[EAI Issue Brief] A Correct Reading of North Korea's Shift in Policy Toward South Korea: The Annihilation of the Republic of Korea vs. The End of the Kim Jong Un Regime

As North Korea has declared a "fundamental shift in policy" toward South Korea centered on "hostile state relations" and mentioned the possibility of war, various domestic and international discussions are chaotically ongoing regarding its background. To clarify this confusion, this article will first briefly summarize the changes in North Korea's policy toward South Korea, as presented at the expanded plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, 9th session in late December last year, within the context of the historical evolution of North Korea's policy toward South Korea. Second, it will examine North Korea's newly proposed "annihilation of the Republic of Korea" in conjunction with the U.S. Biden administration's "end of the Kim Jong Un regime" as part of its tailored extended deterrence strategy in response to North Korea's nuclear threats. Finally, it will propose four comprehensive policy directions for South Korea to pursue in order to build a new system for peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, moving beyond the current discourse of destruction and annihilation.

1. Fundamental Shift in Policy Toward South Korea: The Annihilation of the Republic of Korea

At the end-of-year meeting, Chairman Kim Jong Un presented "a policy for a fundamental shift in direction in the South Korea policy, based on a sober analysis of the bitter history of inter-Korean relations, which has been fraught with distrust and confrontation" (KCNA, 12/31/2023). He explained that this was because both conservative and progressive South Korean governments, under the guise of 'North Korea policy' or 'unification policy,' had actually pursued 'absorption unification' or 'regime collapse,' thereby conflicting with North Korea's "policy for the unification of the fatherland based on one nation, one state, and two systems." Furthermore, he asserted that South Korea, which is "polluted by Yankee culture" socially and culturally and is merely a "paralyzed, colonial subordinate state" dependent on the U.S. for security, has "completely solidified into relations between two hostile states, not relations between compatriots or of the same origin, and relations between two belligerent states in a state of war."

In his policy speech at the 10th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (KCNA, 01/15/2024), Chairman Kim Jong Un warned that as the U.S. escalates military tensions while bordering South Korea, the possibility of escalation and war due to physical conflict is increasing, stating that war would "end with the horrific annihilation of the entity called the Republic of Korea" and vowing to inflict "unimaginable disaster and defeat upon the United States." In a speech on February 8, the Ministry of National Defense designated South Korea as "the primary hostile country posing the greatest threat to us, an immutable enemy" and established the invasion of South Korean territory in case of emergency as a "national policy." It also stated that North Korea had "taken the initiative to shed the unrealistic shackles" of having to pursue formal dialogue or cooperation with South Korea "out of consideration for the rhetorical expression of compatriots," and had gained "legitimacy to strike and annihilate at any time."

Since the military parade commemorating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army on April 25, 2022, North Korea has referred to a "second mission" for its nuclear forces in an offensive capacity toward South Korea, distinct from the "first mission" of deterrence and defense against U.S. military threats in the traditional sense. When revising the decree on nuclear force policy, adopted on April 1, 2013, on September 8, 2022, it newly included the "operational mission to repel the aggression and attack of hostile forces and achieve decisive victory in war in case deterrence fails." However, at the time of mentioning the second mission of nuclear forces in 2022, the "annihilation of the Republic of Korea" was not explicitly mentioned. Therefore, North Korea's theory of the annihilation of the Republic of Korea is a new expression to clearly demonstrate the shift in its policy toward South Korea.

Looking back historically at the changes in North Korea's policy toward South Korea, the first period was the 'war-based unification line' pursued after 1948, which manifested concretely in the Korean War of 1950. The second period was the introduction of the 'revolutionary unification theory' at the 4th Party Congress in 1964. The key factor behind this policy shift was international variables. Although the U.S. began its full-scale intervention in the Vietnam War, amidst the deepening Sino-Soviet conflict, North Korea found it increasingly difficult to pursue a war-based unification line, such as a second Korean War. Consequently, North Korea, which held military and economic superiority over South Korea, shifted its priority from a war-based line to a revolutionary line. The three basic principles of the July 4th South-North Joint Statement in 1972—independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity—were also concrete expressions of this policy.

As a third period, following the war-based unification line and the revolutionary unification line, North Korea is redefining inter-Korean relations as "relations between two hostile states, not relations between compatriots or of the same origin, and relations between two belligerent states in a state of war" to pursue its tailored nuclear threat strategy toward South Korea. Therefore, North Korea's newly proposed hostile state relations must be examined with attention, distinct from the past war-based and revolutionary lines.

2. The Core of the Policy Shift Toward South Korea: Extended Deterrence Against North Korea and the End of the Kim Jong Un Regime

While North Korea's policy shift toward South Korea is proceeding amidst a complex interplay of changes in North Korean domestic politics, inter-Korean relations, and international politics, it is particularly necessary to examine the changes in the international political dimension first.

The U.S. Biden administration, in its October 27, 2022, public release of the National Defense Strategy, including the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), presented a new tailored deterrence strategy against North Korea (U.S. Department of Defense, 10/27/2022). It stated that if North Korea uses nuclear weapons against the U.S. or its allies, it would face "the end of the Kim Jong Un regime," meaning "no scenario exists in which North Korea could survive after using nuclear weapons." In response, a spokesperson for the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on October 31, asserting that "the United States, which is the only country in the world to make the 'regime end' of a sovereign state a primary objective of its nuclear strategy, must be prepared to pay an equivalent price if it attempts to use force against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (KCNA, 10/31/2022). Chairman Kim Jong Un then designated South Korea as "undoubtedly our clear enemy" at the expanded plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, 6th session, and mentioned the execution of the "second mission" of nuclear forces, emphasizing that this was "clearly not for defense" (KCNA, 01/01/2023). Realistically, North Korea, lacking effective nuclear deterrence against the U.S., has begun to designate South Korea as an 'enemy' and emphasize it as a target for its nuclear forces in response to the threat of the 'end of the Kim Jong Un regime'.

A more specific response emerged after the South Korea-U.S. summit and the announcement of the Washington Declaration on April 26, 2023. On April 29, Kim Yo Jong, Deputy Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, released a statement through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA, 04/29/2023). In this document, North Korea clarified three points. First, the Washington Declaration was described as "a concentrated product of the most hostile and aggressive actions and an epitome of the extremely hostile policy toward North Korea." The establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) has placed North Korea in a situation where it "must take more decisive action commensurate with the new security environment." Second, North Korea pointed out "another fact that cannot but be calculated and cannot be overlooked from our perspective": "the enemy's commander-in-chief openly and directly used the expression 'regime end' in front of the eyes of the whole world." Third, North Korea stated that it "must further perfect the enhancement of nuclear war deterrence" and particularly "the second mission of deterrence." Subsequently, North Korea held nationwide rallies condemning South Korea and the U.S., and at a youth and student rally on May 3, a straw effigy burning ceremony targeting the leaders of South Korea and the U.S. was held.

Since then, the expression 'regime end' has been consistently included in North Korea's responses. In his speech at the 9th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly on September 28, 2023, Chairman Kim Jong Un criticized that "the United States, which in the last century made the physical elimination of our state its national policy and even forced a war for its realization, is still revising its war scenario for the realization of our 'regime end' and has activated the 'Nuclear Consultative Group' in collusion with the 'Republic of Korea' with the aim of using nuclear weapons against our state," thereby justifying the advancement of North Korea's nuclear forces and the constitutionalization of its nuclear force policy (KCNA, 09/28/2023). The fundamental shift in policy toward South Korea announced at the expanded plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in late December 2023 also points to the "regime end" as part of the Biden administration's tailored extended deterrence strategy.

Since the U.S. government first used the expression "regime end" in October 2022, North Korea has designated South Korea as an enemy state capable of executing the second mission of its nuclear forces, and refers to it as 'the Republic of Korea,' a distinct hostile nation, instead of 'South Korea,' its fellow ethnic group. In the face of the U.S. proposing the 'regime end' and demonstrating the technological capabilities to back it up, North Korea, while consistently asserting the first mission of its nuclear forces, has recently placed greater emphasis on nuclear threats against South Korea as its second mission.

At the root of these changes lies North Korea's tailored nuclear threat strategy. In the past Cold War era, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union possessed stable second-strike capabilities—the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons even after being attacked—leading to a state of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) where both sides could certainly destroy each other, a significant shift occurred as they sought to avoid mutual annihilation by refraining from direct armed conflict. The most crucial factor in this "Nuclear Revolution" was the sharing of "mutual vulnerability" based on MAD (Jervis 1989, 23-38). Therefore, for North Korea to secure strategic stability in U.S.-North Korea relations by possessing the capability for MAD against the U.S., it would need to possess capabilities such as the 'end of U.S. core leadership' or the 'destruction of major cities,' holding the lives and property of a significant portion of the population hostage, at a level comparable to the U.S. threat of 'regime end' against North Korea.

However, the gap in nuclear capabilities between the U.S. and North Korea is incomparably large. According to statistics from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), as of January 2023, the U.S. possesses 1,770 deployable nuclear warheads and 1,938 warheads in storage. North Korea, on the other hand, is estimated to have no deployable warheads and approximately 30 warheads in storage. In terms of sheer warhead numbers, North Korea is at about one-hundredth the level of the U.S. Particularly concerning tactical nuclear warheads usable on the battlefield, while North Korea's numbers are not precisely known, the U.S. is known to have deployed 100 such warheads to NATO member states—Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey—and stores 100 more in the continental U.S. Of particular note is the ongoing replacement of older B61-3 and B61-4 warheads with the newer B61-12. The B61-12 is a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon with high-precision guidance capabilities, capable of destroying underground targets with minimal radioactive fallout, unlike its predecessors. Its delivery platforms include not only the B-2 strategic bomber but also the F-35A fifth-generation stealth fighter, enabling preemptive strikes against enemy command centers and key military facilities (SIPRI 2023, 247-259).

The U.S. is further pursuing integrated deterrence by building comprehensive security capabilities that can simultaneously engage in armed conflict and hybrid warfare in gray zones across multiple domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyber—using advanced nuclear and conventional weapons augmented by artificial intelligence and allied capabilities (White House, 10/12/2022, 22). In short, the era of exclusive dominance of nuclear weapons is rapidly fading. The U.S.'s tailored extended deterrence strategy of "regime end" against North Korea is realistically operating based on these integrated deterrence capabilities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022/10/27, 8).

In response to these U.S. capability advancements, North Korea is, above all, concerned with the issue of life and death for its "absolute dignity." Ri Ji-seong, a researcher at the Institute of International Politics, recently wrote in the Rodong Sinmun (February 2, 2024) about the U.S. redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the UK, pointing out and expressing concern that U.S. B-2 stealth nuclear strategic bombers based in Guam can be equipped with and operate the B61-12, making them usable for operations in the Korean Peninsula region, and urging the strengthening of North Korea's nuclear war deterrence.The Telegraphreporting on the U.S. redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the UK, pointing out and expressing concern that U.S. B-2 stealth nuclear strategic bombers based in Guam can be equipped with and operate the B61-12, making them usable for operations in the Korean Peninsula region, and urging the strengthening of North Korea's nuclear war deterrence.

However, North Korea's nuclear capabilities cannot pose a realistic threat to the U.S. by targeting key military and non-military facilities that constitute core U.S. national interests. Without possessing second-strike capability against the U.S., it cannot share mutual vulnerability with the U.S., making it impossible to establish stable mutual deterrence. Due to these clear limitations, North Korea is emphasizing the second mission of 'annihilation of the Republic of Korea' instead of its first mission, given its current nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Therefore, the 'annihilation of the Republic of Korea' is North Korea's tailored nuclear threat strategy in response to the U.S.'s enhanced tailored extended deterrence of 'regime end.' To advocate for this nuclear threat strategy, it emphasizes the annihilation of the Republic of Korea as a completely different hostile nation, rather than 'South Korea,' its fellow ethnic group.

3. South Korea's Policy Toward North Korea: Strengthening Integrated Deterrence and Comprehensive Security Guarantees for a Non-Nuclear North Korea

Historically, North Korea has developed its policy toward South Korea within the framework of strengthening three revolutionary capabilities: international, inter-Korean, and domestic. To wisely respond to North Korea's new tailored nuclear threat theory based on 'two hostile states' and the 'annihilation of the Republic of Korea,' thereby contributing to peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in the regional order, South Korea must move beyond the current efforts that merely connect North Korea's domestic political needs, changes in inter-Korean relations, and international political factors in a flat manner. It is necessary to accurately grasp North Korea's strategic priorities and formulate a new direction for policy toward North Korea.

First, strengthening extended deterrence in conjunction with the U.S.'s integrated deterrence, which has been actively pursued since 2023, is unavoidable. The Washington Declaration and the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group have, with the recent production and deployment of B61-12 warheads and the increasing importance of the F-35 as a key delivery platform, brought about increased credibility for the most fatal threat of regime end to North Korea. Unlike the Cold War era when the U.S. and the Soviet Union established a system of mutual assured destruction by being able to accept massive destruction of each other's core military facilities, major cities, and industrial complexes, North Korea itself proves that the end of the Kim Jong Un regime is the most effective response. In this context, South Korea's nascent discussion of indigenous nuclear armament is no longer effective, and the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons is also difficult to consider as an option in the strategic reality of the Indo-Pacific, which differs from Europe. Through the evolution of the South Korea-U.S. nuclear consultation body, South Korea must fully utilize the U.S.'s efforts to build integrated deterrence, while simultaneously strengthening its advanced technology-based integrated security capabilities that can minimize the cost-effectiveness of complex military strategies, including North Korea's tailored nuclear threats, to prepare for the newly emerging era of algorithmic warfare.

Second, alongside making North Korea's primary and secondary nuclear missions realistically meaningless through integrated deterrence strategy, comprehensive efforts must be pursued in parallel to maximize the cost-effectiveness of North Korean denuclearization. In a situation where South Korea and the U.S. are strengthening integrated extended deterrence, the utility of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, however advanced, will inevitably diminish further. However, it will be difficult to break the current cycle of endless escalation unless North Korea itself is convinced that its right to survival will be guaranteed even if it abandons its nuclear weapons. North Korea is wasting enormous national assets to enhance its nuclear forces, whose utility is rapidly declining, while simultaneously being unable to escape economic sanctions due to its nuclear development, and failing to achieve results in economic development—its most pressing issue—ahead of the 9th Party Congress in 2025. Amidst these difficulties, if North Korea attempts to lift economic sanctions through diplomatic negotiation after a more severe military provocation, the South Korea-U.S. alliance will build even stronger integrated deterrence, ultimately trapping North Korea in a vicious cycle.

Given that North Korea declared the enhancement of nuclear weapons to guarantee its right to survival at the 8th Workers' Party Congress in 2021, a new alternative must be presented: a third path that guarantees the survival of a non-nuclear North Korea. Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop a plan for building a comprehensive security guarantee system for North Korea, including bilateral security guarantees between the U.S. and North Korea, and South and North Korea; multilateral security guarantees from relevant countries such as China, Russia, and Japan; and finally, global security guarantees from international bodies like the UN.

Third, a comprehensive model that guarantees the development rights of a non-nuclear North Korea must be presented. North Korea's most significant task to announce at the 9th Party Congress in 2025, from a domestic political perspective, is the achievement and future of economic development. Currently, the plan does not go much beyond a model of economic development centered on self-reliance and self-sufficiency, as emphasized in the "frontal breakthrough" declared at the 5th plenary meeting of the 7th Central Committee in 2020, and achieving economic development goals through limited exchange expansion with Russia or China. However, as North Korea's current dire economic situation clearly shows, the limitations of the self-reliance model are evident. Following the precedent of China's Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up policy, which recorded double-digit economic growth rates for nearly 40 years, the choice of a North Korean-style reform and opening-up path is inevitable. A global cooperative economic model must be developed to make the path of reform and opening-up for North Korea's 21st-century advancement an attractive third option.

Fourth, comprehensive support for the informatization and knowledge-based development of a non-nuclear North Korea is needed. The new civilizational standard of the world order in the 21st century is based on the evolution of advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence, leading to informatization and knowledge-based development. North Korea is no exception if it aims to become a developed nation in the 21st century. For North Korea to secure its right to survival and development in the 21st century, it must build a non-nuclear survival model instead of nuclear forces whose utility is rapidly declining, and simultaneously achieve high economic growth through a North Korean-style 21st-century reform and opening-up model. The most crucial element for this is building a model for 21st-century informatization and knowledge-based development. As the study of evolutionary biology in the 21st century clearly demonstrates, living organisms without the competitive coexistence efforts of self-organization and coevolution can no longer maintain their vitality. Therefore, global cooperation is needed to enable North Korea to seek new paths of self-organization and coevolution.

Thus, through the four strategies—expansion of South Korea's integrated deterrence, comprehensive guarantees for the survival of a non-nuclear North Korea, promotion of economic advancement for a non-nuclear North Korea, and comprehensive support for 21st-century informatization and knowledge-based development—we must move forward with discussions on building a new peace and prosperity system on the Korean Peninsula, transcending the discourse of mutual destruction represented by the 'end of the Kim Jong Un regime' and the 'annihilation of the Republic of Korea.' ■

References

"The Reckless Acts That Increase the Risk of Nuclear War." Rodong Sinmun, February 2, 2024.

Statement by the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. October 31, 2022. Korean Central News Agency.

Report on the Expanded Plenary Meeting of the 6th Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. January 1, 2023. Korean Central News Agency.

Kim Yo Jong, Deputy Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee, Releases Statement Through Korean Central News Agency. April 29, 2023. Korean Central News Agency.

Report on the 9th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. September 28, 2023. Korean Central News Agency.

Report on the Expanded Plenary Meeting of the 9th Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. December 31, 2023. Korean Central News Agency.

Policy Speech at the 10th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, "On the Immediate Tasks for the Prosperity and Development of the Republic and the People's Welfare." January 15, 2024. Korean Central News Agency.

Jervis, Robert. 1989. "The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution" New York: Cornell University Press.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: SIPRI. 2023. "SIPRI Yearbook 2023.

U.S. Department of Defense. 2022. "2022 National Defense Strategy." October 27. https://www.defense.gov/National-Defense-Strategy/ (Accessed February 23, 2024)

White House. 2022. "FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy." October 12. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/12/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-national-security-strategy/ (Accessed February 23, 2024)

■ Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University.

■ Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute and Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr