[EAI Issue Brief] 'Israel's 9/11' and the Collapse of the Iron Dome: Why Ending Hamas's Rule in Gaza is Difficult

I. Introduction

On October 7, 2023, the Israel-Hamas war, initiated by Hamas's large-scale attack, is escalating political instability in the Middle East. On October 12, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated in a parliamentary address, "Hamas is ISIS. After 9/11, the world united to stop ISIS and Al-Qaeda," appealing for global participation in confronting Hamas (Netanyahu 2023). Hamas launched over 5,000 rockets at Israel and is reported to have infiltrated operatives to take at least 199 Israeli citizens hostage (Sharp 2023). The rapidly increasing number of casualties on both sides is a cause for significant international concern.

Hamas's surprise attack on Israel is being compared to 'Israel's 9/11.' Just as the United States invaded Iraq after the 9/11 attacks to eliminate Al-Qaeda, Israel appears to be intensifying its political and military operations to end Hamas's rule in Gaza. In response, Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, stated in a declaration following the launch of the military operation 'Operation Al-Aqsa Flood' that they are fighting for "honor, resistance, and dignity" against the aggressions committed by Israel against Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, and called for "all Muslims and freedom-lovers around the world to join the battle" (Al Jazeera 2023a). Hamas is continuing its resistance against Israel by highlighting the injustice of Israel's occupation of Palestine and asserting the legitimacy of its military actions.

This study examines the history of the conflict between Israel and Hamas over the past two decades, from the end of the Oslo Accords through the 9/11 attacks, in conjunction with changes in US administrations. Specifically, by examining the history of the Israel-Hamas conflict, this study seeks to answer the following key questions: How did Hamas come to secure a dominant position in Gaza? How did the war between Israel and Hamas escalate, and why did US mediation efforts fail in the process? Why is Hamas strengthening its strategy of linking the issue of Jerusalem with attacks on Israel? Therefore, by answering these questions, this study aims to understand the historical trends and background of the recent Israel-Hamas conflict and, consequently, to present the limitations of Israel's attempts to end Hamas's rule in Gaza as an implication.

II. The Israel-Hamas Conflict: A Historical Review of the Past 20 Years

1. Bush's 'Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East' after 9/11 and the Dualization of Palestinian Governance

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, in 1994, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their contributions to the Middle East peace process. The first and second Oslo Accords, signed in 1993 and 1995 respectively with the mediation of President Clinton, were successfully concluded, fostering great expectations for resolving the long-standing issues between Israel and Palestine.[1] However, the momentum for peace negotiations significantly weakened with the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 and the subsequent election of Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud party as Prime Minister in 1996. Subsequently, the Oslo peace process ultimately stalled following the failure of the summit between Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat in July 2000 at Camp David.

The Second Intifada, which erupted in 2000, further exacerbated the conflict situation following the failure of the Oslo peace process. 'Intifada' refers to the Palestinian popular uprising against Israel, distinguished into the First Intifada (1987) and the Second Intifada (2000). The First Intifada was triggered by an incident where a Palestinian civilian in Gaza was run over and killed by an Israeli military vehicle. The Second Intifada was sparked by the visit of Ariel Sharon, then leader of the opposition Likud party, to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem.

During the escalation of the Second Intifada, Hamas carried out suicide bombings, and Israel's retaliatory measures followed in the West Bank and Gaza. Against this backdrop, the Bush administration, focused on the Iraq War after the 9/11 attacks, was relatively less involved in resolving the Israel-Palestine issue compared to the Clinton administration. However, amidst the aftermath of 9/11, the importance of democratization and counter-terrorism in the Middle East came to the fore, leading to efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestine issue as part of the response to terrorism. Consequently, Bush devised a new plan for Middle East peace and, in a Rose Garden speech on June 24, 2002, announced the 'Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East,' which included the following points:

My vision is two states, living side-by-side in peace and security. There is no simple way to achieve that peace, unless all parties are committed to the "war on terror." ... I call on the Palestinians to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror, leaders who will lead their people to peace, to democracy, to freedom. If they take these steps, we will help them achieve their dream of a state. All of us, in all of our nations, will help them achieve their dream of a state (Bush 2002).

From this perspective, the Bush administration hoped for the emergence of new Palestinian leadership to succeed Yasser Arafat. The United States shared Israel's perception of Arafat as a figure associated with terrorism. As a result, senior US policymakers, led by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, sought ways to replace Arafat and elect a democratic leader.

However, in November 2004, Yasser Arafat died under mysterious circumstances, leading to the establishment of a new leadership for the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas. Consequently, the Bush administration viewed the Palestinian Authority as a credible partner for negotiations and began to actively pursue the Middle East Peace Roadmap. Washington promoted democratic elections within Palestine while also emphasizing the creation of conditions for peace negotiations by the Israeli government.

In 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made the unprecedented decision to withdraw the 21 Jewish settlements in Gaza and Israeli forces from the area. In a letter to President Bush, Prime Minister Sharon stated that this withdrawal plan was intended to enhance Israel's security and stabilize the political and economic situation, emphasizing that it would be pursued independently of the Middle East Peace Roadmap but shared the same objectives (MFA Israel 2004).

This decision caused significant controversy within Israel, particularly strong opposition from the right-wing and settlers regarding Sharon's unilateral withdrawal. Benjamin Netanyahu, then Finance Minister, clearly expressed his opposition and resigned. Given Prime Minister Sharon's conservative leanings, analyses suggested that this decision might have stemmed from strategic considerations to focus more on the West Bank or pragmatic judgments aimed at preserving the identity of the Jewish state.

Following Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, Palestinian legislative elections were held in January 2006 with the support of the Bush administration. Contrary to expectations, Hamas won, defeating Fatah, which was centered in the West Bank. As a result, Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas assumed the position of Prime Minister in Gaza, while Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah remained President in the West Bank, creating a unique coalition structure. Subsequently, in June 2007, Hamas forcibly expelled Fatah from Gaza, leading to the establishment of a divided governance structure with Hamas dominant in Gaza and Fatah dominant in the West Bank. Therefore, Bush's Middle East Peace Roadmap is assessed to have resulted in the dualization of Palestinian governance and the strengthening of Hamas's power in Gaza. Furthermore, this situation made the success of the Middle East Peace Roadmap more difficult. The Annapolis Conference, held on November 27-28, 2007, under the auspices of the Bush administration, did not yield significant results, and negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas in 2008 also failed to reach an agreement.

2. Escalation of Conflict and Failure of Obama's Mediation

With Hamas controlling Gaza, the limitations of Israel's decision to withdraw its settlements began to become apparent. Following the withdrawal, Israel intensified its blockade policy on Gaza due to security concerns. Consequently, Gaza became entirely dependent on Israel for essential survival elements such as fuel, water, and electricity. Most importantly, conflicts between Israel and Hamas intensified after Hamas took control of Gaza. Therefore, the withdrawal plan spearheaded by Prime Minister Sharon did not serve as a turning point for resolving the Gaza issue, nor did it have a calming effect on the conflict. Instead, the conflict between Israel and Hamas expanded further. Notably, on December 27, 2008, Israel launched a large-scale military operation targeting Gaza. This 22-day war between Israel and Hamas resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,400 Palestinians, including many civilians.

The 50-day Gaza War between Israel and Hamas in 2014 symbolically represented the intensified conflict between the two sides. The war began when Israel launched retaliatory attacks following the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers. Gaza suffered extensive damage. During the war, the Israeli Ministry of Defense attempted to eliminate Mohammed Deif, the leader of Hamas's military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, but failed; instead, his wife and two children were killed.

Meanwhile, President Obama sought new initiatives for peace settlement, aiming to avoid repeating the failure of the Annapolis Conference pursued by the Bush administration. The core strategy of the Obama administration was to compel Israel to cease settlement activities in occupied territories, including East Jerusalem. In this context, UN Security Council Resolution 2334 was adopted in December 2016, towards the end of Obama's term. This resolution condemned Israel's expansion of settlements and demanded a halt to settlement construction; it was adopted as a result of the US abstaining from exercising its veto power. However, Obama's peace vision faced difficulties progressing due to the rise of a right-wing government in Israel. The right-wing bloc won the Israeli parliamentary elections in February 2009, and Benjamin Netanyahu once again became Prime Minister in March 2009.

There were clear policy differences between Obama and Netanyahu. Netanyahu maintained a strong criticism of former Prime Minister Sharon's Gaza withdrawal policy and argued that Palestine did not recognize Israel as a Jewish state. Conversely, Obama held a negative view of Israel's blockade of Gaza and urged a halt to settlement construction in the West Bank. Amidst these differences in perception, the Obama administration found it difficult to find common ground for resolving the Palestinian issue. Nevertheless, mediation negotiations proceeded, spearheaded by then-Secretary of State John Kerry. Kerry mediated peace talks from July 2013 to April 2014 but failed to reach an agreement. He attempted mediation again in 2016, but it proved insufficient to overcome the distrust between the two sides.

3. Trump's 'Deal of the Century' and Hamas's Strategy of Linking to 'Jerusalem'

As the conflict between Israel and Hamas continued, Hamas's hardline stance against Israel became more pronounced. Hamas explored various strategies to emphasize the legitimacy of its resistance against Israel, notably strengthening its approach centered on the issue of 'Jerusalem.' This strategy became particularly evident when the Trump administration recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. In December 2017, President Trump officially recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and announced the decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem.

Within the Trump administration, concerns were raised that recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital would amplify anti-American sentiment in the Arab and Islamic worlds, potentially leading to violent reactions. However, significant backlash, as feared by the US, did not materialize. Following the 'Arab Spring,' political instability in the Arab world led to a considerable decline in interest in the Palestinian issue. This background can be seen as influencing the lukewarm response from Arab countries to Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital.

In January 2020, Trump announced a peace plan to resolve the Israel-Palestine issue, dubbed the 'Deal of the Century.' The primary reason for Palestine's rejection of this peace plan was the issue of sovereignty over Jerusalem. According to the 'Deal of the Century,' Israel's capital would be located in a unified Jerusalem, while Palestine's capital would be designated in Abu Dis, East Jerusalem. Furthermore, the US embassy was slated to be located in the new Palestinian capital. However, the Palestinian side objected, stating that they could not fully cede sovereignty over Jerusalem to Israel, with Israel controlling the Old City, which houses Islamic holy sites.

Moreover, in September 2020, Israel and the United Arab Emirates signed the 'Abraham Accords,' agreeing to normalize relations. By the end of that year, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco also restored relations with Israel, fostering an atmosphere of reconciliation between Israel and Arab nations. Palestine, and particularly Hamas, expressed dissatisfaction with these decisions by Arab political leaders. In a situation where Arab governments and politicians showed little interest in the Palestinian issue, Hamas sought to convey a clear political message to the Arab and Muslim masses, with the issue of 'Jerusalem' at the center of that message.

In May 2021, when Palestinian residents of the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem were forcibly evicted following a decision by the Israeli Supreme Court, Hamas responded militarily against Israel. Consequently, military clashes between Israel and Hamas continued from May 10 until a ceasefire was achieved on May 21. Mohammed Deif warned that Israel would pay a price if it attacked the residents of Sheikh Jarrah, which is seen as an expression of Hamas's strategy to link the issues of Gaza and the West Bank with Jerusalem (Rabinovich 2023, 236).

Subsequently, military tensions between the two sides surrounding Gaza persisted. Against this backdrop, on May 11, 2022, Shireen Abu Akleh, a Palestinian-American journalist for Al Jazeera, was killed by Israeli forces in Jenin. Furthermore, on August 5, 2022, after the arrest of Islamic Jihad leader Bassam al-Saadi in Jenin, military clashes erupted between Israel and Palestine in Gaza.

Consequently, it can be seen that after Trump's 'Deal of the Century,' Hamas strengthened the linkage between the issue of Jerusalem and its resistance against Israel to secure political support from the Arab and global Muslim communities. The current operation declared by Hamas under the name 'Al-Aqsa Flood' is also analyzed as reflecting this intention. Recently, frequent visits by religious nationalists to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, a holy site, have led to conflicts between Jews and Palestinians, but major Arab political leaders have not taken a clear stance. In this situation, Hamas has sought to highlight the legitimacy of its military actions by emphasizing the 'Al-Aqsa' issue and garner support from the Arab and Islamic worlds. In this context, Mohammed Deif, in a video announcing 'Operation Al-Aqsa Flood,' called on Palestinian youth in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and within Israel to participate in an 'Intifada for the victory of Al-Aqsa' (Al Jazeera 2023b).

III. Conclusion and Implications

Based on the history of the conflict between Israel and Hamas over the past 20 years, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the background to Hamas establishing its current dominant power in Gaza is closely linked to the 'Middle East Peace Roadmap' pursued by the Bush administration after the 9/11 attacks. The United States promoted the emergence of new leadership within Palestine and sought democratic elections. This led to Hamas solidifying its political base in Gaza and resulted in the dualization of the Palestinian governance structure.

Second, after Hamas took control of Gaza, the conflict between Israel and Hamas escalated further. Notably, during the Obama administration, mediation was not effectively carried out due to differences in perception between the US and Israel regarding settlements and the Gaza blockade. Following Hamas's takeover of Gaza, the intensity of the war increased, leading to fierce conflicts for 22 days in 2008 and 50 days in 2014, causing significant damage. From this perspective, the Gaza withdrawal led by Prime Minister Sharon could not serve as a turning point for Israel to disengage from the Gaza issue, nor did it help resolve the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Against this backdrop, differences in perception regarding policies existed between Obama and Netanyahu, and the US failed in effective mediation.

Third, as evidenced by the naming of the current military operation 'Al-Aqsa Flood,' Hamas is pursuing a strategy of linking the issue of Jerusalem with its resistance against Israel. In particular, Hamas is assessed to be directing a political message towards the Arab and Islamic worlds. This strategic direction of Hamas has become more robust, especially after the Trump administration officially recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Amidst a series of political events such as the Arab Spring and the Abraham Accords, where Arab countries have avoided involvement in the Palestinian issue, Hamas is making political appeals to the Islamic world by linking it to Israel and the issue of Jerusalem.

In conclusion, since Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007, a dual governance structure has been formed within Palestine, centered on the West Bank and Gaza. Since then, Hamas has experienced continuous confrontation and conflict with Israel. Particularly over the past 20 years, Hamas has consolidated its political base through resistance against Israel, and through the Trump administration, it has strengthened its strategy of establishing legitimacy by linking the issue to Jerusalem. Considering Hamas's historically built foundation and its current strategy of issuing political messages to gain support from the entire Islamic world, it is projected to be difficult for Israel to completely destroy Hamas's base and end its rule in Gaza through the current war.

References

Al Jazeera. 2023a. “Haniyeh: Resistance forces are engaging in a heroic epic called ‘Al-Aqsa’ (هنية: المقاومة تخوض ملحمة بطولية عنوانها الأقصى).” October 7. https://bitly.ws/XSvA

Al Jazeera. 2023b. “An audio message from the Al-Qassam Commander to launch Operation Al-Aqsa Flood (رسالة صوتية لقائد القسام لإطلاق عملية "طوفان الأقصى").” October 7. https://bitly.ws/XSxK

Bush, George W. 2002. “President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership.” The White House. June 24. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA Israel). 2004. “Exchange of letters between PM Sharon and President Bush.” April 14. https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/exchange-of-letters-sharon-bush-14-apr-2004

Netanyahu, Benjamin. 2023. “Excerpt from PM Netanyahu’s Knesset Speech on the Occasion of the Swearing-in of the National Emergency Government.” Prime Minister’s Office. October 12. https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/event-speech121023

Rabinovich, Itamar. 2023. Middle Eastern Maze: Israel, the Arabs, and the Region, 1948-2022. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Sharp, Alexandra. 2023. “Israel Estimates 199 Hostages Held by Hamas.” Foreign Policy. October 16. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/16/israel-hostages-hamas-gaza-ground-assault-us-hezbollah-lebanon/

[1] The Oslo I Accord of 1993 stipulated that Israel would officially recognize the PLO and transfer administrative authority of Jericho in the West Bank to Palestine. Following this decision, Jericho was established as the first self-governing city in Palestine, and it was agreed that Israeli forces would be gradually reduced in the West Bank. Furthermore, a Palestinian Authority was established with Jericho as its center. The Oslo II Accord of 1995 stipulated that self-governing authority would be transferred to Palestine in seven cities in the West Bank (Hebron, Nablus, Ramallah, Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Bethlehem), and Israeli forces were promised to completely withdraw from these areas within six months (In Nam-sik. 2007. "Korea's Policy Direction on the Palestinian Issue." KIEP Research Series 07, 06: 24-25).

■ Kim Kang-seok, Professor, Department of Arabic Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

■ Editor: Park Ji-soo, EAI Fellow

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr