[EAI Issue Brief] Analysis of South Korean Public Perception of the ROK-US Alliance in 2023: Expectations and Concerns Regarding a Comprehensive Alliance

To mark the 70th anniversary of the ROK-US alliance, the East Asia Institute (EAI), in collaboration with the JoongAng Ilbo and Korea Research, conducted a public perception survey and presented an analysis of key issues by referencing public opinion survey results on ROK-US relations conducted over the past several years. The analysis covers three main areas: first, public perception of ROK-US relations overall; second, public perception of the comprehensive alliance (i.e., cooperation with the US on issues beyond traditional security, and cooperation with the US on regional and global dimensions beyond Korean Peninsula security); and third, perceptions of US extended deterrence and nuclear armament. The public expresses overwhelming support for the ROK-US alliance while also recognizing its challenges and judging that significant efforts are needed to strengthen it. While the public generally agrees with the expansion of the ROK-US alliance's scope and geographical reach in principle, opinions are divided on specific aspects. Concerns about the risk of alliance entanglement, particularly being drawn into conflicts involving China, are prominently expressed. Finally, the public trusts US extended deterrence against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats but does not view this as necessarily weakening the need for independent nuclear armament.

I. Perceptions of ROK-US Relations

1. Strong Support for the ROK-US Alliance

The results of this public opinion survey indicate strong public support for the ROK-US alliance. When asked about the role of the ROK-US alliance over the past 70 years, an overwhelming majority of respondents agreed that the alliance has benefited South Korea ([Figure 1]). 93.8% responded positively to the statement that the ROK-US alliance has contributed to South Korea's security, and over 80% expressed positive perceptions regarding its contributions to economic and democratic development. The public perceives that the alliance has not only provided absolute security benefits through military cooperation with the United States but has also contributed to economic and democratic development as a form of 'security externality.' Considering that critical views exist regarding the evaluation of US aid during economic growth, the US role during periods of rapid growth or financial crises, and the US role in the democratization movement, the current overwhelming public support for the alliance is noteworthy.

[Figure 1] Opinion on the Contributions of the ROK-US Alliance

The positive assessment of the ROK-US alliance's past extends to the present and future. The public identifies ROK-US relations as the most important foreign relations for the current government ([Figure 2]). 74.8% of the public selected ROK-US relations, a figure that has increased by about 10 percentage points over the past two years. Furthermore, strengthening the ROK-US alliance is ranked as the top foreign policy priority for the government (40%) ([Figure 3]). This figure also represents an increase of 11.5 percentage points compared to last year.

[Figure 2] Most Important Foreign Relations for the Government

[Figure 3] Government's Top Foreign Policy Priorities

2. Lukewarm Assessment of ROK-US Relations

Despite the high regard for the importance of ROK-US relations and the ROK-US alliance, the public generally held a positive, albeit reserved, stance regarding the present and future of ROK-US relations. When asked about the current state of relations between South Korea and the United States, 5.3% responded "very good," and 45.4% responded "somewhat good." In contrast, 42.3% responded "average." Regarding the future outlook of ROK-US relations, 46.9% responded that it would "remain the same as the present," narrowly surpassing the combined percentage of those who responded "will improve" (10.1%) and "will somewhat improve" (36.5%), which totaled 46.6%. Considering that the percentage of respondents with negative perceptions of current and future ROK-US relations is less than 10%, the overall public sentiment leans towards positive assessment. However, given that successive governments have invariably emphasized a "watertight ROK-US alliance" and promoted alliance strengthening as diplomatic achievements, the public's perceived temperature shows a certain gap. This implies that the government has much work to do to strengthen relations. The public identifies the following adjustment issues as narrowing the gap in interests between the United States and South Korea:

The first is the dilemma of entrapment that the ROK-US alliance may entail. When asked, "Due to the ROK-US alliance, South Korea may get caught up in conflicts in the Asian region unrelated to South Korea's national interests," 66.5% responded in agreement. The rate of agreement has been steadily increasing since the 2018 survey ([Figure 4]). This reflects an awareness of the gap between US security interests and South Korean security interests.

[Figure 4] ROK-US Alliance and the Possibility of Entanglement in Asian Regional Conflicts

Second, the perception that ROK-US economic relations are becoming increasingly competitive is also growing. When asked separately about economic relations between the US and South Korea, 50.8% responded that "the economies of South Korea and the United States are complementary," but the perception that they are competitive also reached 31.7% ([Figure 5]). The perspective that movements promoting regional investment, such as the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act, could affect neighboring countries like South Korea is aligned with the perception of ROK-US economic relations revealed in this survey.

[Figure 5] Opinion on ROK-US Economic Relations

Third, one in three South Koreans agrees with the statement that the importance of the ROK-US alliance is diminishing due to the relative decline of the United States ([Figure 6]). The relative decline of US hegemony manifested as the "Trump phenomenon," characterized by "America First" and unilateral diplomacy, and this has continued into the Biden administration.

[Figure 6] Decline of US Hegemony and the Importance of the ROK-US Alliance

The reasons cited by the public for negative impressions of the United States, such as "America First policies and unilateral attitudes in the international community" (55.6%) and "unfair attitudes in trade and investment" (55%), also reflect public concerns stemming from the decline of hegemony ([Figure 7]). If the US presidential election intensifies and the "Trump phenomenon" re-emerges, or if Trump's return to power becomes visible, public concerns are likely to grow.

[Figure 7] Reasons for Negative Impressions of the United States

3. Alliance Strengthening and Diplomatic Diversification

The public perceives that South Korea is exposed to multifaceted threats ([Figure 8]). Rather than the traditional approach of responding to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats by strengthening the ROK-US alliance, the public exhibits more multifaceted and complex thinking. In addition to North Korea's nuclear threat (56.3%), the public identifies multiple key threat factors, including trade and high-tech competition among major powers (55%), climate change and environmental issues (41%), and US-China strategic competition and conflict (36.3%). This suggests a need to upgrade the ROK-US alliance into a "global, comprehensive strategic alliance" while simultaneously pursuing diplomatic diversification by strengthening ROK-China relations, ROK-Japan relations, regional cooperative diplomacy, and economic diplomacy ([Figure 2], [Figure 3]). Notably, the percentage of respondents who selected ROK-China relations as the most important foreign relations increased by a significant 22.1 percentage points from 26% in 2021 to 48.1% this year ([Figure 2]), indicating a public perception that China also requires considerable attention, comparable to the US. This signals that while the alliance should be strengthened, it should not be the sole focus of foreign policy.

[Figure 8] Threats Facing South Korea

II. Perceptions of Expanding the Scope of the ROK-US Alliance

A particularly noteworthy finding from this survey on perceptions of the ROK-US alliance is that an overwhelming majority of respondents, 81.8%, support the direction that the ROK-US alliance "should evolve into an alliance that plays a role in resolving regional and global issues beyond responding to North Korea's military threats" ([Figure 9]). This can be interpreted as the public largely agreeing with the ROK-US alliance's orientation as a "global comprehensive strategic alliance" being pursued by the current government.

[Figure 9] Opinion on the Future Vision of the ROK-US Alliance

However, it is also observed that while the general principle of strengthening the ROK-US alliance's role and status as a regional and global alliance garners support, this support does not necessarily translate into support for expanding the alliance's scope in specific, practical applications. [Figure 10] reveals that South Koreans exhibit very different attitudes depending on the issue when it comes to contributing to various global and regional issues.

[Figure 10] Opinion on the ROK-US Alliance and South Korea's Role

Therefore, it can be inferred that the general public does not have a consistent understanding of what "an alliance that plays a role in resolving regional and global issues" specifically entails, nor of the costs associated with expanding the alliance's scope. To ascertain this, a multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted by recategorizing opinions on expanding the ROK-US alliance from a Korean Peninsula-centric alliance to a regional and global one into binary variables of support and opposition. This analysis examined the relationship between those who support the expansion of the ROK-US alliance's role and scope and their responses to specific issues.

[Figure 11] Relationship Between Expansion of ROK-US Alliance Scope and Increased South Korean Contribution to Specific Issues

[Figure 11] analyzes the trend of how opinions on specific issues change when moving from supporting the expansion of the ROK-US alliance's scope to opposing it, using those who support scope expansion as the base group. First, variables that have a statistically significant impact on perceptions related to the scope of the ROK-US alliance include: (1) global challenges such as non-proliferation, climate change, and infectious diseases; (2) countering China in advanced technology areas like semiconductors; (3) responding to human rights abuses in China's Xinjiang region; and (4) contributing to European issues such as the war in Ukraine. Opposition to expanding South Korea's role in these issues shows a positive correlation with opposition to expanding the ROK-US alliance's scope. Second, the issue of whether South Korea should participate in a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, while having a significant impact when considered alone, does not have a statistically significant impact on the expansion of the ROK-US alliance's scope when all variables are considered.

These regression analysis results clearly demonstrate that public opinion holds differing perceptions regarding the costs South Korea must bear due to the expansion of the ROK-US alliance. While it is statistically proven that "global issues" such as climate change, infectious diseases, advanced technologies, human rights, and the war in Ukraine are considered areas where the expanded ROK-US alliance should play a role, and these are indeed regional and global issues beyond the Korean Peninsula, the fact that the perception of South Korea's involvement in a Taiwan Strait crisis loses statistical significance when other variables are considered is intriguing. This could be because it is perceived as an issue not to be coordinated by the US and South Korea, or because it is felt that the interests of the US and South Korea do not align on this particular issue. Alternatively, it might simply be that the crisis in the Taiwan Strait is not included in the public's perception horizon as one of the regional/global issues.

Further analysis appears necessary to understand why the stance on the Taiwan issue alone shows varying impacts on the perception of expanding the ROK-US alliance scope depending on the regression model setup. One certainty is that the variables significantly influencing the direction of the ROK-US global comprehensive strategic alliance, which South Koreans overwhelmingly support, are the issues of joint response to global challenges like climate change, advanced technologies like semiconductors, human rights issues, and issues in regions outside Northeast Asia such as support for Ukraine. The crisis in the Taiwan Strait, which provokes strong opposition from China and carries the risk of military entanglement in some cases, is excluded from consideration when thinking about the scope of the ROK-US alliance. This suggests that South Koreans are not fully considering the value trade-offs between gains and losses associated with expanding the ROK-US alliance beyond the Korean Peninsula to a regional or global alliance.

III. Nuclear Armament and the Alliance: Trust in US Extended Deterrence and Support for Independent Nuclear Armament

This survey also included questions asking about trust in the extended deterrence provided by the United States to South Korea and an evaluation of the Washington Declaration announced in April 2023. As shown in [Figure 12] and [Figure 13] below, an overwhelming majority of respondents (90.2%) believed that the United States would retaliate with nuclear or conventional forces if North Korea launched a nuclear attack on South Korea, and a majority (57.7%) agreed that the Washington Declaration had alleviated security concerns.

[Figure 12] Trust in US Extended Deterrence

[Figure 13] Evaluation of the Washington Declaration

The question then arises: did this trust in US extended deterrence influence the perception that South Korea should pursue its own nuclear armament? [Figure 14] shows that public opinion on whether South Korea should possess nuclear weapons has changed considerably when North Korea's nuclear threat persists. While 69.6% supported independent nuclear armament for South Korea in the 2022 survey, this figure decreased by 11.1 percentage points to 58.5% in this year's survey.

[Figure 14] Support for and Opposition to South Korean Nuclear Possession Amidst Persistent North Korean Nuclear Threats

It is relatively evident that this change in perception is likely influenced by the trust in US extended deterrence. To examine this, a multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted on the relationship between opinions on nuclear possession and trust in US extended deterrence, yielding the following results.

[Figure 15] US Extended Deterrence Trust and Public Opinion on Nuclear Armament

[Figure 15] shows how opinions on US extended deterrence trust change when moving from supporting South Korean nuclear armament (base group) to opposing it. The results indicate that: First, both (1) perceptions of how the US would respond if North Korea launched a nuclear attack on South Korea, and (2) whether the Washington Declaration has resolved security concerns, have a statistically significant impact on the perception of the necessity of South Korean nuclear armament. Second, the more one believes that the US would not retaliate effectively against a North Korean nuclear attack (nuclear retaliation → conventional retaliation → no retaliation), the more likely they are to oppose nuclear armament, showing a positive correlation. Third, the more one believes that the Washington Declaration has not resolved South Korea's security concerns, the more likely they are to oppose South Korean nuclear armament.

The tendency for individuals with lower trust in US extended deterrence to oppose independent nuclear armament for South Korea implies the converse: those who positively evaluate the extended deterrence provided by the US are more likely to support South Korea's nuclear armament. This runs counter to the expectations of deterrence and alliance theory, which generally posits that when trust in an ally's extended deterrence falters, the ally will pursue independent nuclear capabilities out of fear of abandonment.

Further rigorous statistical analysis appears necessary to interpret these results. The considerable distance between the two questions, given the face-to-face survey method, should also be considered. However, one possibility that can be cautiously considered is that there may be factors more significant than trust in US extended deterrence underlying the logic behind South Koreans' support for nuclear armament.

Two important policy implications can be drawn from the respondents' answers regarding the expansion of the ROK-US alliance scope and trust in US extended deterrence, reflecting the perceptions of South Korean public opinion. First, the direction of strengthening the ROK-US alliance pursued by the US Biden administration and the South Korean Yoon Suk Yeol administration may not necessarily align with the type of alliance policy supported by public opinion. While public opinion broadly supports the scope and role of the ROK-US alliance, and a majority positively evaluates the recent series of extended deterrence strengthening measures pursued under bilateral government agreement, public opinion also desires distance from the Taiwan Strait crisis and continues to maintain the view that South Korea should possess its own nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is crucial to remember that South Koreans are not giving their full endorsement to the establishment of a global alliance network operating within the framework of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and integrated deterrence strategy, to the extent of accepting the risk of full-scale military conflict with China.

Second, enhancing the credibility of extended deterrence provided to South Korea may not necessarily lead to public opposition to independent nuclear armament. The results of this survey show that while most South Koreans trust the US nuclear umbrella, a majority of respondents still exhibit a tendency to believe that South Korea needs to independently develop nuclear weapons. Consequently, even if the US and South Korea establish stronger preparedness measures against North Korea's nuclear threat, such as through the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), it is unlikely to effectively quell public opinion favoring nuclear armament. To find ways to influence the direction of public opinion on nuclear armament development in South Korea for the sake of strengthening global non-proliferation regime stability, separate research is needed to identify the most significant variables driving South Koreans' support for nuclear armament.

Yeol YoelHe holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and is currently a Professor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies and President of the East Asia Institute (EAI). He has served as Dean of Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies, Head of the Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies. He was a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, and a Visiting Scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Political Science Association (2019) and President of the Association for Japanese Studies (2012). He has been a Senior Fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, the Japan Foundation, and Waseda University's Advanced Research Center. He has also served as a consultant for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, and as a specialist member of the Committee for Northeast Asian Affairs. His research areas include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include "Conditions for Presidential Success in 2022" (2021, co-editor), "Policy Recommendations for the New Government's Foreign Policy in 2022" (2021, co-editor), "The Story of BTS's Global Appeal" (2021, co-editor), "South Korea's Choices After the Crisis" (2021, co-editor),Japan and Asia's Contested Order(2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia(2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review23, 6 (2019), and "South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy" (2017, co-editor).

Yangkyu KimSenior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Lecturer at Seoul National University's Department of Political Science and International Relations. He holds a Bachelor's degree in French Education and Diplomacy and a Master's degree in Diplomacy from Seoul National University, and a Ph.D. in International Politics from Florida International University. He served as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Florida International University and as a Visiting Scholar at Columbia University's Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He received the Fulbright Graduate Study Award and the Smith Richardson Foundation's "World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship." His main research areas include coercive diplomacy, nuclear strategy, power transition, US-China relations, North Korea's nuclear issue, and international politics and security theory. His recent research includes "Infeasible Punishment and Non-Effective Threats: Political Feasibility of Nuclear Punishment and Policy Choices after Direct Nuclear Deterrence Failure" and "At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis."

Park Han-soo_Research Fellow at EAI.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

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