[New Year Special Commentary Series] VI. China's Global Vision and China-South Korea Relations in 2024

1. China's Global Vision and Diplomatic Strategy in 2024

1) Promoting Multipolarization and Economic Globalization

In 2024, China is presenting a global vision to create a new framework in its 'relations with the world' as a major power. It anticipates active diplomacy by assessing that the 'major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics' pursued over the past decade has entered a new phase where its role can be further expanded. The Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference (中央外事工作会议), held in December 2023 for the first time in five years, reviewed Xi Jinping's diplomacy of the past decade and presented a diplomatic vision and blueprint for the next five years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2023/12/28). China has traditionally maintained a pattern of classifying diplomatic targets into major powers, neighboring countries, developing countries, and multilateral diplomacy, setting priorities accordingly and adjusting its diplomatic tone and direction. For example, while the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference in 2014 prioritized neighboring diplomacy, the 2018 conference placed major power diplomacy at the forefront and emphasized its importance.

However, the 2024 diplomatic vision places a global vision and blueprint that showcases China's identity as a major power at the forefront. The essence of China's proposed global vision is the promotion of 'multipolarization of the world' and 'economic globalization.' This reflects China's determination to exercise a role and influence commensurate with its status as a major power. Simultaneously, it contains a strategy to create an international environment conducive to economic recovery while overcoming the complex challenges and obstacles China faces. By advocating for 'equal and orderly multipolarization of the world,' China is actively expressing its will to transform the existing international order. This is an extension of the discussion on reforming the global governance system, which has been continuously emphasized since the Xi Jinping administration came to power. It also highlights the significant diplomatic achievement of 2023 in actively participating in global governance and leading the transformation of the international system and order. China is ultimately considering competition with the United States over the establishment of the international order and system in the long term. However, in reality, behind China's advocacy for multipolarization lies a strategic calculation to weaken the US-led anti-China coalition by fostering international criticism of American unilateralism and hegemony, even if the US is not explicitly mentioned.

A similar strategic consideration lies behind China's advocacy for 'economic globalization.' China emphasizes promoting the liberalization of trade and investment and resolving structural issues that hinder the sound development of the global economy, while advocating for the promotion of open, inclusive, and comprehensive economic globalization. This is also part of its global vision and, at the same time, a de facto diplomatic strategy toward the US, without explicitly naming it. The economic globalization advocated by China is an indirect criticism of the US's China policy, which seeks to exclude China from supply chains in future advanced industries such as semiconductors. In his opening speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 2023, President Xi Jinping implicitly targeted the US's offensive and pressure, particularly in advanced technology fields, and openly criticized it, although without explicitly naming the US. In other words, by advocating for 'adherence to opening up,' he stated his opposition to the 'politicization, weaponization, and securitization of economic and trade relations' that hinder the stabilization and smooth functioning of industrial supply chains (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2023/11/18).

China believes that securing allies in the international community is crucial to counter the US's offensive and, in particular, to find breakthroughs from sanctions in the economic and scientific-technological fields. In this context, China aims to expand its support base by targeting the so-called 'Global South,' which consists mainly of emerging and developing countries. China claims that it is responding to the universal needs of developing countries through economic globalization and resolving imbalances in national development through global resource allocation.

In 2023, China actively promoted the expansion of member states in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and expanded the scope of solidarity and cooperation among them. Furthermore, in summit meetings with these countries, China consistently emphasized mutual support for 'core interests' and highlighted its 'China-style' global initiatives and agendas, such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), the community of shared future for mankind, and the Belt and Road Initiative cooperation. In particular, President Xi Jinping officially referred to China as a member of the 'Global South' as a developing country in his closing remarks at the BRICS Business Forum in South Africa in 2023, implicitly signaling his intention to strengthen South-South cooperation, targeting the US.

China's active multilateral diplomacy centered on multilateral organizations where US influence is relatively weak, such as BRICS, SCO, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum, and its expansion of diplomatic outreach towards the 'Global South' are strategic moves to secure partners for development in the short to medium term and to expand its base of allies in the long term, targeting strategic competition with the US. However, the Xi Jinping administration faces a dilemma where its continuous presentation of new global visions and initiatives to enhance its international influence and expand its support base is struggling to gain international consensus and support. China's attempts to transform the international order are creating new friction and challenges, hindering its development strategy.

2) Diplomacy for Development and Regime Security

In his 2024 New Year's address, President Xi Jinping unusually acknowledged the sluggishness of the Chinese economy and pledged to focus on economic recovery and stable long-term development. China is currently facing various economic challenges, including a real estate crisis, a slump in local economies, high unemployment, and a decrease in foreign direct investment. The US continues to impose sanctions and pressure on China in economic and advanced scientific-technological fields to curb China's rise. In particular, the long-term rule of the Xi Jinping regime is stimulating anti-China sentiment internationally and spreading consensus on containing China, placing China in a severe complex challenge both domestically and internationally.

China is concerned that the uncertainty and instability of the international situation caused by the so-called 'Year of Elections' (大选年) in 2024 will create an unfavorable environment for economic recovery and could also pose challenges to regime security. The Chinese government recognizes that economic recovery is the top priority directly linked to regime security, despite the difficult domestic and international environment. President Xi Jinping emphasized in his New Year's address the need to pursue Chinese-style modernization, achieve high-quality development, and maintain a balance between development and security to achieve stable and long-term economic development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2023/12/31). In essence, the Xi Jinping administration has set the establishment of a foundation for long-term economic development through economic recovery as a key task for 2024.

The Xi Jinping administration intends to pursue comprehensive diplomacy to create external conditions and environments that can overcome complex domestic and international challenges and promote growth. China highlights its diplomatic achievement in 2023 of building a global partnership network. The Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference also emphasized the need to create a favorable international environment for building a strong nation through Chinese-style modernization (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2023/12/28). China expresses its commitment to opposing protectionism, implementing high-level opening-up for high-quality development, and actively attracting foreign investment. Furthermore, by advocating for 'unity with the majority of the world,' China has implicitly signaled its intention to pursue active diplomacy towards the 'Global South,' including emerging and developing countries, to counter the US's de-risking offensive. The Xi Jinping administration ambitiously presents its so-called China-style global initiatives, such as building a community of shared future for mankind, and expresses its determination to lead the transformation of the international system and order. However, in reality, China's global initiatives are also focused on creating an international environment and conditions for securing its development rights and achieving economic revitalization in the short to medium term.

2. China's Diplomatic Vision and Strategy Toward the US: Five Commonalities and Five Nos

China opposes the US defining US-China relations as 'competition' and consistently emphasizes the adherence to the three principles of 'mutual respect (相互尊重),' 'peaceful coexistence (平和共存),' and 'win-win cooperation (合作共赢).' China is also sending a message that US-China relations should be 'restored to a healthy and stable track.'

At the San Francisco summit in November 2023, President Xi Jinping specifically presented his vision and principles for US-China relations through the so-called 'five commonalities' and 'five nos' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2023/11/16). The five commonalities presented by President Xi are 'establishing common positive perceptions,' 'effectively managing common differences,' 'jointly promoting win-win cooperation,' 'sharing major-country responsibilities,' and 'jointly promoting people-to-people exchanges.' Some aspects of President Xi's vision and direction for US-China relations were shared and agreed upon at the San Francisco summit. For example, both sides agreed to manage crises by restoring high-level military dialogue channels to prevent differences and competition from escalating into conflict (Son Yeol et al. 2023). The agreement to establish intergovernmental dialogue in the areas of fentanyl precursor control and artificial intelligence (AI) can be seen as a partial sharing of major-country responsibilities for global issues. Bilaterally, an agreement was reached to promote people-to-people exchanges. However, differences were not resolved on the most contentious issues in US-China relations, namely advanced technology and export controls, and the Taiwan issue, with only clear differences in positions being reaffirmed. Ultimately, the 'establishment of common positive perceptions' and 'jointly promoting win-win cooperation,' which encompass the most critical tasks among Xi Jinping's 'five commonalities,' revealed limitations.

Furthermore, reviewing the discussion on the 'five nos' shows that there are significant practical barriers to rebuilding trust and developing stable relations between the two countries. At the San Francisco summit, China reiterated its demand that the Biden administration adhere to the 'five nos'—not pursuing a new Cold War, not seeking to change China's system, not supporting Taiwan's independence, and not engaging in conflict with China—which it had also advocated at the Bali summit in 2022. According to the announcement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President Biden reaffirmed these 'five nos' at the San Francisco summit, emphasizing that the US must demonstrate these agreements through concrete actions in the future (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2023/11/16). While China advocates for the restoration of healthy and stable relations with the US, it also frankly reveals its significant concerns and suspicions about the possibility of continued US containment and pressure on China, particularly regarding efforts to change China's system and strengthen alliances, suggesting that it is also preparing resistance and countermeasures.

The practical challenges China faces in its diplomacy toward the US are the Taiwan issue, which falls under sovereign interests among the core interests mentioned earlier, and US controls on advanced technology and trade related to development interests. The Taiwan issue has become even more acute with the connection to the presidential election in Taiwan. However, it is important to note the historical context of the Taiwan issue, which has been a familiar yet intractable chronic problem throughout the 45-year history of US-China relations. In fact, the Taiwan issue has invariably emerged as the most sensitive point of conflict whenever US-China relations have deteriorated over the past 45 years. Conversely, when US-China relations have stabilized, the two countries have managed instability based on an implicit agreement to maintain the status quo regarding Taiwan. In essence, the Taiwan issue has historically been a product of US-China confrontation and conflict rather than an independent variable causing US-China conflict.

In the current context of escalating US-China competition and confrontation, the re-emergence of the Taiwan issue as a point of contention is, in a way, a predictable repetition of history. Particularly, for the Xi Jinping administration, which is strengthening its legitimacy through heightened nationalism, the room for flexibility on the territorial sovereignty issue of Taiwan has narrowed, leading to tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait higher than ever before. However, ultimately, it is difficult to see the US having a clear motivation or capacity to support Taiwan's independence, and given China's complex domestic and international situation, the possibility of it rashly invading Taiwan with force is not high. Taiwanese public opinion also shows a low proportion supporting independence, and confidence in US security commitments is not high. Both the US and China are also engaging in dialogue to avoid facing the worst-case scenario due to the Taiwan issue, which is difficult to resolve fundamentally. In essence, because the Taiwan issue cannot be fundamentally resolved, it will remain a variable of instability and China's Achilles' heel in the future, influenced by the fluctuations in US-China relations and changes in Taiwan's political landscape.

What President Xi Jinping emphasized at the San Francisco summit was development interests, specifically the right to development. According to the press release from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the summit, President Xi mentioned 'Chinese-style modernization' and strongly asserted that pursuing the path of Chinese development is legitimate and that the US should not obstruct it. The US has imposed regulations on China in three areas: advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing. President Xi criticized the US for infringing upon China's legitimate right to development through export controls, investment reviews, and unilateral sanctions.

For the Xi Jinping administration, facing an economic downturn, economic development is a crucial task directly linked to strengthening the legitimacy of its rule and ensuring regime stability. To secure its ruling legitimacy through economic development, it is an urgent and important task for the Xi Jinping administration to ease US sanctions in the economic and advanced technology sectors, and it is concentrating its diplomatic efforts on finding breakthroughs in various ways. However, given that the Biden administration is highly unlikely to cease sanctions in advanced technology fields, China's countermeasures are limited.

First, China has attempted to counter by 'weaponizing resources,' controlling exports of gallium and germanium, which are mainly used in semiconductors. China is also seeking to diversify its diplomatic space for securing development rights, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, but faces limitations in overcoming US pressure. While advocating for active opening-up and economic globalization, China is simultaneously seeking long-term countermeasures internally to achieve self-reliance in advanced technologies in response to US pressure. Under the banner of a 'new whole-nation system' that mobilizes national resources and capabilities, China is preparing for a long-term confrontation with the US by building an industry ecosystem centered on itself and an independent scientific and technological ecosystem.

3. China's Perception and Response to ROK-US-Japan Cooperation

China perceives and criticizes ROK-US-Japan cooperation as a US-led effort to contain China, using the North Korean threat as a pretext (Zhang Chi 2023). China also strongly criticized the Camp David ROK-US-Japan summit. A People's Daily commentary stated that 'calling it a ROK-US-Japan trilateral alliance demonstrates the US's intention to build a mini-NATO in Northeast Asia, posing a threat to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and pushing the region towards a 'new Cold War'' (Zhong Sheng 2023). In particular, it strongly criticized the raising of issues concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea at the ROK-US-Japan summit as blatant interference in internal affairs and an intentional attempt to sow discord between China and its neighboring countries.

China's criticism of strengthened ROK-US-Japan cooperation is primarily directed at the US, criticizing its intentions and strategy of drawing in South Korea and Japan, which are adjacent to China, to pressure and encircle China. In contrast, it has shown relative restraint in direct attacks on Japan and South Korea. Regarding South Korea, despite the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's attempts to improve relations with Japan, China anticipates that strengthening ROK-Japan security cooperation as intended by the US will not be easy due to strong domestic opposition in South Korea and the inherent historical and territorial issues in ROK-Japan relations that are difficult to resolve easily. Furthermore, it argues that the US's plan to build a mini-NATO in Northeast Asia does not align with the national interests of South Korea and Japan. Specifically, it criticizes that it will not contribute to regional economic cooperation and will escalate military tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, causing security instability. While expressing concerns and dissatisfaction with ROK-US-Japan cooperation, China employs a strategy of differentiating its response to the US, South Korea, and Japan, thereby seeking to weaken US-led ROK-US-Japan cooperation.

In essence, China fundamentally perceives and responds to the strengthening of ROK-US-Japan security cooperation as the establishment of a US-led containment network against China. China views the ROK-Japan relationship as a weak link in the ROK-US-Japan cooperation framework. China believes that historical and territorial issues between South Korea and Japan are difficult to resolve fundamentally, and that differences in strategic interests between the two countries will be potential variables that constrain the development of their relationship. For example, China believes that South Korea and Japan inherently have differences in their strategic positions and interests in responding to the rise of China and in dealing with the North Korean issue. This perception on China's part partly reflects wishful thinking and also suggests the possibility of implementing strategies and policies that highlight the various conflict issues inherent in ROK-Japan relations and use them to counter the strengthening of ROK-US-Japan cooperation.

China has not shown concrete actions to counter ROK-US-Japan security cooperation through the strengthening of China-North Korea-Russia solidarity. While the strategic value of North Korea is increasing amidst escalating competition with the US, China also harbors concerns about security instability originating from North Korea, its neighbor. North Korea frequently causes instability along China's border through its nuclear weapons development, missile provocations, and economic difficulties. China's persistent calls for 'strategic communication' with North Korea are also intended to manage various security concerns stemming from North Korea. North Korea attempts to drive solidarity among China, North Korea, and Russia through continuous provocations. However, China does not wish for its confrontation with the US to expand further due to the North Korean issue. The US also does not wish for its strategic burden to increase due to North Korea's continuous provocations. However, China is wary of North Korea's excessive closeness with Russia. China also faces a dilemma where it cannot entirely disregard some of North Korea's demands to counter the deepening ties between North Korea and Russia. To counter North Korea's attempts to draw China into China-North Korea-Russia solidarity through continuous provocations and displays of closeness with Russia, it is necessary for South Korea to be more proactive in strategic communication with China on the North Korean issue. That is, as North Korean provocations intensify, it is necessary to restore and maintain channels of strategic communication with China based on a shared understanding of resolving instability on the Korean Peninsula.

4. China-South Korea Relations and South Korea's Strategy Toward China

It is an unusual and noteworthy change that China's 2024 diplomatic vision did not include direct discussions on neighboring diplomacy. Given China's geopolitical characteristic of bordering 20 countries by land and sea, neighboring diplomacy is inevitably crucial. Nevertheless, the absence of separate mention of China's neighboring diplomacy suggests that China's diplomatic vision is essentially focused on diplomacy toward the US, with neighboring diplomacy becoming a subordinate variable to its US strategy and US-China relations.

For China, the Korean Peninsula is a complex and sensitive region where major power diplomacy and neighboring diplomacy overlap due to its geopolitical specificity. As China pursues its so-called major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics and competition with the US intensifies as an extension of this, the influence of major power diplomacy is expanding on the Korean Peninsula rather than neighboring diplomacy. In particular, as South Korea continues to strengthen its alliance with the US and ROK-US-Japan security cooperation, China increasingly perceives and responds to the Korean Peninsula and South Korea in conjunction with changes in US-China relations. Therefore, South Korea is facing a new situation where it must keenly and continuously observe the complexities and fluidity of US-China relations more than ever before and explore various response strategies based on this understanding.

China has also unusually omitted any mention of the Korean Peninsula issue in the official press releases following the US-China summits in Bali and San Francisco. Previously, China always included a brief, standard phrase about 'denuclearization and stability on the Korean Peninsula' in summit press releases, suggesting that the Korean Peninsula issue was among the major agenda items. Through this, China conveyed its influence on the Korean Peninsula and indirectly signaled its support for North Korea's position, even without reaching fundamental agreement with the US on core issues such as North Korean denuclearization. Given the highly unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula leading up to the US-China summits, marked by North Korean provocations and the ROK-North Korea summit, the omission of the Korean Peninsula issue is highly unusual. If the escalating US-China competition leads to the North Korean nuclear issue being sidelined from policy priorities rather than seeking solutions, South Korea will need a new approach. From South Korea's perspective, which is most directly exposed to the North Korean threat, it is essential to keenly monitor changes reflecting the fluidity of US-China relations on the Korean Peninsula.

Recent public opinion surveys by the East Asia Institute indicate a clear sentiment supporting the US and countering China's challenges in the context of US-China competition (Lee Dong-ryul 2023). However, there is a demand for caution depending on the issue when South Korea participates in containing China through the ROK-US alliance. For example, regarding military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the opinion against participation (56.5%) is higher than that in favor (43.5%). Regarding participation in a joint stance to strongly respond to human rights abuses in China's Xinjiang Uyghur region, the approval rate is slightly higher at 52.4% compared to opposition at 47.6%, indicating a need for caution. Conversely, regarding participation in policies to strongly contain China in advanced technologies such as semiconductors, the approval rate is higher at 60% compared to opposition at 40%. In summary, as public opinion suggests, South Korea requires a cautious yet flexible and selective approach in its diplomacy toward China, depending on the issue and situation. For security-sensitive and fluid issues like the Taiwan Strait, there are significant concerns about excessively provoking China, which could exacerbate South Korea's security anxieties or worsen China-South Korea relations.

Furthermore, recent opinion polls show that a majority of the public believes that while they dislike China, it is an important country for South Korea and cooperation is necessary. This suggests that South Korea's diplomacy toward China is in a complex and difficult phase. Despite high negative sentiment towards China, the pragmatic view is that South Korea's relations with China should be managed more stably and cooperatively than they are now for the sake of South Korea's national interests. Given the unavoidable particularity of being neighboring countries with the most active human and material exchanges in the world, it is necessary for both countries to proactively manage their relationship to prevent it from becoming mired in a vicious cycle of chronic conflict.

Moreover, for South Korea to secure leadership through new initiatives in a fluid Korean Peninsula situation, it is important to make various attempts to find breakthroughs in the stagnant relationship with China. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the reason why South Korea and China were able to achieve remarkable development in their relationship, despite differences in systems and values, is that functional cooperation, such as economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges, has driven the bilateral relationship. Of course, fueled by the rapid development of economic cooperation, the China-South Korea relationship has also seen expanded conflicts due to excessive mutual expectations regarding sensitive strategic issues such as North Korea's nuclear program and the ROK-US alliance. Therefore, to restore China-South Korea relations, priority should be given to seeking ways to revitalize economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges in evolved forms suitable for the changed environment and situation.

Furthermore, the more unstable China-South Korea relations become, the more necessary it is to activate close and diverse communication channels to proactively prevent misunderstandings, conflicts, and clashes of interest that may arise between the two countries, and to be prepared for prompt post-incident responses. For example, in preparation for unforeseen sensitive issues that may arise between China and South Korea, such as North Korea's provocations and nuclear issue, the Taiwan issue, maritime safety, and the spread of infectious diseases and environmental pollution, it is necessary to proactively strengthen strategic communication to manage and prevent the expansion and reproduction of unnecessary conflicts and misunderstandings. In particular, given the high possibility of new fluidity in the Taiwan issue and US-China relations in 2024 depending on the outcomes of elections in various countries, and considering the resulting instability on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea's diplomatic strategy should focus on crisis management, flexibility, and autonomy.

References

Son Yeol, Kim Yang-gyu, Lee Dong-ryul, Lee Seung-ju, Jeon Jae-seong, Ha Young-sun. 2023. "Between 'Managed Competition' and 'Securing Development Rights': Seeking Cooperation at the 2023 APEC US-China Summit." EAI Special Report.https://eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22234&board=kor_issuebriefing(Accessed: January 9, 2024.)

Lee Dong-ryul. 2023. "'I Dislike China, But China-South Korea Relations Are Important': What is South Korea's Policy Direction Toward China?" EAI Issue Briefing.https://eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22120&board=kor_issuebriefing(Accessed: January 9, 2024.)

Zhang Chi. 2023. "The Core Objective of US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation Shifts: From Responding to the 'North Korean Nuclear Threat' to 'Containing China'." *Northeast Asia Forum*, Issue 3.

Zhong Sheng. 2023. "Building a 'Mini-NATO' Style Trilateral Alliance Harms Peace and Stability in the Asia-Pacific." *People's Daily*, August 29. Page 017.http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2023-08/29/nw.D110000renmrb_20230829_2-17.htm(Accessed: January 9, 2024.)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2023. "Xi Jinping Holds Summit Meeting with US President Biden." November 16.https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202311/t20231116_11181125.shtml(Accessed: January 9, 2024.)

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______. 2023. "Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference Held in Beijing; Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech." December 28.https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202312/t20231228_11214409.shtml(Accessed: January 9, 2024.)

______. 2023. "President Xi Jinping Delivers 2024 New Year's Address." December 31.https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202312/t20231231_11215589.shtml(Accessed: January 9, 2024.)

■ Mobility Rate_Director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the East Asia Institute (EAI), Professor of Chinese Language and Literature at Dongduk Women’s University.

■ Responsible for and edited by: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

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