[New Year Special Commentary Series] ⑨ The Israel-Hamas War in 2024 and the Middle East: Prospects and South Korea's Policy

1. Possibility of Escalation of the Israel-Hamas War

A key question regarding the outlook for the Middle East in 2024 is whether the Israel-Hamas war will escalate beyond Gaza to encompass the entire region. A major variable that could trigger escalation is a military conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Israel assassinated Radhi Mousavi, a senior commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in Syria and eliminated senior Hamas leaders, including Saleh al-Arouri, in Lebanon. In response to these events, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, has vowed retaliation against Israel, heightening the crisis in the Middle East. Israel, citing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 adopted in 2006, insists that Hezbollah withdraw from the Israel-Lebanon border area, thus increasing concerns about escalation.

The right-wing politicians in Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, maintain a hardline stance that does not shy away from escalation. Facing accountability for failing to prevent the war and grappling with corruption charges, Prime Minister Netanyahu finds himself in a dilemma where his political survival is at stake if the war ends without achieving his objectives. Furthermore, hardline figures with far-right leanings, such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, wield significant influence in policy-making. From this perspective, it is assessed that Israel's military actions to completely expel Hamas could be prolonged, and if unforeseen clashes occur in the process, escalation is possible.

Most importantly, the risk of the Gaza war escalating has become visible through the issue of the Houthi rebels in Yemen in the Red Sea. The Houthi rebels have attacked international merchant ships transiting the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, attempting to blockade vessels heading to Israeli ports. Consequently, major global shipping companies have suspended voyages through the Red Sea and opted for alternative routes around the Cape of Good Hope, raising concerns about a global supply chain crisis. Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, a senior leader of the Houthi rebels and former chairman of Yemen's Supreme Revolutionary Committee, threatened to expand military actions unless the continuous terrorism, crimes, and massacres against the Palestinian people cease. Notably, on January 12, 2024, the United States and the United Kingdom launched military operations against the Houthi rebels within Yemen. Attacks on Houthi military facilities in Sana'a, the capital of Yemen, as well as in Hodeidah, have heightened military tensions in the region.

Meanwhile, the United States does not wish for the war to escalate and is seeking an exit strategy. President Biden, facing the 2024 presidential election, prefers a diplomatic solution and prioritizes diplomatic efforts to prevent escalation. Washington has made multifaceted efforts to contain the spread of the war and has specifically managed to prevent clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border from escalating into a full-blown conflict. It is reported that Israel considered airstrikes against Hezbollah, but the US government, concerned about escalation due to Iranian involvement, opposed it, preventing the plan from being realized. Additionally, the US has attempted mediation by dispatching Special Envoy Amos Hochstein to prevent military clashes between Israel and Hezbollah. The fact that Iran, which has significant influence over Hezbollah and the Houthi rebels, is also avoiding military confrontation, along with the US's stance, are factors that reduce the possibility of escalation. Therefore, despite the persistent risk of the Gaza war expanding due to unforeseen circumstances, the possibility of finding a resolution to the conflict is still considered more likely than escalation in 2024.

2. The Future of Gaza

The biggest concern regarding the Middle East situation in 2024 is the future direction of Gaza after the war ends. The relevant parties hold differing views on the future scenarios for Gaza. Firstly, Israel's position can be understood through an op-ed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu published in The Wall Street Journal in December last year (Netanyahu 2023).

Prime Minister Netanyahu presented three preconditions for peace: the complete expulsion of Hamas, the demilitarization of Gaza, and the de-radicalization of Palestinian society. The Israeli government views Hamas as a proxy of Iran and advocates for the dismantling of Hamas's military capabilities and the end of its political dominance in Gaza. In particular, Israel argues for demilitarization measures to prevent Gaza from being used as a base for attacks against Israel by monitoring arms smuggling through the border area with Egypt and establishing a temporary security zone along the border between Israel and Gaza. Furthermore, recognizing that current structures like the security fence and concrete walls on the outskirts of Gaza are insufficient to ensure Israel's security, they are discussing measures to reinforce border security structures.

From this perspective, Israel insists on directly controlling the Philadelphi Corridor, the border area between Gaza and Egypt, to achieve Gaza's demilitarization. The Philadelphi Corridor's control was transferred to Israel under the 1979 Camp David Accords to prevent arms smuggling into Gaza. After Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, control was transferred to Egypt, and Israel argues that it must regain control after the current war. However, Egypt has clearly expressed its opposition to Israel's plan to regain control of the Philadelphi Corridor, citing the potential for a large-scale exodus of Palestinians into Egypt (Motamedi 2023).

Crucially, the key to demilitarizing Gaza lies in the discussion of how to establish a future Palestinian governance structure. Israel holds a negative view, unlike the United States, regarding the current Palestinian Authority, deeming it incapable and unwilling to achieve demilitarization. In response, the United States is considering expanding the Palestinian Authority's governance to Gaza, adhering to the principle of the two-state solution, which has been effectively abandoned since the Oslo Accords. Secretary of State Antony John Blinken emphasized that the Palestinian Authority must play a significant role in Gaza's future. However, Washington is fully aware of the incompetence of the current Palestinian Authority leadership, including President Mahmoud Abbas, and the public's dissatisfaction with it, and may therefore seek the creation of a new governance system.

Meanwhile, Arab nations, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are calling for a fundamental solution for Palestinian statehood beyond short-term solutions for Gaza's future. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi urged a comprehensive solution encompassing Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem at the Cairo Peace Summit last October. Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, at the Riyadh Arab-Islamic Summit in November, called for an end to the Israeli occupation and blockade of Gaza and mentioned the necessity of establishing a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, based on the pre-1967 borders. In this context, a three-phase peace plan has been proposed, centered around Egypt, which includes the formation of a new technocratic government involving all Palestinian factions from the West Bank and Gaza. The main points of this plan involve a phased approach to peace building, leading to a ceasefire, hostage exchange, and the end of the war, with a technocratic government ruling the Palestinian territories (Nabil 2023).

Amidst these differing views on Gaza's future scenarios, various proposals are currently being presented. Therefore, to understand the Middle East situation in 2024, it is crucial to observe how these differences in positions are reconciled and how consensus is reached on the vision for Gaza's future. In other words, the direction of future negotiations regarding Gaza, which are expected to be challenging, will be a major variable significantly influencing the unfolding of the Middle East political order in 2024.

3. Saudi-Israel Normalization and its Impact on US-China Competition in the Middle East

Prior to the Gaza war, a period of reconciliation had been underway in the Middle East. Starting with the restoration of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023, mediated by China, and followed by a summit between the UAE and Turkey in June, relations between these countries shifted towards friendliness. The UAE led a détente atmosphere by reconciling with various Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, Israel, and Turkey. Against this backdrop, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan highlighted the Biden administration's contribution to de-escalating Middle East conflicts and promoted the establishment of a new economic corridor in September 2023, connecting the Middle East to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel (Sullivan 2023).

Most significantly, the United States was mediating the normalization of Saudi Arabia-Israel relations right before the war broke out, and it is known to have achieved substantial progress. This led to the theory that Hamas's attack on Israel was intended to prevent their isolation resulting from the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Therefore, there is considerable interest in whether the Saudi Arabia-Israel normalization talks, which were suspended due to the Gaza war, will resume after the conflict ends.

What is clear is that the momentum for Saudi Arabia-Israel normalization has weakened due to the repercussions of the war. The surge in anti-Israel sentiment across the Arab world during the war has placed a greater political burden on Saudi Arabia regarding improving relations with Israel. Consequently, Saudi Arabia is currently pursuing a strategy that links the normalization of relations with Israel to the resolution of the Palestinian issue. In other words, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has indicated that Saudi Arabia could normalize relations with Israel if a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is achieved (Schwartz 2024). This stance by Saudi Arabia is understood as a principled position considering public opinion in the Arab world, and its actual strategic approach remains uncertain.

Meanwhile, the United States is coordinating normalization efforts and proposing new initiatives. For instance, normalization negotiations could proceed with the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip as a condition, rather than the establishment of a Palestinian state. Brett McGurk, the White House Coordinator for Middle East and North Africa, revealed a plan to involve Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar in the reconstruction process as a proposal politically linking reconstruction with normalization after the war (Coates and Asropets 2024). Although the normalization of Saudi Arabia-Israel relations after the war is expected to be a challenging process, the United States is anticipated to continue behind-the-scenes efforts for mediation.

The Gaza war is expected to directly and indirectly impact the US-China competition in the Middle East, along with the normalization of Saudi Arabia-Israel relations. In this context, discussions about the strengthening of China's influence amidst the US's de-engagement from the Middle East have been active recently. Following Obama's 'pivot to Asia,' the US, under the Trump and Biden administrations, has pursued a policy of de-engagement from the Middle East, avoiding intervention in Middle Eastern affairs. This policy stance was clearly reflected in the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan immediately after the Biden administration took office. Consequently, traditional US allies in the Middle East have strengthened their perception that they cannot rely solely on the US for security and have sought cooperation with China. For example, Saudi Arabia participated as a dialogue partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in March 2023, and in January 2024, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt joined BRICS. This is seen as an indication that BRICS has begun to absorb the Global South amidst US-China tensions, demonstrating China's expanding influence in the Middle East.

In this context, it is argued that while the US is losing the trust of the Global South due to its unconditional support for Israel during the Gaza war, China is leveraging the war to increase its influence over the Global South (Leonard 2024). In other words, China has made symbolic efforts by calling for a two-state solution, refusing direct condemnation of Hamas, and supporting a ceasefire, thereby enhancing its standing in the Global South, including the Middle East, where anti-Israel sentiment is prevalent. In fact, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has consistently issued statements calling for a ceasefire and supporting the two-state solution. For instance, on January 15, 2024, Chinese Politburo member and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a joint statement on the Gaza war with Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, urged an end to all violence, killings, and attacks on civilians and emphasized the need for humanitarian aid to Gaza ("Xinhua 2024-01-15). China's sustained actions can be interpreted as reflecting its intention to use this war as an opportunity to consolidate its leadership in the Middle East and the broader Global South.

Conversely, there is a counterargument that the Israel-Hamas war actually challenges the conventional wisdom of declining US influence. That is, the war has revealed that the US still plays a crucial and decisive role in Middle East security. Immediately after the war broke out, the US demonstrated active military intervention by deploying two carrier strike groups, Ohio-class nuclear submarines, various strategic air assets, and troops, influencing a shift in the perception of Middle Eastern countries towards the US. In contrast, China has focused solely on issuing statements friendly to Palestine, leaving the impression on Middle Eastern countries that the US remains a decisive political actor. In this context, despite the increased anti-American sentiment within the Middle East during the war, it can be argued that the war has played a significant role in Middle Eastern political leaders re-recognizing the political importance of the US. Thus, while there are conflicting assessments regarding the impact of the Gaza war on the US-China competition in the Middle East, the post-war trajectory warrants close observation.

4. South Korea's Middle East Policy

As instability in the Middle East intensifies, the United States is seeking to strengthen cooperation with its allies worldwide. Therefore, it is possible that the US will request additional roles from South Korea in maintaining Middle Eastern stability, presenting South Korea with the challenge of maximizing its national interests within the context of its relationship with the US. In this regard, as an emerging advanced economy, South Korea is in a position to pursue greater autonomy in its relationship with the US, with its own distinct vision, unlike in the past (Jeon Jae-seong 2024). Thus, it is important for South Korea's future Middle East policy to seek rational approaches that promote national interests while balancing the framework of the ROK-US alliance with national autonomy.

In this context, on December 18, 2023, the United States announced 'Operation Prosperity Guardian' to protect freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. This operation, launched in response to Houthi rebel attacks on vessels in the Red Sea to safeguard freedom of navigation and reduce threats to international maritime trade, involves a multinational coalition of over 20 countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. The US Central Command stated that the number of participating countries is increasing and assessed that navigation in the Red Sea has become safer for global merchant ships since the operation began.

While European countries are primarily participating in the US-led maritime operation, only Bahrain from the Middle Eastern allies has joined. Traditional US allies such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt are hesitant to cooperate with the US, as public support for Houthi rebel attacks would create political burdens. Egypt, in particular, despite suffering significant losses due to the suspension of shipping traffic through the Red Sea, has not participated in the US-led international operation in the Red Sea. It is assessed that many countries in the Middle East, while maintaining long-standing alliances with the US, are reluctant to become entangled in unnecessary Middle Eastern conflicts.

In this situation, if the US requests further participation from South Korea in resolving Middle Eastern issues, what stance will South Korea take? In response to this question, it is necessary to formulate a Middle East policy from the perspective of long-term national interests. In this regard, on January 12, South Korea was among the 10 countries that issued a joint statement supporting airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen, alongside the US, UK, Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. When South Korea participates in sensitive issues that even regional Middle Eastern countries are reluctant to engage in, it must make careful choices after closely considering the Middle East situation. For example, if the US requests support to ensure navigation safety in the Red Sea due to changes in the Red Sea situation, South Korea must find the best policy direction within a more independent and autonomous ROK-US relationship.

Furthermore, South Korea needs to devise ways to contribute more significantly to discussions on Gaza's reconstruction in the Middle East. Currently, approximately 85% of Gaza's entire population of 2.3 million people have been forced to displace, and a humanitarian crisis is escalating due to insufficient supply of goods. In the past, former World Bank President James Wolfensohn pursued plans for Gaza's economic revitalization during discussions on Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. Similar discussions for Gaza's economic self-sufficiency may re-emerge after the current war concludes (Filiu 2024), and in such a case, South Korea should explore ways to contribute more from a humanitarian perspective. Last October, the South Korean government decided to provide $2 million in humanitarian aid for civilian casualties of the Gaza war. Moving forward, as a responsible member of the international community, South Korea should pay attention to the direction of discussions on Gaza's reconstruction and use this as an opportunity to enhance its standing in the Middle East by providing more active support. ■

References

Jeon Jae-seong. 2024. “The Biden Administration's Foreign Policy in 2024 and South Korea's Policy Challenges toward the US.” EAI New Year Special Commentary Series. https://eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22297&board=kor_issuebriefing (Accessed: January 15, 2024.)

Coates, Gideon, and Haim Asropets. 2024. “A proposed American plan: reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in exchange for normalization with Saudi Arabia.” (in Arabic) Alquds. January 14. https://www.alquds.co.uk/خطة-أمريكية-مقترحة-إعمار-القطاع-مقابل/ (Accessed: January 15, 2024.)

Filiu, Jean-Pierre. 2024. “Why Gaza Matters.” Foreign Affairs. January 1. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/why-gaza-matters (Accessed: January 15, 2024.)

Leonard, Mark. 2024. “China’s Game in Gaza: How Beijing Is Exploiting Israel’s War to Win Over the Global South.” Foreign Affairs. January 8. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-game-gaza (Accessed: January 15, 2024.)

Motamedi, Maziar. 2023. “What’s the Philadelphi Corridor border zone that Israel wants to control?” Al Jazeera. December 31. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/31/whats-the-philadelphi-corridor-border-zone-that-israel-wants-to-control (Accessed: January 15, 2024.)

Nabil, Attia. 2023. “What do we know about the Egyptian initiative to resolve the war crisis in Gaza?” (in Arabic) BBC News. December 28. https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/c4ny8y04g8lo (Accessed: January 15, 2024.)

Netanyahu, Benjamin. 2023. “Benjamin Netanyahu: Our Three Prerequisites for Peace.” Wall Street Journal. December 25. https://www.wsj.com/articles/benjamin-netanyahu-our-three-prerequisites-for-peace-gaza-israel-bff895bd (Accessed: January 15, 2024)

Schwartz, Felicia. 2024. “Israel and Saudi Arabia will normalize ties in coming years, say experts.” Financial Times. January 12. https://www.ft.com/content/2403c258-dbb0-42de-a1d0-59b579676e88 (Accessed: January 15, 2024.)

Sullivan, Jake. 2023. “The Sources of American Power: A Foreign Policy for a Changed World.” Foreign Affairs. October 24. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/sources-american-power-biden-jake-sullivan (Accessed: January 15, 2024.)

Xinhua. 2024. “China, Egypt call for comprehensive, lasting truce in Gaza.” January 15. https://english.news.cn/20240115/aefe52b21fb845128fba23fd70490f27/c.html (Accessed: January 15, 2024.)

Kim Kang-seok_Professor, Department of Arabic Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr