[New Year Special Commentary Series] ⑩ North Korea in 2024 Facing Multiple Crises

At the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, held at the end of December 2023, General Secretary Kim Jong Un evaluated 2023 as follows.

2023 was truly a great year of transition and great transformation, marking a glorious milestone in the Republic's development and enhancement of national prestige (KCNA, 12/31/2023).

This signifies an intention to proceed through the current year without a change in direction, building upon the "groundbreaking achievements" of last year (KCNA, 12/31/2023). This paper aims to examine North Korea's self-assessed year of 2023 from multiple angles and then forecast 2024. In broad terms, North Korea is expected to continue its "frontal breakthrough" strategy, adopted in December 2019, throughout 2024. The frontal breakthrough strategy consists of four pillars: "self-reliance" in the economic sector, "ideological struggle" with domestic political implications, "advancement of nuclear capabilities" as the core of military power, and "long-term engagement" encompassing policies towards the U.S. and South Korea (KCNA, 12/31/2019). This article will analyze these areas by dividing them into economic, military, and foreign/inter-Korean affairs.

1. Economic Sector

North Korea touts the economic sector as one of its greatest achievements in 2023. At the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in December 2022, Kim Jong Un acknowledged economic difficulties, stating, "We must overcome the difficult situation with our own strength" (KCNA, 12/31/2022). However, in 2023, North Korea claimed to have "conquered all 12 'high grounds' (goals)" and "achieved remarkable results across the entire people's economy." It particularly boasted that the "serious economic crisis caused by poor agricultural performance in 2022" was overcome in 2023 by "exceeding the grain production target, achieving the most precious and valuable success in economic work." Grain production increased by 104% compared to 2022, and "distinct production growth was achieved across the entire economy," leading to a "1.4-fold increase in gross domestic product" (KCNA, 12/31/2023).

Based on these economic achievements, Kim Jong Un emphasized the need to "accelerate production growth in all sectors of the people's economy, push forward with modernization and reinforcement projects, and continue to set 12 important high grounds for the new year, concentrating efforts on them." Consequently, economic policies for 2024 were presented similarly to 2023, without groundbreaking shifts, including industrial modernization, rural housing construction, agricultural and rural development, light industry development, and fishery expansion (KCNA, 12/31/2023).

However, North Korea's economic assessment for 2023 raises questions due to the lack of specific data. Firstly, while it claimed to have exceeded 100% of the targets for all 12 high grounds, the baseline figures were not precisely disclosed. Although the figures appear to be compared to 2022, an objective evaluation is limited because the specific target achievement rates were not revealed at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee held at the end of 2022.

In the case of grain (food) production, which is emphasized the most, it is claimed that production increased by 103% in 2023. According to Statistics Korea, North Korea's grain production in 2022 was approximately 4.5 million tons, a 4.0% decrease compared to 4.69 million tons in 2021 (Statistics Korea, 2023). The 4.5 million tons is the lowest figure in the past five years, excluding 2020.

Table 1. North Korea's Grain Production

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Source: Statistics Korea, 2023/12/10

Therefore, if the grain production increase rate is calculated based on 2022, it can easily exceed 100%. While boasting of a bumper harvest in absolute terms, North Korea's grain production in 2023 increased by about 300,000 tons compared to the previous year, reaching 4.8 million tons, still leaving a deficit of about 1 million tons (Rural Development Administration, 2023).

The claim of a 1.4-fold increase in GDP in 2023 also requires careful interpretation. While the 12 high grounds were calculated based on growth rates compared to 2022, the economic growth rate for 2023 is based on the year 2020.[1]According to Bank of Korea statistics, North Korea's economic growth rate in 2020 was -4.5%, the lowest since the "Arduous March" period (Bank of Korea, n.d.). Presenting a 1.4-fold growth based on this figure suggests an intention to maximize and publicize the growth rate.

North Korea's concern is its inability to achieve the "1.4-fold economic growth target by the end of 2025" set by Kim Jong Un at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. According to the five-year economic development plan, achieving a 1.4-fold target requires an average annual growth of 4%. However, according to Bank of Korea statistics, North Korea experienced negative growth of -0.1% in 2021 and -0.2% in 2022. Although positive growth is expected in 2023, it is insufficient to compensate for the accumulated shortfall (Bank of Korea, n.d.). Given that the 2023 performance is a base effect from the worsening economic conditions due to COVID-19 and sanctions, the economic outlook for 2024 is also bleak.

