. Peace negotiations for the war in Ukraine currently seem likely to begin with the establishment of a demilitarized zone based on the current front lines, and as a condition for delaying Ukraine's NATO membership for at least 20 years, offering additional security guarantees to Ukraine. Key figures in foreign policy and national security, such as Vice President-elect J.D. Vance, incoming Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and National Security Advisor-designate Mike Waltz, also support Trump's approach to negotiating the war in Ukraine.[1] Given that both the House and Senate are controlled by Republicans, a negotiated settlement appears possible.

However, a peace agreement for the war in Ukraine will not be easy. Even if Ukraine accepts territorial losses and a delay in NATO membership, issues such as the cost of Ukraine's reconstruction, the withdrawal of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) indictment against Putin, and solutions for easing over 20,000 sanctions against Russia are complex and time-consuming. Furthermore, there may be resistance within the US Congress and relevant agencies to concessions to Russia, as well as resistance from the European Union (EU), which advocates for maintaining sanctions against Russia and ensuring Ukraine's security. Even if a temporary ceasefire is established, maintaining the 1,300 km demilitarized zone will be difficult, and the low level of trust among the parties involved in maintaining it means the possibility of renewed conflict remains high.

During Trump's first term, despite his pre-inauguration remarks, the US maintained a tough stance on Russia. In 2018, Trump established legal mechanisms through Executive Order 13849 to apply the "Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)," enacted during the Obama administration. He expelled 60 Russian diplomats from the US and ordered the closure of the Russian consulate in Seattle. To impact the Russian economy, he supported the "Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act (PEESA)" in 2019. He also authorized the provision of lethal aid to Ukraine for the first time, approving the supply of 47 million dollars worth of FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles and 210 launchers.

It appears unlikely that US-Russia relations will significantly improve in Trump's second term. US foreign policy tends to be determined by structural factors rather than the president[2] and there is little bipartisan disagreement on Russia. Moreover, the public shows less interest in foreign policy compared to domestic policy. Given that resolving the war in Ukraine is likely to take considerable time and that abruptly easing sanctions against Russia is technically difficult[3], this is even more the case.

There is a possibility that the Trump administration will attempt to drive a wedge between Russia and China to intensify pressure on China. [4] This logic was also proposed during Trump's first term under the name 'Reverse Nixon.' While not an impossible argument, the long-term US strategy is to contain both Russia and China, and given Russia's increasing economic dependence on China, the likelihood appears low. [5]

While improved US-Russia relations mediated by the end of the war in Ukraine could lead to a relaxation of close Russia-North Korea ties, without a breakthrough in US-North Korea relations, close Russia-North Korea ties are likely to persist, and the trend of long-term Russia-China-North Korea alignment will not significantly decline.

IV. Trump's Intensified Pressure on China and Russia-China-North Korea Alignment

China appears to hold a somewhat passive or negative stance towards Russia-China-North Korea trilateral cooperation. The reasons are: first, China's participation in the triangle contradicts its criticism of US alliances and Cold War mentality; second, the formation of the triangle could accelerate security cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan, and intensify pressure on China in the region; third, the triangle could worsen US-China relations, for which the Biden administration is seeking solutions; fourth, a triangle with rogue states could damage China's international standing and constrain its international cooperation; and fifth, China could face economic pressure due to international sanctions. Furthermore, China supports denuclearization within achievable strategic goals for maintaining strategic balance in Northeast Asia, which could lead to widening differences in views on the North Korean nuclear issue between Russia and China, posing another burden.

Nevertheless, China maintains a wait-and-see attitude towards the closer Russia-North Korea ties, a key factor in the possibility of Russia-China-North Korea alignment. Firstly, it appears highly likely that there is prior consultation between Russia and China regarding closer Russia-North Korea ties. Serious issues such as the deployment of North Korean troops could not occur without China's consent, and summit meetings between Putin and Xi Jinping have been proceeding normally, such as at the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 22nd. Military cooperation between Russia and North Korea has the effect of reducing China's burden in its relations with Russia. For China, which cannot provide military support to Russia in the war in Ukraine, it offers a way to provide support to Russia while avoiding hostility from the US and Europe. Furthermore, increased threats from North Korea towards South Korea compel South Korea to seek diplomatic support from China, which has significant influence over North Korea, thereby strengthening China's leverage over South Korea. This applies similarly to Japan. It also reduces China's international burden in maintaining relations with North Korea by shifting responsibility for sanctions violations to Russia.

Therefore, although China maintains a passive stance on Russia-China-North Korea alignment because the burdens currently outweigh the benefits, it is highly likely that in the long term, as both Russia and North Korea are important strategic assets for China in its competition with the US, China will adopt a wait-and-see approach towards closer Russia-North Korea ties as long as they remain within a controllable level, while adjusting the intensity through economic means such as improving relations with South Korea or complying with Western sanctions. Recent instances, such as Russian regional banks refusing Ruble payments or North Korean athletes active in China being sent back to North Korea under the pretext of sanctions compliance, may be related to China's efforts to control the situation.

Trump's return could potentially change China's stance. It seems clear that Trump will intensify pressure on China. During his campaign, Trump pledged to impose a 60% tariff on some Chinese imports and revoke Most Favored Nation status. However, it does not seem likely that the US-China conflict in Trump's second term will extend to security issues. Recalling Trump's first term, he prioritized economic issues over security issues and favored an independent US approach over a multilateral one.

If the Trump administration intensifies pressure on China, the strategic value of North Korea and Russia to China as key strategic assets in its competition with the US will increase. However, as the US-China conflict is likely to focus on economic and trade issues rather than security matters or Taiwan, the possibility of China strengthening Russia-China-North Korea alignment as a countermeasure against the US does not appear very high.

Furthermore, the trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan, which gained strong momentum under the Biden administration, may weaken. The Quad, revived by Trump himself in 2017, has become more of an economic consultative body than a security one, and it is likely to play a significant role in excluding China from global and regional supply chains, one of his key objectives. Trump's avoidance of multilateralism could actually weaken US pressure capabilities on China by undermining the alliance and partnership networks that expand US global and regional influence.

V. Trump's North Korea Policy and the Sustainability of Closer Russia-North Korea Ties

Even at the time of the signing of the 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the DPRK and Russia' on June 19th, which included provisions essentially defining a military alliance, there were many debates about the sustainability of closer Russia-North Korea ties. The prevailing opinion was that the driving force behind closer ties, namely North Korea's need for weapons due to Russia's struggles in the war in Ukraine, would significantly weaken after the war's conclusion. Another reason cited was the difficulty in sustaining the benefits of economic cooperation between the two countries. Both North Korea and Russia are under sanctions, and due to the lack of complementarity in their areas of cooperation (both are resource-rich countries), it is difficult to find new areas of cooperation. If China were to participate, a Russia-China-North Korea economic bloc could form centered around the Russian Far East, extending to Northeast China and North Korea, but this too would likely be dominated by low-level industries. This is because the prices of exports from North Korea and Russia to China are low. Furthermore, after the war in Ukraine ends, economic cooperation with South Korea will become crucial for economic recovery, making it difficult to ignore demands from South Korea to cease closer Russia-North Korea ties. The fact that Russia did not intervene militarily in the 2020 Karabakh war, despite requests from its ally Armenia, due to economic benefits with Azerbaijan and Turkey, was presented as a good example.

