[EAI-Brookings Conference] The Future of Alliances, Partnerships, and the Indo-Pacific Order

1. Outlook on Trump's Economic Policies and Regional Implications

2. Outlook on Trump's China Policy

3. U.S. Strategy Regarding a Taiwan Contingency and Its Impact on Indo-Pacific Allies

4. Potential U.S. Strategic Retreat from the Indo-Pacific and Allied Responses

5. The Future of Multilateral and Plurilateral Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

6. Inter-Korean Relations and Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

7. The Future of Trilateral Cooperation Among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan

8. South Korea's Strategic Role in the Indo-Pacific

9. The Role and Responsibilities of Middle Powers During a U.S. Leadership Transition

1. Outlook on Trump's Economic and Foreign Policies and Regional Implications

ㆍ Economic Protectionism and Tariff Policy: The Trump administration's tariff policies, including universal tariffs and selective tariffs on countries with trade surpluses with the U.S. such as South Korea and Japan, could exacerbate trade wars and economic uncertainty. While some countries might temporarily benefit from U.S. tariffs on China, those with trade surpluses will soon face pressure.

ㆍ Interlinkage Between Economic and Security Policies: While Trump's second-term security policies may not differ significantly from those of the Biden administration, economic policies could weaken allies' willingness and ability to cooperate closely with the U.S. on security matters.

ㆍ Domestic Political Dynamics Regarding Alliance Policy: Trump's views on alliances and Asia are not the sole determinant of the direction of U.S. foreign policy in the next administration. Many figures within the Republican Party support alliances, which could serve as a check on Trump's foreign policy.

ㆍ Regional Implications and Allied Responses: Given Trump's focus on trade imbalances and transactional economics, the next administration may compel allies to increase imports of U.S. products or demand concessions in key industries. Consequently, allies are likely to accelerate efforts to diversify trade partners and reduce dependence on both the U.S. and China.

2. Outlook on Trump's China Policy

ㆍ Hardline Policy: Key Trump appointees, including Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, signal a hardline approach toward China. This suggests a continuation of strategic competition between the U.S. and China, particularly in the technology sector. Trump proposes measures such as tariffs to pressure China, which are likely to cause supply chain disruptions and negatively impact U.S. allies like South Korea and Japan, who are closely linked to China economically.

ㆍ Decoupling and Strategic Competition: It remains uncertain whether Trump views China primarily as an economic threat or also as a security threat. At a minimum, a strategy of decoupling is likely to be strengthened in the technology and supply chain sectors. However, it is questionable whether tariff policies will be an effective tool for achieving reshoring. Past tariff policies under Trump's first term promoted supply chain diversification rather than reshoring.

ㆍ U.S.-China Competition in Security Terms: U.S.-China competition can be interpreted as a struggle over regional order, with China attempting to expand its influence by presenting an alternative framework to the U.S. This strategic competition not only pressures U.S. allies to align with U.S. strategic objectives but also risks weakening their economic ties with China. Simultaneously, it could weaken the cohesion of alliances in response to China.

ㆍ China's Response: President Xi Jinping is likely to adopt a cautious wait-and-see policy to prepare for U.S. pressure, while simultaneously pursuing a hedging strategy to strengthen relations with the Global South, BRICS, and non-aligned nations. These partnerships forged by China could offset the economic and political impacts of U.S. containment measures. Xi, prioritizing stability, is expected to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. while strategically attributing responsibility for potential conflicts to the U.S.

3. U.S. Strategy Regarding a Taiwan Contingency and Its Impact on Indo-Pacific Allies

ㆍ Trump's Stance: Trump has viewed Taiwan transactionally, considering it a financial burden for the U.S. and criticizing Taiwan's role, particularly in the global semiconductor industry competition. While U.S.-Taiwan relations might deepen on the surface, there is a risk of increased unpredictability without a clear strategic direction. This strategic uncertainty could embolden China and lead to regional instability.

ㆍ Impact on Allies: South Korea, as a U.S. ally, faces the challenge of balancing its obligations with concerns for regional stability. North Korea-China solidarity could force South Korea into a two-front war scenario, presenting difficulties in dispersing assets available for Korean Peninsula defense, including U.S. Forces Korea resources. A Taiwan contingency could serve as a test for trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. The responses of South Korea and Japan will inevitably depend on U.S. leadership and strategic clarity, precisely the elements Trump lacks.

ㆍ Regional Dynamics and Responses: Southeast Asian nations like the Philippines and Singapore prefer a pragmatic and balanced approach to avoid the tensions and instability surrounding a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. For instance, the Philippines demonstrates strategic alignment with the U.S. while being cautious about escalating tensions with China. Conversely, China seeks to project its power and influence regionally but avoids direct confrontation with the U.S. Nevertheless, China's actions could test the resilience of the U.S. alliance network in the region and exploit potential fissures.

ㆍ Future Outlook and Challenges: Enhancing Taiwan's domestic resilience and international standing will be key challenges. A Trump administration may prioritize supporting Taiwan's military modernization efforts while potentially engaging only limitedly in issues with broader regional implications.

4. Potential U.S. Strategic Retreat from the Indo-Pacific and Allied Responses

ㆍ Risk of Strategic Retreat: Allies are concerned about the potential for a leadership vacuum in the Indo-Pacific (hereafter, IP) region due to U.S. withdrawal from various multilateral cooperation mechanisms. While the U.S. has recovered global leadership after strategic retreats in the past, such as during the Nixon Doctrine, a prolonged U.S. retreat under a Trump administration could provide China with opportunities to expand its regional influence. This could make it more difficult for the U.S. to re-establish leadership in the IP region in the future.

ㆍ Impact on Regional Security Architecture: A U.S. retreat could weaken the importance of multilateral security cooperation frameworks, such as trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. U.S. allies are concerned about a return to the 'hub-and-spoke' model. However, Trump's policy direction of maintaining a hardline stance against China could strengthen relationships with allies in the context of deterring China. In this vein, Trump might continue to pursue U.S. IP strategy, partnerships with India, and initiatives like the Quad.

ㆍ Economic Implications: If the possibility of economic retreat under a Trump administration, particularly measures such as withdrawal from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) or the imposition of universal tariffs, weakens U.S. economic engagement in the region, it could conversely lead to increased dependence of regional allies on China. This vacuum could place a burden on allies like South Korea to maintain regional economic cooperation independently.

ㆍ Responses of Allies: South Korea and Japan are likely to seek independent or collective strategies, strengthening trilateral cooperation, and endeavor to solidify alliances with ASEAN, India, and Europe. Enhanced multilateral engagement will help offset the effects of a US withdrawal. Allies should proactively advocate for continued US engagement by emphasizing shared security and economic objectives. It is crucial to align allied strategies with US policy and pursue a unified response to challenges such as North Korea's nuclear program and China's strategic ambitions.

ㆍ South Korea's Strategic Dilemma: South Korea faces a dual challenge: relying on US extended deterrence while simultaneously needing to counter the risks of US disengagement. Especially as North Korea's nuclear threat and the potential for South Korea's entanglement in US-China competition increase, Seoul must enhance its strategic autonomy.

ㆍ Positive Outlook: Despite the possibility of reduced US engagement, there remains scope to influence the US administration through various channels, including the Indo-Pacific Command, diplomacy, business-to-business relations, and NGO activities. Regardless of who becomes president, US engagement in Asia is likely to continue.

5. The Future of Multilateral and Plurilateral Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

ㆍ The Quad and AUKUS: Multilateral cooperation frameworks in the Indo-Pacific gained momentum under the Biden administration but will face uncertainty under a Trump administration that favors a transactional approach. The Quad will continue to focus on countering China, but US leadership in promoting multilateralism may weaken. AUKUS will remain an important cooperation framework, particularly in defense and technology cooperation, but may shift towards allies bearing more costs.

ㆍ Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF): The IPEF was designed to demonstrate US engagement and economic presence in the Indo-Pacific but has so far remained an incomplete, non-binding arrangement. If Trump reverts to emphasizing bilateral relationships, eschewing IPEF's multilateral approach, the IPEF's significance, which relies on US leadership for cooperation based on goodwill, may diminish. Consequently, regional partners are likely to focus more on predictable and binding frameworks like the CPTPP.

ㆍ Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP): With the unlikelihood of the Trump administration rejoining the CPTPP, middle powers like Japan aim to update its provisions to address new challenges such as strengthening supply chain resilience and responding to economic coercion. Even without US participation, the CPTPP can serve as a key mechanism for ensuring rules-based trade. South Korea has postponed its accession to the CPTPP, focusing on domestic political issues and responses to the IPEF. However, as US protectionism intensifies, the CPTPP is emerging as an important tool to counter disruptions to the trade order.

6. Inter-Korean Relations and Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

ㆍ Diplomatic Risks: Trump's transactional approach could lead to risky negotiations with North Korea. If the Trump administration engages in a unilateral deal with Pyongyang, it could legitimize North Korea's possession of nuclear capabilities, thereby undermining South Korea's security interests. Trump's preference for unpredictable summit diplomacy and top-down approaches risks repeating the failures of the Hanoi Summit. Furthermore, his unilateral style carries the risk of excluding key stakeholders like South Korea, potentially leading to agreements lacking regional consensus and sustainability. Kim Jong Un, who has succeeded in enhancing his nuclear capabilities and is closely aligned with Russia and China, is unlikely to accept past negotiation terms. North Korea now demands comprehensive guarantees for regime survival, including economic support measures, further reducing the likelihood of successful negotiations.

ㆍ Security Issues: If Trump's approach remains passive, and North Korea succeeds in enhancing its nuclear weapons capabilities and weakening international sanctions against it with support from Russia and China, this would pose a significant risk to South Korea's security and regional stability.

ㆍ Domestic Public Opinion Trends: As North Korea's nuclear threat escalates, calls for South Korea to develop its own nuclear armament are growing. Excessive demands for defense cost-sharing by the US or a weakened commitment to providing extended deterrence could further fuel these domestic demands, destabilizing the regional security architecture. Moreover, perceptions of US disengagement or transactional diplomacy could provoke anti-American sentiment within South Korean society.

7. The Future of South Korea-US-Japan Trilateral Cooperation

ㆍ Biden's Legacy: The Camp David Summit institutionalized trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan at various levels. Trilateral cooperation enjoys bipartisan support within South Korea, and all parties appear to recognize the strategic importance of the partnership. However, Trump's transactional approach to allies and his preference for bilateral over multilateral cooperation could undermine the achievements of the Biden administration. If US leadership continues to be absent, the institutionalization of trilateral cooperation may weaken.

ㆍ Challenges to Trilateral Cooperation: Deep-seated historical grievances and nationalist sentiments in South Korea and Japan remain significant obstacles. Ishiba's weak political base in Japan could limit increased defense spending. Without strong US leadership, it may be difficult for South Korea and Japan to maintain the momentum of trilateral cooperation.

ㆍ Opportunities for Cooperation: Regional security threats, such as North Korea's nuclear and missile development, promote closer trilateral cooperation. A unified response is essential to deter these threats and maintain regional stability. Public opinion polls indicate that the South Korean public recognizes the importance of the trilateral partnership, and Japan has no incentive to withdraw from the current cooperation framework, making it likely that efforts to strengthen trilateral cooperation will continue.

8. South Korea's Strategic Role in the Indo-Pacific

ㆍ South Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy and 'Global Pivotal State' Vision: President Yoon Suk-yeol's foreign policy is based on a strong ROK-US alliance, which presents both opportunities and challenges. Given Trump's transactional approach, a policy overly reliant on the US could create significant difficulties for South Korea. However, this approach has also led to the diversification of South Korea's international partnerships, including strengthening relations with ASEAN, cooperation with the European Union (EU), and engagement with NATO. This has provided South Korea with strategic flexibility and options to respond to challenges arising from changes in its alliance with the US.

ㆍ Expanding Leadership: South Korea is actively working to enhance its leadership in the region, including by revitalizing organizations such as the UN Command. It also prioritizes strengthening trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan and developing initiatives like the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). Although the US under a Trump administration might withdraw from various cooperative frameworks pursued by the Biden administration, South Korea will strive to ensure that these new cooperative mechanisms are maintained and developed at the working level.

ㆍ Economic Strategy: To counter China's economic coercion, South Korea has pursued diversification of supply chains and investments by promoting trade relations with Southeast Asia and the Global South. Nevertheless, dependence on China in key industries such as semiconductors remains a critical vulnerability. While continuing to pursue diversification, considering that China is South Korea's largest trading partner, the South Korean government must carefully manage the risks associated with geopolitical tensions.

9. The Role and Responsibility of Middle Powers Amidst US Leadership Transition

ㆍ The Role of Middle Powers as Stabilizers: Middle powers such as South Korea and Japan must play a greater role in maintaining regional stability. Key areas of focus should include promoting multilateralism and strengthening the rules-based order.

ㆍ Maintaining Regional Norms: Middle powers play a crucial role in the effective functioning of multilateral and plurilateral cooperation frameworks such as the Quad, AUKUS, and CPTPP. South Korea and Japan are expanding engagement with the Global South to mitigate US-China competition.

ㆍ Ensuring Continued US Engagement: Middle powers must persuade the US to remain engaged in global order issues by emphasizing common interests and mutually beneficial cooperation, and particularly encourage the US to continue playing a vital role in addressing shared global threats and promoting global stability.