[New Year Special Commentary Series] V. Foreign Policy of the Biden Administration in 2024 and Tasks for South Korea's Policy Toward the U.S.

1. Foreign Policy Direction of the Biden Administration in its Fourth Year

The broad direction of foreign policy that the Biden administration will pursue in 2024 can be gauged from Jake Sullivan's article, "The Sources of American Power: A Foreign Policy for a Changed World," published in Foreign Affairson October 24, 2023 (Sullivan 2023). The Biden administration presents a mission to consolidate America's third era of foreign policy, which seeks global leadership. If the establishment and maintenance of a liberal, rules-based order is the raison d'être of American foreign policy, then this is a recognition that after the first era of leadership immediately after World War II and the second era during the post-Cold War period, a third era of leadership must now be redesigned at a historical inflection point, with the post-Cold War era having ended.

The Biden administration has set geopolitical competition and transnational threats as the most important factors in its foreign policy decisions. Geopolitical competition combines great power competition for leadership with the strategy of non-great powers choosing sides, and transnational threats are existential dangers that could annihilate humanity before the 22nd century arrives. If even one of the four major transnational threats—climate change, health crises, nuclear war, and failure to manage new technologies—materializes, humanity's future will inevitably be bleak. If transnational threats are addressed solely within the framework of geopolitical competition, the very foundation for geopolitical competition will disappear. While the Biden administration understands the importance of transnational threats, it remains to be seen whether it can wisely escape the "sovereignty trap" compared to other great powers and whether it can prioritize important issues over urgent ones.

The Biden administration firmly believes that the era of a single nation exercising global leadership has passed. This is a correct assessment. It recognizes that leadership can only be maintained in transnational threats, as well as in geopolitical competition, through cooperation with allies, strategic partners, and even countries with which it does not share values. When overcoming the tendency to categorize the world as authoritarian versus democratic is important, the Biden administration's perspective, as it enters its fourth year, appears to have broadened. The key will be how it can foster cooperation with allies, partner countries, Global South nations, and even competitors like China and Russia to meet the growing demand for global public goods.

While theorists strongly believe that international politics is a history of repetition, and the past often serves as a crucial reference point when designing the post-Cold War international order, the future of international politics is highly likely to be filled with unprecedented phenomena. The United States' pursuit of geopolitical competition, its policies for strengthening national power for this purpose, and its efforts to modernize alliances are ongoing endeavors, but transnational threats, coupled with the reshaping of global supply chains after globalization, the reality of pursuing both interdependence and geopolitical competition, and the existence of Global South countries that have become significantly stronger compared to the past, all constitute a new policy environment. In 2024, the Biden administration will likely seek to solidify the foundation of American leadership by continuing the broad framework and specific policies of its foreign policy over the past three years, but its leadership, as well as the fate of the Biden administration on the eve of a presidential election, will be determined by how it responds to these new challenges.

2. The Biden Dilemma

Facing the new year with two wars—the Ukraine-Russia war and the Israel-Hamas war—the Biden administration is confronted with the difficult task of not only managing and concluding these wars and their aftermath but also laying the groundwork for the future international order through them. First, it is crucial to recognize that these two wars are important indicators that will shape the future international order. The war in Ukraine is the largest war in Europe since World War II, and the war in Gaza is a war that questions the foundation of the realigning Middle East regional order. Although both are regional conflicts and not direct military confrontations between great powers, their repercussions are considered immense for great power geopolitical competition and on a global scale.

Looking back, the United States and the Soviet Union never engaged in direct combat during the Cold War of the 20th century, which is why the Cold War was also called a "long peace" or a "cold peace." However, the Cold War unfolded through numerous small-scale "hot wars" in various regions, and many countries were forced to take sides in proxy wars at immense sacrifice. When inherent regional and intrinsic conflicts between or within regions and countries became linked to the Cold War confrontation between the US and the USSR, conflicts escalated, and confrontations turned into large-scale total wars. From the Korean Peninsula to Vietnam, Africa, Central America, and Afghanistan, numerous hot wars occurred, through which both the US and the USSR confirmed each other's strength and achieved a balance of power and spheres of influence through proxy wars, thereby avoiding nuclear war between them.

The wars in Ukraine and Gaza represent a process through which great powers such as the United States, Russia, the European Union, and China are confirming their respective strengths and resolve and establishing a new order after the end of the Cold War. Regardless of the individual outcomes of these wars, they serve as a testing ground for evaluating the strategic objectives and policy intentions of great powers, the robustness or fragility of their domestic politics and economies, and the steadfastness of their commitments to allies and partners. Therefore, the current hot wars inevitably carry global implications.

Second, while it would be ideal if the Biden administration could design the third era of global leadership with the vast policy resources that past U.S. administrations possessed, the reality is quite different. Unlike immediately after World War II or the end of the Cold War, the United States does not currently command immense economic power, solid military strength, and strong support from its allies. Most importantly, it does not have the advantageous environment of weakened competitors. Frederick Kempe, President of the Atlantic Council, recently quoted a senior Biden administration official to express the Biden administration's dilemma: namely, that the conditions for the United States to lead global affairs no longer exist, unlike the periods immediately after World War II or the Cold War. At that time, the U.S. accounted for half of the world's GDP, major adversaries were in ruins, even Europe had lost its strength, the emerging Global South lacked its current political power, and global industrialization was also favorable to the U.S. He points out that if these conditions still existed today, the U.S. could accomplish many things.

Although the Biden administration has provided substantial support for the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, it remains uncertain whether U.S. national strength can sustain this in the future. The United States has provided over $100 billion in military, economic, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. On October 20, 2023, President Biden submitted a $106 billion security budget request to the House of Representatives for aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, but the portion for Ukraine has yet to be passed.

Beyond economic power, the ongoing wars also raise fundamental questions about America's defense industrial base. The difficulties faced by the U.S. defense industry in the basic sector of weapons production are becoming increasingly clear through these conflicts. Decades of underfunding defense budgets and poor management of major defense acquisition programs have led to limitations in U.S. inventory of key weapons and readiness for combat. The hollowing out of the broad manufacturing base has weakened weapons production capacity, and defense contractors, in particular, rely on supply chains originating from China. From electronic components to minerals like gallium, Chinese companies now hold a significant share in essential sub-components and materials.

The problems arising from military aid to Ukraine are becoming increasingly apparent. For example, U.S. stocks of precision-guided munitions are so low that it is estimated the U.S. military would run out of ammunition within 3 to 10 days if involved in a conflict in the Pacific. Ukraine has received approximately $50 billion in U.S. military assistance to date, struggling with depleted weapon stockpiles for survival, and while Israel is also being supported, this places an enormous burden on domestic manufacturing capabilities. Currently, there are strong calls for fundamental reform, as large-scale expansion plans are inadequate and the necessary budget is limited.

Third, there is the challenge of how to conclude the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, establish a framework for rebuilding the international security order based on these outcomes, and send a clear message to geopolitical rivals and the international community. The Biden administration cannot ignore Russia's invasion, which clearly violated the sovereignty of a neighboring country, nor Hamas's terrorist attacks, which resulted in casualties, including civilians. This is because it views maintaining a rules-based security order as essential for U.S. national interests. The question is whether it can move forward with Ukraine and Israel toward the desired end goals through close cooperation.

In the war in Ukraine, President Zelensky aims to restore the borders of 1991 and demands reparations for war damages. Russia, on the other hand, seeks Ukraine's non-accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), regime change in Ukraine to one not hostile to Russia, and recognition of the territories of the four currently occupied regions. As Ukraine's offensive in June last year effectively failed and the war in Ukraine has become prolonged, the United States and the European Union are facing fatigue and skepticism about the sustainability of support for Ukraine. With the uncertainty surrounding Ukraine's continued ability to wage war, prolonged fighting without an exit strategy inevitably presents numerous difficulties for the United States.

Israel, too, shows a resolve for a protracted war, not only to decisively counter its existential security threats but also to attack Lebanon, where Iran and Hezbollah, supporters of Hamas, are stationed, aiming for the complete expulsion of Hamas. With the fundamental resolution of the Palestinian issue, the future governance of Gaza, and the broader task of Middle East détente based on the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia at stake, the Biden administration cannot maintain unconditional support for Israel in light of the future of the Gaza war.

In its alliance policy, the United States has emphasized restraint toward its allies, as well as joint action against adversaries, sometimes employing coercive methods. The international community is watching to see whether the U.S. can pursue effective and reasonable methods of restraint toward its strategic partners in the new policy environment.

The United States faces the challenge of finding a new momentum in the war in Ukraine to counter Russia's strategy of a protracted war and negotiate under favorable conditions. A hasty end to the war amidst short-term disadvantages will inevitably send a message of weakened security commitments to allies and strategic partners. The U.S. will be wary of creating the perception among its rivals that it cannot sustain prolonged international commitments. For Israel, it must be encouraged to conclude the short-term war, resolve the Palestinian issue through the two-state solution pursued by the international community, and find a sustainable solution for Israel's coexistence in the Middle East. In this process, the U.S. faces the difficulty of defining its relationship with Israel while considering the domestic political circumstances of the Netanyahu government.

Third, the most important counterpart in the U.S. effort to establish an international order is China. The Biden administration has been criticized for failing to provide a clear answer to the question of the ultimate objective of its strategy toward China. The Biden administration's response, as it enters its fourth year, is to pursue both competition and cooperation with China, while preventing competition from escalating into military conflict. This can be summarized as pursuing "de-risking" and diversification rather than "decoupling." It intends to maintain comprehensive trade and investment relations while raising issues regarding China's unfair trade practices. Simultaneously, it aims to pursue decoupling in narrow areas of advanced technology to prevent technologies acquired by China from the U.S. and its allies from being used to coerce the U.S. and its allies.

In this process, the Biden administration has demonstrated efforts to prevent military conflict and jointly address transnational threats through U.S.-China summits. The summit in San Francisco last November aimed to lay the groundwork for dialogue, and efforts to establish rules for competition in artificial intelligence-based nuclear weapons, in particular, are seen as having achieved certain results.

The issue is how effectively the U.S.-China relationship and the management of key hot conflict zones in Asia can be handled. In particular, the presidential election in Taiwan scheduled for January 13 will have a significant impact on future cross-strait relations and carries the risk of escalating tensions. Of course, it is unlikely that presidential candidates in Taiwan will advocate for a rapid declaration of independence or confrontational policies toward China, and the Biden administration will pursue its existing Taiwan strategy regardless of the election outcome. In this process, clear deterrence against China's attempts at military unification of Taiwan is crucial. This includes not only clarifying the strategy for responding to China's use of military force but also reaffirming the U.S.'s clear commitment to the One China principle and reassuring Taiwan's opposition to a declaration of independence. It is important for the Biden administration to pursue a balanced strategy for maintaining the status quo, but the challenge is that such crisis management and reassurance policies toward China could be perceived as weakness by the Biden administration during the election campaign.

The implications of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza for U.S.-China relations are also significant. Although the scale of economic budget and weapon systems supported by the U.S. are not identical, there is overlap in various conflicts, which presents a dilemma regarding a potential future crisis in Taiwan. With U.S.-China relations being the greatest source of instability for the U.S., and the Taiwan issue remaining a core concern, the wars in Europe and the Middle East weaken the focus on China policy and create a dilemma of reduced readiness in terms of weapons and capabilities in case of an emergency.

Ultimately, the Biden administration faces the task of effectively managing two wars in 2024, concluding them in a way that provides positive indicators for the future security order and its aftermath, maintaining its security reputation by securing clear security commitments to allies and partners, and signaling to competitors the U.S.'s military strength and commitment to alliances. Simultaneously, it must manage global conflicts and prioritize them. In a new geopolitical landscape where U.S. global engagement is weakening, there is ample possibility for chronic conflicts in various regions to erupt into war. The U.S. faces the difficult dilemma of whether it can maintain the national strength and readiness to manage multiple battlefronts and maintain military deterrence against China, while being mindful of China as its greatest competitor.

3. Trump Risk

The possibility of former President Trump being re-elected in the U.S. presidential election on November 5 is currently considered high. While the foreign policy that a second Trump administration would pursue and how to respond to it are issues for next year, the impact on U.S. foreign policy this year, should Trump become the Republican nominee and compete with the Biden administration on foreign policy, is a significant question.

First, it is important to recognize that America's political polarization is based on a more fundamental political and economic polarization within the United States. The fact that Donald Trump enjoys the support of a significant portion of American voters, despite numerous issues, points to the fundamental political and economic problems plaguing American society. The Biden administration also discusses the revival of the middle class and the revitalization of manufacturing as the bedrock of U.S. foreign policy, underscoring the importance of domestic political economy.

President Biden will likely try to avoid giving the impression that he is overly focused on foreign policy. He has stated that approximately 75% of his energy during his term has been devoted to foreign policy. In reality, the efforts and outcomes of U.S. presidents in foreign policy are often not clearly communicated to domestic voters. This is due to the inherent nature of foreign policy, which often involves secrecy regarding its achievements or progress, and the fact that its benefits are realized over long-term structural situations, making them unhelpful for short-term elections. Therefore, in a presidential election year, a situation may arise where the incumbent president's foreign policy becomes less assertive. Similar situations occurred with President Carter in 1980 and President Bush in 1992, where achievements in foreign policy did not translate into victory in domestic presidential elections.

As in other countries, domestic political issues, particularly economic factors such as inflation, employment rates, and economic growth rates, are inevitably perceived as important by voters in the United States. Recent macroeconomic indicators suggest a strong recovery in the U.S. economy, but the gap between these indicators and the economic hardships felt by voters must be explained by a multitude of factors. A survey conducted by the "Wall Street Journal" in August 2023 found that less than a quarter of registered voters believed the economy was heading in the right direction. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index is at levels nearly comparable to those reported during the Great Recession of 2009, and a Pew Research Center poll indicated that the proportion of respondents with a positive view of the economy has halved between 2016 and the present. This situation is attributed to factors such as persistently rising inequality, high price levels due to post-pandemic inflation, a widespread shortage of affordable housing, and a loss of faith in future economic prospects, including concerns about the negative impact of artificial intelligence on quality jobs. The problem is that it is difficult for the Biden administration to resolve these perceptual issues in the short term. Nevertheless, there is a risk that the Biden administration's attention and efforts in foreign policy may decrease in order to counter President Trump's attacks on the Biden administration's economic failures.

Second, the Biden administration will inevitably have to strengthen its competitiveness against the foreign policy proposals put forth by President Trump, which could lead to a competition for clarity or a competition for "America First." Institutions such as the America First Policy Institute and the Heritage Foundation, known to support President Trump, view China as a clear adversary and advocate for disengagement and strong deterrence against China. President Trump is expected to pursue policies that oppose climate change, promote increased U.S. oil production, and oppose electric vehicles, which would be a reversal of efforts to address the transnational threat of climate crisis. In the long term, the slogan "Make America Great Again" could make America more dangerous.

The Biden administration will also have to pay close attention to voter trends. As the election approaches, there is a shift where voters become more sensitive to foreign policy issues. According to a poll conducted in December last year by the Associated Press and the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center (NORC) for the Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research, about 4 out of 10 American adults included foreign policy among the top five major issues the government should address next year (Weissert and Sanders 2024). This is about double the figure from last year's poll. The new poll results indicate an increase in concerns about U.S. overseas involvement, with 20% expressing this opinion, compared to 5% a year ago. Approximately 46% of Republican voters cited foreign policy as an important factor, an increase from 23% last year. Among Democratic voters, 34% considered foreign policy important, a significant increase from 16% a year ago. In this context, the Biden administration will be compelled to pursue a foreign policy that is "politically correct" domestically. For example, we can anticipate issues such as a competition for clarity on China, strong statements of support for Taiwan, a passive stance on support for the war in Ukraine, and ambivalence regarding support for Israel.

