[EAI Issue Brief] Analysis of South Koreans' Support for Nuclear Armament in 2024: Has the Reassurance Effect of the Washington Declaration Disappeared?

I. South Koreans' Support for Nuclear Armament Returns to 2022 Levels

Public support for indigenous nuclear armament has returned to 2022 levels. Over the past decade, according to East Asia Institute (EAI) public opinion surveys, support for South Korea's indigenous nuclear armament has not fallen below 50%, except during the period of the "Pyeongchang Spring" in 2018, which saw inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits. Notably, in 2022, when North Korea conducted a record 69 missile provocations, including eight Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), the support rate for South Korea's indigenous nuclear armament reached 69.6%, the highest level since 2016 ([Figure 1]). This pattern is similarly observed in most other domestic public opinion surveys (Cha 2024, 6; James Kim, Kang Chung-gu, Ham Geon-hee 2023; Son Yeol, Kim Yang-gyu, Park Han-soo 2023; Lee Sang-shin, Min Tae-eun, Yoon Kwang-il, Gu Bon-sang 2023).

[Figure 1] Trend of Public Opinion on South Korea's Nuclear Possession (Pro/Con) Amidst Continued North Korean Nuclear Threat (2016-2024)

However, this year, as shown in Question 5 of [Figure 1] and [Figure 2], support for nuclear armament surged to 71.4% ("Strongly agree" 34.8%, "Somewhat agree" 36.6% for the statement 'If North Korea does not abandon its nuclear weapons, South Korea should arm itself with nuclear weapons'). Whether this is a unique phenomenon this year or a pattern that will continue requires careful observation of future survey trends. However, the results of this survey suggest that 2023 may be recorded as an exceptional period for public support for nuclear armament in South Korea, similar to the "Pyeongchang Spring" of 2018. In 2023, a majority of respondents (57.7%) agreed with the opinion that "South Korea's security concerns have been resolved due to the Washington Declaration," and consequently, as shown in [Figure 1], the proportion of respondents who supported South Korea's indigenous nuclear armament decreased by 11.1 percentage points compared to 2022 (Son Yeol, Kim Yang-gyu, Park Han-soo 2023, 13).

[Figure 2] Agreement Levels on Statements Regarding North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Responses

What is the reason for the rebound in South Koreans' support for nuclear armament in the 2024 survey? This issue brief aims to examine the variables that have a statistically significant impact on South Koreans' support for nuclear armament in 2024, focusing on the variables suggested by existing research on nuclear proliferation, such as threat perception, the ROK-U.S. alliance (credibility of U.S. extended deterrence), and domestic politics and ideological orientation, and to discuss their implications.

II. Variables Affecting Support for Nuclear Armament: Threat Perception, Alliance Credibility, and Domestic Politics

According to previous research on nuclear proliferation, factors contributing to increased public support for nuclear armament include increased security threats due to the military buildup of (potential) adversaries (Bett 1993; Cirincione 2007; Dalton et al., 2022; Lee 2023), weakened credibility of security assurances provided by allies (Kroenig 2009; Bleek 2010; Reiter 2014; Ko 2019), enhanced international status and perception of great power status conferred by nuclear weapons (Epstein 1977), and domestic political forces (conservative parties) or public opinion supporting nuclear armament (Solingen 2009; Charnysh 2014; Berger 2014). Conversely, variables that can weaken public support for nuclear armament include the high economic and human costs of nuclear armament (Son and Park 2023) and strengthened credibility of security assurances provided by allies (Jo and Gartzke 2007).

As such, there is a considerable body of research on the variables contributing to public support for nuclear armament. Of course, there are limitations where the same variable yields conflicting research results, such as reports indicating that the higher the credibility of security assurances or extended deterrence provided by allies, the lower the desire for nuclear armament in that country (Jo and Gartzke 2007), and reports suggesting that high extended deterrence credibility, conversely, stimulates "fear of entrapment," leading to a stronger desire for nuclear armament to enhance foreign policy independence (Sukin 2020).

