[New Year Special Commentary Series] III. The Global Military Order of 2024 and South Korea: South Korea's Security Policy in the Era of Offensive Advantage Driven by the Revolution in Accuracy and Transparency

Revolutionary technological changes decisively impact the nature and outcomes of war, altering the trajectory of the global security order. Examples abound, familiar to us all: railways, telegraphs, machine guns, bombers, and nuclear weapons. Two years have passed since U.S. President Joe Biden declared that the world stands at a historical “inflection point” and is navigating a “decisive decade” in the National Security Strategy (NSS). In the interim, the world has experienced the Israel-Hamas war, even before the Russia-Ukraine war has concluded. How have technological changes altered the dynamics of warfare? How are major powers responding, and what shifts are occurring in U.S.-China relations and the Korean Peninsula situation? What preparations should South Korea undertake?

This paper will first briefly discuss, through an interim assessment of the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Palestine, how the recent "accuracy" and "transparency" revolution (Lieber and Press 2017) in military technology has altered the 'offense-defense balance' in conventional warfare environments. Second, it will outline the preparations being made by the United States to counter China and the efforts being undertaken by North Korea in response to these changes in the security environment, focusing on integrated deterrence strategy, artificial intelligence, and military reconnaissance satellites. Finally, based on the discussion of changes in the global security landscape, it will propose directions for South Korea's security policy in 2024.

1. The Russia-Ukraine War and the Hamas-Israel War: The Revolution in Accuracy and Transparency and Changes in the Offense-Defense Balance

Since Robert Jervis formulated the concept of the "offense-defense balance"—addressing the question of whether offense or defense is more advantageous for enhancing national security when investing the same resources (Jervis 1978, 187-199)—this variable has been recognized as a key factor determining the severity of security dilemmas, the likelihood of war, arms races, alliance structures, possibilities for international cooperation, and the problem of commitment in anarchy (Fearon 1995; Biddle 2001). Jervis posited that the offense-defense balance is influenced by military technology and geography. Subsequent studies indicate that technological advancements contributing to improved "mobility" (e.g., cavalry, trains, tanks, fighter jets) confer an offensive advantage, while those enhancing "firepower" and the ability to impede enemy mobility (e.g., machine guns, trenches, anti-tank missiles, surface-to-surface missiles) lead to shifts toward defensive advantage (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998). Just as the "Cult of the Offensive" prior to World War I escalated minor regional conflicts into world wars almost instantaneously, the global security environment becomes unstable when offense holds the advantage. Conversely, strategic stability increases when defense holds the advantage, as exemplified by the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, which prevented direct armed conflict between the superpowers based on second-strike capability. How, then, are current military technological developments altering the offense-defense balance?

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press define recent military technological changes as a revolution in "accuracy" and "transparency." This includes the ability to detect military targets 24/7, regardless of weather conditions, through comprehensive long-range reconnaissance using satellites equipped with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and drones operating at various altitudes. It also encompasses the development of long-range strike capabilities that achieve near 100 percent accuracy within error margins reduced from hundreds of meters to tens of meters (Lieber and Press 2017). However, while these two major revolutions in advanced military technology could lead to a world with a defensive advantage by enabling perfect disruption of enemy movements, they could also foster an offensive advantage by significantly enhancing the effectiveness of preemptive strikes, utilizing the same capabilities to neutralize an adversary's command and control capabilities before hostilities commence.

The course of the Russia-Ukraine war, now in its second year, makes it difficult to interpret the situation as clearly favoring one side. Russia succeeded in occupying a vast territory of 42,000 square miles within the first month of its invasion. Ukraine subsequently launched a counteroffensive, reclaiming 19,000 square miles in two months, and recaptured 470 and 2,300 square miles respectively during the Kherson and Kharkiv liberation operations in August and September 2022 (Biddle 2023). Judging solely by these war dynamics, it might seem like an era of offensive advantage has arrived.

However, as [Figure 1] illustrates, intriguingly, there has been little change in the proportion of occupied territory between Russia and Ukraine since October 2022. Russia has dug trenches and installed anti-tank obstacles (dragon's teeth) along a 2,000-kilometer front line, from the border regions of Ukraine and Belarus to the Dnipro River delta, shifting to operations focused on defending occupied territories (Jones, Palmer, and Bermudez 2023). Ukraine's counteroffensive in the latter half of 2023, despite significant human and material costs, resulted in the recovery of only about 200 square miles, failing to achieve substantial gains (Birnbaum et al. 2023). Tanks have been identified as a key factor in both the success and failure of offensive operations. Stephen Biddle argues that the ongoing "cat-and-mouse" game between tank attacks utilizing inexpensive drones, which have gained prominence in this war, and the portable drone jammers designed to counter them, confirms that the offense-defense balance is not solely determined by technological variables, but rather by the interplay between the military application of new technologies and the adversary's adaptation to them (Biddle 2023).

Figure 1. Changes in the Proportion of Ukrainian Territory Occupied by Russia

Source: O’Hanlon et al. 2023

The Israel-Hamas war, however, presents a somewhat different picture. Israel's ten Iron Dome batteries, each equipped with approximately 60-80 interceptor missiles and boasting a renowned interception success rate of 90 percent, were considered a state-of-the-art defensive system. Nevertheless, a simple arithmetic calculation reveals that the Iron Dome system would be overwhelmed by a simultaneous barrage of over 1,000 rockets. This is precisely why Hamas's rocket attacks were able to penetrate the Iron Dome. Furthermore, while a single rocket fired by Hamas costs approximately $600, one Iron Dome interceptor missile costs about $60,000. If Hamas fired 5,000 rockets, the cost of the attack would be around $3 million, whereas Israel expended $48 million in military costs to defend against them (Boyd 2023). Offense is significantly cheaper and more effective than defense. Although the Israeli military destroyed about half of Hamas's forces in its counteroffensive, it failed to eliminate the core leadership. Resulting in over 20,000 Palestinian civilian casualties, Israel ultimately decided to transition to low-intensity military operations in January 2024 (De Luce 2023; Shalal 2024).

While it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions, considering the interim assessments of both the Ukraine and Palestine conflicts, the revolutionary changes in long-range reconnaissance and strike capabilities appear to offer significant opportunities to the attacking side in conventional warfare, excluding the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, in total war scenarios involving the mobilization of national resources, tactics such as establishing robust defensive lines, as demonstrated by the Russian military, remain effective. However, constructing such defensive lines requires immense costs, and as the limitations of the Iron Dome have shown, their effectiveness is not always guaranteed. Well-planned attacks utilizing advanced technologies can inflict substantial damage on the defending side. Considering the resources required to achieve complete defense against such attacks, the defending side incurs relatively higher costs. In terms of sheer effectiveness, it appears we are entering an era where offense holds the advantage over defense.

2. Advanced Technologies and Major Power Responses: U.S.-China Relations and the Korean Peninsula

The United States is responding most rapidly to the changes in the military security landscape driven by advanced technologies. Since 2021, the U.S. has been developing a distinct strategy centered on the concept of "integrated deterrence." According to the National Security Strategy (White House 2022/10/12), "integrated deterrence" is defined as "the seamless combination of capabilities" designed to convince potential adversaries that the costs of aggression outweigh the benefits. In essence, it is a strategy that integrates all military domains (land, sea, air, space, cyber, and non-kinetic), regions (e.g., Europe and the Indo-Pacific), conflict spectrums (from armed conflict to gray zone), governmental capabilities (diplomacy, intelligence, economics), and alliance capabilities. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies the "near-simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states" as a primary driver for the development of this strategy (U.S. Department of Defense 2022/10/27).

The ability to manage conflicts with two nuclear-armed states simultaneously necessitates the capacity to rapidly conclude one theater of operations. This requires not only the technologies related to the 'accuracy' and 'transparency' revolution, as previously explained, but also the ability to rapidly process the vast amounts of information collected for target detection and identification. In this context, the military application of artificial intelligence (AI) becomes crucial. The subtitle of the U.S. Department of Defense's "Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy," released in June 2023, is "Accelerating Decision Advantage." The strategy emphasizes that the U.S. military must focus on AI because it "enable[s] leaders to make better decisions faster" (U.S. Department of Defense 2023/06/27, 3).

Semiconductors are at the core of building this AI capability. For AI to make more accurate judgments, the continuous and rapid updating of data is paramount (Jensen 2023). However, the acquisition of vast databases, algorithm development, enhancement of computing power, and the rapid advancement of the AI industry are all contingent upon the "advanced semiconductor manufacturing capacity" as a fundamental physical foundation. China lags behind the United States by more than 15 years in advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and the cooperation between the U.S., Netherlands, and Japan alone can prevent China from accessing 90 percent of the supply chain for advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment. China faces an immense challenge in catching up to the U.S. in semiconductor capabilities, as it would need to establish a system capable of replacing the "entire existing semiconductor manufacturing equipment value chain" (Allen 2023).

The U.S. has placed semiconductors and AI at the heart of its de-risking strategy, characterized by "small yard, high fence." This context helps explain why, at the U.S.-China summit in San Francisco last November, the U.S. confidently emphasized "managed competition," feeling it held a relative advantage (Son Yeol et al. 2023). Furthermore, Wang Yi, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his briefing on the summit's outcomes, cautiously highlighted agreements such as the resumption of high-level dialogues and military communication, while refraining from mentioning points of conflict between the U.S. and China. However, he also stressed China's right to development in advanced technology fields and its inability to tolerate U.S. actions that infringe upon it, particularly concerning Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2023-11-16). This underscores the U.S.-China competition over advanced military technology as a background factor.

Meanwhile, North Korea's self-congratulatory statement following the successful launch of the Malligyong-1 satellite on November 21st, after two failed attempts, claiming it now possesses "eyes that see ten thousand li and a fist that strikes ten thousand li" (Kim Ji-heon 2023), can be understood as a desperate effort to keep pace with the changes occurring in the realm of advanced military technology. In the field of AI, where keeping up with major powers is nearly impossible, this represents an attempt to secure at least a rudimentary long-range reconnaissance capability. The Malligyong-1 appears to follow a Sun-synchronous orbit, passing over Pyongyang daily at 10 AM and 10 PM, with a ground track repeating every five days (Langbroek 2023).

However, North Korea still has a long way to go in terms of long-range reconnaissance capabilities. "Persistent observation" is essential for the proper functioning of military reconnaissance satellites. Calculations suggest that even with 20 satellites conducting aerial surveillance 50 times a day, there would still be a 24-minute surveillance gap (Lieber and Press 2017, 41). Therefore, the practical utility of a single reconnaissance satellite is minimal. Moreover, the electro-optical (EO) camera currently believed to be installed on the Malligyong-1, aside from resolution issues, cannot reliably identify targets in adverse weather conditions or when obscured by smoke. Consequently, it is difficult to consider North Korea as having secured practical long-range surveillance capabilities until it launches a satellite equipped with SAR (Diepen 2023-11-28).

3. South Korea's 2024 Security and Defense Strategy: Building Defense Capabilities Based on Advanced Technology

If the revolutionary changes in long-range reconnaissance and strike capabilities in the military security technology domain imply the potential advent of an era of offensive advantage, then meticulous research and the exploration of response strategies are urgently needed. For example, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) included in the 2022 National Defense Strategy warns North Korea that any use of nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies would result in the "end of that regime," stating that "no scenario exists in which Kim Jong Un... could survive a nuclear attack." However, it also specifies that the U.S. would only consider nuclear use under "extreme circumstances." The strategy also emphasizes that "non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces" in terms of strategic deterrence planning and operations (U.S. Department of Defense 2022-10-27, 10).

This may be because the future battlefield envisioned by the United States involves the integration of advanced technologies into military operations, enabling the precise targeting and elimination of an adversary's vulnerabilities. Weapons like the "ninja missile," used to assassinate Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Qasem Soleimani, Osama bin Laden's successor Ayman al-Zawahiri, and numerous other ISIS leaders using drone assets, could be central to the future battlefield the U.S. envisions. Considering that the greater the destructive power of a weapon, the larger the collateral damage and thus the higher the political cost, precision weapons will always offer greater military utility than nuclear weapons.

The tasks that South Korea's defense policy should focus on in 2024 can be considered in this context. First, at the most fundamental level, efforts to strengthen cooperation in advanced technology fields, which serve as the foundational strength of future South Korean defense capabilities, are crucial. As demonstrated in Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin's speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022, the U.S. integrated deterrence strategy includes elements of integrating allied capabilities with U.S. capabilities. In this regard, the U.S. has already presented a policy direction of "sharing the fruits of our R&D success" (Austin 2022). The "Next Generation Critical and Emerging Technologies Dialogue," announced through the joint declaration of the South Korea-U.S. summit in April 2023, was launched in December, with semiconductors and artificial intelligence listed at the beginning and end of the six key strategic technology cooperation areas (White House 2023/12/08). Particularly, given that AI norms and governance are still under development and discussions are ongoing, South Korea should actively participate in global norm discussions through the "Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military domain Summit (REAIM)" to be held in South Korea this year, and strive to establish governance that aligns with national interests.

Furthermore, special efforts are needed to establish an organization that will serve as a control tower for translating advancements in advanced technology into tangible defense capabilities. This includes formulating technology development and defense procurement plans, developing operational doctrines, and assigning personnel to appropriate positions. Currently, the "Strategic Command," mentioned in the Washington Declaration last April and the speech commemorating the 75th Armed Forces Day in September, appears poised to play the most critical role in this regard. The Strategic Command is reportedly set to "control missile units, cyber operations command, space operations units, electromagnetic spectrum operations units, special mission operations units, and F-35 and submarine units" (Ha Chae-rim 2023). These are not only core assets for advanced technology-based defense capabilities but also key strategic assets constituting South Korea's three-axis system. Efforts must be made to ensure the newly established Strategic Command is well integrated into the existing military governance structure. Additionally, as emphasized in the Washington Declaration, it should function in a manner that enhances the interoperability of ROK-U.S. combined operational capabilities (White House 2023/04/26).

Continuous efforts are also necessary to enhance independent long-range reconnaissance capabilities. Following North Korea's launch of a reconnaissance satellite at the end of November, South Korea also launched its first military reconnaissance satellite on December 2nd. Equipped with electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), and high-resolution cameras, it is reported to have higher resolution than the Malligyong-1. The military authorities have announced plans to further reduce surveillance gaps by launching additional SAR satellites and very small satellites (Defense Acquisition Program Administration 2023-12-21; Yoo Yong-won 2023). As previously emphasized, the greater the number of reconnaissance satellites, the more continuous surveillance becomes possible. Therefore, in addition to independent efforts to strengthen long-range reconnaissance capabilities, institutional efforts are needed to enhance information cooperation within the framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance and ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. ■

References

Kim Yang-gyu. 2023. “'Space as a Battlefield' and Future Deterrence Strategy: Changes in U.S.-China Security Strategies and Korea.” In *Challenges of Future Warfare and the Aerospace Industry*, edited by Shin Beom-sik, 106. Seoul: Sahoepyeongron Academy.

Kim Ji-heon. 2023. “North Korea Produces Propaganda Film on 'Successful Military Reconnaissance Satellite'... 'Inspiring Struggle'.” *Yonhap News*. December 7.https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231207056400504(Accessed: January 4, 2024.)

Defense Acquisition Program Administration. 2023. “[Defense Acquisition Program Administration Policy Spotlight 2023] Securing Military Reconnaissance Satellites, the Vanguard of National Security.” December 21.https://www.korea.kr/briefing/pressReleaseView.do?newsId=156607374(Accessed: January 4, 2024.)

Son Yeol, Kim Yang-gyu, Lee Dong-ryul, Lee Seung-ju, Jeon Jae-sung, and Ha Young-sun. 2023. “Between 'Managed Competition' and 'Securing Development Rights': The 2023 APEC U.S.-China Summit Seeking Cooperation.” EAI Special Report. November 20.https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22234(Accessed: January 2, 2024.)

Yoo Yong-won. 2023. “South Korea Launches First Reconnaissance Satellite... 10 Times the Resolution of North Korea's Satellite, Capable of Identifying Objects Down to 30cm.” *Chosun Ilbo*. December 2.https://www.chosun.com/politics/politics_general/2023/12/02/OAEVVSAM75E6HKX3KBTMIEMXCQ/(Accessed: January 4, 2024.)

Ha Chae-rim. 2023. “Ministry of National Defense: 'Strategic Command Will Control F-35s, Submarines, Space, and Electromagnetic Spectrum Units'.” *Yonhap News*. February 9.https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20230209106200504(Accessed: January 4, 2024.)

Allen, Gregory C. 2023. “Blocking China’s Access to AI Chips Matters to U.S. National Security.” CSIS Commentary. July 31.https://www.csis.org/analysis/blocking-chinas-access-ai-chips-matters-us-national-security(Accessed: January 4, 2024.)

Austin, Lloyd J. 2022. “Remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III (As Delivered).” U.S. Department of Defense. June 11.https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3059852/(Accessed: January 4, 2024.)

Biddle, Stephen. 2001. “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory.”The Journal of Politics 63, 3: 741-774.

______. 2023. “Back in the Trenches: Why New Technology Hasn’t Revolutionized Warfare in Ukraine.”Foreign Affairs. August 10.https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/back-trenches-technology-warfare(Accessed: January 4, 2024.)

Birnbaum, Michael, Karen DeYoung, Kamila Hrabchuk, Alex Horton, John Hudson, Mary Ilynshina, Kostiantyn Khudov, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Dan Lamothe, Kostiantyn Khudov, Serhii Korolchuk, Greg Miller, Serhiy Morgunov, Siobhán O’Grady, Emily Rauhala, David L. Stern, and Missy Ryan. 2023. “In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls.”The Washington Post. December 4. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-stalled-russia-war-defenses/ (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

Boyd, Iain. 2023. “Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system works well – here’s how Hamas got around it.” The Conversation. October 13. https://theconversation.com/israels-iron-dome-air-defense-systеm-works-well-heres-how-hamas-got-around-it-215512 (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

De Luce, Dan. 2023. “Is Israel’s offensive succeeding or failing?” NBC News. December 22. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israels-offensive-hamas-gaza-succeeding-rcna130745 (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

Diepen, Vann H. Van. 2023. “Modest Beginnings: North Korea Launches Its First Reconnaissance Satellite.” 38 North. November 28. https://www.38north.org/2023/11/modest-beginnings-north-korea-launches-its-first-reconnaissance-satellite/ (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49, 3: 379-414.

Glaser, Charles L., and Chaim Kaufmann. 1998. “What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?” International Security 22, 4: 44-82.

Jensen, Benjamin. 2023. “Addressing the National Security Implications of AI.” CSIS Testimony. September 19. https://www.csis.org/analysis/addressing-national-security-implications-ai (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30, 2: 167-214.

Jones, Seth G., alexander Palmer, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. 2023. “Ukraine’s Offensive Operations: Shifting the Offense-Defense Balance.” CSIS Briefs. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-offensive-operations-shifting-offense-defense-balance (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

Langbroek, Marco. 2023. “North Korea successfully launches the Malligyong-1 reconnaissance satellite.” SatTrackCam Leiden Blog. November 22. https://sattrackcam.blogspot.com/2023/11/north-korea-successfully-launches-their.html (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

Lieber, Keir A. and Daryl G. Press. 2017. “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence.” International Security 41, 4: 9-49.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2023. “Wang Yi Speaks to the Press about the Summit Meeting Between Chinese and U.S. Presidents in San Francisco.” November 16. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202311/t20231117_11182054.html (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

O’Hanlon, Michael E., Constanze Stelzenmüller, and David Wessel. 2023. “Ukraine Index: Tracking developments in the Ukraine war.” Brookings. January 2. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ukraine-index-tracking-developments-in-the-ukraine-war/ (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

Shalal, Andrea. 2024. “Israel pullback signals 'gradual shift' to lower intensity: U.S.” Reuters. January 2. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-troop-pullback-signals-gradual-shift-lower-intensity-operations-us-2024-01-01/ (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

U.S. Department of Defense. 2022. “DOD Releases National Defense Strategy, Missile Defense, Nuclear Posture Reviews.” October 27. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3202438/ (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

______. 2023. “Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy: Accelerating Decision Advantage.” July 27. https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/02/2003333300/-1/-1/1/DOD_DATA_ANALYTICS_AI_ADOPTION_STRATEGY.PDF (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

White House. 2022. “FACT SHEET: The Biden-⁠Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy.” October 12. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/12/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-admіnistrations-national-security-strategy/ (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

______. 2023. “Washington Declaration.” April 26. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/ (Accessed: 2024. 1. 4.)

______. 2023. “JOINT FACT SHEET: Launching the U.S.-ROK Next Generation Critical and Emerging Technologies Dialogue.” December 8. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/08/joint-fact-sheet-launching-the-u-s-rok-next-generation-critical-and-emerging-technologies-dialogue/ (Accessed January 4, 2024.)

■ Kim Yang-gyuSenior Research Fellow, East Asia Institute. Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Editor: Park Han-sooResearch Fellow, EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr