[New Year Special Commentary Series] ⑦ 2024 Korea-Japan Relations Practicing the Spirit of Camp David: Challenges and Prospects

1. Introduction

One of the greatest achievements of South Korean diplomacy in 2023 was the improvement of Korea-Japan relations. After a decade of strained relations due to conflicts over the comfort women and forced labor issues, Korea-Japan relations entered a period of thaw with the Yoon Suk Yeol administration's proposal of the so-called "third-party compensation plan" in March as a solution to the forced labor issue. The leaders of the two countries met an unprecedented seven times, and intergovernmental exchanges rapidly increased. Private exchanges also quickly recovered to pre-COVID-19 levels, particularly in tourism. This is a remarkable change compared to the past when the governments of the two countries were in a "crisis of trust" and clashed on every issue.

The fruits of this improved relationship culminated in the trilateral summit between South Korea, the United States, and Japan in August and the Camp David Declaration. Moving forward, South Korea and Japan plan to hold summit meetings at least once a year through the U.S. mediation, conduct ministerial-level meetings in diplomacy, defense, commerce (industry), finance, and national security councils on a rotating basis among the three countries, and operate a vice-ministerial dialogue channel to coordinate the Indo-Pacific strategies/approaches of the three nations. The scope of cooperation has also expanded beyond the existing North Korean nuclear and missile response to various fields such as regional security, economic prosperity and resilience, the rules-based international order, democracy, and human rights.

Therefore, the interactions between South Korea and Japan in 2024 will largely take place within the trilateral framework of South Korea-U.S.-Japan, with the U.S. as a mediator. Policy issues will also address regional and global challenges rather than unique bilateral issues like historical matters. South Korea and Japan have already discussed regional issues at the vice-ministerial annual trilateral Indo-Pacific dialogue held in Washington on January 6.

If 2023 was the year of declaring a "new era" of trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan at Camp David, then 2024 must be a year of substantive cooperation and concrete achievements. The Korea-Japan relationship, as the weaker link in the triangle, will play a crucial role and bear significant responsibility. In other words, the new era of U.S.-Japan-Korea relations calls for a new era of Korea-Japan relations. This involves both countries working to find solutions to their unique bilateral issues, such as historical problems, while simultaneously transforming the Korea-Japan relationship into a strategic one that addresses issues at the Korean Peninsula, regional, and global levels. While South Korea has established global comprehensive strategic partnership relations with the U.S., strategic cooperative partnership relations with China and Vietnam, and strategic partnership relations with India, Russia, Mexico, and the European Union (EU), there is no specific descriptor for the Korea-Japan relationship. What preparations are needed to make 2024 the inaugural year of a comprehensive strategic partnership between South Korea and Japan?

2. Japan's Perception of the International Order: A Historical Turning Point

In 2023, the Kishida government presented its perception of the structural shifts in the international order and its strategic direction through official documents and speeches by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. A particularly noteworthy document is Prime Minister Kishida's speech at Johns Hopkins University on January 13 (Prime Minister Kishida's Speech 2023a). He identifies the structural challenges facing Japanese diplomacy as stemming from the international community being at a "historical turning point." This "historical turning point," which has since appeared in all official documents, refers to a significant shift in the balance of power and a crisis in the liberal international order. As a recent example, Russia's invasion of Ukraine clearly demonstrates not only the relative decline of U.S. leadership but also the failure of the U.S.-led international order, which pursued globalization and deepening interdependence, to guarantee international peace and development. Consequently, the "post-Cold War world has completely ended," and the international community has "entered an era of intense competition between nations, with complex intermingling of cooperation and division."

These remarks express the perception that the United States no longer possesses the capacity to exercise global leadership. Japan's adoption of the Indo-Pacific concept and its vision of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) can be seen as an initial manifestation of this perception. Looking back, Prime Minister Abe pursued a strategy of embracing the rising power of India and expanding strategic partnerships with Australia, based on the recognition that strengthening the alliance with the U.S., which was in relative decline, would be insufficient to counter and manage China's expanding influence. Internally, he aimed to augment military capabilities, and externally, to lead with a dual approach of the U.S.-Japan alliance and FOIP.

