[EAI Issue Brief] ROK-Japan Relations Swayed by Political Polarization: Improvement and Public Division Revealed in 2024 Public Opinion Survey

I. Introduction

The results concerning Japan from the 2024 East Asia Institute (EAI) East Asia Survey indicate that ROK-Japan relations have clearly entered a new phase. The proportion of respondents holding a positive impression of Japan reached its highest point since the survey began in 2013, while the proportion holding a negative impression reached its lowest. Furthermore, the perceived improvement in ROK-Japan relations was also high. Trust in Japan also more than doubled compared to the previous year. ROK-Japan relations are in a clear recovery trend.

This improvement in bilateral relations can be seen as riding the tide of the times (or structural trends). In the current international geopolitical structure characterized by US-China confrontation and the incessant nuclear-missile threats from North Korea, the strategic value and necessity of ROK-US-Japan security cooperation are increasing daily. Moreover, the economies of South Korea and Japan have become deeply interdependent. The attempt by both sides to decouple their supply chains, initiated by Japan's export control of three semiconductor materials in 2019 and South Korea's subsequent push for domestic production of materials, components, and equipment, has been effectively nullified; the economies of both countries are now so intricately connected that they are difficult to separate.

However, this trend is not irreversible. It is a well-known fact that historical issues remain an obstacle. A closer examination of public opinion trends surrounding historical disputes reveals an increasing competition among political factions united around specific political beliefs, values, and goals within both countries. In South Korea, confrontations between ideological and political groups over key issues are intensifying. The survey results show that public opinion is divided on major diplomatic issues such as the third-party compensation plan, the handling of the Sado Mine issue, and ROK-US-Japan security cooperation. The polarization of public opinion on diplomacy toward Japan undermines policy rationality, encourages extreme views, and leads to a tendency to rationalize politically or ideologically rather than learn from past mistakes, and to unilaterally pursue policies while disregarding opposing opinions. This can negatively impact South Korea's international credibility and its negotiating power with Japan. Future diplomacy toward Japan faces the critical challenge of navigating this significant obstacle of polarization.

II. Drivers of Favorable Impressions Toward Japan

The survey reveals a notable increase in positive impressions of Japan compared to last year. Respondents who hold a favorable impression (good or generally good impression) of Japan were 41.7%, while those with an unfavorable impression (bad or generally bad impression) were 42.7% ([Figure 1]). Compared to last year, favorable impressions increased by 12.9 percentage points, and unfavorable impressions decreased by 10.6 percentage points. Since the survey began in 2013, favorable impressions have reached their highest point, and unfavorable impressions their lowest ([Figure 2]).

[Figure 1] Impression of Japan

[Figure 2] Trend of Impression of Japan (2013-2024)

The favorable impression toward Japan leads to a positive evaluation of current ROK-Japan relations. When asked about the current state of ROK-Japan relations, the most common response was "average" at 50.9%. "Bad" responses accounted for 37.1%, and "good" responses for 12.0% ([Figure 3]). While "good" responses remained relatively stable at 12.7% from the previous year, "bad" responses decreased by 4.9 percentage points from the previous year (42.0% → 37.1%), and "average" responses increased by 7.8 percentage points from the previous year (43.1% → 50.9%), showing a clear reversal between "average" and "bad."

[Figure 3] Current ROK-Japan Relations

In the long term, the increase in favorable impressions has steadily risen since the survey began in 2013. After a sharp decline during the heightened ROK-Japan conflict in 2019, it has since recovered and reached its peak this year. Therefore, the drivers of favorable impressions can be considered structural. As shown in [Table 1] of the statistical analysis appendix, the main drivers of increased favorable impressions are the expansion of private-level exchanges, such as popular culture, tourism, and people-to-people exchanges, and the growing recognition of shared identity as democratic nations.

As shown in [Figure 4], the consumption of Japanese popular culture, such as anime, is increasing in South Korea. The number of visitors to Japan reached a remarkable 6.96 million in 2023, and already 5.19 million Koreans have visited Japan in January-July of this year, indicating a massive number of Koreans directly experiencing Japan. Of these visitors, 55.1% responded that their "good impression was maintained," and 22.4% responded that it "changed to a good impression" ([Figure 5]). Among consumers of Japanese popular culture, 77.9% responded that popular culture enhances their impression of Japan ([Figure 6]). In other words, the more Koreans experience Japan directly, the more favorable their impression becomes. Furthermore, as seen in [Figure 7], following "the diligent national character of the Japanese people," which has consistently been cited as the primary reason for a good impression of Japan, "Japanese food culture and shopping" rose to second place, and "shared identity as liberal democratic nations" rose to third place.

[Figure 4] Consumption of Japanese Popular Culture

[Figure 5] Change in Impression After Visiting Japan

[Figure 6] Whether Popular Culture Enhances Impression of Japan

[Figure 7] Reasons for Developing a Good Impression of Japan (2013-2024)

In summary, the increase in favorable impressions toward Japan is partly attributed to the growing perception of being on the same boat with Japan in terms of security and economy. More importantly, however, it stems from enhanced understanding and expanded shared identity through increased private-level exchanges, such as popular culture, tourism, and people-to-people interactions. Conversely, the reality of ROK-Japan relations over the past decade (the 'lost decade') suggests that the 'bottom-up forces' operating at the grassroots level have been constrained by the 'top-down forces' of conflict between political factions in both countries.

III. Rising Criticism of Government Policy

Despite the increase in favorable impressions toward Japan and the perceived improvement in relations, public evaluation of government policies addressing ROK-Japan relations is not positive. Regarding the South Korean government's policies and attitudes toward improving ROK-Japan relations, the proportion of respondents who evaluated them negatively (49.6%) exceeded those who evaluated them positively (34.5%) ([Figure 8]). Negative evaluations increased by 17.3 percentage points from the previous year (32.3%). Specifically, public opinion was significantly more negative than positive regarding the third-party compensation plan for the forced labor issue and the South Korean government's decision on the Sado Mine's inscription as a UNESCO World Heritage site ([Figure 9], [Figure 10]). In contrast, security cooperation initiatives received largely positive evaluations. 66.5% of respondents expressed a positive stance on strengthening trilateral ROK-US-Japan military security cooperation ([Figure 11]). Public opinion was also positive regarding bilateral security cooperation. When asked about the direction of ROK-Japan security cooperation in response to the escalating North Korean nuclear and missile threats, 70.8% of respondents indicated the need for information sharing or further security cooperation ([Figure 12]).

[Figure 8] South Korean Government's Attitude Toward Improving ROK-Japan Relations

[Figure 9] Evaluation of the Third-Party Compensation Plan

[Figure 10] Evaluation of South Korean Government's Response to the Sado Mine Inscription Issue

[Figure 11] Stance on Strengthening Trilateral ROK-US-Japan Military Security Cooperation

[Figure 12] Direction of ROK-Japan Security Cooperation Against North Korean Threats

The public's evaluation of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's policy toward Japan can be summarized as positive regarding government-level relations improvement and cooperation, particularly in security, but negative regarding the approach to historical issues. There is no doubt that the Yoon administration's proactive stance in proposing the third-party compensation plan to resolve the ROK-Japan relations deadlock has contributed to restoring trust at the government level through 12 summit meetings. However, the current administration appears to have relied on the optimistic view that future-oriented cooperation, centered on security cooperation, especially ROK-US-Japan cooperation, would gradually resolve historical issues. This is evidenced by the lack of concrete reciprocal measures from Japan following the proposal of the third-party compensation plan in March 2023, the South Korean government's lukewarm response, and the apparent lack of independent efforts by the South Korean government on historical issues (comfort women and forced labor issues).

In this opinion poll, the majority of the public still believes that "future-oriented cooperation (security, economy, culture, climate change cooperation, etc.) between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues" ([Figure 13]). When asked about the desired goals for ROK-Japan relations, up to the second priority, "resolution of historical issues between the two countries" was the most frequent response at 53.2%, followed by "restoration of trust between the two countries" at 47.8% ([Figure 14]). These results demonstrate that public perception of historical issues continues to be the most crucial factor influencing the future direction of ROK-Japan relations.

[Figure 13] ROK-Japan Relations and Historical Issues

[Figure 14] Goals for ROK-Japan Relations

IV. Polarizing Perceptions of Japan

The phenomenon revealed in the public opinion trends on major issues is polarization between political factions and ideologies. On almost all issues, including impressions and trust toward Japan, the overall ROK-Japan policy of the current government, and specific policies, supporters of the People Power Party and the conservative camp provided positive evaluations, while supporters of the Democratic Party of Korea and the progressive camp provided negative evaluations. [Table 2] in the appendix starkly illustrates the gap in positions between the two camps on specific issues. This suggests that the polarization of South Korean politics is having a significant impact on foreign policy, just as it is dividing public opinion and hindering the formulation of sound policies.

Looking at the trend of public opinion over the past four years, which included a change in administration, the gap between conservatives and progressives regarding impressions of Japan has widened since 2023. The conservative camp's evaluation of the current government's attitude toward improving relations shifted from negative to positive, while the progressive camp's evaluation shifted from positive to negative ([Figure 15], [Figure 16]). In other words, support and opposition regarding Japan-related issues are divided according to political affiliation.

Generational gaps are also prominent. As described in EAI's "ROK-Japan Relations Through Public Opinion 2013-2023"[1]over the past 12 years of surveys, the age groups driving positive impressions of Japan have been the youth in their 20s and 30s, while the main group holding negative impressions has been those in their 50s and 60s and older. A notable recent development is the political orientation of those in their 60s and 70s and older. Since 2023, they have shifted towards positive impressions, with those in their 70s showing the highest level among all age groups ([Figure 17]). Similarly, regarding the current government's attitude toward improving relations, those in their 70s have rapidly shifted towards support ([Figure 18]). The changes in the 60s and 70s can be interpreted as a result of political choices (i.e., support for conservative parties). The negative attitudes of those in their 40s and 50s can also be seen in the same light (i.e., support for progressive parties). In essence, the positive and cooperative attitude toward Japan revealed in the 2024 opinion poll appears to be a combination of the youth in their 20s and 30s, who are accumulating direct experiences with Japan through popular culture, tourism, and people-to-people exchanges, and the elderly in their 60s and 70s, who are providing support from a political standpoint.

[Figure 15] Impression of Japan (Positive): By Ideological Orientation

[Figure 16] South Korean Government's Attitude Toward Improving ROK-Japan Relations (Positive): By Ideological Orientation

[Figure 17] Impression of Japan (Positive): By Age Group

[Figure 18] South Korean Government's Attitude Toward Improving ROK-Japan Relations (Positive): By Age Group

V. The Trap of Polarization

As polarization in diplomacy toward Japan intensifies, South Korea will face significant diplomatic burdens. First, political power prioritizes political partisanship over policy rationality. The divided public opinion revealed in this survey reflects not their beliefs, goals, or ideologies, but rather the interests of key political leaders and political manipulation. They frame major policies as divisive issues to divide the public and force a choice between two options, thereby consolidating political support. Recent examples include framing the Fukushima wastewater issue last year or the Sado Mine issue this year within the dichotomy of pro-Japan vs. anti-Japan, amplifying public polarization. In this context, extreme voices are increasingly likely to gain political influence, while moderate or bipartisan positions are weakened.

Second, domestic division in diplomacy toward Japan not only weakens external negotiating power but also often leads to delayed decisions or stopgap measures. Conversely, polarization can encourage presidents to unilaterally pursue their agendas, disregarding the opposition of competing factions and relying on the (blind) support of their own factions. This behavior undermines democratic accountability.

Third, as partisan confrontation continues, there is a tendency not to learn from past mistakes in foreign policy formulation. Past instances such as the comfort women agreement, the lack of response after the forced labor ruling, and the suspension of the ROK-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) extension are examples where insufficient persuasion of domestic stakeholders, delayed policy decisions leading to diplomatic retaliation, or hasty responses swayed by supporter opinion damaged alliance relations. Instead of learning from these as cautionary tales and developing consistent strategies, political leaders tend to lean towards partisan rationalization.

Fourth, as foreign policy becomes polarized, an environment is created where fake news emerges, conspiracy theories proliferate, and foreign interference becomes easier. Fake news, such as the Fukushima myth claiming the sea color changed due to the discharge of wastewater, or the conspiracy theory about the current administration erasing Dokdo, and intensified political disputes through witch hunts labeling opponents as 'spies' will damage South Korea's external soft power and create an environment conducive to covert political intervention by third countries.

Finally, pursuing policies based on such partisan calculations, if they exceed the scope of strategic choices allowed by the international structure, will incur significant costs. For instance, the partisan choice to suspend the GSOMIA extension was not pursued due to US opposition, and it is well known that this led to a decline in South Korea's international credibility and, conversely, strengthened Japan's negotiating position. At a time when geopolitical competition is intensifying and the liberal economic order is in crisis, South Korea's foreign policy polarization poses significant challenges in responding to various pressing foreign policy issues. It is time to pool national wisdom, including institutional reforms, to ensure that the rational perceptions of ROK-Japan relations held by the majority of the public are not distorted by partisan polarization. ■

Appendix

[Table 1] Favorable Impressions of Japan by Koreans: Results of Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis

[Table 2] Perceptions of and policies toward Japan by political party affiliation

[1] Son Yeol and Lee Jeong-hwan, eds. 2024. *Public Opinion on Korea-Japan Relations 2013-2023*. Seoul: East Asia Institute.

■ Son Yeol_Director of the East Asia Institute, Professor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr