[Future of America Series] III. The Future of the Republican Party and Korean Peninsula Security

I. Why Trump Still? Is the Republican Party Trump's Party?

Donald Trump is the individual nominated as the Republican presidential candidate for three consecutive elections. Although he began his political career as an outsider and was unexpectedly elected president, few individuals have transformed into such a distinguished politician based on their business acumen. Trumpism has continuously exerted influence since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and it is no exaggeration to say that it has now become the ideology of the Republican Party. While Trump's personal convictions and charisma played a significant role, the success of his electoral strategy, which skillfully linked domestic political issues such as race and immigration, trade policy, and China policy with foreign policy by discerning political, economic, and cultural shifts within the United States, was crucial.

It is not surprising why the Republican Party is still Trump's party. The answer lies in recalling the process from the 2003 Iraq War to the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot, where far-right Trump supporters attempted to block the certification of Joe Biden's election victory. Trump had a history of boldly expressing opposition to the Bush administration's 2003 invasion of Iraq, a stance supported by most Republican voters at the time. If the failure of this war irrevocably damaged the credibility of Bush-era Republicans, it provided Trump with an opportunity to solidify his position by accurately expressing dissent against the Republican establishment. Twenty years later, according to a December 2023 poll conducted by The Washington Post and the University of Maryland, public opinion sympathetic to Trump and those involved in the Capitol riot has grown, significantly mitigating negative evaluations of him. Conversely, the number of respondents who view Biden's election victory as legitimate has decreased ("The Washington Post 2024-01-02). In fact, reports indicate that the perception among Trump supporters is spreading that the Capitol riot was orchestrated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), demonstrating how facts are being distorted. Thus, even if individuals do not personally like Trump, the sentiment that he deserves another chance because he was treated unfairly is gaining momentum within the Republican Party. The perceived perpetrators of Trump's "oppression" include not only Democrats but also the media, the judiciary, elites, and even mainstream Republicans who served in the Trump administration. As the Biden administration pursued investigations into those involved in the Capitol riot, Trump periodically reappeared in the news, asserting his presence. He was reborn not as someone who attempted to illegally manipulate election results, but as a champion fighting for the oppressed.

Of course, there were also crises. With the Democratic Party's strong performance in the 2022 midterm elections, assessments began to emerge that Trump no longer had a role in the Republican Party. At that time, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis began to be highlighted as a rising Republican contender, perceived as having policy directions similar to Trump's but possessing governing competence and a more moderate personality (Dueck 2023). However, contrary to expectations, DeSantis's support throughout the primary process fell short of expectations, and he had to concede defeat and withdraw from the campaign without significant impact. While his lack of charisma compared to Trump was a factor, the continuous media coverage of the legal investigations against Trump at the time significantly helped him regain momentum through publicity and sympathy (Harb 2023).

So, as of May 2024, can the Republican Party be called Trump's party? This depends on how the question is posed. If asked, "Do you believe Trump is qualified to be the Republican nominee?" a significant portion of Republican supporters would answer affirmatively. Although Trump has had significant and minor conflicts with Republican elites and donors, he is still considered a suitable candidate to unite the party. However, if asked about support for Trump on specific policy issues, a positive answer is not guaranteed. Trump has thoroughly retaliated against Republican members of Congress who voted for his impeachment, but he has been relatively lenient towards those who expressed policy differences based on their constituents' interests. The unusual division within the Republican Party over support for the war in Ukraine underscores this point.

On April 20, 2024, a security aid package bill of $95 billion, including support for Ukraine, passed the House of Representatives, followed by the Senate on the 23rd, and was signed into law by President Biden on the 24th. Although the package bill had already passed the Senate in February 2024, the vote was delayed as Republican lawmakers, holding a majority in the House, argued that domestic issues such as border security should be prioritized over foreign aid. House Speaker Mike Johnson, a staunch Trump loyalist, found a breakthrough by proposing amendments and processing the bill as four separate pieces of legislation. His decision to put the bill to a vote, risking his political career, and his meeting with Trump at Mar-a-Lago to ensure non-interference were notable. Prior to the Senate vote, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell emphasized, "The world is watching how Congress acts. The possibility of defeating Russia has been diminished by the delay in providing weapons to help Ukraine defend itself. Hesitation and delay have exacerbated the challenges we face" (Kight 2024).

The four individual bills that were abruptly passed can be summarized as follows: First, approximately $60.8 billion in military and economic assistance for Ukraine. Second, approximately $26.4 billion in aid for Israel, including military support for its fight against Hamas and humanitarian assistance for Gaza. Third, $8.1 billion to enhance the security of allies in the Indo-Pacific, including Taiwan. Fourth, a provision mandating the divestiture of TikTok. There were 14 Republican lawmakers who opposed all four bills to the end, and 17 who supported aid to Israel but opposed aid to Taiwan and Ukraine. Interestingly, despite the Ukraine security bill passing with overwhelming support—311 to 112 in the House and 79 to 18 in the Senate—a small number of Republican lawmakers delayed the vote and changed their positions like migratory birds. For example, five Republican senators who had voted in favor of Ukraine aid in the February Senate vote switched to opposition in April. Furthermore, 16 House Republicans and 15 Senate Republicans voted against the bill despite the potential for defense industry jobs in their districts (Thiessen 2024). Among the Republicans who opposed Ukraine aid, some may have done so based on political convictions, but others likely opposed it because, despite acknowledging the necessity of Ukraine aid in a highly polarized political climate, they could not bring themselves to support Biden.

II. Republican Foreign Policy Traditions and the Trump Doctrine

There have been numerous attempts by academics and media outlets to explain Trump's foreign policy strategy or doctrine. At this juncture, with the presidential debate scheduled for June 27, we will examine the core content of Colin Dueck's book, "Age of Iron," which is accessible to the general public.[1] According to Dueck, the criticism that the United States has been weakening the rules-based liberal international order since Trump's election in 2016 is based on a misunderstanding of long-standing American foreign policy traditions and strategies. The limitations of the liberal international order were foreshadowed by economic, national sovereignty, and geopolitical challenges since the Cold War. Since its founding, the United States has consistently possessed a strong conservative nationalist character, emphasizing national sovereignty, economic interests, and burden-sharing. Conservative nationalism can be categorized into three types. First, conservative interventionism, a Republican foreign policy tradition spearheaded by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, which formed the mainstream Republican stance after World War II, emphasizing anti-communism and strengthening national defense. Today, figures within the Republican Party representing this type include Senator Mitch McConnell, former South Carolina Governor and UN Ambassador Nikki Haley, and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster from the first Trump administration.

Second, conservative non-interventionism, led by Senator Robert M. La Follette, advocates for a small government in all areas, including economy, society, and security, and particularly champions peace, disarmament, and non-interference in foreign affairs. Although long considered a fringe voice, it has seen a resurgence following the failure of the Iraq War. A representative figure of this type is Senator Rand Paul, son of former Texas Representative Ron Paul.

Third, conservative hardline unilateralism, led by Senator William Borah, also known as Jacksonianism, emphasizes the status and dignity that America rightfully deserves and advocates for strengthening national defense, but calls for selective engagement rather than active involvement. This ideology aligns with the principles of the Tea Party Movement, and figures who resonate with it include members of the far-right House Freedom Caucus, such as Senator J. D. Vance, Representative Jim Jordan, and former Representative Mark Meadows.

To which of these three does Trump belong? He has stated that he is both a nationalist and an internationalist, and that he alone makes these decisions (“I’m a nationalist and a globalist. I’m both. And I’m the only one who makes the decision.”) (Nicholas et al. 2017). Dueck emphasizes that Trump is by no means an isolationist. This is because withdrawing all of America's post-World War II international commitments is a fundamentally different matter from Trump's approach of readjusting and renegotiating existing Washington foreign policy for America's benefit. In essence, Trump's foreign policy is a hybrid form that incorporates both conservative nationalism and internationalist elements, and Dueck concludes that, as has been the case in the past, this will continue to be the case as the Republican Party evolves.

Dueck summarizes the Trump Doctrine into four "pressure campaigns," which primarily involved pressuring both adversaries and allies on security and economic issues. First, the pressure campaign on adversaries regarding security issues is exemplified by the attempt to engage North Korea while maintaining maximum pressure. Second, the pressure campaign on allies regarding security issues was primarily applied to NATO members, particularly concerning defense cost-sharing, with South Korea being the next target. Third, the pressure campaign on adversaries regarding economic issues was most clearly applied in U.S. policy toward China. Fourth, the pressure campaign on allies regarding economic issues includes the imposition of tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and the European Union. Dueck assesses that while the first three pressure campaigns were justifiable, the fourth campaign—pressuring allies on economic issues—lacked strategic benefit, and suggests that this campaign should be eased to form a united front against China. He adds that instead of fixating on tariffs, the focus should be on achieving concessions, and that means other than tariffs should also be utilized. The recent imposition of high tariffs by the Biden administration on Chinese electric vehicles, batteries, steel, and aluminum offers a glimpse of the Trump Doctrine's influence.

III. The 2024 U.S. Presidential Election, the Future of the Republican Party, and Korean Peninsula Security

Foreign policy does not carry significant weight in determining the ideology and identity of the Republican Party. However, its importance has been highlighted because Trump exposed new fault lines within the Republican Party concerning foreign policy during the 2015 primaries, leading to his nomination and election in 2016. The question is whether the hybrid or balanced combination of nationalism and internationalism demonstrated during Trump's first term will continue in his second term. If Trump wins the 2024 election, the foreign policy tradition known as conservative nationalism will be re-emphasized, reinforcing the continuity of this mixed tradition. However, if Trump fails to win re-election, the situation will change. Trump's presence will be maintained to some extent through social media and news coverage, but his influence will gradually wane unless he is re-elected as the Republican presidential nominee. Instead, intense competition and rivalry among Republicans, encompassing perspectives from internationalism to isolationism, such as those of Nikki Haley, Ron DeSantis, and J. D. Vance, will emerge, creating new opportunities and challenges.

Trump's negative perception of alliances, unpredictable rhetoric and actions, and the "escalate to de-escalate" tactic aimed at reducing pressure all contributed to making his first term's pressure campaigns memorable. However, as seen in the recent congressional vote on Ukraine aid, flexibility within the Republican Party regarding specific alliance policies can be expected. Even if Trump personally views alliances as burdens rather than assets, a majority of Republican lawmakers strongly support security commitments to NATO and East Asian allies.

In recent years, in addition to traditional internationalist Republicans who advocate for actively supporting alliances, hawkish unilateralist Republicans who believe in selective support, and isolationist Republicans who argue that allies should be self-reliant in their defense, another type has emerged emphasizing regional priorities. These are individuals like former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby and Senator Josh Hawley, who advocate for active engagement to counter China but prioritize an "Asia First" approach (Colby and Mastro 2022). Their argument that the United States must concentrate military and strategic resources in Asia to effectively counter China's multifaceted threats may cause anxiety among European allies while offering some reassurance to Asian allies. Conversely, Republican supporters who advocate for active engagement in Europe argue that this is necessary to deter Russia and prevent it from bolstering China's rise (Grygiel 2024). At the very least, the fact that traditional internationalists like McConnell, and Asia First proponents like Colby and Hawley, actively support engagement and defense in East Asia can be interpreted as securing a supermajority within the Republican Party. However, the increased pressure on Asian allies to invest more in their own defense and participate in efforts to counter China, commensurate with the U.S. focus on Asia, presents a more challenging aspect for South Korea. This could lead to demands for increased cost-sharing beyond the current burden-sharing agreement, potentially including costs for joint military exercises and training, and extended deterrence, in addition to the costs of maintaining U.S. Forces Korea. Regarding participation in countering China, Washington may impose unreasonable demands, such as diplomatic criticism of China's aggressive actions, more assertive joint military exercises, the adoption and operation of advanced weapon systems, further expansion of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, and integration of missile defense systems.