Prime Minister Kishida went a step further, emphasizing that strengthening defense capabilities, including securing military spending equivalent to 2% of GDP, is fundamental to enhancing diplomatic capabilities. Following this, he mentioned strengthening the alliance with the United States, then stressed the importance of strengthening solidarity with "like-minded countries" and enhancing relations with the "Global South." Speaking to a U.S. audience, he conveyed that Japan would play a pivotal role in restoring U.S. leadership, which alone cannot rebuild the global order, by cooperating with the U.S., and by leading cooperation with like-minded countries and the Global South, particularly with India and ASEAN, which are emerging as key players for the future.

The Kishida government emphasizes solidarity and cooperation with like-minded countries that share values and identities as partners necessary for managing and resolving current security and economic issues, designating the G7 as the central forum for this. For Japan, the G7 is an easily accessible partner in terms of alignment with the U.S.-Japan alliance, and it also offers the advantage of hosting the G7 Summit in Hiroshima as the presiding nation in May. Prime Minister Kishida underscored the security linkage between Europe and Asia, particularly emphasizing that "it is absolutely necessary for Japan, the United States, and Europe to work together to manage relations with China," aiming to use the G7 as a key mechanism to control unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the region (Prime Minister Kishida's Press Conference 2023).

Meanwhile, on March 20, Prime Minister Kishida visited India and, in his speech "The Future of the Indo-Pacific: A New Plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Together with India, an Indispensable Partner," announced a revised version of FOIP, "A New Plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific." He emphasized the rise of India as a symbol of the significant shift in the balance of power and once again mentioned the growth of the Global South (Prime Minister Kishida's Speech 2023b). He expressed the view that the current and future international order should not be defined by U.S.-China strategic competition or a new Cold War. Stating that terms such as "unipolar, bipolar, multipolar... poles by a single or multiple great powers" are not accurate descriptions of the international order, he argued that the international community, using the concept of "diversification," should pursue "equal partnerships" based on a "precise understanding of the historical and cultural backgrounds of the Global South" and reconsider "the way responsibility is shared in global governance." While this statement is largely aimed at India, which seeks to lead the Global South, it also reflects a growing sentiment within Japanese policy circles—the recognition that the foreign policy line focused on the U.S. and the West needs reconsideration, given that only 33% of the world's population agreed with the condemnation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, only 73 countries signed the Declaration of the Summit for Democracy, and this trend could be further amplified depending on the outcome of the U.S. presidential election this year.

In fact, ASEAN is the gateway or litmus test for Japan's engagement with the Global South. In Prime Minister Kishida's words, ASEAN represents "the closest and most important colleagues" for Japan in strengthening relations with the Global South. The ASEAN region is a center of global economic growth and occupies a strategic location for Japan's maritime routes and the FOIP, while China's economic influence is overwhelming. China is the largest trading partner for all ASEAN countries, accounting for 16% of ASEAN's total exports and 24% of its imports. Therefore, Japan seeks a delicate diplomatic strategy to counter ASEAN's excessive dependence on China while preventing it from being drawn into the U.S.-China confrontation. To mark the 50th anniversary of exchange, Japan presented a vision for economic cooperation and held a special summit meeting between Japan and ASEAN on December 17, declaring the "deepening and expansion" of economic cooperation and the "co-creation of the future" through the establishment of a strategic partnership (Prime Minister Kishida's Speech 2023c).

Japan's solidarity with like-minded countries and its efforts to strengthen relations with the Global South are not solely considered as means to counter China. As evident in the 2022 National Security Strategy and the 2023 "New Plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific," Japan's strategic objective is to maintain an international order where, even if not strictly based on liberal norms and rules, fundamental principles such as freedom, the rule of law, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, and non-use of force are upheld. Therefore, Japan does not oppose China's rise itself, as long as China does not violate the basic framework and rules of competition defined by the order, even if its system and ideology differ. However, Japan opposes attempts by China to create new international norms, rules, and orders that favor its own interests. Prime Minister Kishida asserted that challenges posed by China should be addressed through Japan's comprehensive national strength and alliances with its allies and like-minded countries, while also maintaining the stance of aiming to build a "constructive and stable relationship" with China that contributes to international peace and stability and cooperates on common global challenges (Prime Minister Kishida's Speech 2023a).

3. Camp David from Japan's Perspective

In the strategic framework presented in speeches and official documents in the first half of last year, South Korea was virtually absent. Japan did not accord South Korea the status of a like-minded country with which to forge a strategic relationship. While the United States cites trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan as a prime example of cooperation among like-minded countries, Japan has been hesitant towards it, largely due to deep-seated distrust of South Korea amidst deteriorating bilateral relations. Of course, following the launch of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration in 2022 and various efforts to improve relations, there has been some shift in Japan's stance regarding South Korea. The foreign minister's policy speech to the Diet in January 2022 stated, "South Korea is an important neighbor... Keeping promises between countries is the basis of interstate relations... We strongly urge South Korea to take appropriate action." This evolved to the 2023 speech, which stated, "South Korea is an important neighbor with whom we must cooperate in addressing various challenges in the international community... It is necessary to restore and further develop Japan-South Korea relations on the foundation of friendly and cooperative relations built since the normalization of diplomatic ties... We are in close communication with the South Korean government," showing a more progressive response (Foreign Minister Hayashi's Speech 2023).

The situation changed rapidly in the first half of 2023, with trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan rapidly gaining prominence. Fundamentally, the United States was the main driving force behind the push for trilateral cooperation. Since the 2010s, the U.S. has defined trilateral cooperation in the context of its regional strategy for dealing with China and has viewed it as a key component of the regional architecture. In particular, as the U.S. shifted its regional concept from "Asia-Pacific" to "Indo-Pacific," the regional strategy intensified its focus on responding to China's challenges, thereby increasing the strategic value of trilateral cooperation. This strategy aims to maintain U.S. leadership by elevating the roles and responsibilities of Japan and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific region. This, in turn, signifies an increase in the pressure exerted by the U.S. on both South Korea and Japan to improve their bilateral relations.

The Biden administration, as clearly articulated in its "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report" released in February 2022, emphasized the importance of cooperation between allies such as South Korea and Japan within its "hub-and-spoke" alliance network and explicitly urged the improvement of Korea-Japan relations. Furthermore, it clearly defined trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan as one of the ten action plans in its Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, to build an "integrated deterrence" system that mobilizes allies and like-minded countries, the Biden administration continuously exerted pressure on Tokyo and Seoul. The political decision to respond to this came first from the South Korean government. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration set the strengthening of the South Korea-U.S. alliance as its top foreign policy priority and, as part of this, pursued the strengthening of trilateral cooperation and the improvement of Korea-Japan relations. Since the proposal of the third-party compensation plan in March 2023, improvements in Korea-Japan relations have progressed, creating conditions for enhanced trilateral cooperation.

Japan's full-scale pursuit of trilateral cooperation with South Korea and the U.S. signifies its elevation of South Korea to the status of a like-minded country. Simultaneously, it implies Japan's intention to use this cooperation as a mechanism for building an international order based on norms and rules. In essence, the Kishida government has presented three pillars for its foreign policy vision at this historical turning point: the alliance with the U.S., cooperation with like-minded countries centered around trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan (and the G7), and cooperation with the Global South, and has included South Korea within this framework.

4. Korea-Japan Cooperation Amidst U.S.-China Strategic Competition

As mentioned earlier, if a significant portion of Korea-Japan relations in 2024 is to occur within the framework of South Korea-U.S.-Japan relations, then the policy agenda for embodying the spirit of Camp David will become the main focus of South Korea's policy toward Japan. It is important to note the stark reality that the U.S. is the director and Japan is a co-star in the "Camp David" production, with South Korea playing a supporting role. Therefore, if South Korea is not adequately prepared for the numerous trilateral meetings, it will inevitably be led by the two co-stars.

First, security cooperation between South Korea and Japan has already been largely restored. Both countries share an understanding on the Korean Peninsula regarding joint responses to the North Korean nuclear issue. They will reaffirm the goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea, pursue a mechanism for real-time sharing of missile warning information, and continue cooperation on improving North Korean human rights and countering cyber illicit activities.

The biggest issue in the security domain relates to the strategic objectives of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. The three countries aim to strengthen deterrence systems not only against North Korean nuclear and missile threats but also with an eye on China and Russia. They have also explicitly included security cooperation targeting China, such as joint responses to security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, for instance, by specifying "dangerous and aggressive actions by China to support its unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea" and mentioning peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The issue here arises when the U.S. seeks to align its strategic objectives toward China with trilateral cooperation. This involves strengthening military cooperation among allies to deter China's attempts to change the status quo by force, but it could have ripple effects in other areas. For example, with technological innovation, warfare technologies across all domains—land, sea, air, space, cyber, and cognitive—are overwhelmingly based on advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology. Consequently, the U.S. is strengthening regulations on technologies with strong military-security implications or dual-use technologies, and is particularly enhancing cooperation with Japan and South Korea, which possess manufacturing bases for these technologies. As seen in the cases of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Chips and Science Act, the U.S. is demanding cooperation in technology and investment, as well as export and investment controls, from both allies. Furthermore, if China attempts to use force in the South China Sea or commits significant human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur region, the U.S. may impose economic and diplomatic sanctions on China. Thus, when trilateral cooperation emerges as a concrete policy issue, domestic support becomes the key factor.

Referring to public opinion regarding the expansion of the scope and role of the South Korea-U.S. alliance from the East Asia Institute's survey on South Korean perceptions of East Asia, we can infer the public support for trilateral cooperation. According to a public opinion poll conducted in August 2023, an overwhelming majority of 81.8% supported the direction of the South Korea-U.S. alliance evolving into an alliance that plays a role in resolving regional and global issues beyond responding to North Korean nuclear threats. However, when it came to specific scenarios such as being requested to intervene in a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, being asked to participate in policies to strongly deter China in advanced technology areas, or being asked to join a joint stance to respond strongly to human rights abuses in China's Xinjiang Uyghur region, public approval and disapproval were nearly evenly divided (Son Yeol, Kim Yang-gyu, Park Han-soo 2023).

Figure 1. Table of Alliances and South Korea's Role

Given that the South Korea-U.S. alliance, which enjoys full public support, faces such divisions, it will be difficult for the South Korean public to provide strong support for trilateral cooperation involving Japan if it expands to global, comprehensive, and strategic cooperation beyond responding to North Korean threats.

The core challenge is policy coordination regarding China. If South Korea, the U.S., and Japan are perceived as building an exclusive security system centered on deterring China, the alliance between North Korea, China, and Russia will be strengthened. In fact, the spirit of Camp David presents policy cooperation in a wide range of areas, including military security, economy, advanced technology, and global/transnational issues, while also setting a goal of promoting a new vision for the international order, namely, an international order based on universal values and norms. Therefore, trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan should be understood not as an alliance targeting or excluding specific countries, or as an Asian NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO), but rather as a form of minilateral cooperation that upholds the rules-based order and creates a model for a new international order (Jeon Jae-seong 2023). From this perspective, South Korea and Japan can respond flexibly and resiliently to China. In fact, there is significant room for convergence in the positions of South Korea and Japan on issues such as responding to contingencies in Taiwan, ensuring supply chain resilience in terms of economic security, and technology security. Both countries share security vulnerabilities in the event of an armed conflict between Taiwan and China, and they share concerns about the coercive tactics of the U.S. regarding the control of key technologies towards China, as well as the leakage of technologies to China and the U.S. Efforts to establish a mutual response system against China's economic coercion, along with strategic efforts to be able to "say no" to excessive U.S. control, should be considered.

Since the summit meeting in Bali, Indonesia, in November 2022, the U.S. has been seeking a period of strategic adjustment and, driven by the strong demand from Europe to avoid economic decoupling due to U.S.-China confrontation, is pursuing de-risking or risk reduction and diversification rather than complete decoupling of economic relations between the U.S. and China. South Korea and Japan must help ensure that the U.S. does not deviate from this trend by refraining from excessive securitization and adhering to its stated principle of "small yard, high fence" in advanced technology areas. Discussions on specific cooperation agendas are needed, including defining the scope of dual-use technologies closely related to national security, industrial subsidy standards, national security exceptions, and dispute resolution procedures.

Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan must actively counter China's tendency to establish protectionist barriers and strengthen managed trade (export controls) in critical mineral sectors, ostensibly under the guise of securitization—and under the pretext of strengthening its own capabilities in response to U.S. containment measures. While the Chinese government advocates for "economic globalization" and states its opposition to the "politicization, weaponization, and securitization of economic and trade relations" using U.S. policies toward China as a pretext, unfair practices that hinder access to the Chinese market persist behind the scenes. South Korea and Japan must not only make joint efforts to dismantle trade barriers with China but also earnestly begin efforts toward re-globalization by establishing international norms and rules.

5. Efforts to Improve Bilateral Relations

The improvement of Korea-Japan relations, which led to Camp David, is ongoing but still requires continuous mutual effort. Behind this improvement, President Yoon's forward-looking stance and the resulting personal trust between the leaders of the two countries have played a significant role. Japan confirmed President Yoon's commitment to improving relations through his strong support for the third-party compensation plan in March, his emphasis on solidarity among countries sharing universal values such as freedom, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law at the G7 Summit in May, and his statement in the Liberation Day address in August that framed Korea-Japan relations not as "aggressor vs. victim" but as "partners defending freedom in the international community." Japan also judged that South Korea qualifies as a like-minded country. Prime Minister Kishida acknowledged the role of personal relationships in his policy speech at the regular Diet session in October, stating, "We have deepened broad ties by leveraging the personal trust relationship with President Yoon."

This, conversely, also highlights the fragility of the improved relations. If the Kishida administration, which suffers from very low cabinet approval ratings, were to fall, or if President Yoon's support base were to significantly shift depending on the results of the general election in April, Korea-Japan relations could become unstable. While the South Korean public awaits a reciprocal response from Japan, believing that the Yoon administration has taken forward-looking measures, it is unlikely that Japan will adopt a forward-looking stance on historical issues. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has established a kind of gold standard of "no further apologies" after the official apology statement. This is a continuation of the declaration made around the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II in 2015, when then-Prime Minister Abe issued an official apology statement mindful of international opinion, while also declaring that the post-war generation, which constitutes over 80% of the population, should not bear the responsibility of apologizing for past events. Therefore, the LDP government's stance of "no further apologies" is likely to persist.

Furthermore, as seen in the process of resolving the forced labor issue, Japan's attitude of "not moving unless South Korea moves first" is unlikely to change significantly. The defendant companies in the forced labor lawsuits are not providing funding to the Foundation for Victims of Forced Mobilization by Japan (which the South Korean government requested) or the Korea-Japan Future Partnership Fund established by the Korea Employers Federation (KEF) and the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren). Voluntary participation from South Korean companies has also not progressed. Consequently, the Foundation for Victims of Forced Mobilization is struggling to secure sufficient funds to pay compensation equivalent to the damages awarded to the victorious plaintiffs, thereby preventing the liquidation of Japanese corporate assets. The government has stated that approximately 2.5 billion won has been spent to compensate 11 out of the 15 plaintiffs who won their cases and accepted the compensation plan. With approximately 60 lawsuits currently pending, including those for the 11 individuals who won their cases on December 21, the foundation's financial issues will likely emerge as more judgments are made. It is time to pay attention to historical issues that have been relatively neglected.

South Korea's policy toward Japan in 2024 must involve expanding functional cooperation in security and economic areas to build a comprehensive strategic partnership, while simultaneously making efforts to more actively address historical issues. Both countries face the challenge of expanding and deepening functional cooperation to foster an atmosphere conducive to reconciliation on historical perceptions, and creating a virtuous cycle structure that simultaneously pursues cooperation on historical issues and functional cooperation. ■

References

Son Yeol. 2023. “Korea-Japan Relations Amidst U.S.-China Strategic Competition, 2012-2023: Historical Conflicts, External Pressure, and Strategic Alignment.” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 58: 125-147.

Son Yeol, Kim Yang-gyu, and Park Han-soo. 2023. “Analysis of Public Perception of the South Korea-U.S. Alliance in 2023: Expectations and Concerns Regarding a Comprehensive Alliance.” EAI Issue Briefing.http://eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22118&board=kor_issuebriefing(Accessed: January 10, 2024.)

Jeon Jae-seong. 2023. “Current Status and Future Tasks of South Korea-U.S.-Japan Cooperation.” Yoon Bo-sun Democracy Research Institute 2023 Fall Academic Conference (November 2, 2023).

Prime Minister Kishida's Speech. 2023a. "Prime Minister Kishida's Speech at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University."https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/101_kishida/statement/2023/0113speech.html(Accessed: January 10, 2024.)

Prime Minister Kishida's Speech. 2023b. "Prime Minister Kishida's Policy Speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)."https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/101_kishida/statement/2023/0320speech.html(Accessed: January 10, 2024.)

Prime Minister Kishida's Speech. 2023c. "'Co-creation' Based on 'Trust' to Achieve 'Peace and Prosperity'" (December 2023),https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100596239.pdf(Accessed: January 10, 2024.)

Prime Minister Kishida's Press Conference. 2023. "Press Conference on the G7 Hiroshima Summit, etc."https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/101_kishida/statement/2023/0518bura.html(Accessed: January 10, 2024.)

Foreign Minister Hayashi's Speech. 2023. "Foreign Policy Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayashi at the 211th Session of the Diet."https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/fp/pp/page3_003597.html(Accessed: January 10, 2024.)

■Yeol SonPresident of the East Asia Institute, Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

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