[EAI Issue Brief] The Distance Between Korean and Japanese Public Opinion on Improving Relations: Analysis of the 2023 Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey Results

Introduction

2023 marks a period of significant thaw in Korea-Japan relations. Following the announcement of South Korea's solution to the forced labor issue in March, the leaders of both countries have met six times in six months, an unprecedented frequency, and intergovernmental exchanges have rapidly increased. Through the mediation of the United States, Korea and Japan have established consultative bodies addressing various issues through multiple channels, including foreign affairs, defense, commerce (industry), finance, and national security. Private exchanges, particularly in tourism, are also rapidly recovering to pre-COVID-19 levels. Considering the difficult period following the dispute over the comfort women issue in 2012 and the confrontation over the forced labor issue after the 2018 Supreme Court ruling, which led both governments into a "crisis of trust," this is a remarkable change. Will 2023 indeed be the year that marks a new era, leaving behind a "lost decade"? How do the publics in both countries perceive the changes in intergovernmental relations? What do they consider the driving force for improving relations? Has mutual perception improved as much as relations have? Do they believe the historical issues, the primary cause of the "lost decade," are being resolved?

The results of this year's public opinion survey, the 11th since its inception in 2013, offer highly interesting and significant interpretations and policy implications. First, the publics in both countries perceive that bilateral relations are improving. Positive evaluations have reached their highest point in the survey's history, while negative evaluations have hit their lowest. Second, a divergence in public perception regarding the improvement of bilateral relations has emerged. In Japan, positive evaluations were observed across key indicators, including increased favorability towards South Korea, increased recognition of the importance of Korea-Japan relations, and increased support for security cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the U.S., as well as the solution to the forced labor issue. In contrast, for South Korean public opinion, the mood of improved relations has not translated into increased favorability towards Japan, recognition of the importance of Korea-Japan relations, support for security cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the U.S., or support for the solution to the forced labor issue. Third, these differences in results reflect differing evaluations of the governments' efforts to improve relations. While the Japanese public supports the improvement efforts of both its own and the South Korean governments, the South Korean public does not offer significant support for the improvement efforts of either government. Fourth, historical issues continue to act as a major variable in bilateral relations. The publics in both countries identify historical issues as the primary variable affecting the development of Korea-Japan relations. South Korea points to Japan's historical perceptions (e.g., aggressive wars, history textbooks, forced labor, comfort women), while Japan points to South Korea's attitude towards historical issues (anti-Japanese sentiment), such as anti-Japanese education, statements by South Korean politicians and media outlets about Japan, and excessive anti-Japanese actions by South Koreans. This survey suggests that South Korea believes Japan's historical perceptions have not changed, while Japan believes South Korea's anti-Japanese attitude is being corrected. In any case, the reality of differing historical perceptions between the two countries remains unchanged.

Therefore, the policy implications of the survey results for Korea-Japan relations are clear. Both countries must simultaneously expand and strengthen functional cooperation in areas such as security and economy, which are currently being actively pursued, while also making progress towards converging historical perceptions. Only when functional cooperation and historical reconciliation move forward together can the cart of Korea-Japan relations be put on the right track.

1. Both Korean and Japanese Publics Perceive Improvement in Korea-Japan Relations

According to the perception survey results, the publics in both South Korea and Japan perceive an improvement in bilateral relations ([Figure 1]). The proportion of respondents who rated Korea-Japan relations as "bad" sharply decreased from 64.6% in 2022 to 42% in 2023. This represents a halving of the negative assessment in three years, compared to the 88.4% negative rating during the period of tit-for-tat economic retaliation in the summer of 2019. Conversely, the proportion of positive assessments increased from 4.9% in 2022 to 12.7% this year. The improvement is even more pronounced in Japan. The negative assessment of bilateral relations dropped sharply from 39.8% in 2022 to 21.2% in 2023, while the positive assessment surged from 13.7% to 29% during the same period.

[Figure 1] Current State of Korea-Japan Relations

Regarding the future of Korea-Japan relations, 28.8% of South Koreans expect improvement, while 48% believe relations will remain the same. In Japan, 38.5% anticipate improvement, and 31.3% expect them to stay the same ([Figure 2]). This indicates an outlook that the trend of improvement will continue and that relations will not worsen in the future.

[Figure 2] Future of Korea-Japan Relations

2. Perceptual Differences Between the Two Countries Regarding Impressions of the Other

Did positive evaluations of bilateral relations lead to an improvement in favorable impressions of the other country? For Koreans, impressions of Japan did not change significantly compared to last year. Favorable impressions slightly decreased from 30.6% in 2022 to 28.9% in 2023, while unfavorable impressions slightly increased from 52.8% to 53.3%. In contrast, for Japanese people, favorable impressions increased from 30.4% to 37.4% during the same period, and unfavorable impressions decreased from 40.3% to 32.8% ([Figure 3]). While improved relations did not lead to improved favorability for Koreans, the two align for Japanese people.

[Figure 3] Impressions of the Other Country

These perceptual differences also extend to impressions of the leaders (heads of state) of the respective countries. Regarding the change in South Korean perceptions of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, positive impressions slightly increased from 6.6% in 2022 to 8.5% in 2023, while negative impressions increased significantly by 14.3 percentage points from 21.8% in 2022 to 36.1% in 2023. In contrast, regarding the change in Japanese perceptions of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, positive impressions increased by 12 percentage points from 20.1% in 2022 to 32.1% in 2023, and negative impressions slightly decreased from 4.6% to 4.1% ([Figure 4]). This can be interpreted as a result of the publics in both countries, who previously held reserved judgments such as "don't know" or "not interested," forming clearer impressions as the leaders of both nations intensified efforts to improve relations. Notably, negative impressions increased in South Korea, while positive impressions increased in Japan.

[Figure 4] Impressions of the Other Country's Leader

An analysis of the survey results over the past 11 years shows that impressions of the other country are connected to judgments and future outlooks of relations in various aspects. The discrepancy in impressions between South Korea and Japan is evident in evaluations of the importance of bilateral relations, approaches to managing bilateral disputes, and support for trilateral security cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the U.S., as discussed in Chapter 5. When asked about the importance of current Korea-Japan relations for their own country, 74.1% of South Korean respondents and 61.8% of Japanese respondents answered "important" or "relatively important." Compared to 2022, the proportion of respondents who considered relations important decreased by 8.5 percentage points in South Korea, while it increased by 5.3 percentage points in Japan ([Figure 5]).

Regarding the approach to managing future bilateral disputes, the most common response in both South Korea and Japan was "both sides should manage the disputes to prevent escalation," with 48.3% and 42.8% respectively. The proportion of respondents who believed that bilateral disputes should be overcome in a future-oriented manner was 31.3% in South Korea (a decrease of 17.9% from the previous year) and 26.1% in Japan (a decrease of 2.4% from the previous year) ([Figure 6]). Notably, the South Korean side showed a critical stance towards future-oriented resolution.

[Figure 5] Importance of Korea-Japan Relations

[Figure 6] Approach to Managing Korea-Japan Disputes

3. Key Variables Determining Impressions of the Other Country are Government Policies and Attitudes Towards Improving Relations

As shown in [Figure 7], for South Koreans, the proportion evaluating the South Korean government's attitude towards improving Korea-Japan relations favorably was 21.7%, showing no significant change from 21.2% the previous year, while the proportion evaluating it unfavorably increased slightly from 27.5% to 32.3%. The favorable evaluation rate is about 10 percentage points lower than during the previous administration (30.8% in 2020, 30.2% in 2021). South Korean public opinion does not actively support the government's efforts to improve Korea-Japan relations. The core issue in improving relations is the solution to the forced labor issue, and public support for the third-party compensation plan proposed by the South Korean government is not high (28.4% vs. 34.1%). Similarly, South Korean public opinion is highly critical of the Japanese government's attitude towards improving Korea-Japan relations ([Figure 8]). The favorable evaluation is 15%, and the unfavorable evaluation is 34.2%, which is considerably lower than the Japanese public's evaluation of their own government's attitude towards improving Korea-Japan relations (favorable 34.5%, unfavorable 16.2%). In short, South Korean public opinion is dissatisfied with the attitudes of both governments.

In contrast, Japanese citizens highly evaluate the South Korean government's attitude towards improving Korea-Japan relations (34.8%), and the unfavorable evaluation is also lower than in South Korea (19.3%). While the Japanese public holds a positive view of both governments' handling of the forced labor issue, South Korean public opinion holds a relatively negative view.

[Figure 7] Evaluation of the South Korean Government's Attitude Towards Korea-Japan Relations

[Figure 8] Evaluation of the Japanese Government's Attitude Towards Korea-Japan Relations

What are the key variables that most influence the perceptions of South Koreans and Japanese towards each other's country? To understand this, we conducted an ordinal logistic regression analysis on the mutual favorability variable for the publics of both countries to identify the variables that significantly influence their perceptual changes.

[Table 1] Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis of South Koreans' Favorability Towards Japan

[Table 1] analyzes the statistical significance of various variables influencing South Koreans' favorability towards Japan. The results can be summarized as follows: First, the statistically significant variables influencing South Koreans' favorability towards Japan are (1) the South Korean government's efforts to improve relations, (2) the Japanese government's efforts to improve relations, (3) the degree to which Korea-Japan relations are perceived as important to South Korea, (4) perceptions of Korea-Japan economic relations, (5) impressions of China, and (6) age. All show a positive correlation, meaning that the more positively the efforts of both governments are evaluated, the more important Korea-Japan relations are perceived to be, the more complementary rather than competitive the economic relations are felt to be, the better the impressions of China, and the younger the age group, the more positive the perception of Japan. Second, interpreting the t-values indicates that the two most important variables influencing South Koreans' favorability towards Japan are 'age' and 'perception of the importance of Korea-Japan relations,' followed by 'Japanese government's efforts to improve relations' and 'South Korean government's efforts.' Third, regarding the issue of the discharge of contaminated water from Fukushima ([Figure 9]), when compared to the group that believes "IAEA verification is trustworthy and the Japanese government's measures are appropriate" as the base group, the other groups ("IAEA verification is trustworthy, but the Japanese government needs to make additional efforts," "Oppose discharge regardless of IAEA verification results," "Oppose discharge because IAEA verification results are not trusted," "Don't know") do not influence favorability towards Japan. Perceptions of the necessity and ideology of security cooperation between Korea and Japan in response to North Korea's nuclear threat do not hold statistical significance in the comprehensive model, considering other variables.

[Figure 9] Opinion on the Discharge of Contaminated Water from Fukushima

According to these regression analysis results, despite significant progress in improving bilateral relations compared to last year, it is noteworthy that the reason for the stagnation in South Koreans' favorability towards Japan lies in the decline in the proportion who perceive 'the importance of Korea-Japan relations' (8.5%p) and dissatisfaction with 'the South Korean government's efforts to improve relations' and 'the Japanese government's efforts to improve relations.' This implies that no matter how actively the South Korean government strives, it will be difficult to increase South Koreans' favorability towards Japan if the Japanese government does not respond actively and shows a passive stance. The issue of the Fukushima contaminated water discharge, while not easily interpretable due to the analysis based on the base group, does not directly influence South Koreans' favorability towards Japan. In other words, negative perceptions of the Fukushima water discharge do not translate into negative perceptions of Japan.

[Table 2] summarizes the results of analyzing the variables influencing Japanese favorability towards South Korea, using the same variables as in the analysis for South Koreans.

First, among the statistically significant variables influencing Japanese favorability towards South Korea, the most important variable is 'perception of the importance of Korea-Japan relations,' followed by 'perception of Korea-Japan economic relations' and 'South Korean government's efforts to improve relations.' Second, interestingly, the Japanese government's efforts to improve relations do not affect favorability towards South Korea. The necessity or degree of support for military cooperation between Korea and Japan in response to North Korea's nuclear threat also shows no significant impact. Japanese people positively assess South Korea's strategic value, and it appears clear that the 'South Korean government's efforts to improve relations,' particularly the proactive efforts of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, have played a crucial role in driving positive perceptions of South Korea among Japanese citizens.

[Table 2] Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis of Japanese Favorability Towards South Korea

4. Korea-U.S. Relations, the Main Driving Force for Improving Korea-Japan Relations

In its "Indo-Pacific Strategy" released in February 2022, the United States identified trilateral security cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the U.S. as a key element in pursuing its Indo-Pacific strategy and explicitly called for the restoration of bilateral relations. Indeed, the U.S. government played a crucial role in facilitating the 2015 Korea-Japan agreement on comfort women (Yeol Son, 2018) and made various mediation efforts even as diplomatic friction between the Moon Jae-in administration and the Abe administration intensified over the forced labor issue. The reason President Biden issued a statement immediately after the announcement of the forced labor solution in March, welcoming it as "a groundbreaking new chapter in cooperation and partnership between two of America's closest allies," is precisely this.

Against this backdrop, results suggest that South Korean public opinion also considers the Korea-U.S. alliance and other U.S. variables as the primary factors for improving Korea-Japan relations. When South Korean respondents were asked whether improving Korea-Japan relations is necessary for the development of the Korea-U.S. alliance, 71.6% responded "very much so" or "so" ([Figure 10]). These results indicate that the perception of the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance in responding to external threats such as North Korea's nuclear program could lead to favorable public opinion within South Korea for improving relations with Japan, thereby driving progress.

[Figure 10] Necessity of Improving Korea-Japan Relations for the Development of the Korea-U.S. Alliance

5. Firm Support from Both Countries for Security Cooperation

The publics in both countries show firm support for security cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the U.S., and between Korea and Japan. The proportion of respondents agreeing to strengthen trilateral military security cooperation was 60.6% in South Korea and 49.9% in Japan ([Figure 11]). Although the proportion of affirmative responses from the Japanese public is lower than that of the South Korean public, it represents a 12 percentage point increase compared to 37.9% in 2022, reaching the highest level since the survey began in 2018. When asked for the reasons for agreeing to strengthen trilateral military security cooperation, the most frequent response in both countries was that cooperation is indispensable for the denuclearization of North Korea and stability on the Korean Peninsula ([Figure 12]). Meanwhile, respondents who viewed strengthening cooperation negatively primarily expressed concerns that trilateral cooperation would escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Notably, in Japan, the response "Cannot trust South Korea given its past actions" was the highest at 70.9% in 2022, but this proportion significantly decreased to 39.3% in 2023 ([Figure 13]). While this result is based only on respondents who viewed strengthening cooperation negatively, and thus cannot be definitively concluded, it suggests that distrust towards the other country, which had been a stumbling block for military security cooperation, has been largely resolved on the Japanese side.

[Figure 11] Stance on Trilateral Military Security Cooperation Among Korea, Japan, and the U.S.

[Figure 12] Reasons for Positive Views on Trilateral Military Security Cooperation Among Korea, Japan, and the U.S.

[Figure 13] Reasons for Negative Views on Trilateral Military Security Cooperation Among Korea, Japan, and the U.S.

This survey also explored the direction of security cooperation between South Korea and Japan in response to the escalating nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. 82% of South Korean respondents and 71.4% of Japanese respondents indicated that security cooperation, at the level of information sharing or higher, is necessary ([Figure 14]). This demonstrates that the publics in both countries recognize the necessity of bilateral security cooperation between South Korea and Japan, in addition to the existing trilateral cooperation based on the Korea-U.S. alliance and the Japan-U.S. alliance. This public sentiment aligns with the recent moves by both countries to seek expanded security cooperation, such as the normalization of the operation of the Korea-Japan Military Information Protection Agreement (GSOMIA) announced as a follow-up measure to the Korea-Japan summit in March.

[Figure 14] Direction of Korea-Japan Security Cooperation Regarding North Korea

6. Favorable Tendencies Towards Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation

This survey also reaffirmed a favorable trend regarding economic relations between the two countries. When asked to choose the statement that best reflects their views on the economic relationship between South Korea and Japan, the proportion of respondents who chose "complementary" was 44.6% in South Korea and 38.5% in Japan. The proportion who chose "competitive" was 38.1% in South Korea and 24% in Japan ([Figure 15]). In South Korea, the "complementary" view surpassed the "competitive" view, a reversal from the 2022 results, while in Japan, the "competitive" view has continued to decline since 2021.

[Figure 15] Opinion on Economic Relations Between Korea and Japan

When asked to select, without limit, countries or regions for which economic relations are particularly important, South Korean respondents ranked Japan third after the United States and China. Japanese respondents ranked South Korea fourth after the United States, China, and India. The proportion of respondents who selected the other country showed a slight increase in both countries compared to 2022 ([Figure 16]).

[Figure 16] Countries or Regions with Important Economic Relations for One's Own Country

7. Conclusion

The 2023 Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey indicates that public opinion in both countries is moving away from the "lost decade" of mutual distrust, which stemmed from emotional confrontations over historical issues since 2012. Intergovernmental relations have rapidly been restored through the restoration of trust between the leaders of the two nations, and public opinion views this trend positively. The background to this includes the active efforts by the United States to promote the improvement of Korea-Japan relations, as well as the increasing threat perceptions from North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations and China. In South Korea, the growing security threats from North Korea and China led to the strengthening of the Korea-U.S. alliance, necessitating an improvement in Korea-Japan relations for the strengthening of trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the U.S., which the U.S. has consistently requested. The same causal relationship appears to hold for Japan.

Meanwhile, South Korean public opinion expresses reservations about the attitudes of both governments towards improving relations. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has made all-out efforts in a dual diplomatic approach with the Japanese government and domestic stakeholders to present a solution (third-party compensation plan) to the forced labor issue, but the Kishida administration, with low cabinet approval ratings, has not proactively responded to the South Korean government's efforts. In the absence of contributions from related companies to compensate forced labor victims or apologies to the victims, South Korean public opinion is not providing sufficient support for the South Korean government's proactive moves. This suggests that without a proactive response from the Japanese side, trust may not be restored or future-oriented cooperation may not be initiated to the extent desired by both governments.

Just as the argument that true future-oriented cooperation is impossible without resolving historical issues is incorrect, the prospect that historical issues will gradually be resolved by pursuing future-oriented cooperation is also not necessarily true. It is a trend of the times for both governments to pursue cooperation on issues such as responding to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, economic security, and transnational threats, and the public actively supports this. Concurrently, both governments must strive to make progress in resolving historical pending issues. In cases such as the comfort women and forced labor issues, both countries must work together to heal the deep wounds to the victims' honor and dignity, beyond mere monetary compensation.

References

Son, Yeol. 2018. “The International Politics of the Comfort Women Agreement: The Identity-Security-Economy Nexus and the Park Geun-hye Administration's Diplomacy towards Japan.” *Journal of International Politics*, 58(2): 145-177.

Yeol SonPresident of the East Asia Institute. Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University.

Kim Yang-gyu_Senior Fellow at the East Asia Institute (EAI). Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Park Han-soo_Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute.

■ Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

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