[2024 Japan Election Issue Briefing] ① The Dilemma of the Ishiba Administration Amidst Entry into the Post-Abe Era and Pressure for Political Reform

I. 2024 House of Representatives Election Results

In the House of Representatives election (general election) held on October 27, the LDP-Komeito coalition led by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba suffered a crushing defeat. Out of a total of 465 seats, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) secured 191 seats and Komeito secured 24 seats, for a combined total of 215 seats, failing to achieve the target of a majority (233 seats). This is a significant drop from the 290 seats (LDP 258, Komeito 32, 62% of total seats) before the dissolution, and it clearly reflects the situation of the ruling party, which was difficult to avoid headwinds due to the LDP's political funds scandal and its aftermath [1], as well as the ongoing high inflation.[1], and the ongoing high inflation.

Meanwhile, opposition parties saw gains as a result. Specifically, as votes from LDP defectors and unaffiliated voters were dispersed, the fortunes of each party varied. Led by the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party, the Democratic Party for the People, and Reiwa Shinsengumi significantly expanded their parliamentary presence, and the Japan Innovation Party, a conservative outsider force, also secured seats. In contrast, the Japanese Communist Party saw a slight decrease, and the Japan Innovation Party, which had made significant gains in the previous election, also lost seats. Overall, the gains of the former Democratic Party bloc, the new conservative bloc, and smaller parties targeting the current generation were prominent ([Table 1]).

[Table 1] 2024 House of Representatives Election Results

Note: LDP seats were 261 immediately after the 2021 general election, 258 before the election announcement, and 247 after candidates excluded from nominations ran as independents.

Source: Compiled by author based on NHK Election WEB (2024) and Asahi Shimbun (2024).

[Figure 1] Trend of Party Strength Changes Between LDP and DPJ in Past General Elections (2003-2024)

Source: Compiled by author based on past election results from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2003-2021) and NHK (2024).

Particularly noteworthy is the significant gain by the Constitutional Democratic Party, which secured 148 seats. As shown in [Figure 1], while there is still a gap in seats with the LDP, an expansion similar to the qualitative and quantitative growth seen in the 2000s when the Democratic Party achieved a change of government is evident. However, it is difficult to foresee a change of government at this point. Unlike the 2000s, when votes converged between the LDP and the DPJ, the proportion of smaller parties below the third party is also substantial. The Democratic Party for the People and the Japan Innovation Party are considered pivotal players for the same reason. These parties will likely distance themselves from forming coalitions or alliances with the unpopular LDP for the time being, but they retain considerable strategic flexibility to shift their cooperation and opposition targets depending on the political situation. The Constitutional Democratic Party is also proceeding cautiously with its plans for government. If a reversal of power between the ruling and opposition forces is achieved in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors by focusing on next year's House of Councillors election, a situation for preparing for a full-fledged change of government led by the Constitutional Democratic Party could emerge.

Conversely, the impact on the LDP, the core of the ruling party, is substantial. Above all, stable government operations have become difficult. In the short term, to secure a physical majority in the Prime Minister's appointment election in the extraordinary session in November, the government must swiftly engage in appeasing opposition parties and absorbing independent members. If this fails, the Ishiba administration will have to begin governing as a minority coalition. Furthermore, to ensure smooth passage of legislation in the future, the government will inevitably have to seek new coalition partners or explore partial alliances that cooperate on specific policy issues. The response of the opposition parties (or cooperation among them) will inevitably become a variable that determines the fate of the Ishiba administration. In the worst-case scenario, the possibility of Ishiba's resignation being hastened through internal LDP processes cannot be ruled out.

So why did the LDP suffer such a major defeat? Although the election campaign began with Prime Minister Ishiba at the helm, symbolizing the "post-Abe" era, the administration ultimately failed to gain the trust of the majority of the public. The aftermath of the political funds scandal, the Prime Minister's inconsistent statements and actions (ブレ), and the abstention of LDP supporters are cited as major reasons. However, these cannot be considered temporary or isolated incidents. From a more structural perspective, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the structural characteristics of Japanese politics, referred to as the "Abe era" [2], are gradually changing due to discord across three levels: the LDP's single-party dominance system, the single-dominant force of the Abe faction within the party, and the evaluation of the LDP government's capacity to govern, as well as inter-party competition and the voter level.[2], are gradually changing due to discord across three levels: the LDP's single-party dominance system, the single-dominant force of the Abe faction within the party, and the evaluation of the LDP government's capacity to govern, as well as inter-party competition and the voter level.

Below, we will examine the changing landscape of Japanese politics from the perspective of electoral politics by presenting the political coordinates of the 2024 election results and the political challenges facing the Ishiba administration in conjunction with them.

II. Political Coordinates of the 2024 Election

1. Fading Strategic Effectiveness of the Prime Minister's Dissolution Power

The most significant characteristic of this election is the substantial reduction in the LDP's strength, which had secured a single-party majority since its return to power in December 2012. This can be seen as a fading of the effect of changing prime ministers and utilizing the dissolution power, which had served as the LDP's formula for electoral victory.

In this regard, the 2017 and 2021 House of Representatives election cases present a stark contrast. First, the 2017 election was a case where the Prime Minister's right to dissolve the House of Representatives was utilized to achieve a reset effect from political scandals. The Abe administration, which lasted for 7 years and 8 months, is assessed to have rebuilt the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) dominant party system and weakened the opposition. However, the LDP government faced a crisis due to political scandals centered around the Prime Minister that emerged after 2016, which concentrated power. To overcome this, Prime Minister Abe dissolved the House of Representatives in September 2017 under the pretext of a "national crisis-overcoming election" and held a general election. At this time, voters' preference for the LDP's perceived relative competence in governing, coupled with the influence of their support (Taniguchi et al. 2018), led to the party winning 284 seats and successfully rebuilding its governing base. In other words, by using the logic of having gained the public's trust through the election, the reset effect was achieved, mitigating the accountability for political scandals and gaining momentum for policy implementation.

Meanwhile, the 2021 election was a case of shifting the political landscape by creating an image renewal effect through a change in prime minister. This election was held at a time when public anxiety about daily life due to the COVID-19 pandemic was high, and doubts about the LDP government's policy capabilities, which voters had witnessed over the past eight years, intensified under the Yoshihide Suga administration, which inherited and deepened Abenomics, a quantitative easing stimulus policy. In this context, the LDP appointed Fumio Kishida, who emphasized a "virtuous cycle of growth and distribution," as the new prime minister on October 4, 2021. Shortly thereafter, in the general election held on October 31, the party created a pseudo-regime change effect through image renewal, thereby shifting the political landscape and successfully securing a single-party majority with 261 seats. Although the number of seats decreased slightly compared to 2017, it can be interpreted that voters re-endorsed the administration, acknowledging the LDP's own recognition of its insufficient policy performance and its efforts to improve.

In contrast, the 2024 election made it difficult to achieve a reset from political scandals or an image renewal effect. The conventional formula for election victory backfired, as awareness of the problems associated with the strategic use of the Prime Minister's right to dissolve the House of Representatives spread. While the timing of elections can be the Prime Minister's choice due to the nature of this authority, in reality, it is closer to the LDP's collective will to increase the likelihood of winning when facing declining support. Furthermore, Ishiba's response, which diverged from his statements during the party leadership election regarding both the timing of the election and policy direction, exacerbated the disappointment and distrust among voters who had expected the LDP's self-purification to be promoted through a change in leadership, leading to the LDP's defeat. Consequently, the LDP found itself in a situation where it could no longer substitute election results with a renewed trust in the new cabinet or public recognition of the LDP's policy capabilities.

2. Fluidity in Voter Choice

This can be seen as a result of changes in voter consciousness. It is necessary to pay attention to the emerging fluidity in the voting behavior of individuals who have traditionally based their votes on the LDP's relative superiority in policy capabilities. The political funding scandal also played a significant role. According to an NHK poll (conducted October 12-14, 2024), when asked about important factors in voting, economic and price measures accounted for 34%, social security systems for 17%, and political funding (slush fund issue) for 13% (NHK 2024). In fact, an exit poll by Asahi Shimbun immediately after the election showed that a strong awareness of the LDP's factional slush fund scandal led to a significantly higher proportion of respondents considering it when voting (73%) compared to those who did not (24%) ("Asahi Shimbun" 2024/10/27).

However, it is difficult to conclude that public sentiment was oriented towards a change of government. According to a Kyodo News poll (conducted October 19-20, 2024), when asked about the desired election outcome, 49.7% preferred a close balance of power between the ruling and opposition parties, exceeding the preference for a ruling party advantage (24.8%) and a reversal of power (20.5%) ("Kyodo News" 2024/10/21). This confirms another aspect of voter preference: the desire for the continuation of the LDP-Komeito coalition government within a balanced power structure where the opposition provides checks and balances. As evidenced by the election results, the political scandals, high inflation, and a cabinet lacking public trust would have been sufficient conditions for a change of government in other democracies. Yet, the LDP remains the leading party. Instead, a state of balanced power between the ruling and opposition parties has been realized, where the LDP must govern cautiously amidst concerns of losing power due to the checks imposed by an opposition party that has overwhelmingly expanded its influence.

In this context, the tendency of a majority of voters to remain hesitant to withdraw their support, even with disappointment and distrust towards the LDP, is not entirely surprising. The 1970s, which saw a decline in the LDP's strength and a balance of power between ruling and opposition parties, were explained by the "buffer player" theory, which described voters who acknowledged the LDP as a governing party but did not want its unchecked dominance (Kamajima 2004). Furthermore, during the period of political realignment in the 1990s, which saw the collapse of the LDP's long-term rule and rapid returns to power, the argument was made that the strategic choices of unaffiliated voters, who desired the continuation of Japan's political and economic system in broad terms, played the role of "system supporters" by balancing criticism of the LDP with support for it (Tanaka 1995). In this sense, the period of regime change between the LDP and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) from 2009 to 2012 can be seen as a crucial experiment in the transition to a system where voters could choose the government through elections. However, the prevailing trend in Japanese electoral politics has been the rapid resurgence of the LDP, driven by anxieties about the DPJ's governance and empirical trust in the LDP government, followed by the re-establishment of the dominant party system.

The underlying public perception that "LDP = ruling party = system stability" is not easily changed. However, Japanese voters are wary of the LDP government's prolonged tenure, which can lead to repeated self-serving actions or a decline in political responsiveness. Empirically, they have made strategic choices to create a balance of power between the ruling and opposition parties in such situations. In this sense, the recent election can be seen as raising questions about "who constitutes the LDP," a prerequisite that must precede governing competence, and as projecting pressure for reform onto the LDP through the opposition parties.

3. Revitalization of Opposition Response

Therefore, a cautious approach is needed to determine whether the gains made by opposition parties in the 2024 election will be a litmus test for future regime change. At the very least, it can be confirmed at this point that the situation has moved beyond the dynamic where the LDP benefited passively from the weakening of opposition forces.

Particularly noteworthy is the change in the response of opposition forces, which have historically pursued candidate unification. In the past, opposition parties actively pursued candidate unification strategies to counter the LDP's dominance in single-member constituencies. However, this process sometimes led to a counterproductive effect where cooperation between parties with different ideological orientations raised doubts about the identity of individual parties. In other words, opposition parties faced criticism for their platforms when they pursued candidate unification for electoral victory, and conversely, when they strengthened individual strategies to clarify their policy platforms, their candidates faced mutual destruction in electoral districts. This dichotomy persisted under the LDP's dominant party system.

In contrast, in the recent election, opposition forces avoided physical unification but still showed signs of progress. While this undoubtedly placed opposition candidates at a disadvantage in their respective constituencies, it can be seen as having broadened the scope of voter choice by prioritizing the strategy of making their own policy platforms visible.[3] The progress of the Constitutional Democratic Party, which has effectively abandoned electoral cooperation with the Communist Party, and the Democratic Party for the People, which has clearly articulated its centrist-conservative orientation and appealed to both the current generation and younger voters, can serve as important indicators for gauging future inter-party competition and the fluidity of policy positions within the former DPJ bloc. In this regard, it can be assessed that the opposition parties have entered a phase of expanded and revitalized political influence.

However, it remains uncertain whether the DPJ bloc, which has moved to a relatively conservative position while appealing to defectors from the LDP and unaffiliated voters, can establish a distinct platform from the LDP and expand its influence simultaneously. The key variable influencing voter sentiment was disappointment with the LDP, and the opposition bloc failed to generate the buzz necessary to mobilize voters as an alternative governing force. Contrasting with the historic gains of the opposition parties, the voter turnout, which was the third lowest on record at 53.85%, indicates that while voters were indifferent to the ruling party, they did not show strong support for the opposition either; in essence, a "historic moment devoid of fervor" was created.[4]

Consequently, alongside regaining trust in LDP politics, securing trust in their governing capabilities remains a crucial future task for the DPJ bloc. In fact, many of the policies implemented by the LDP have been adapted from DPJ policies, and particularly in domestic policy, there is a strong continuity rather than differentiation between the two administrations (Takenaka 2017). The fundamental reasons for the widening gap in strength between the LDP and the DPJ stem from the regime trust effect that has been emotionally formed over the long history of LDP rule (Taniguchi 2018, 252) and the overwhelming organizational power (local organizations, interest groups) built during this process.

4. Actualization of Internal LDP Conflict

In this sense, the most prominent reason for the LDP's defeat is the failure to rally its support base. The strength of the LDP's electoral politics lies in its resilience, which is based on individual politicians managing their electoral districts through personal support groups and building human networks.[5]This is because supporters tend to continue their support for individual candidates based on personal connections, even in the face of mistakes by government leaders or party executives. Therefore, in election campaigns where the party label becomes a disadvantage, rallying support based on individual candidates becomes even more crucial. The reason Ishiba quickly withdrew his stance and moved to dissolve the House of Representatives also indicates that the essence of the LDP's ability to win votes lies in its candidate-centric approach.

However, the slush fund scandal directly relates to the issue of trust, the foundation of the human connection between politicians and supporters, as it implies the opaque use of funds in the daily political activities and overall management of electoral districts by individual Diet members. A public opinion poll indicating that 29% of respondents who stated they would consider the LDP's slush fund issue when voting were LDP supporters well illustrates this situation of support base erosion (Asahi Shimbun 2024/10/21). In this context, the success or failure of the 46 Diet members implicated in the slush fund scandal (裏金議員) can be seen as a direct factor that contributed to the reduction of LDP seats.

The reason why most of the individuals involved in the slush fund scandal belonged to the Abe faction is not unrelated to the method of rebuilding the party organization established during the Abe administration. During its time in opposition from 2009 to 2012, the LDP's intense focus was on rebuilding its support base. In this process, the Abe administration established a "grassroots conservatism" that connected its stable support base (economic conservatives) with new supporters (ideological conservatives) (Nakakita 2017). The "Abe Ichigō" (Abe's dominance) structure within the LDP was advantageous for emerging politicians with weak support bases, particularly due to the influx of ideological conservatives drawn by Abe's symbolic presence and the electoral strategy effects of these ideological conservatives. Furthermore, the utility of the personnel appointment power exercised by the Prime Minister also served as an incentive for mid-career and emerging Diet members to join the Abe faction, leading to the formation of a massive faction with nearly 100 members. To manage such an oversized faction, a long-term system was developed for securing political funds through faction-centric political parties under the "Abe" brand, which possessed charismatic appeal, and allowing faction members to use surplus funds based on their contributions. This organizational management and expansion know-how forms the basic structure of the current LDP slush fund scandal under debate.

This approach has acted as a dual factor, promoting the numerical increase of ideologically conservative party members within the LDP, the expansion of the Abe faction, and the management and expansion of larger political funds, thereby stabilizing the LDP government centered around Prime Minister Abe and simultaneously underpinning the internal divisions after his departure. The current situation can be interpreted as an exacerbation of the negative repercussions of this Abe legacy. First, there is the issue of declining loyalty among party members, stemming from the lack of homogeneity in their attributes. As revealed in the party leadership election in September, current party members are divided on the type of leader they aspire to. This trend is particularly evident in the first round of voting, where party member votes and Diet member votes are weighted equally. At that time, party member votes were concentrated on Shigeru Ishiba and Sanae Takaichi among the nine candidates, with support divided between Ishiba (108 votes), supported by traditional supporters (economic conservatives), and Takaichi (109 votes), supported by new supporters (ideological conservatives). This clearly demonstrates the sharp divisions at the party member level, making it difficult to unify support regardless of who is elected.

Second, there are also conflicts and confrontations at the level of politicians. In addition to the political funding scandal, the Ishiba executive team is composed mainly of anti-Abe faction and non-mainstream members, leading to significant dissatisfaction among former Abe faction members who have been excluded from key positions. While some argue that the large number of Abe faction members involved in the slush fund scandal who lost in the recent election will reduce their influence within the party, the embers of conflict still remain. Above all, if party member votes are to be strategically utilized for the next leadership election, an overrepresentation of the LDP's conservative orientation may emerge at the intersection of horizontal power competition within the party and vertical support from party members. Conversely, the argument that operating the party based on economic conservatism is desirable to secure the cooperation of opposition parties in a situation of balanced power between ruling and opposition parties also fuels internal discord.

Third, there is the possibility of a decline in the LDP's function of reflecting public opinion in this process. The fact that the LDP has been able to maintain its position as the ruling party has also been significantly influenced by the alignment of party members' aspirations with the general public's opinion. The party leadership election has been perceived as an indirect circuit for reflecting public opinion for this reason. Therefore, the current internal structure of the party has the potential to weaken the effect of reflecting public opinion in the leadership election.

This heterogeneity in party member composition and the conflict among politicians within the party are likely to undermine the expected effect of prime ministerial leadership at the general public level and the sense of unity among party members at the party level. The recurring issues of a lack of prime ministerial leadership and the fragility of party governance since Abe's resignation in September 2020 also indicate that the shadows of the Abe era were bred within the party.

III. Future Prospects

In this context, the 2024 election can be seen as a turning point where the entry into the post-Abe era has become visible across all three levels: inter-party competition, internal party dynamics, and voter consciousness. This change also signifies that stable governance centered on the LDP has become more difficult.

The influence of the Abe era still lingers. While the foundation for the Ishiba administration's establishment was its symbolic opposition to Abe, a majority of voters have not expressed confidence in the new cabinet or support for the LDP. The pressure for political reform from public opinion is strong, but internal party sentiment diverges from this public opinion. Regarding the treatment of Diet members involved in the slush fund scandal (exclusion from candidacy for 12 individuals, exclusion from concurrent candidacy in proportional representation for 34 individuals [6]), some within the party leadership have suggested that it is excessive double punishment, or that those elected have received the public's support (forgiveness) and should be incorporated as LDP Diet members and considered for important positions. It is difficult for the LDP to shed the shadows of the Abe era on its own, and Ishiba is not immune to the internal dynamics of the LDP.[6])

In this situation, Prime Minister Ishiba's control over the party and his cabinet's approval ratings are likely to decline concurrently. The first hurdle is the issue of how to treat the elected Diet members involved in the slush fund scandal. Of the 46 individuals subject to sanctions, 43 belong to the former Abe faction, and 18 of them were elected. It is necessary to proceed cautiously to meet public expectations. In the first Abe administration in 2006, the LDP lost public trust and paved the way for the regime change in 2009 when Prime Minister Koizumi reinstated Diet members who had rebelled in the 2005 postal privatization general election. However, in a situation where coalition plans with opposition parties are unclear, it is important to incorporate the elected Diet members into the LDP through additional nominations (追加公認).[7] Furthermore, three of the four elected individuals who were excluded from candidacy are key leaders who led the faction after Abe's death and possess significant symbolic presence. Additionally, the fact that competent senior Diet members are included among those subject to sanctions will inevitably be a practical consideration in future personnel appointments. Public opinion and internal party dynamics exist as two centrifugal forces, making the prospects for governance uncertain.

The House of Councillors election scheduled for 2025 will further intensify the Prime Minister's dilemma. As mentioned earlier, the LDP's electoral strategy fundamentally relies on the human networks of individual politicians, but in the House of Councillors, the characteristics of individual candidates are even more emphasized. These candidates tend to prioritize their support groups in electoral campaigns and policy activities, often distancing themselves from the party leader's or central party's policy line (Kenbayashi 2017). Moreover, the fact that the former Abe faction and the Motegi faction, which are in conflict or at odds with Prime Minister Ishiba, hold overwhelming power within the LDP's House of Councillors contingent is also a factor that undermines the Prime Minister's control over the party. Prime Minister Ishiba will inevitably be forced to seek compromise measures for electoral response once again.[8]

However, focusing on the content of the policies, the Ishiba administration prioritizes stability over reform. Considering the Kishida administration's partial rectifications of underperforming tasks while inheriting Abe's policies, and Ishiba's declaration of continuity in domestic and foreign policy with the Kishida administration, it can be seen that the policies do not significantly deviate from the LDP's policy direction since the 2010s. The issue is not the policy goals themselves, but rather the difficulty in gaining public trust during the process of pursuing them. Over the past decade, the Abe era has emphasized that the LDP government possesses the policy capabilities to lead in strengthening national competitiveness, stabilizing public life, and responding to future societal challenges, and that this process is still ongoing (道半ば). However, voters are becoming increasingly sensitive to the lack of tangible policy achievements in areas such as the economy and prices, healthcare and welfare, and finance and taxation.

The political funding scandal carries significant implications in this regard, as it is intertwined with issues of political trust and taxation. The government's policies, which have sought a balance between social investment to stimulate growth and fiscal deficits, are structured in a way that inevitably places burdens on various segments of the public. Furthermore, during this process, the LDP government has relied on the traditional slogan of social integration, urging the overcoming of national crises together by transcending individual interests. The logic of LDP-style reform politics, which has emphasized prime ministerial leadership representing the general public's interests by excluding "special interests," has continued to this day.

However, the reality of the LDP, linked to political funding, demonstrates a paradoxical situation where the political class itself constitutes special interests, and the Prime Minister is inextricably linked to the party's interests. Political funds, which are exempt from taxation, and the opaque use of policy activity funds can be perceived as privileges for politicians, leading voters to feel a sense of deprivation, believing that politicians are exceptions to the community of "us" who share the burdens together. In this sense, the LDP's policy performance, unaccompanied by political reform, lacks the power of social integration. The LDP's emphasis on policy capabilities also becomes an ineffective electoral strategy when the effects on improving public life are uncertain. Furthermore, the government-party operating method, which has offset the lack of transparency in processes and procedures by leveraging speed and promptness, is also not immune to public pressure for reform demanding transparent political processes.

Consequently, the Ishiba administration, and subsequent administrations, will likely highlight the instability arising from Japan's entry into the post-Abe era. Positively, however, this could be a period of trial and error leading to the final reform that has not been achieved in the past 30 years of Japanese political reform: the reform of the Diet and politics itself. Coincidentally, voters have now opened the door for both correction and a second chance for both the ruling and opposition parties. With the disappearance of an overwhelming majority, parliamentary operations will be characterized by active policy debates and coordination between ruling and opposition parties, and various forms of inter-party alliances and coalitions will emerge. In this context, voters will gain material for judging the LDP's capacity for reform and the former DPJ bloc's capacity for governance. In the near future, the 2025 House of Councillors election will serve as an interim report card for each party.

Frequent changes in prime ministers and political instability are likely to continue. However, it is precisely in this context that the collective intelligence of voters, seeking to balance system stability with political reform, is at play. The extent to which the political sphere's self-purification process, which converges and reflects this collective intelligence, proceeds in terms of speed and intensity will be a crucial measure for gauging the next turning point in Japanese politics as it transitions from the post-Abe era to the post-Abe era. ■

References

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Nakakita, Kōji. 2017. *The Liberal Democratic Party: The Reality of "One Strong"*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha.

Takenaka, Harukata. 2017. *Two Regime Changes: Did Policies Change?* Tokyo: Keisō Shobō.

Tanaka, Aiji. 1995. "The Collapse of the 1955 System and the Continuation of System Support—The Discrepancy Between Voter and Diet Member Consciousness." *Leviathan* 17: 31-66.

Taniguchi, Masanori, et al. 2018. "2017 University of Tokyo Taniguchi Laboratory-Asahi Shimbun Joint Survey." *Journal of the Association of Political Science* 131, 9-10: 51-81.

________. 2020. *Representative Democracy in Contemporary Japan*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Kenbayashi, Masahiko. 2017. *An Institutional Analysis of Party Politics*. Tokyo: Chikura Shobō.

Shimizu, Ichiro. 2024. "Democracy and Hereditary Politicians." In *Platforms and Democracy: The Future of Another Monster 'Demos'*, edited by Keigo Komamura, 199-216. Tokyo: Keio University Press.

NHK Election WEB. 2024. "October 2024 House of Representatives Election Trend Survey."https://www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/shijiritsu/archive/2024/10_1.html(Accessed: October 25, 2024).

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Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 2003-2021. "General Election of Members of the House of Representatives / Referendum on Supreme Court Justices Preliminary Results." (Year of each election)https://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo_s/data/shugiin/ichiran.html (Accessed October 25, 2024).

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[1] In December 2023, an investigation by the prosecution was launched after it was revealed that some factions within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), primarily the former Abe faction, had been misappropriating political funds raised through political parties as slush funds. As a consequence, in September 2024, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida resigned. Although disciplinary actions were taken against related individuals within the LDP over the incident, considering its potential impact on the election, additional measures were implemented, including the exclusion of 12 involved lawmakers from party nominations and barring 34 individuals from running in both district and proportional representation constituencies. However, on October 23, four days before the election, it was revealed that the party headquarters had provided policy activity funds (20 million yen), interpreted as de facto election funds, to the party branches of eight excluded candidates, leading to a decisive backlash against the LDP.

[2] The term "Abe era," commonly used, narrowly refers to the period of Prime Minister Abe's administration, broadly encompasses the period influenced by the political structural characteristics established during that time, and further extends to the entire period during which major domestic and foreign policy directions were sustained. This paper views the Abe era from a political structural perspective and diagnoses that Japanese politics is currently at the juncture of a post-Abe era, beginning to move beyond the Abe era.

[3] According to exit polls, in this election, even when multiple opposition party candidates ran in the same electoral district, voters made a strategic choice to concentrate their votes on the candidate of the main opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) (Asahi Shimbun, October 28, 2024).

[4] Historically, high voter turnout has been observed during moments of power shifts between ruling and opposition parties. 1993 (67.26%) and 2009 (69.28%) are prime examples. In contrast, low voter turnout has persisted since the consolidation of LDP dominance, with the lowest ever recorded in 2014 (52.66%), followed by 2017 (53.68%). The turnout in the current election is the third lowest in history.

[5] This aligns with the phenomenon of hereditary politicians, whose proportion is overwhelmingly high within the LDP. Hereditary politicians have a significantly higher success rate (69.7%) compared to general candidates (20.8%) due to advantages in electoral base, name recognition, and political funding (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 17, 2021). As of 2024, 27.2% of LDP Diet members are hereditary politicians (Jiji Press, October 15, 2024). For the historical, institutional, and political-cultural background of the perpetuation of hereditary politicians, refer to Shimizu (2024).

[6] In Japan's House of Representatives elections, district candidates can be included in the proportional representation candidate lists. The 'sekihairitsu' system allows such candidates, if narrowly defeated in their district race, to be elected through the proportional representation ballot.

[7] For individuals who were not expelled and remained party members but were excluded from nominations, the party must provide subsequent nominations. This is because even if they are affiliated with the LDP, those not receiving nominations are treated as independent members. By retroactively providing additional nominations after the election, dating back to the nomination period, they are officially recognized as LDP members.

[8] It is realistically difficult for the Ishiba administration to continue until the Upper House election next year.

■ Lee Ju-kyungProfessor, Institute for Social Sciences, Busan National University.

■ Editor: Park Han-sooResearch Fellow, EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr