[ADRN Issue Brief] Indonesian Democracy and the 2024 Election: A Decisive Moment

Preliminary results released immediately after Indonesia's presidential and legislative elections on February 14 projected a convergence of outcomes for both elections. The presidential and vice-presidential ticket of Prabowo Subianto of the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra Party) and Gibran Rakabuming Raka defeated the independent candidates Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar and the ticket of Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), winning the presidential election. The Prabowo-Gibran ticket secured 56-59 percent of the vote, ahead of the Anies-Muhaimin ticket with 24-26 percent and the Ganjar-Mahfud ticket with 15-17 percent (Ira 2024). Meanwhile, the legislative election results are estimated to have seen eight parties enter parliament: the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P, 16.4%), Golkar Party (14.6%), Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra Party, 13.5%), National Awakening Party (PKB, 10.7%), Nasdem Party (9.9%), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, 8.4%), Democratic Party (Demokrat Party, 7.6%), and National Mandate Party (PAN, 7.1%). Although the PDI-P lost the presidential election, its leading performance in the legislative election suggests diversity in the electoral outcomes (Farisa 2024).

Although the official results from the General Election Commission (KPU) are yet to be announced, preliminary results indicate the victory of the incumbent President Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) political successor. Not only is Vice Presidential candidate Gibran the son of President Jokowi, but the Prabowo-Gibran ticket also claimed victory by emphasizing continuity with President Jokowi's administration during their campaign. Furthermore, the parties supporting the Prabowo-Gibran ticket collectively secured over 40 percent of the vote in the legislative elections, surpassing the combined 29% for parties supporting Anies-Muhaimin and 16.4% for parties supporting Ganjar-Mahfud. These results raise concerns that the trend of democratic regression, noted in several studies during Jokowi's tenure, may continue under the new administration (Power and Warburton 2020).

Democratic Regression in Indonesia and the 2024 Election

In recent years, numerous scholars have argued that Indonesia's democracy is experiencing regression (Aspinall and Warburton 2017; Power and Warburton 2020; Wijayanto, Budiatri and Wiratraman 2022). How did this democratic regression manifest during the 2024 election, and what will be its future implications? Indonesia's democratic decline appears to be exacerbated by the political misuse of the judicial system, the strengthening of dynastic politics, and serious electoral fraud. Indonesia is currently at a crossroads between the resurgence of authoritarianism and the restoration of democracy, experiencing a period that will significantly impact the future of democracy.

Prior to the 2019 election, Indonesia's electoral processes were lauded by experts in the field (Aspinall and Mietzner 2019; Bland 2019). Indonesia had been recognized for successfully managing complex electoral procedures on a global scale, realizing the principles of competitiveness, fairness, and freedom. However, a different perspective has emerged regarding the 2024 election. Some segments of civil society, including academics and democracy advocates, have raised criticisms of the electoral process, arguing that it has negatively impacted Indonesian democracy and further accelerated democratic regression. Specifically, the politicization of the judicial system, the strengthening of dynastic politics, and serious electoral fraud and irregularities have emerged as significant threats to full democracy.

The Constitutional Court's decision to grant an exception to the age requirement of 40 years for presidential and vice-presidential candidates, specifically for individuals with prior elected experience, caused considerable political upheaval and democratic regression during the election period. This ruling enabled Jokowi's eldest son, Gibran, to run as Prabowo's running mate in the vice-presidential election. Although Gibran did not meet the age requirement, his prior experience as the mayor of Solo for two years made him eligible to run under the Constitutional Court's decision.

The Constitutional Court's decision was made by Chief Justice Anwar Usman, who is related to President Jokowi, and faced criticism for not undergoing a sufficient deliberation process. The decision-making process was characterized by inconsistency and haste. Initially, the issue of candidacy requirements was considered a matter for the legislature and the executive branch, not the Constitutional Court. However, the Chief Justice ultimately participated in the deliberation despite potential conflicts of interest, and an agreement was reached to amend the candidacy requirement regulations. This series of events further complicated the political interests surrounding the issue (Ulya, Mantalean and Yahya 2023; Ulya and Prabowo 2023). While there have been past instances where legal and political interests intertwined, such as concerning the job creation bill or amendments to the anti-corruption commission law, this case directly involves the status of Indonesia's highest constitutional body, raising concerns about its significant impact on democratic regression.

Following the Constitutional Court's decision and Gibran's candidacy, President Jokowi's successor officially entered the 2024 election arena. Despite Gibran's limited political experience, he overshadowed politicians like Airlangga Hartarto, the chairman of the Golkar Party, and Erick Thohir, the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises, who were also considered potential running mates for Prabowo. Furthermore, Gibran's younger brother, Kaesang Pangarep, entered politics by being elected chairman of the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) shortly before the election. The clear influence of kinship in placing Jokowi's two sons in prominent positions, despite their lack of experience, solidifies the trend of dynastic politics that has recently permeated Indonesian politics, spearheaded by the children of former presidents Megawati Soekarnoputri (presidency 2001-2004) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (presidency 2004-2014). These 'political dynasties' undermine the political recruitment function of political parties and disregard the principle of meritocracy, thereby causing democratic regression.

In contrast to the 2019 election, which was deemed fair, the current electoral process is marred by numerous allegations of violations and fraud, as pointed out by various civil society groups. Vote-buying, voter mobilization, and suspicious vote-counting procedures are not new issues in elections. However, the problem of state institutions compromising their impartiality is particularly concerning and was not evident in previous elections. The issue of unfairness in the election arose because numerous public officials, who had conflicts of interest as candidates, relatives of candidates, or party officials, did not resign from their positions. Moreover, in 2023, the Jokowi administration enacted new regulations allowing ministers to retain their positions even if they ran for president. Consequently, ministers running for office could potentially misuse state resources for personal political gain during the election campaign. A joint investigation by 35 civil society organizations and five individuals documented 121 cases of electoral fraud between November 13, 2023, and January 31, 2024. The majority of these cases involved the lack of impartiality of state institutions. These findings suggest that President Jokowi violated the principle of fairness in democratic elections by using his presidential authority to influence the election (Kontras 2024).

The 2024 election represents a turning point that will determine the future trajectory of Indonesian democracy. The aforementioned three issues suggest that elections can function not only as a mechanism for political succession but also as an intermediate stage towards an authoritarian political system. This evokes the 'New Order' presented by Suharto's authoritarian regime, which included dynastic politics within the Suharto family, the erosion of judicial foundations, and the pursuit of political interests by the ruling elite through the abuse of state power. Indonesian democracy has moved beyond the initial stages of regression and is heading towards its most critical juncture.

Positive Trends for the Future of Democracy

The 2024 election process, on the other hand, also presented hopeful prospects for the future of democracy. The rapid growth of coalitions among civil society organizations to monitor the election process and strengthen democratic institutions has formed a crucial asset for building a more robust democratic oversight system in the future. Furthermore, the alliance of parties supporting the Anies-Muhaimin ticket, which advocated for reforms to the Jokowi administration, and the PDI-P, which distanced itself from the Jokowi family after attempting to curb the political alliance between Jokowi and his son, could form an opposition coalition in parliament, creating an opportunity to pursue the principle of checks and balances. If civil society continues to develop and maintain its coalitions, and if influential opposition forces emerge, there remains hope for the future development of democracy.

During the election period, civil society strengthened its collaborative relationships. Democracy-related organizations, which traditionally focused on different agendas, formed alliances and coalitions. For instance, a coalition of 35 institutions and five individual activists has filed lawsuits against President Jokowi for alleged electoral fraud and unfairness. This coalition includes not only organizations that have raised election-related issues but also institutions addressing diverse agendas such as the environment, anti-corruption, and labor rights (Kontras 2024). Additionally, the documentary "Dirty Vote," which sparked widespread interest in electoral irregularities, was produced through the collaboration of 23 civil society organizations working on themes such as elections, environmental conservation, anti-corruption, and journalism (Dirty Vote 2024).

Alongside civil society organizations, academic circles have also seen movements toward coalition building. From late January until election day, thousands of scholars from over 70 universities issued statements expressing concern over the fairness of the election and the state of Indonesian democracy (Wijayanto 2024). The academic movement has resonated with and complemented the efforts of civil society organizations and activists. This solidarity and broad mobilization within civil society are significant for disseminating public discourse and promoting collective action against democratic infringements. It remains to be seen whether this solidarity will persist and generate further impact beyond the election, reaching grassroots communities.

Alongside the influence of civil society, the role of political forces committed to upholding democracy is essential. The existence of a self-sustaining opposition is particularly crucial. Based on the preliminary legislative election results, the opposition parties, if allied with the PDI-P, Nasdem Party, Prosperous Justice Party, and National Awakening Party, could secure over 45 percent of the seats. The formation of this opposition alliance would create a political asset capable of achieving checks and balances through collective influence. If this alliance materializes, it would represent the strongest opposition force in the last two decades. The fact that the PDI-P secured the largest number of seats in parliament also warrants attention.

However, political negotiations between President Jokowi, the Prabowo-Gibran camp, and various political parties could hinder the formation of a strong opposition coalition. Media reports indicate that Surya Paloh, the chairman of the Nasdem Party, met with Jokowi shortly after the election to discuss the possibility of an alliance, and the National Awakening Party has consistently supported the government to date (Abdurrahman 2024). The balance of power between the ruling and opposition parties in the new parliament will be shaped by political dynamics and lobbying. Therefore, the current juncture immediately following the election is a critical moment in Indonesian politics, and it is imperative for all parties to uphold their responsibility to protect democracy and recognize the necessity of an opposition force in parliament to prevent democratic regression.

Conclusion

The 2024 election is a pivotal moment that will determine the future direction of Indonesian democracy. The misuse of the judicial system, electoral fraud, and the strengthening of dynastic politics have posed serious threats to Indonesian democracy. The victory of the successor to President Jokowi's political legacy has fueled concerns that democratic regression will accelerate. However, hope for the future of Indonesian democracy still remains. The concerted efforts of a consolidated civil society coalition have formed a source of strength capable of safeguarding democracy in the future. The potential for opposition forces to play a role in defending democracy within parliament also remains open. If civil society and political actors remain steadfast in their commitment to democracy, they can ensure the principles of checks and balances and deepen the understanding of democratic principles throughout society. ■

References

Abdurrahman, Sultan. 2024. “Soal Surya Paloh Bertemu Jokowi, Nasdem: Murni Mengharga Undangan Seorang Kepala Negara.” Tempo. February 23. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1836771/soal-surya-paloh-bertemu-jokowi-nasdem-murni-menghargai-undangan-seorang-kepala-negara (Accessed February 23, 2024)

Aspinall, Edward, and Eve Warburton. 2017. “Indonesia: The Dangers of Democratic Regression.” Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research (ASSEHR), Volume 129. https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/25891321.pdf (Accessed February 18, 2024)

Aspinall, Edward and Marcus Mietzner. 2019. “Indonesia’s Democratic Paradox.” New Mandala. December 7. https://www.newmandala.org/indonesias-democratic-paradox/ (Accessed February 18, 2024)

Bland, Ben. 2019. “The World’s Most Complicated Single-Day Election is a Feat of Democracy.” The Atlantic. April 15. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/indonesias-elections-are-feat-democracy/587143/ (Accessed February 18, 2024)

Dirty Vote. 2024.“DIRTY VOTE – Full Movie (OFFICIAL).” YouTube. February 11. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRgLZ66NCmE (Accessed February 22, 2024)

Farisa, Fitria Chusna. 2023. “Quick Count Litbang Kompas Data 99 Persen: 8 Masuk ke DPR.” Kompas. February 17. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/02/17/09002941/quick-count-litbang-kompas-data-99-persen-8-parpol-masuk-ke-dpr (Accessed February 21, 2024)

Ira, Laili. 2024. “10 Lembaga Survei yang Rilis Prabowo-Gibran Menang Quick Count Pilpres 2024.” Tempo. February 15. https://pemilu.tempo.co/read/1833863/10-lembaga-survei-yang-rilis-prabowo-gibran-menang-quick-count-pilpres-2024 (Accessed February 21, 2024)

Power, Thomas and Eve Warburton (eds.). 2020. Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression? Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

Ulya, Fika Nurul, Vitorio Mantalean, and Achmad Nasrudin Yahya. 2023. “Saldi Isra Sebut MK Masuk Jebakan Politik Usai Putuskan Usia Capres-Cawapres.” Kompas. October 16. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/10/16/19445651/hakim-saldi-isra-sebut-mk-masuk-jebakan-politik-usai-putuskan-usia-capres (Accessed February 18, 2024)

Ulya, Fika and Dani Prabowo. 2023. “Constitutional Court Justice Arief Hidayat Reveals Irregularities in the Court’s Granting of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Age Limit Lawsuit.” Kompas. October 16. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/10/16/19130891/hakim-konstitusi-arief-hidayat-beberkan-kejanggalan-mk-kabulkan-gugatan-usia?page=all (Accessed February 18, 2024)

Wijayanto, Aisah P. Budiatri, and Herlambang P. Wiratraman (eds.). 2022. Reflections of 100 Social and Political Scientists on the Decline of Democracy in Indonesia. Jakarta: LP3ES.

Wijayanto. 2024. “Strengthening Democratic Culture.” Kompas. February 22. https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2024/02/21/en-memperkuat-budaya-demokrasi?open_from=English_Page (Accessed February 23, 2024)

Kontras. 2024. “Civil Society Coalition Summons President Jokowi, Urges Halt to Deception and Unethical Actions Ahead of the Vote.” Kontras. February 9. https://kontras.org/2024/02/09/koalisi-masyarakat-sipil-somasi-presiden-jokowi-desak-hentikan-keculasan-dan-tindakan-nir-etika-jelang-pencoblosan/ (Accessed February 20, 2024)

■ Aisah Putri Budiatri_Researcher at the Center for Political Research, National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Indonesia.

■ Responsible and Edited by: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

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