However, the argument that the 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the DPRK and Russia' has been officially ratified by the Russian parliament and Kim Jong Un, and that the relationship between the two countries is rapidly evolving into a de facto blood alliance with North Korean troops deployed in the war in Ukraine, is gaining traction. Russia is envisioning a new Eurasian security structure to counter the global security structure where NATO and IP4 are connected. It views North Korea as an essential element of this plan to disperse US deterrence between Europe and Asia and to establish its sphere of influence in the vulnerable Russian Far East. Moreover, the fact that North Korea has also sought closer ties with Russia cannot be overlooked. Facing internal crises that cannot be managed with domestic resources, North Korea, concerned about excessive economic dependence on China and perceiving China as relatively less considerate of North Korea's security, chose Russia, which it perceived as relatively free from such dependence, as a way to overcome its crisis.

The strategic alignment between these two countries, while influenced by the war in Ukraine, the level of US-China conflict, and US-North Korea relations, should be a cause for concern given that Russia-North Korea relations have evolved to the level of a blood alliance. A blood alliance relationship implies a high likelihood of military and military-technical cooperation exceeding expectations. Initially, it is highly probable that North Korea will receive assistance with its air defense systems and aircraft upgrades, followed by the creation of a defense industry production chain. Joint military exercises or the use of North Korean ports by the Russian navy may also occur. While the provision of nuclear enhancement technologies, such as ICBM readiness, is unlikely in the immediate future, if the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is not extended as scheduled in 2026 during the Trump administration, and if Russia evolves towards supporting nuclear multilateralism, it is not an impossibility. Russia has lowered the threshold for nuclear use by amending its 2020 executive order in November of this year to allow for nuclear responses not only to attacks with conventional weapons but also to threats against Russia or its allies by nuclear-armed states or states receiving their support, even if they themselves do not possess nuclear weapons (Kremlin 2020, 2024). Furthermore, the necessity of nuclear multilateralism is openly discussed among experts close to the president.[6] Nuclear multilateralism is the logic that while non-proliferation was useful in the past for reducing the risks of unauthorized use and nuclear terrorism, it currently creates an unfair situation for many non-Western countries, and thus nuclear proliferation can actually contribute to peace.

Currently, North Korean troops deployed in the Russia-Ukraine war are largely mercenaries, and there has been no official declaration of deployment. If the deployment of North Korean troops is formalized, although the possibility is not high, North Korea might raise the issue of immediate withdrawal linked to sanctions relief with the US during peace negotiations for Ukraine. The most concerning aspect is Russia recognizing North Korea's status as a nuclear-weapon state and proposing nuclear disarmament negotiations between the US and North Korea. Given Russia's position as a UN Security Council member and a key pillar of the NPT regime, the possibility of Russia recognizing North Korea's nuclear-weapon state status is currently low. However, the fact that Russia's attempts to nullify sanctions against North Korea are effectively creating an atmosphere of recognizing North Korea's nuclear-weapon state status is highly concerning.

In Trump's second term, there is a possibility of negotiations between Trump and Kim Jong Un, similar to his first term, which could opportunistically slow down the progress of North Korea's relations with Russia, as North Korea has used the advancement of US-North Korea relations for its own benefit. However, the most urgent issues for the Trump administration will be the war in Ukraine and the Middle East conflict, so the North Korean nuclear issue may be relegated to a lower priority. Furthermore, North Korea's nuclear capabilities have advanced since Trump's first term, making it difficult to meet negotiation conditions. The possibility of a small deal through direct dialogue between the US and North Korea is also a concern, but it would be difficult for South Korea and the international community to accept.

After the inauguration of the Trump administration, the pace of closer Russia-North Korea ties will be influenced by the situation and speed of resolving the war in Ukraine, as well as the timing and outcomes of US-North Korea contacts. If the US adopts an inclusive approach towards North Korea and Russia, China may indeed pursue the actual operationalization of Russia-China-North Korea trilateral cooperation. However, it will be difficult to find breakthroughs in US-Russia and US-North Korea relations during Trump's second term.

VI. Prospects for Russia-China-North Korea Cooperation in Trump's Second Term

While the fundamental nature of the Russia-China-North Korea triangle is unlikely to change drastically in Trump's second term, the trend of Russia-China-North Korea alignment may accelerate slightly. Fundamentally, if pressure on China intensifies under Trump's second term, the strategic value of Russia and North Korea to China as a counterweight against the US will increase. Several scenarios are possible for South Korea to formulate its response strategies.

First, Russia-North Korea relations have long-term strategic alignment, making it likely that close ties will continue even after the war in Ukraine ends. Therefore, even if dialogue occurs between the US and North Korea, it will be difficult to detach North Korea from Russia or China.

Second, while efforts may be made to improve US-Russia relations in Trump's second term, given the current state of Sino-Russian relations, it will be difficult to detach Russia from China.

Third, intensified pressure on China in Trump's second term will increase the strategic value of North Korea and Russia to China, but China will not formalize the Russia-China-North Korea alignment for negotiations with the US.

Fourth, even if the Russia-China-North Korea alignment is not formalized in Trump's second term, friendly relations between North Korea and China, North Korea and Russia, and China and Russia, based on a common anti-US stance, will continue, and informal Russia-China-North Korea alignment will function.

VII. The Trump Administration Must Be Made Aware of the Risks of Russia-China-North Korea Alignment

The greatest risk of Russia-China-North Korea alignment on a global scale is the possibility that three nuclear-armed states could mutualize their nuclear capabilities. The Trump administration must be made to understand that it is virtually impossible for the US to prevent Russia-China-North Korea alignment through improved relations with North Korea or Russia. It must also be made aware that closer Russia-North Korea ties will lead to the advancement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and the recognition of North Korea's status as a nuclear-weapon state, posing a global security threat, not just to the Korean Peninsula. The crucial point here is that South Korea must develop a concrete roadmap for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and lead proactive nuclear diplomacy based on it. We must prevent South Korea's position from being excluded or disregarded in the negotiations between the US and North Korea or Russia. Nuclear weapons must never be tolerated, and a justifiable logic for strengthened nuclear guarantees for South Korea must be clearly articulated.

Since Russia-China-North Korea alignment could be catastrophic for South Korean diplomacy, we must strengthen strategic management towards Russia and China to prevent them from becoming excessively close to North Korea. The ROK-US alliance is a strategic asset for the US to counter Russia-China-North Korea alignment, and it must be clearly communicated that South Korea has a role to play in preventing North Korea and Russia from becoming tools for China's containment of the US under the Trump administration.

VIII. Red Lines Must Be Set for Diplomacy with Russia

It should be assumed that Russia also values its relationship with South Korea. By maintaining good relations with both South Korea and North Korea, Russia can exert some influence over China and, economically, South Korea's technology and capital are highly necessary considering the post-Ukraine war international landscape. Therefore, South Korea must employ a mix of appropriate pressure and incentives in its relations with Russia, depending on the situation.

Firstly, South Korea needs to establish clear red lines in its relations with Russia. If Russia provides advanced military technology, including nuclear enhancement, to North Korea, the Russia-South Korea relationship will exceed manageable levels, and this must be made clear to Russia. If Russia crosses this red line, South Korea will have no choice but to consider measures such as providing lethal weapons to Ukraine and effectively severing diplomatic ties.

In the preceding stage, it would be necessary to employ a combination of diplomatic means and economic incentives, while refraining from direct arms support to Ukraine, which is a red line set by Russia. Diplomatic means could include criticizing Russia's status as a member of the UN Security Council and strengthening communication with China. Russia must be burdened with the cost of violating sanctions, as it prioritizes maintaining its UNSC membership. A diplomatic approach considering China's discomfort with a certain level of military closeness between Russia and North Korea would be necessary.