Ultimately, what is crucial is the South Korean government's consistent strategic orientation and preparedness, free from short-term reactions. During Trump's first term, there was a gap between the U.S. grand strategy focused on great power competition and the conservative nationalist foreign policy advocated by the Trump Doctrine (Wright 2018). While the former ultimately prevailed, some argue that Trump's nationalist tendencies directly clashed with a great power worldview by rejecting competition with Russia and actively engaging with North Korea. If Trump wins re-election and his second administration lacks "adults" like former Secretary of Defense James Mattis or former National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster, this gap may converge towards nationalism, significantly impacting Korean Peninsula security. Under the slogan of "peace through strength," Trump was primarily concerned with North Korean attacks on the U.S. homeland and considered preemptive strikes in 2017. If this approach continues, the possibility of a freeze-for-relief agreement with North Korea—a nuclear freeze or a halt to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests in exchange for sanctions relief—cannot be ruled out. Amidst the deepening relations between China, Russia, North Korea, and Russia-North Korea due to the aftermath of the Ukraine war, if simultaneous conflicts were to erupt in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea could face a situation where it must defend itself against North Korean aggression while the U.S. is preoccupied with Taiwan. Since U.S. extended deterrence commitments are inherently "extended," close alliance cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. is essential. Although Trump is well aware of the risks of nuclear proliferation, if the U.S. continues to become increasingly nationalistic and shifts more security burdens to its allies, it is conceivable that under the demands of South Korean leadership, South Korea's own nuclear armament, or at least the potential for nuclear development, might be tolerated. ■

References

Colby, Elbridge, and Oriana Skylar Mastro. 2022. “Ukraine Is a Distraction From Taiwan.” Wall Street Journal. February 13. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-is-a-distraction-from-taiwan-russia-china-nato-global-powers-military-invasion-jinping-biden-putin-europe-11644781247(Accessed May 20, 2024)

Dueck, Colin. 2019. Age of Iron: On Conservative Nationalism. Oxford University Press.

______. 2023a. “The DeSantis Doctrine At Home.” The National Interest. February 8. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/desantis-doctrine-home-206193(Accessed May 20, 2024)

______. 2023b. “The DeSantis Doctrine Abroad.” The National Interest. February 9. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/desantis-doctrine-abroad-206198(Accessed May 20, 2024)

Grygiel, Jakub. 2021. “Deter Russia in Ukraine and Avoid a Sino-Russian Dual Alliance.” The National Interest. April 16. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/deter-russia-ukraine-and-avoid-sino-russian-dual-alliance-182898(Accessed May 20, 2024)

Harb, Ali. 2023. “Donald Trump stumbled in 2022. How is he leading the 2024 race?” Al Jazeera. December 27. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/12/27/donald-trump-stumbled-in-2022-how-is-he-leading-the-2024-race(Accessed May 20, 2024)

Kight, Stef W. 2024. “McConnell blasts “dithering and hesitation” on Ukraine aid.” Axios. April 23. https://www.axios.com/2024/04/23/mcconnell-ukraine-aid-senate-vote (Retrieved: May 20, 2024)

Nicholas, Peter, Paul Vieira, and José de Córdoba. 2017. “Why Donald Trump Decided to Back Off Nafta Threat.” Wall Street Journal. April 27. https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-says-nafta-partners-persuaded-him-to-keep-u-s-in-trade-pact-1493320127 (Retrieved: May 20, 2024)

The Washington Post. 2024. “Dec. 14-18, 2023, Washington Post-University of Maryland poll.” January 2. https://www.washingtonpost.com/tablet/2024/01/01/dec-14-18-2023-washington-post-university-maryland-poll/ (Retrieved: May 20, 2024)

Theissen, Marc A. 2024. “These politicians voted against their states’ best interests on Ukraine aid.” The Washington Post. April 25. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/04/25/senators-house-members-opposed-ukraine-aid/ (Retrieved: May 20, 2024)

Wright, Thomas. 2018. “Trump Wants Little to Do With His Own Foreign Policy.” The Atlantic. January 31. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/trump-foreign-policy-russia-china-nato-mcmaster-tillerson-mattis/552002/ (Retrieved: May 20, 2024)

[1] When asked during a video conference on May 16th if there were any parts of the book that needed revision or upgrading, Professor Dueck confidently replied that partial upgrades were necessary and important, but the core arguments remained unchanged.

■ Kwon Boram_Senior Researcher, Center for Security Strategy, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ Contact and Editing: Park Hansu_EAI Researcher

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