[Global NK Russia-North Korea-China Triangle Series] The New Cold War and the Russia-North Korea-China Triangle: North Korea’s Strategy and Its Implications

I. Why North Korea’s National Strategy?

This study attempts to analyze the recently prominent ‘Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship’ by focusing on North Korea’s strategy and intentions. Of course, such an attempt can find basic significance in the aspect that North Korea is fundamentally an actor constituting this triangular relationship. However, the importance of North Korea’s strategy and intentions in the Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship carries implications beyond that. Although most related studies, including this one, utilize the term ‘triangular relationship,’ the specific interest lies in the functioning of the ‘trilateral alliance.’ This is because, despite the global issue of the Ukraine war, the core medium and arena for this alliance is precisely ‘North Korea’ and ‘the Korean Peninsula.’

Particularly noteworthy is that North Korea’s national strategy, as a key variable driving the current Russia-North Korea-China trilateral alliance, is the result of a recent, drastic ‘transition.’ This is because the content and intensity of that transition are intertwined with North Korea’s assessment and outlook on the structural, long-term changes at the global level that form the basis of the Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship. Based on this premise, the following will proceed with an analysis of the Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship, focusing on the changes in North Korea’s national strategy.

II. Transition to a ‘Balancing Strategy’ After the Korean Peninsula Peace Process[1]

National strategy can be defined as “a regime’s vision for how to most rationally pursue national interests within the constraints of the international environment and its own capabilities,” that is, a nation’s ‘grand strategy’ encompassing politics, diplomacy, economy, and military affairs. If so, how can North Korea’s national strategy be typified?

It is difficult to deny that North Korea has faced a severe security crisis since the end of the Cold War. In other words, the importance of regime survival in North Korea’s national strategy has been higher than in any other country, and in practice, North Korea’s national strategy has strongly characterized itself as a security strategy since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, it is also important that the choice of strategy was not merely a matter of security strategy but was inevitably linked to the issue of reform and opening up in North Korea, which remained isolated under the Cold War order. From this perspective, typifying national strategies using the concept of security strategy allows for the following distinctions.

The first is ‘balancing strategy.’ This is a strategy that offsets threats through power, in other words, a strategy that pursues ‘structural peace’ based on physical strength by confronting threats. This balancing strategy can be further divided into an ‘internal balancing’ strategy, which enhances one’s own strength through military buildup, and an ‘external balancing’ strategy, which mobilizes external strength through alliances.

The next is ‘bandwagoning strategy.’ This is a method that aims for ‘relational peace’ by mitigating threats through appeasement rather than confronting them. This can be further divided into ‘typical bandwagoning,’ which appears in the form of unilateral submission and concession by the weaker party due to a power disadvantage, and ‘conflictual bandwagoning,’ which mitigates power asymmetry by utilizing other leverage or bargaining chips.

While various interpretations are possible regarding North Korea’s true intentions, it is well-known that North Korea’s ‘official’ line during the post-Cold War era was a bandwagoning strategy that sought to complete the post-Cold War transition on the Korean Peninsula by resolving the asymmetry of the post-Cold War era through mutual recognition. The Geneva Agreed Framework, the U.S.-North Korea Joint Communiqué, and the September 19 Joint Statement, which are fundamentally structured around the exchange of denuclearization for security guarantees and improved relations, clearly demonstrate this.

However, signs of deviation from this bandwagoning strategy began to appear from 2009, when the succession to Kim Jong-un began to take effect. The Six-Party Talks and their agreements became defunct, and the position was that security would be pursued through a balance of power, specifically nuclear armament, rather than improved relations with the United States. Consequently, this balancing strategy accelerated with the launch of the Kim Jong-un regime. The emergence of the ‘global denuclearization’ theory, which departed from the ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula theory’—the fundamental premise of the bandwagoning strategy and the core logic of North Korea’s national strategy during the post-Cold War era—was a significant indication.[2]

The ‘Byungjin Line’ (parallel development of economy and nuclear weapons) presented at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in March 2013 perfectly illustrated the formula of the balancing strategy. Kim Jong-un’s declaration at the conference, stating that “the Byungjin Line is not a temporary measure to cope with the rapidly changing situation, but a strategic line that must be held onto permanently for the supreme interests of our revolution,” and that “we will permanently solidify our self-defensive nuclear possession in defiance of the reckless nuclear threats and invasion tactics of the imperialists and their followers,” is a prime example. The fundamental logic of the Byungjin Line, which formalized, intensified, and permanentized nuclear development, continued to be strengthened thereafter, being re-emphasized at the 7th Party Congress in 2016 and even codified in the Party Charter. The period from 2013 to 2017, when the Byungjin Line was in effect, was literally a period when the balancing strategy was fully implemented.

It is precisely in this context that the declaration to end the Byungjin Line at the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in April 2018, and the subsequent announcement to focus on economic construction based on the exchange of improved relations, peace regime establishment, and denuclearization, signified a return to the bandwagoning strategy. Particularly, the fact that the decision to formalize the ‘new strategic line’ came exactly one week before the inter-Korean summit and at a time when successive U.S.-North Korea summits were scheduled, drew significant attention to the wording of the plenary meeting’s decision: “to create a favorable international environment for socialist economic construction and to defend peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the world.” This was because, although the level of emphasis may differ, it bore a strong resemblance to China’s reform and opening-up policy, which attempted a transition to a bandwagoning strategy by linking the stable and peaceful external environment created by the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978 and the normalization of U.S.-China relations in 1979 with a shift in resource allocation strategy prioritizing heavy and defense industries, and a series of opening measures.

However, as everyone knows, this attempt ended in dramatic failure. As evidenced by North Korea’s journey to Hanoi by train, which attracted global attention as a grand ‘ceremony’ lasting over 60 hours, North Korea did not seem to anticipate such a failure at all. North Korea’s confession that the collapse of the summit, which occurred “in a situation where a draft of a ‘Hanoi Declaration’ that would surprise the world was already prepared and only the signatures of the two leaders were needed,” was “so unexpected” clearly shows their bewilderment.

The deliberation following the Hanoi no-deal regarding the continuation of the ‘new strategic line,’ which signified a shift to a bandwagoning strategy, began to reveal its content nearly three full years later, in March 2022. It was the abandonment of the bandwagoning strategy, i.e., the new strategic line, which prioritized economic construction based on the exchange of denuclearization and peace, and a return to the balancing strategy based on nuclear armament and self-reliance.

The commencement of action was, naturally, the dismantling of the reciprocal moratorium that was a prerequisite for the 2018 peace process. Given that the South Korea-U.S. military exercises had resumed after the Hanoi no-deal in 2019, the moratorium was merely a unilateral measure based on North Korea’s ‘goodwill.’ The test launch of the new intercontinental ballistic missile ‘Hwasong-17’ in March 2022 was symbolic of this. Ultimately, after prolonged deliberation, North Korea publicly announced its final choice on September 8, 2022, in a speech at the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly and in the “Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Nuclear Weapons Policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea” enacted on the same day. It clearly indicated a return to the Byungjin Line, which pursues structural peace based on self-reliance, rather than continuing the new strategic line that aims for relational peace based on mutual goodwill.

In summary, as of 2022, North Korea has formalized a balancing strategy that pursues ‘a strong nation through self-reliance under sanctions’ by combining the ‘logic of an arms race centered on nuclear forces’ with a ‘realist perspective focused on capabilities and national variables.’ The appearance of Kim Jong-un’s daughter, Kim Ju-ae, at the Hwasong-17 launch in November 2022 was symbolic of this strategic shift. Kim Jong-un’s pledge during the 2018 peace process, “we cannot let future generations live carrying nuclear weapons,” has now been replaced by the assertion that “nuclear weapons are the strongest guarantee for the survival and prosperity of future generations.” The paradoxical logic of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which involved nuclear armament for denuclearization, can no longer be found in North Korea.

III. Evolution into an ‘Expanded Internal Balancing Strategy’ and the Russia-North Korea-China Triangle

As mentioned earlier, the transition from a bandwagoning strategy back to a balancing strategy, formalized in 2022, was carried out very cautiously, passing through a transitional period of nearly three years. The first background for this prolonged deliberation was, naturally, the weight of the issue of national grand strategy itself, and the fact that it was impossible to avoid assuming the failure of a dramatic experiment directly led by the supreme leader, the pinnacle of infallible, monolithic leadership. However, beyond these intrinsic and political issues, more technical and direct causes also appear to have been reasons for the prolonged deliberation. These relate to ‘consideration of alternatives’ and ‘the feasibility of a new strategy.’

First, consideration of alternatives. The alternative to transitioning to a balancing strategy is, naturally, the continued pursuit of a bandwagoning strategy. Despite the Hanoi no-deal, which was an unexpected ‘accident,’ North Korea continued to ‘test’ the bandwagoning strategy for a considerable period, even after the change of administration from Trump to Biden. This was the reason why North Korea continued to leave room for negotiation and maintained a conditional nuclear armament theory—‘until the U.S. withdraws its hostile policy and establishes a peace regime’—even though the promise to suspend South Korea-U.S. military exercises in the second half of the year, a significant achievement of the Panmunjom meeting in June 2019, was not kept, and the ‘new calculation’ anticipated in the working-level talks in Stockholm did not materialize.

However, the Biden administration’s pledge to pursue a pragmatic and diplomatic approach that would not rule out a partial denuclearization in exchange for partial sanctions relief, based on the Singapore U.S.-North Korea agreement, was ultimately not kept. This is why the assessment emerged that the so-called “calibrated practical approach” was, in effect, no different from the Obama administration’s strategic patience. Ultimately, North Korea’s final assessment of the feasibility of the bandwagoning strategy also concluded negatively.

Second, the feasibility of a new strategy. The test of this feasibility was conducted in relation to nuclear capabilities and self-reliance capabilities, which are the core pillars determining the feasibility of the balancing strategy. First, regarding nuclear capabilities. In order to achieve its own security against the direct threat from the United States, the world’s strongest military power, the only weapon North Korea possesses is nuclear weapons. Therefore, the first element of the feasibility of the balancing strategy was whether it could deter attacks from the United States through nuclear weapons. Consequently, from immediately after the Hanoi no-deal, North Korea accelerated the development of various weapon systems focused on tactical nuclear capabilities targeting South Korea. This was a way to strengthen deterrence without crossing the redlines of test launches of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, thereby dismantling the moratorium that fundamentally undermined the bandwagoning strategy. It is known that North Korea has achieved considerable success in these efforts.

Next is self-reliance capability. Survival is the fundamental premise of national strategy, and naturally, basic welfare must be addressed in addition to strengthening military power. In particular, for North Korea’s balancing strategy to succeed under thorough isolation and blockade, represented by sanctions, regime resilience is essential. In this context, the border closure that has continued since early 2020, citing COVID-19 prevention, can be compared to North Korea “applying to itself stricter sanctions than any that the arch-hawk John Bolton could have ever hoped for.” The fact that North Korea did not collapse within a year or more under these blockade conditions, dispelling some ‘wishful thinking,’ also gave North Korea considerable confidence (Cha 2021a, 2021b).

In other words, the reassessment of North Korea’s national strategy, which began to surface with the dismantling of the moratorium through the Hwasong-17 launch in March 2022, is not based on North Korea’s inherent unpredictability or impulsiveness, but rather is close to a conclusion reached by the leadership after a very long period of testing and careful, meticulous evaluation. Furthermore, institutionalization through policies such as the Nuclear Forces Policy Law served as mechanisms to formalize and solidify this conclusion.

However, this ‘long transition,’ based on deliberations of three years at the shortest, since the Hanoi no-deal, or four years, since the 2018 peace process, encountered a new situation almost simultaneously with the formalization and full implementation of the transition. This was the structural repercussions caused by the Ukraine war, or more precisely, the ‘protraction’ of the Ukraine war. The core of this was the strengthening of the new Cold War structure and the rise of multipolarization discourse as a response from challenging nations.

North Korea appears to have closely tracked and analyzed these trends and the opportunities they presented. While it is true that concepts of the new Cold War and multipolarization have appeared in North Korea’s official documents much earlier, a clear change in the content and tone of related assessments began to be observed, particularly from the latter half of 2022.

Let us first examine the case of the new Cold War. North Korea has mentioned this term since the 2010s, when it began to gain traction in international politics. However, its application has been limited to criticizing policies, rather than as a reality or structure. In other words, it was used as a warning that certain policies could lead to a new Cold War, urging their cessation. Furthermore, even Kim Jong-un’s policy address in September 2021, in line with previous discourse, emphasized blaming the United States as the cause of the new Cold War and rationalizing North Korea’s nuclear development, or balancing strategy, as a response. However, from the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in December 2022, the new Cold War began to be treated not as a policy or a future prospect, but as a structure and a present reality. In other words, the new Cold War has now become an international political reality that North Korea must respond to and leverage.

Next, multipolarization was also re-evaluated around the same time. Multipolarization has been mentioned in North Korea since the late 1990s as a normative aspiration in the context of criticizing U.S. hegemony, and since the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, it has been described as a competitive trend. However, from Kim Jong-un’s policy address in September 2022, the term ‘multipolar world’ was introduced, solidifying it as an alternative trend and a near-future reality.

Consequently, this re-evaluation of the international political structure began to influence the nature of the balancing strategy. As examined earlier, the original balancing strategy was based on the dichotomy of ‘self-reliance, not dependence’ and ‘security, not economy,’ with the core being the internal balancing strategy based on self-reliance and security paramountcy. However, the reality of the ‘protraction’ of the Ukraine war, which no one anticipated, and the rise of the new Cold War structure and multipolarization discourse through it, have strengthened anti-U.S. and anti-hegemony fronts worldwide. This, in turn, has opened up opportunities for North Korea to more actively utilize external balancing.

Ultimately, the ‘internal balancing strategy’ formalized in 2022 evolved through 2023 into an ‘expanded internal balancing strategy’ that maintains the priority of internal balancing while actively utilizing external balancing through international solidarity and alliances. The core of this was, of course, to continue developing the already strengthened North Korea-China alliance and to create a virtuous cycle of the Russia-North Korea-China triangular alliance by dramatically strengthening relations with Russia. In that sense, the scene at the 70th anniversary Victory Day military parade on July 27, 2023, where Kim Jong-un reviewed the latest ICBMs—the primary targets of sanctions—with representatives of Russia and China, permanent members of the UN Security Council, on either side, was symbolic of the ‘expanded internal balancing strategy.’

Of course, North Korea had already made special efforts to strengthen relations with China and Russia since the beginning of the Korean Peninsula peace process in 2018. The five summit meetings with China within approximately one year, including Kim Jong-un’s visit to China in March 2018 immediately after the decision on a series of summits with South Korea and the United States, and the summit with Russia in April 2019, the first since Kim Jong-un took power, clearly demonstrate these efforts. However, at the time, the significance of these efforts was closer to a hedging strategy against failure rather than a part of the balancing strategy. This was not only because North Korea had the grand strategy of bandwagoning and the principle of self-reliance. It was also because it was difficult to trust China, which had passed a series of UN sanctions, evaluated as the strongest in UN history, just a few months prior, and had even advocated for the dissolution of alliances and the severance of oil pipelines, and Russia, which was cautiously observing the U.S.’s escalating criticism of China.

In other words, North Korea fully understood that China’s and Russia’s approaches to North Korea were not driven by trust or the dynamics of their bilateral relations, but were largely characterized by a response to the U.S.’s offensive strategy and a ‘fear of reversed abandonment’—a measure to prepare for the weakening of influence due to the rapid advancement of U.S.-North Korea relations. Despite the superficial trend of strengthening Russia-North Korea-China solidarity, the declaration of ‘frontal breakthrough’ at the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, which comprehensively assessed and responded to the situation after the Hanoi no-deal in December 2019, was replete with terms of self-reliance such as ‘self-strengthening,’ ‘self-prosperity,’ and ‘self-reliance.’ This clearly reflects North Korea’s assessment. This is why Kim Jong-un stated in his report that “while it is true that a favorable external environment for economic construction is urgently needed, we can never sell the dignity we have protected like our lives for the sake of a brilliant transformation,” and emphasized that all efforts must be concentrated on “taking for granted that we must live under sanctions from hostile forces and further strengthening internal capabilities in all aspects.”

However, with the rise of the ‘expanded internal balancing strategy’ examined earlier, this discourse began to undergo a significant change. While the principles of foreign strategy presented in Kim Jong-un’s policy address in September 2022 reiterated the traditional phrases emphasizing cooperation with “all countries that oppose and reject imperialist aggression and interference, domination and subjugation, and pursue self-reliance and justice,” exactly one year later, in the September 2023 policy address, the emphasis was placed on the logic of the multipolarization strategy advocated by China and Russia, specifically stating the need to “further strengthen solidarity with countries that defy the hegemonic strategy of the United States and the West,” and specifying the targets.

From this perspective, North Korea’s consistent, firm, and special support for Russia following the Ukraine war, and its active approach towards Russia based on this, are judged to be based on this strategic shift. Kim Jong-un’s declaration at the expanded meeting of the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in December 2023, presenting the so-called ‘theory of two hostile states’ and permanently abandoning inter-Korean relations improvement and unification—the last asset of the bandwagoning strategy—and advocating for the need to proactively and strategically respond to the changing international situation and write a diplomatic history befitting a strong nation, should be understood in the same context.

IV. The Future of the Russia-North Korea-China Triangle and the Trump Era

The Russia-North Korea-China triangular alliance has been continuously strengthened by the convergence of North Korea’s strategic shift, as examined so far, with the needs of China, which has faced strong containment strategies from the U.S., and Russia, which has literally stood at the forefront of the anti-U.S. front through the Ukraine war. Furthermore, the signing of the <Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership> between Russia and North Korea in June 2024 and the subsequent dispatch of North Korean troops to Russia have rapidly strengthened Russia-North Korea relations, drawing unprecedented global attention due to their ripple effects. So, what will be the future of the Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship in the face of the new issue of Trump’s return?

Considering that all alliances, despite various descriptions of historical specificity and common identity, fundamentally operate within the politics of national interest and the calculations of power politics between states, the future of the Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship is likely to be determined by two main points: the ‘structure of interests’ and the ‘structure of power’ among the three countries.

First, the ‘structure of interests.’ Let us first examine North Korea’s structure of interests. What does North Korea seek to gain through the Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship? The primary answer to this question is already provided in the analysis of North Korea’s national strategy discussed earlier. The core of North Korea’s national strategy is the securing of security, and North Korea’s clear answer to ‘how’ after prolonged deliberation is ‘internal balancing,’ meaning nuclear armament is the only alternative. Therefore, what North Korea seeks to gain through the strengthening of the Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship is likely related to this.

First, it is to buy time by gaining tacit support for its nuclear development or easing international pressure. Second, it is to shorten the time by securing more substantial support, as seen in military cooperation with Russia. Of course, in this process, North Korea will actively pursue aid and cooperation to resolve economic issues by circumventing sanctions and achieve the ultimate goal of ‘building a civilized nation through the comprehensive development of socialism.’ Furthermore, there is a considerable possibility that these efforts will develop into what some call a ‘limited Northern Economic Zone.’ However, these economic goals will not take precedence over security issues. This is because it is the core of the ‘expanded internal balancing strategy’ that combines external cooperation while maintaining the centrality of self-reliance and internal balancing.

The problem is that this structure of North Korea’s interests has the potential to conflict with the structures of China’s and Russia’s interests. In particular, compared to Russia, which has clearly defined the existing Western order as “imperialist” and “colonialist” and expressed a stance of negation and differentiation, as seen in the ‘Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’ released in 2023, China, which still asserts itself as a force maintaining the international order and emphasizes its role as a responsible major power, faces significant burdens from the negation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Geopolitically, China, as a regional power, bears a much greater burden than Russia, which is Europe-centric, regarding the possibility of North Korea’s nuclear armament leading to the sequential nuclear armament of South Korea, Japan, and others. Furthermore, the deepening security instability on the Korean Peninsula during the process of nuclear armament is also unfavorable to China. This is one of the reasons for China’s gradual approach to North Korea, which has led to speculation about ‘abnormal signs,’ along with checks on Russia-North Korea rapprochement. In other words, while the three countries share a common structure of interests within the broad framework of an anti-U.S. front, there are clear differences in speed and issues.

Second, the ‘structure of power.’ The most interesting point concerning this issue is, naturally, the ‘power asymmetry.’ This is because the North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relationships take the form of a typical ‘asymmetric alliance,’ and various ‘alliance games’ have operated as a result. Ultimately, how the aforementioned divergence of interests will affect the triangular relationship is also likely to be determined by this alliance game. If so, to what extent can the autonomy of the weaker party, i.e., North Korea’s autonomy, which is sometimes referred to as the ‘tyranny of the weak,’ be exercised? Perhaps the main elements of that equation will be ‘China and Russia’s needs’ and ‘North Korea’s capabilities.’

First, China and Russia’s needs. It is well-known that the core variable determining China and Russia’s needs is their conflict with the United States. From this perspective, it is important that the U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations are unlikely to improve in the short term, whether viewed from the perspective of power transition theory, which focuses on structural issues, or from the perspective of civilizational clash theory, which emphasizes identity and culture. While opinions differ on the speed, there is no disagreement that the power gap is narrowing, and as seen in the recent theories of distinct civilizations proposed by China and Russia, the clash of identities is intensifying. Furthermore, the military value of North Korea, proven through the Ukraine war, combined with Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’ trend and China’s ongoing development needs in its Northeast provinces, means that the economic value of North Korea’s border regions is being re-evaluated.

Next, North Korea’s capabilities. As is known, precise technical assessments vary regarding the extent to which North Korea’s ‘second strike capability,’ which is the core of deterrence, has been completed. However, the assessment that North Korea must be considered to have secured a certain level of capability to strike the U.S. mainland is shared by many researchers, including the U.S. government. Furthermore, there is no room for doubt that North Korea has strengthened its indirect deterrence by securing the capability for nuclear attacks against South Korea through the accelerated development of tactical nuclear weapons since 2019. In other words, North Korea’s ‘internal balancing’ strategy has achieved considerable success over the past period.

This indigenous deterrence is important as it is the most crucial asset that can mitigate the fear of abandonment—the most powerful weapon of major powers in an asymmetric alliance—and enhance the autonomy of a weaker nation. Of course, since abandonment can occur in various ‘levels’ and ‘issues’ beyond the military-security domain, including economic cooperation and external support, the limits of autonomy that North Korea can enjoy in the alliance game are clear. However, it is clear that the assets of autonomy currently possessed are not insignificant when compared to the North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relationships during the Cold War.

Furthermore, it is also important that subjective assessments of capabilities, as well as actual capabilities, are changing. Autonomy is a product of the combination of ‘capability’ and ‘will,’ and subjective assessment is an important variable that influences the latter. In this regard, it is also necessary to pay attention to the significant changes detected in North Korea’s self-identity and discourse since its nuclear development. These include a series of ‘strategic state theories’ and ‘strong nation theories,’ asserting that they are no longer a weak nation but have reached a ‘strategic status’ where they can voice their opinions clearly in the international community. It is also important that these discourses are combined with multipolarization discourse. North Korea’s multipolarization theory contains not only the decline of U.S. hegemony but also the weakening of hierarchy within blocs, thus emphasizing the equality of North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relations and the will for it.

Of course, despite various limitations, the friendly relations between China and Russia mean that the possibility of North Korea repeating its opportunistic pendulum diplomacy of the Cold War era is slim. In other words, from Lowell Dittmer’s framework, the current Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship is closer to a loose ‘ménage à trois’ rather than a ‘romantic triangle’ based on the conflict between China and Russia. However, it is also important to remember that due to immutable geopolitical conditions, the competitive dynamic between China and Russia over North Korea remains valid. Furthermore, it is worth noting that China and Russia’s needs are likely to be structural and long-term, while North Korea’s subjective and objective capabilities have significantly strengthened.

From this perspective, the current status and future prospects of the Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship, synthesizing the discussions so far, are as follows. First, considering the divergence of interests and power asymmetry discussed earlier, it is difficult to consider the Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship as symmetrical to the U.S.-South Korea-Japan triangular relationship, which is moving towards institutionalization, even at a rudimentary level, through summit meetings. Furthermore, in terms of identity, since there is no shared identity encompassing all three, it is realistic to consider it closer to the sum of bilateral relationships rather than a single ‘axis’ as suggested by some. However, what is clear is that the strengthening Russia-North Korea-China triangular relationship, combined with the trends of the new Cold War and multipolarization that are occurring simultaneously with North Korea’s ‘de facto’ nuclear possession, is acting as a highly ideal window of opportunity for North Korea, a ‘revisionist weak state,’ in its balancing strategy.

So, what variable will the emergence of a Trump administration represent in this situation? Will it be possible to replicate the dramatic progress of 2018? Of course, North Korea’s surprisingly pragmatic choices so far give rise to expectations that it will continue to utilize southern diplomacy. However, as reaffirmed in Kim Jong-un’s speech on November 21, which contained a notable official reaction to Trump’s election, we must not forget that in North Korea’s current strategy, the realist logic behind the ‘method’ of balance, namely the principle of prioritizing ‘the state over the regime’ and ‘capabilities over intentions,’ is as important as the ‘method’ of balance itself.[3]In other words, any southern diplomacy, including diplomacy with the U.S., is likely to be ‘managed’ within the scope of ‘not refusing, but not clinging to,’ even if it materializes.

Bibliography

Cha, Victor. 2021a. “North Korea could become one of Biden’s biggest challenges—and not just because of its nukes.” Washington Post. January 15. https://www.washingtonpost.com/...challenges/.

____. 2021b. “North Korea’s Denuclearization Caught in the ‘Carrot and Stick’ Dilemma of COVID-19.” *Chosun Ilbo*, July 19. https://www.chosun.com/...2OHQWMCM/.

[1] For a more detailed explanation of the shift back to a balancing strategy centered on 2022, see Ahn Kyung-mo. 2023. “North Korea’s National Strategy After the ‘New Strategic Line’: A Return to Balancing Strategy and Its Implications.” *Journal of Korean Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 1. Seoul National University Institute for Korean Politics.

[2] For a more detailed explanation of the “Theory of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” see Ahn Kyung-mo and Kang Hye-seok. “Kim Jong Un Regime’s Strategy Toward South Korea (2018-2020): ‘Three Pillars’ and the ‘Frontal Breakthrough Strategy’.” *Korea and International Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4. pp. 182-184.

[3] This principle represents the first and most candid assessment of the peace process over approximately two years, and appears to have been consistently maintained thereafter, as evidenced by Kim Yo Jong’s statement on July 10, 2020.

■ Ahn Kyung-mo, Professor, Department of Security Policy, Korea National Defense University.

■ Editor:Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

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