If the war in Ukraine enters a resolution phase, it would be necessary to consider measures to revitalize economic cooperation in non-sanctioned areas. It would be necessary to explore projects that could benefit South Korea in the development of the Russian Far East and Arctic shipping routes, which Russia will increasingly prioritize in the future. Joint investment plans with Russia could also be considered in Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, members of the Eurasian Economic Union, and Uzbekistan, an observer. Preparations would also be needed to preemptively fill the void left by Western companies departing from Russia.

Communication between think tanks of South Korea and Russia should be maintained. While conflict between the two countries is inevitable in the current situation, private-level communication can serve to prevent interstate conflict from escalating rapidly. 

References

Gavrisheva, Anna. 2024. “How does Trump really feel about Russia and what should Moscow expect from his presidency? (in Russian)” Gazeta.Ru. November 6. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/20036887.shtml.

Karaganov, Sergei A. 2024. “An Age of Wars? Article One.” Russia in Global Affairs. January 1.

Kashin, Vasily. 2024. “How Trump Can Do to Destroy the Russia-China Alliance (in Russian).” Russian Foreign Affairs Council. November 6. https://russiancouncil.ru/...razrusheniya-soyuza-rf-i-knr/.

Kremlin. 2020. “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence (in Russian).” Presidential Executive Order No.355. June 8.

______. 2024. “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence (in Russian).” Presidential Executive Order No.355. November 19.

Porter, Tom. 2024. “Trump said he will divide Russia from China. It’s a tough bromance to break.” Business Insider. November 7. https://www.businessinsider.com/...2024-11.

Timofeev, Ivan. 2024. “The Trump Factor (in Russian).” Russian Foreign Affairs Council. August 16. https://russiancouncil.ru/...faktor-trampa/.

[1] In a recent interview, Senator-designate Marco Rubio stated, "The conflict must be resolved through negotiations," and added, "Kyiv cannot expect the return of all territories occupied by Russia." He also voted against a bill for an additional $95 billion in security assistance to Ukraine in April. National Security Advisor-designate Mike Waltz, who initially urged significant arms provision to Ukraine, has recently shifted his stance, emphasizing the need for Ukraine to end the war. He criticizes Biden's indefinite military aid to Ukraine and argues that pressure should be applied to Russia to cease hostilities. Vice President-elect J.D. Vance supports Trump's position by stating, "We must protect our borders, not Ukraine's borders." Elise Stefanik, nominee for U.S. Ambassador to the UN, also supports Trump's stance, aligning with Republican skepticism regarding U.S. support for Ukraine.

[2] Political scientist and member of the Izborsk Club, Yuri Samonkin, pointed out that it does not matter who becomes president for Russia, as U.S. foreign policy remains aggressive (Gavrisheva 2024). Ivan Timofeev, Secretary General of the Russian International Affairs Council, also noted that while there are expectations within Russia for potential deals or a constructive relationship with Trump, President Trump will not significantly impact U.S.-Russia relations. He emphasized that U.S. foreign and security policy is determined by structural factors rather than the president (Timofeev 2024).

[3]1) Trump's first term saw intensified sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. 2) Given the limited linkage between sanctions against Russia and the U.S. economy, Trump may consider sanctions as a cost-effective tool. 3) The U.S. legislative environment makes it difficult for the president to unilaterally ease sanctions. For example, the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), enacted in 2017, places specific restrictions on the president's ability to lift sanctions against Russia.

[4]Trump has stated he will seek to drive a wedge between Russia and China to increase pressure on China (Porter 2024).

[5]Vasily Kashin, a professor at the Higher School of Economics (2024), argues that while it is not impossible for Trump to normalize relations with Russia to increase pressure on China, as Russia is not asserting global leadership, it is unlikely due to the U.S. domestic situation and the U.S. strategy of dual containment of Russia and China.

[6]Sergei Karaganov, considered Putin's foreign policy advisor and a prominent scholar at the Higher School of Economics, argues that North Korea would have already collapsed if it did not possess nuclear weapons (Karaganov 2024).

■ Eom Gu-ho, Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University.

■ Manager and Editor:Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

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