However, considering the variables commonly pointed out in most studies, it can be predicted that support for indigenous nuclear armament will be higher when (1) the perceived magnitude of the nuclear threat posed by North Korea is greater, (2) it is believed that the extended deterrence provided by the United States is insufficient to counter the North Korean nuclear threat, and (3) conservative parties are supported. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the reasons for the recovery of public support for nuclear armament in 2024 to the 2022 level, focusing on the aforementioned variables.

III. Survey Overview and Analysis Results: South Korean Public Opinion on Nuclear Armament in 2024

EAI has conducted annual public opinion surveys since 2013 to understand the perceptions of South Koreans towards the U.S., Japan, China, and North Korea. This year, from August 26-29, 2024, an online survey was conducted targeting South Korean citizens and experts in related fields. The public opinion survey was conducted via web survey with 1,006 panelists, proportionally allocated by region, gender, and age based on the resident registration population announced by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety in July 2024. The survey method and respondent composition are shown in [Table 1]. The expert survey was conducted among 102 individuals, including researchers specializing in international affairs, journalists, and government and public institution employees.

[Table 1] Overview of the EAI East Asian Perceptions Survey

To identify the variables influencing South Koreans' support for nuclear armament in 2024, an ordinal logistic regression analysis was performed. Support for South Korea's indigenous nuclear armament was measured on a 5-point scale ("Strongly agree," "Somewhat agree," "Neither agree nor disagree," "Somewhat disagree," "Strongly disagree"). As discussed earlier, the explanatory variables included measures of 'security threat level posed by North Korea' and 'credibility of U.S. extended deterrence,' divided into current and future assessments. Additionally, 'support for a specific party' was recoded as a binary variable to examine whether the issue of nuclear armament support is a partisan issue or more influenced by 'political ideology.' Finally, generational and gender variables were added as control variables to verify their significance. The statistical analysis results are presented in [Table 2].

[Table 2] Support for South Korea's Indigenous Nuclear Armament

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

First, the perceptions that have the most consistent impact on the views of those who believe nuclear armament is necessary in South Korea in 2024 (71.37% of all respondents who answered “strongly agree” or “generally agree”) are the perceptions of ‘the possibility of North Korea’s preemptive nuclear strike’ and ‘the sufficiency of the extended deterrence provided by the United States.’ In particular, the possibility of North Korea’s preemptive nuclear strike showed the highest t-value, appearing as the variable whose impact is most difficult to dismiss. Considering the regression coefficients, there is a positive correlation where the higher the perceived possibility of North Korea’s preemptive nuclear strike, the stronger the support for nuclear armament, and a negative correlation where the more sufficient the perceived extended deterrence of the United States is to counter North Korea’s nuclear threat, the stronger the opposition to nuclear armament.

Second, the regression analysis results show that perception variables regarding future concerns about North Korea’s threat (possibility of North Korea abandoning nuclear weapons in the future) or the future of the ROK-US alliance (future prospects of ROK-US relations) are statistically significant in Models 1 and 2, but lose their significance in models including other variables (Models 3 and 4). This suggests that the main variables driving public opinion supporting nuclear armament among South Koreans in 2024 are perceptions of ‘the magnitude of the current North Korean nuclear threat’ and ‘the extended deterrence provided by the United States at the present time,’ rather than future concerns.

Third, examining whether the nuclear armament issue is dominated by political partisanship, Model 3 shows that supporting the Democratic Party of Korea leads to lower support for nuclear armament, while supporting the People Power Party leads to stronger support for independent nuclear armament. However, interestingly, when the political ideology variable is included in the model (Model 4), the issue of supporting a specific party loses statistical significance. This confirms that nuclear armament is an issue more strongly influenced by political ideology than by partisan issues. Fourth, a pattern is confirmed where support for nuclear armament is stronger among those with conservative political ideologies, older individuals, and males. This is consistent with previous research findings.

In summary, the main reasons for the surge in public support for nuclear armament in 2024, after a temporary dip in 2023, can be found in (1) the significantly increased North Korean nuclear threat in 2024, stemming from its offensive nuclear doctrine of using tactical nuclear weapons from the outset of war and statements such as “the annihilation of the Republic of Korea,” and (2) heightened public skepticism regarding the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella. It is particularly important to seriously consider that this shift in public opinion occurred amidst visible measures to demonstrate the credibility of extended deterrence, such as the USS Kentucky's port visit to Busan and the landing of strategic bombers on the Korean Peninsula following the Washington Declaration in 2023, and during consultations on Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meetings and Conventional Nuclear Integration (CNI) measures that integrate South Korea's conventional capabilities with US nuclear capabilities. In other words, despite the diverse efforts by the ROK and US authorities, which are clearly distinct from previous approaches, the public perceives these efforts as insufficient compared to the heightened North Korean nuclear threat, with strong skepticism about the adequacy of US extended deterrence.

What about the perceptions of experts in related fields? The perceptions of experts regarding the possibility of North Korea’s preemptive nuclear strike and the credibility of US extended deterrence, as revealed by statistical analysis, show a significant difference from public opinion. As shown in [Figure 3], while the general public takes the possibility of North Korea’s preemptive nuclear strike seriously (54.6% responded affirmatively), a majority of experts believe the possibility is low (70.6% responded negatively). Regarding the question of whether the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States is sufficient to counter North Korea’s threat ([Figure 4]), public opinion showed more negative perceptions (47.4%) than positive ones (41.2%), whereas experts overwhelmingly had more positive perceptions (61.7% positive, 36.3% negative).

[Figure 3] Possibility of North Korea’s Preemptive Nuclear Strike

[Figure 4] Perception of Sufficiency of Extended Deterrence Provided by the United States

This difference in perception ultimately leads to the result that, unlike the general public which largely supports nuclear armament (71.4%), an overwhelming majority of experts (78.5%) do not support South Korea’s independent nuclear armament ([Figure 5]). The significant gap between the general public and experts in South Korea regarding the issue of independent nuclear armament has also been confirmed through research by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the United States. In this context, Victor Cha advises that rather than worrying about the high support for nuclear armament in South Korean public opinion, efforts should be continuously made through measures such as the NCG, strengthening the integrated early warning system, and enhancing the deployment of strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula. Simultaneously, he urges the US government to refrain from statements and actions that appear to weaken the US security commitment to South Korea, such as highlighting alliance burden-sharing issues (Cha 2024, 17-18).

[Figure 5] Perception of Necessity of South Korean Nuclear Armament: General Public vs. Experts

IV. Policy Implications

The survey and analysis results presented above indicate that public support for nuclear armament among South Koreans has strengthened in 2024. However, the South Korean government's official position on nuclear weapon development has not deviated from its "adherence to South Korea’s long-standing commitment to its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)” (Office of the President of the Republic of Korea 2023). Nevertheless, in a democratic political system, policies that receive majority support from the public for over a decade inevitably exert considerable pressure on government officials. Particularly when government approval ratings are low, there can be a temptation to leverage policies with high public support as a means to reverse the trend.

However, as clearly revealed in the experts' responses, nuclear armament, from the perspective of national interest, has significant negative aspects when considering various factors such as the future of the ROK-US alliance, denuclearization of North Korea, the continuous development of South Korean nuclear energy, and environmental pollution issues. Above all, nuclear weapons are an old weapon system that has been in development for over 70 years, and their status is likely to significantly decline in the long term, considering the changes that the military use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), which is currently being actively discussed, will bring. At the very least, an insurmountable gap is expected to emerge between countries that operate nuclear assets integrated with AI technology and those that do not, and it is not impossible that the former will acquire first-strike capabilities against the latter (Kim Yang-gyu 2024, 12).

Therefore, South Korea needs to identify measures that can effectively counter the escalating North Korean nuclear threat while adhering to the NPT, and actively communicate these measures to the public. The key variables to consider in this process are the changes occurring at the level of military technology. The measures to enhance the credibility of extended deterrence, which the current government is pursuing with the United States, including the NCG since the Washington Declaration in 2023, are yielding positive effects among experts who understand their implications well, but they are unlikely to be causing significant changes among the general public. Thus, the South Korean government should not limit its efforts to enhancing the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella commitment; it must identify future strategic assets that could serve as alternatives to nuclear weapons, make national-level efforts to develop them, and actively communicate this policy direction to the public. ■

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■ Kim Yang-gyu_Senior Researcher, East Asia Institute; Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

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