Third, U.S. presidential elections have a significant impact on other countries as well. President Biden's lame-duck status may manifest not only in domestic politics but also in international politics. This is because many countries may face difficulties due to the high approval ratings of President Trump and the significant uncertainty surrounding the domestic and foreign policies he would pursue if elected. Having experienced 2016, many countries will focus on the incumbent president's foreign policy while also prioritizing relationship-building with the next president. This year, many countries will seek to maintain productive relations with the Biden administration but will simultaneously strive to communicate with and establish relationships with President Trump and the Republican Party. The Biden administration will face the external challenge of achieving foreign policy successes with many countries pursuing such hedging strategies.

4. South Korea's Tasks

In light of the various foreign policy situations facing the Biden administration, South Korea's policy toward the U.S. also presents numerous challenges. First, as the world order undergoes rapid changes, the U.S. is exploring various methods to maintain global leadership, and the ROK-U.S. relationship and alliance are undergoing substantive changes within that context. The U.S.-led liberal, rules-based order is facing fundamental challenges, and the U.S. cannot address them alone, thus seeking active assistance from its allies.

As a nation with the capabilities of an emerging developed country, South Korea can now pursue a more proactive and autonomous relationship with the U.S. than in the past. It can complement the shortcomings of the world order that the U.S. has sought to build over the past 30 years of the post-Cold War era, possess its own vision for a more improved and evolved future world order, and advance in cooperation with the U.S. The space for South Korea to contribute its national interests and values is gradually expanding in many areas, including the U.S. strategy toward China, its Global South strategy, its strategy for emerging technologies, and its strategy for addressing transnational threats. Simply maintaining the broad framework of strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance without South Korea's own considerations could be detrimental to both countries' relations. It is important to clearly define South Korea's national interests in each major sector from a long-term perspective, develop the ROK-U.S. alliance into an order-based alliance, and establish a complementary relationship with the U.S.

Second, while the direction of great power geopolitical competition is important, transnational threats are a matter of survival for South Korea. Many countries consider transnational threats, such as climate change, to be far more direct and urgent issues than U.S.-China geopolitical competition. South Korea, situated in a key region of U.S.-China competition, may have a different relative sense of urgency regarding transnational threats compared to other countries. However, if great powers become trapped in the sovereignty trap and view transnational threats solely within the framework of geopolitical competition, it will lead to unfortunate consequences for all of humanity. South Korea needs to point out the limitations of a policy focused solely on great power competition and strive to propose policy directions that all great powers should pursue for the sake of humanity's collective future.

Third, as the U.S. presidential election progresses throughout the year, the "Trump risk" will loom large for South Korea as well. The strong pressure on alliances and the "America First" approach demonstrated by President Trump during his first term could pose a significant challenge to South Korea if he is elected. It is uncertain whether a Trump administration would pursue the same policies as before in the changed international environment, but a clearer definition of South Korea's policy direction and national interests will lead to more rational negotiations with a Trump administration. Preparations must be made for negotiations with the U.S., anticipating the transactional foreign policy approach that the Trump administration pursued.

Concurrently, as Trump's influence within the Republican Party is weaker than in the past, South Korea must pursue a systematic foreign policy by clarifying the potential for sharing strategic interests with the Republican Party as a whole, beyond just President Trump. For example, the policy proposals of the Heritage Foundation, while advocating for American interests first, place significant emphasis on the importance of alliances. South Korea must simultaneously review and respond to the evolving policies of the Republican Party. ■

References

Sullivan, Jake. 2023. “The Sources of American Power: A Foreign Policy for a Changed World.” Foreign Affairs. October 24. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/sources-american-power-biden-jake-sullivan (Accessed: January 9, 2024.)

Weissert, Will, and Linley Sanders. 2024. “More Americans think foreign policy should be a top US priority for 2024, an AP-NORC poll finds.” AP News. January 2. https://apnews.com/article/2024-top-issues-poll-foreign-policy-israel-d89db59deb07f53382cc9292b49f4d1c (Accessed: January 9, 2024.)

■ Jeon Jae-seong, Director of the Center for National Security Studies at the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

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