Despite this, through the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee, Kim Jong Un reaffirmed that achieving the five-year national economic development goals is a priority for the party and state, asserting that "clear practical guarantees for the fulfillment of the five-year plan must be secured in all sectors and all units by the end of 2024" (KCNA, 12/31/2023). While North Korea may claim to have achieved economic results through propaganda, using exaggerated language and unverifiable statistics as seen in the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee, the reality will likely differ. The people's economy, as experienced by North Korean citizens, has not improved. At this stage, entering the fourth year of the economic development plan, the goals set by Kim Jong Un are unattainable, even if the sanctions against North Korea were dramatically lifted. In this regard, Kim Jong Un's concerns will deepen in 2024.

2. Military Sector

North Korea claims to have achieved "great success in strengthening national defense" in 2023. Key developments include the cultivation of capabilities to strike both South Korea and the U.S., and the irreversible establishment of nuclear possession by enshrining "nuclear weapons" in the constitution. Regarding capability development, Kim Jong Un cited the successful launch of a reconnaissance satellite as a remarkable achievement in "space science and technology" at the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee. He stated, "Overcoming failures, we achieved the miraculous event of successfully launching a reconnaissance satellite." Furthermore, the enshrining of the "policy on strengthening the state's nuclear force" in the constitution through the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2023 was presented as a "political event." Through this, North Korea claims to have reached a strategic position to inflict a devastating political blow on its adversaries. The core "national defense strengthening achievement" highlighted is the "test launches and launch drills of the Hwasong-17 and Hwasong-18 type missiles," which solidified the "direction of strategic force development." In addition, it proudly lists various achievements such as tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, reconnaissance drones, multi-purpose drones, newly built submarines, and reconnaissance satellites, calling them "great achievements" (KCNA, 12/31/2023). Reconnaissance satellites, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and various weapon systems are claimed to have developed practical capabilities to the level of "launch drills" in 2023 through test launches and development processes initiated in 2022. Through these efforts, North Korea asserts it has completed its nuclear capabilities to strike South Korea and the U.S., and particularly claims to have secured its own safety through its constitutional nuclear policy.

North Korea continues to emphasize the importance and necessity of advancing its nuclear capabilities in 2024. It defines ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation as "sinister aggressive war provocations" and directs efforts to establish a system capable of "swiftly responding to any nuclear crisis situation and mobilizing all physical means and capabilities, including nuclear weapons, in case of contingency." Specific tasks include increasing nuclear weapon production, accelerating missile development and production, and launching three additional reconnaissance satellites (KCNA, 12/31/2023). It also instructs the rapid execution of unfinished tasks from the five-year defense development plan and the development and production of unmanned aerial and reconnaissance electronic warfare systems (KCNA, 12/31/2023).

Similar to 2023, North Korea is expected to enhance its military capabilities in 2024 through a strategy of "selection and concentration." Unlike in 2022, North Korea focused in 2023 on developing reconnaissance satellites and the Hwasong-18 ICBM capable of striking the U.S. mainland. In 2024, it will continue to expand its "eyes" through additional reconnaissance satellite launches and secure its "fist" by completing the Hwasong-18, a multi-warhead missile capable of rapid launch due to its solid-fuel propulsion (KCNA, 11/22/2023). Furthermore, it will focus on developing the intermediate-range solid-fuel ballistic missile unveiled in 2023. Having already deployed short-range nuclear-capable missiles based on solid fuel targeting South Korea, North Korea aims to complete its nuclear strike capabilities by developing intermediate-range solid-fuel ballistic missiles that can reach targets in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Japan and Guam.

These North Korean attempts are understood as a strategy to pursue an "asymmetric escalations posture" by emphasizing preemptive nuclear strike capabilities using tactical nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pacific region, recognizing the limitations of an "assured retaliation posture." The possibility of North Korea achieving a nuclear balance of "assured retaliation posture" against the U.S. is limited. Even if North Korea completes the Hwasong-18, a multi-warhead missile capable of rapid launch with solid fuel, enabling preemptive strikes on the U.S. mainland, its ability to secure a second-strike capability against U.S. retaliatory attacks is constrained. Achieving a second-strike capability requires North Korea to possess nuclear-powered submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which face persistent technical limitations. Furthermore, its ability to evade U.S. surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and neutralize U.S. missile defense systems is also limited. In response to a North Korean preemptive strike, North Korea would be defenseless against a large-scale U.S. retaliatory strike due to its inadequate missile defense system. North Korea is at a significant disadvantage against the U.S. in all aspects of nuclear response: deterrence of use, defense during use, and counterattack after use. Consequently, North Korea is judged to be attempting to achieve a balance through "asymmetric crisis escalation" by securing nuclear strike capabilities targeting the Korean Peninsula, Japan, and Guam, rather than a "balance of terror" through mutual assured destruction against the U.S. mainland. Although North Korea cannot completely destroy the U.S. mainland, it seeks to find meaning in its nuclear capabilities by being able to inflict devastating damage on South Korea, Japan, and Guam, a U.S. territory. To this end, in 2024, North Korea will continue to develop its capabilities to strike the U.S. mainland, while simultaneously developing intermediate-range solid-fuel nuclear-capable missiles, and will also continue efforts to institutionalize its nuclear threat, such as refining nuclear operational plans and nuclear units, to enhance the credibility of its nuclear threat.

However, these North Korean endeavors clearly have limitations. In 2023, the U.S. and South Korea strengthened practical measures to deter North Korea through the Washington Declaration in April and the Camp David Summit in August. Specifically, in addition to ROK-U.S. cooperation, responses to North Korea's nuclear threats are being elevated with Japan. Notably, the ROK-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) is enhancing the institutionalization of extended deterrence. Unlike before, the ROK and U.S. are sharing "information necessary for nuclear planning" and strengthening "consultations" to reflect South Korea's position in U.S. nuclear operations. Furthermore, they are pursuing "joint planning" to develop extended deterrence response plans against North Korean nuclear attacks within conventional joint operational plans. Based on this, an enhanced ROK-U.S. extended deterrence system is to be completed in the first half of 2024, and a nuclear operational scenario training, assuming the use of North Korean nuclear weapons, is planned for the ROK-U.S. combined exercise "Ulchi Freedom Shield" in August. The ROK and U.S. have already revised the "Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS)" in October 2023, optimizing U.S. extended deterrence policy for the Korean Peninsula, specifically considering scenarios of North Korean nuclear use, for the first time in 10 years. These efforts by the ROK and U.S. are clearly deterring North Korea's nuclear capabilities.

Paradoxically, the effectiveness of strengthened extended deterrence is confirmed through Kim Jong Un's speeches. At the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee, Kim Jong Un enumerated the "anti-Republic schemes of the U.S. and its followers" in 2023. He criticized the "tripartite cooperation system" of the ROK, U.S., and Japan, mentioning "regime end," "Washington Declaration," "Nuclear Consultative Group," "U.S. nuclear strategic assets," and "joint military exercises." He showed a particularly nervous reaction to the deployment of a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine to the Korean Peninsula in December 2023, stating, "They provoke us until the very last moments of the day" (KCNA, 12/31/2023). Considering that the reaction of the target is a valid indicator of the effectiveness of deterrence measures, the fact that the supreme leader extensively criticizes ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation at the highest-level meeting serves as evidence that deterrence against North Korea is functioning.

3. Foreign and Inter-Korean Affairs

1) Foreign Strategy

North Korea emphasizes two achievements in its foreign strategy for 2023: "strong independent solidarity" and "principled adherence." The former refers to efforts to build a North Korea-China-Russia bloc, including strengthening cooperation with Russia. The latter culminates in the anti-imperialist and self-reliance doctrine, which views South Korea and the U.S. as adversaries and "resolutely defends the sovereign rights of our nation from their wicked schemes." It claims to have elevated the "nation's dignity and status" by pursuing a "proactive" diplomatic strategy (KCNA, 12/31/2023).

Based on this, North Korea has announced its intention to "focus on developing relations with the ruling parties of socialist countries" and "further develop relations with anti-imperialist and independent countries" in 2024, thereby strengthening "joint anti-imperialist actions and struggles." This is a continuation of Kim Jong Un's worldview expressed at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in August 2022, where he stated, "The international relations structure has clearly shifted to a 'new Cold War' system, and the trend of multipolarization is accelerating" (Rodong Sinmun, 01/01/2023). In September of last year, Kim Jong Un reiterated, "A new Cold War structure has materialized on a global scale due to imperialist reactionary forces" (KCNA, 09/28/2023). In essence, the strategy is to strengthen North Korea-China-Russia trilateral cooperation in 2024 and seek international solidarity under the banner of anti-U.S. sentiment to build a bloc. It expresses a desire to actively criticize the actions of the U.S. and the West in conflicts such as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and to contribute to entering an anti-U.S. multipolar order by building solidarity.

While North Korea's efforts to seek North Korea-China-Russia solidarity, marked by close engagement with Russia in 2023, have shown short-term results, structural limitations persist. The dynamics of North Korea-Russia cooperation are evident, with confirmation of North Korea providing KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia and Russia's cooperation in North Korea's satellite launches. However, a clear picture of North Korea-China-Russia trilateral solidarity has not emerged. Moreover, subtle signs of distancing in North Korea-China relations are also observed. In July 2022, representatives from China and Russia attending the anniversary ceremony of the Armistice Agreement delivered personal letters from Xi Jinping and Putin, respectively, to Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Un received Putin's letter formally in his office, but received Xi's letter in a hallway before a performance. The level of the Chinese delegation sent on September 9, the anniversary of North Korea's founding, was also lower than five years prior. At that time, China sent Li Zhanshu, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the third-highest-ranking official in the Communist Party, whereas last year, Liu Guozhong, Vice Premier of the State Council, ranked around 20th, was sent as the head of the congratulatory delegation. Due to the lack of transparency inherent in authoritarian regimes, it is difficult to ascertain the precise dynamics between North Korea and China, but distancing phenomena have been observed in various other forms. While a summit between Putin and Kim Jong Un was held in 2022, high-level exchanges between North Korea and China were limited to the visit of North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho to China in December last year. It is also noteworthy that Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui chose Russia, not China, as her first destination after taking office in January of this year.

The content of the phone calls between the foreign ministers of China and Russia held at the beginning of the year reveals aspects of their respective perceptions of North Korea. Following the talks, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that they discussed "the situation around the Korean Peninsula," while the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs described it as an "exchange of views on international and regional issues," without specifically mentioning the Korean Peninsula (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2024; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2024). China may have been concerned about appearing to be engaged in North Korea-China-Russia trilateral cooperation if it publicly discussed issues related to the Korean Peninsula in the context of close North Korea-Russia ties. The most significant evidence reflecting the unusual atmosphere between North Korea and China is Kim Jong Un's statement at the North Korea-Russia summit in September 2023: "We will prioritize relations between Korea and Russia as the number one and most crucial aspect of our foreign policy." If so, the position of China in North Korea's foreign policy remains unclear. Analyzing this in light of North Korea's traditional diplomatic practices, it appears to be employing a "pendulum diplomacy" approach, using its close ties with Russia to exert pressure on China and achieve its objectives. China, in its pursuit of creating a "coexistent Eurasian order" by strengthening cooperation with European countries amidst its strategic competition with the U.S., may not wish to be entangled with North Korea and Russia, who are cooperating in the Ukraine war. All these circumstances indicate that the North Korea-China-Russia trilateral solidarity is a "union of convenience" rather than a cooperation based on shared values and visions. The close ties between North Korea and Russia in the special circumstances of the Ukraine war, and China's behavior of using North Korea as an "asset" for its competition with the U.S., expose the limitations of the sustainability of North Korea-China-Russia cooperation. This implies a high possibility of shifting alliances depending on short-term changes in circumstances.

2) Inter-Korean Affairs

North Korea has declared a fundamental shift in its policy towards South Korea. It has escalated hostility to the highest level, officially abrogating the "September 19th Inter-Korean Military Agreement," and proclaimed that the relationship is no longer one of "compatriots" or "kin," but has been "completely fixed as a relationship between two hostile states, two belligerent nations currently at war." It has instructed to "make preparations to conquer the entire territory of the southern half," treating the possibility of war as a "fait accompli." In conclusion, it demands to "continue to accelerate efforts to perfectly equip overwhelming war response capabilities and thorough and complete military readiness" (KCNA, 12/31/2023).

The "line on fundamentally changing the direction in the inter-Korean sector" proclaimed by North Korea carries the following two implications. First, it is an attempt to justify nuclear attacks on South Korea. For a long time, North Korea has cited self-defense against U.S. nuclear threats as the purpose of its nuclear development and has denied the possibility of nuclear attacks on its own people. However, in a statement on April 5, 2022, Kim Yo Jong declared that the "mission of the nuclear force is to eliminate the opposing military forces in one fell swoop," and that "nuclear combat forces will be mobilized to seize the initiative in the early stages of war, burn the will to fight of the opponent, prevent a protracted war, and preserve one's own military strength" (KCNA, 04/05/2022). This clarified that North Korea's nuclear weapons are intended not only for deterrence against the U.S. but also for actual use against South Korea in the early stages of a war to seize the initiative. In the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Military Commission held on June 22 of the same year, it was stated that "the operational missions of the front-line units of the Korean People's Army were additionally confirmed and the work of revising operational plans was discussed," effectively announcing the deployment of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons to units responsible for attacking Seoul, the so-called 'Seoul's sea of fire' units (KCNA, 06/22/2022).

Kim Jong Un himself declared on April 30, 2022, that "if necessary, we can preemptively and thoroughly suppress and crush all dangerous attempts and threatening actions, including the nuclear threats continuously and increasingly posed by hostile forces," thereby officially acknowledging the possibility of preemptive nuclear use against South Korea as a hostile force (KCNA, 04/30/2022). Although the "Law on the Policy of Nuclear Force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," enacted in September of the same year, specified five conditions for nuclear use without explicitly naming targets, the principle of use stated that "nuclear weapons can be used if non-nuclear states collude with other nuclear-weapon states to participate in aggressive or attack actions against North Korea," effectively indicating South Korea as the target (KCNA, 09/09/2022). In 2023, Kim Jong Un was also pictured discussing operational plans in front of a map showing key South Korean targets.

In this context, the shift in terminology to refer to South Korea as "the Republic of Korea" starting in the latter half of 2023, defining it as an independent entity and an 'other,' is interpreted as an attempt to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons against a belligerent nation with which it has a hostile relationship, rather than a relationship between compatriots. The "powerful military action to conquer the entire territory of the southern half," confirmed again at the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee using military force including nuclear weapons, is a feasible goal only when South Korea is considered an independent hostile state (KCNA, 12/31/2023). Through this, North Korea aims to strengthen the reality of its "nuclear capabilities," secure dominance on the Korean Peninsula, neutralize the nuclear deterrence of the ROK, U.S., and Japan, and ultimately be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state. The assertion of nuclear attacks against South Korea, which began in earnest in 2022, is being 'made' an irreversible fact by linking it to fundamental changes in inter-Korean relations. It can also be interpreted as a logic to justify their nuclear self-defense by considering South Korea and the U.S. as a single entity and defining them as hostile forces, especially in a situation where South Korea receives extended deterrence from the U.S. In 2024, North Korea will continue to frame all measures related to ROK-U.S. or ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation with the same argument, utilizing it to bolster its narrative of nuclear self-defense.

However, as demonstrated by the ROK-U.S. Washington Declaration and the ROK-U.S.-Japan Camp David Summit in 2023, the more North Korea escalates threats against South Korea, the stronger the deterrence capabilities of the ROK, U.S., and Japan become. In addition to the aforementioned "Tailored Deterrence Strategy," "Conventional & Nuclear Integration (CNI)" represents a sophisticated response to North Korea's nuclear threats, indicating that North Korea's provocations are paradoxically strengthening deterrence.

Secondly, North Korea's official shift in its inter-Korean policy is essentially a last resort, acknowledging the disparity in national power between the two Koreas. If the "Goryeo Federation" system, advocating for one nation, one state, two systems, and two governments, which North Korea has championed, were ever realized, it could actually lead to a regime crisis. North Korea likely recognizes that the legal inflow of "puppet culture" through inter-Korean exchanges could lead to the spread of "bourgeois ideology," and contrary to North Korea's expectations, the absence of pro-North Korean sympathizers in South Korea could increase the possibility of absorption unification. This also reflects the fact that slogans such as "peaceful unification" and "national self-determination," emphasized in inter-Korean strategy and tactics, are no longer effective, given that South Korean public disapproval of North Korea is approaching 80% (Korea Research, 2023). Therefore, this is an attempt to abandon unification policies that are disadvantageous and unrealistic.

Following a shift in North Korea's strategy toward South Korea in 2024, a more hostile offensive is anticipated. First, North Korea will likely seek to exacerbate inter-Korean conflict by continuing to undermine the September 19th Inter-Korean Military Agreement. Having officially declared the "abrogation of the September 19th North-South Military Agreement" at the 8th term, 9th plenary meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea, North Korea will intensify its offensive against South Korea, citing the South Korean government's prior suspension of Article 3 of the agreement as justification. While attributing responsibility for the abrogation to South Korea, North Korea may escalate its offensive to the point of conducting coastal artillery fire south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea, thereby creating tensions. Through this, it aims to create a "peace versus confrontation" narrative to provoke inter-Korean conflict. Specifically, it may opt for "gray zone" tactics. By employing methods that make it difficult to pinpoint the origin of provocations in real-time, North Korea could limit South Korea's response options. Furthermore, it will implement the "institutionalization" of its hostile stance toward South Korea by abolishing various inter-Korean organizations and propaganda media.

However, these North Korean attempts carry significant limitations and potential for backlash. Since the 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea and the United States have established a "Joint Counter-Provocation Plan" and have been strengthening their readiness posture for over a decade. Tailored training and response measures are being prepared for various scenarios, including North Korean gray zone provocations. North Korea recognizes that if it were to conduct a localized provocation with an exposed origin against the ROK-US combined forces, given its absolute inferiority in conventional forces, the possibility of achieving its objectives would be severely limited. Therefore, the likelihood of threats through "verbal attacks" rather than actual actions is high. As North Korea intensifies its offensive, it may face a backlash of growing domestic public opinion in South Korea demanding stronger deterrence, rather than the desired inter-Korean conflict.

Kim Jong Un urged for "struggle" in 2024 with "confidence that a great transformation will be created once again" at the 8th term, 9th plenary meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea at the end of 2023 (KCNA, December 31, 2023). However, contrary to expectations, 2024 is likely to be a year where he faces failure to achieve planned goals once again at the 9th Party Congress scheduled for 2026, forcing him to bow his head, or resorts to deceptive statistics to mislead the public. Success in the fourth year, 2024, is crucial for the successful implementation of the five-year plans for national defense development and economic development established at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. However, in the economic sector, achieving the five-year plan's goal of 1.4 times economic growth by the end of 2025 is already impossible. In the defense sector, despite dedicating maximum effort and resources, including the five major strategic weapons, to nominally approach the target, fundamental limitations are evident. North Korea's attempt to pressure South Korea and the United States by securing advanced nuclear capabilities and seeking recognition as a nuclear state is being countered by strengthened ROK-US-Japan cooperation and the institutionalization of extended deterrence, limiting the utility of its nuclear weapons. North Korea's efforts to escape diplomatic isolation and secure an anti-US front by strengthening North Korea-China-Russia cooperation and building a bloc also show signs of strain. The focus on North Korea-Russia relations mediated by the war in Ukraine has further restricted North Korea's desired sanctions relief, or "development rights." The international community is, in fact, strengthening sanctions against North Korea. Furthermore, China, which finds the cooperation between North Korea and Russia inconvenient, appears to be distancing itself from North Korea. The shift in its policy toward South Korea, declared as an antagonistic relationship, is also unlikely to yield the desired effects. Having effectively lost the system competition, North Korea has officially declared armed unification as "complete territorial control" out of fear of absorption by South Korea through peaceful unification, which implies absorption. This is a last resort after realizing that unification led by North Korea is becoming increasingly remote, a "self-defensive declaration of defeat" (Cho Han-bum 2024). Therefore, Kim Jong Un must make 2024 a "decisive year" in a different sense. It is time to realize that the banner of military-first (Seon-gun) is becoming increasingly meaningless and to raise the flag of prioritizing the people's livelihood (Seon-gyeong). If resources and efforts invested in nuclear and missile development are redirected toward economic development, Kim Jong Un's survival prospects would actually increase. ■

References

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[1]The original North Korean announcement is as follows: "The total scale of economic growth in 2023... Gross domestic product increased by 1.4 times." KCNA, December 31, 2023.

■ Park Won Gon_Director of the North Korea Research Center, East Asia Institute; Professor of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr