[EAI Issue Brief] Analysis of Public Perception of the ROK-US Alliance in 2023: Expectations and Concerns Regarding a Comprehensive Alliance

On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the ROK-US alliance, the East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted a public perception survey with the JoongAng Ilbo and Korea Research, and presented an analysis of key issues by referencing public opinion survey results on ROK-US relations conducted over the past several years. The analysis focused on three areas: first, public perception of ROK-US relations overall; second, public perception of the comprehensive alliance (i.e., cooperation with the US on issues beyond traditional security, and cooperation on regional and global dimensions beyond Korean Peninsula security); and third, perception of US extended deterrence and nuclear armament. While the public overwhelmingly supports the ROK-US alliance, they are aware of the alliance's challenges and believe significant efforts are needed to strengthen it. Regarding the comprehensive nature and geographical expansion of the ROK-US alliance, there is general agreement in principle, but mixed reactions on specific details. Concerns about the risk of entanglement in conflicts, particularly those involving China, are prominently expressed. Finally, while the public trusts the US extended deterrence against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, they do not see this as necessarily diminishing the need for independent nuclear armament.

I. Perception of ROK-US Relations

1. Strong Support for the ROK-US Alliance

The results of this public opinion survey show strong support for the ROK-US alliance. When asked about the role of the ROK-US alliance over the past 70 years, an overwhelming majority of respondents agreed that the alliance has benefited South Korea ([Figure 1]). 93.8% expressed a positive view on the alliance's contribution to South Korea's security, and over 80% held positive perceptions regarding its contributions to economic and democratic development. It is recognized that the alliance has not only provided absolute security benefits through military cooperation with the US but has also contributed to economic growth and the establishment of democracy as a kind of 'security externality.' Considering that critical views exist regarding the assessment of US aid in economic growth, the US role during periods of high growth or financial crises, and the US role in the democratization movement, the public's overwhelming support for the current alliance is noteworthy.

[Figure 1] Opinion on the Contributions of the ROK-US Alliance

The positive assessment of the ROK-US alliance's past extends to the present and future. The public considers ROK-US relations to be the most important foreign relationship for the current government ([Figure 2]). 74.8% of the public cite ROK-US relations, a figure that has increased by about 10 percentage points over the past two years. Furthermore, strengthening the ROK-US alliance is ranked as the top foreign policy priority for the government (40%) ([Figure 3]). This figure also represents an increase of 11.5 percentage points compared to last year.

[Figure 2] Most Important Foreign Relations for the Government

[Figure 3] Government's Top Foreign Policy Priorities

2. Lukewarm Assessment of ROK-US Relations

Despite the high regard for the importance of ROK-US relations and the alliance, the public generally held a positive but also significantly reserved stance regarding the present and future of these relations. When asked about the current state of relations between South Korea and the US, the response 'very good' was given by 5.3%, and 'somewhat good' by 45.4%. In contrast, 42.3% responded 'average.' For the future outlook of ROK-US relations, the response 'will be the same as the present' accounted for 46.9%, narrowly surpassing the combined percentage of 'will improve' (10.1%) and 'will somewhat improve' (36.5%) (46.6%). Considering that the percentage of respondents with negative perceptions of current and future ROK-US relations is less than 10%, the overall public opinion leans towards positive assessment. However, considering that successive governments have invariably emphasized an 'ironclad ROK-US alliance' and promoted alliance strengthening as diplomatic achievements, there is a noticeable gap in public sentiment. This implies that the government has much work to do to strengthen relations. The public identifies the following issues as areas where the gap in interests between the US and South Korea needs to be narrowed:

The first is the dilemma of entanglement that the ROK-US alliance could entail. In response to the statement, 'Due to the ROK-US alliance, South Korea could be drawn into conflicts in the Asian region unrelated to its national interests,' 66.5% agreed. The rate of agreement has been steadily increasing since the 2018 survey ([Figure 4]). This reflects an awareness of the gap between US security interests and South Korean security interests.

[Figure 4] ROK-US Alliance and the Possibility of Entanglement in Asian Regional Conflicts

Second, the perception that ROK-US economic relations are becoming increasingly competitive is also growing. When asked separately about economic relations between the US and South Korea, the response 'ROK-US economies are complementary' was dominant at 50.8%, but the perception of mutual competition also reached 31.7% ([Figure 5]). Concerns about the impact of US policies such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act, which promote regional investment, on neighboring countries like South Korea can be seen as aligning with the perceptions of ROK-US economic relations revealed in this survey.

[Figure 5] Opinion on ROK-US Economic Relations

Third, one in three South Koreans agrees with the view that the importance of the ROK-US alliance is diminishing due to the relative decline of the US ([Figure 6]). The relative decline of US hegemony manifested in the 'Trump phenomenon,' characterized by 'America First' and unilateral diplomacy, and this has continued into the Biden administration.

[Figure 6] US Decline and the Importance of the ROK-US Alliance

The fact that the public cites 'America First policies and unilateral attitudes in the international community' as the primary reason for negative perceptions of the US (55.6%), followed by 'unfair attitudes in trade and investment' (55%) ([Figure 7]), also reflects public concerns stemming from the decline of hegemony. If the US presidential election intensifies and the 'Trump phenomenon' re-emerges, or if Trump's return to power becomes visible, public concerns are likely to grow.

[Figure 7] Reasons for Negative Perceptions of the US

3. Alliance Strengthening and Diplomatic Diversification

The public perceives South Korea as being exposed to multifaceted threats ([Figure 8]). Rather than relying solely on strengthening the ROK-US alliance to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, the public exhibits a more multifaceted and complex way of thinking. In addition to North Korea's nuclear threat (56.3%), the public identifies competition in trade and advanced technology among major powers (55%), climate change and environmental issues (41%), and US-China strategic competition and conflict (36.3%) as multiple key threat factors. While efforts should be made to upgrade the ROK-US alliance into a 'global, comprehensive strategic alliance,' the public also requests diversification of foreign policy, including strengthening ROK-China relations, ROK-Japan relations, regional cooperation diplomacy, and economic diplomacy ([Figure 2], [Figure 3]). Notably, the figure for ROK-China relations as the most important foreign relationship increased by a significant 22.1 percentage points from 26% in 2021 to 48.1% this year ([Figure 2]), indicating public recognition that China warrants as much attention as the US. This signals that while the alliance should be strengthened, it should not be the sole focus of foreign policy.

[Figure 8] Threats Facing South Korea

II. Perception of Expanding the Scope of the ROK-US Alliance

A particularly striking finding in this survey on perceptions of the ROK-US alliance is that an overwhelming majority of 81.8% support the direction that the ROK-US alliance should evolve into an alliance that 'plays a role in resolving regional and global issues beyond responding to North Korea's military threats' ([Figure 9]). This can be interpreted as the majority of the public agreeing with the ROK-US alliance's objective of becoming a 'global comprehensive strategic alliance,' as pursued by the current government.

[Figure 9] Opinion on the Future Vision of the ROK-US Alliance

However, it is also observed that while there is broad agreement in principle that the ROK-US alliance's role and status should be enhanced to become a regional and global alliance, this support does not necessarily translate into support for expanding the alliance's scope in specific, practical matters. [Figure 10] reveals that South Koreans exhibit very different attitudes depending on the issue when it comes to South Korea's contribution to various issues considered regional or global problems.

[Figure 10] Opinion on the ROK-US Alliance and South Korea's Role

Therefore, it can be inferred that the general public does not have a consistent understanding of what 'an alliance that plays a role in resolving regional and global issues' specifically entails, nor what costs would be incurred by expanding the scope of such an alliance. To ascertain this, a multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted to re-categorize opinions on expanding the ROK-US alliance, centered on the Korean Peninsula, into binary variables of support and opposition, and to analyze the relationship between those who support the expansion of the ROK-US alliance's role and scope and their responses to specific issues.

[Figure 11] Relationship Between Expanding the Scope of the ROK-US Alliance and Expanding South Korea's Contribution to Specific Issues

[Figure 11] analyzes the trend of how opinions on specific issues change when moving from supporting the expansion of the ROK-US alliance's scope (the base group) to opposing it. First, variables that have a statistically significant impact on perceptions regarding the scope of the ROK-US alliance include: (1) global challenges such as non-proliferation, climate change, and infectious diseases; (2) countering China in advanced technology areas like semiconductors; (3) responding to human rights abuses in China's Xinjiang region; and (4) contributing to European issues such as the war in Ukraine. Opposition to expanding South Korea's role in these issues shows a positive correlation with opposition to expanding the scope of the ROK-US alliance. Second, the issue of whether South Korea should participate in a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, while having a significant impact when considered alone, does not have a statistically significant impact on the expansion of the ROK-US alliance's scope when all variables are considered.

These regression analysis results clearly show that public opinion has differing perceptions on a case-by-case basis regarding the costs South Korea would incur from expanding the ROK-US alliance. While it is statistically proven that 'global issues' such as climate change, infectious diseases, advanced technology, human rights, and the war in Ukraine are considered areas where the expanded ROK-US alliance should play a role, and these issues indeed transcend the Korean Peninsula to regional and global levels, the fact that perceptions regarding South Korea's involvement in a Taiwan Strait crisis lose statistical significance when other variables are considered is interesting. This could be because it is perceived that involvement in a Taiwan crisis is not an issue for the ROK and US to coordinate, or because it is felt that the interests of the ROK and US do not align on this particular issue. Alternatively, it might simply be that the crisis in the Taiwan Strait is not included in the public's perception horizon as one of the regional/global issues.

Further analysis appears necessary to understand why the stance on the Taiwan issue alone shows varying impacts on the expansion of the ROK-US alliance's scope depending on the regression analysis model setup. One thing is certain: the variables that significantly influence the direction of the global comprehensive strategic alliance, which South Koreans overwhelmingly support, are the joint response to global issues like climate change, advanced technology issues like semiconductors, human rights issues, and issues in regions outside Northeast Asia such as support for Ukraine. The crisis in the Taiwan Strait, a sensitive issue that provokes strong opposition from China and carries the risk of military entanglement in some cases, is excluded from consideration when thinking about the scope of the ROK-US alliance. This suggests that South Koreans are not necessarily supporting the expansion of the ROK-US alliance's scope while comprehensively considering the value trade-offs between gains and losses that such expansion would bring, extending beyond the Korean Peninsula to a regional or global alliance.

III. Nuclear Armament and the Alliance: Trust in US Extended Deterrence and Support for Independent Nuclear Armament

This survey also included questions about the credibility of US extended deterrence provided to South Korea and an assessment of the Washington Declaration announced in April 2023. As shown in [Figure 12] and [Figure 13] below, an overwhelming majority of respondents (90.2%) believed that the US would retaliate with nuclear or conventional forces if North Korea launched a nuclear attack on South Korea, and a majority (57.7%) agreed that the Washington Declaration had alleviated South Korea's security concerns.

[Figure 12] Trust in US Extended Deterrence

[Figure 13] Assessment of the Washington Declaration

Did this trust in US extended deterrence influence the perception that South Korea should pursue independent nuclear armament? [Figure 14] shows that public opinion on whether South Korea should possess nuclear weapons has changed considerably when North Korea's nuclear threat persists. While 69.6% supported independent nuclear armament in the 2022 survey, this figure decreased by 11.1 percentage points to 58.5% in the current survey.

[Figure 14] Support/Opposition for South Korea Possessing Nuclear Weapons Amidst Persistent North Korean Nuclear Threats

It is relatively clear that the credibility of US extended deterrence has influenced this change in perception. To examine this, a multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted on the relationship between opinions on nuclear armament and the credibility of US extended deterrence, yielding the following results.

[Figure 15] US Extended Deterrence Credibility and Public Opinion on Nuclear Armament

[Figure 15] shows how opinions on the credibility of US extended deterrence change when moving from supporting (the base group) to opposing South Korea's nuclear armament. The results indicate that: First, both (1) perceptions of how the US would respond if North Korea launched a nuclear attack on South Korea, and (2) whether security concerns have been alleviated by the Washington Declaration, have a statistically significant impact on perceptions of the necessity of South Korea's nuclear armament. Second, the less trust there is in the US's ability to retaliate properly against a North Korean nuclear attack (nuclear retaliation → conventional retaliation → no retaliation), the stronger the positive correlation with opposition to nuclear armament. Third, the less belief there is that the Washington Declaration has alleviated South Korea's security concerns, the stronger the positive correlation with opposition to nuclear armament.

The tendency for those with lower trust in US extended deterrence to oppose South Korea's independent nuclear armament implies, conversely, that those who positively assess the US extended deterrence provided to South Korea are more likely to support South Korea's nuclear armament. This is contrary to the expectations of deterrence and alliance theory, which predict that when trust in an ally's extended deterrence is compromised, the ally will pursue independent nuclear possession out of fear of abandonment.

Further, more rigorous statistical analysis appears necessary to interpret these results. The considerable distance between the two questions in this face-to-face survey should also be considered. However, one cautiously considered possibility is that there may be factors more important than the credibility of US extended deterrence underlying the logic behind South Koreans' support for nuclear armament.

Two important policy implications can be drawn from the respondents' answers regarding the expansion of the ROK-US alliance scope and trust in US extended deterrence. First, the direction of ROK-US alliance strengthening pursued by the US Biden administration and the South Korean Yoon Suk Yeol administration may not necessarily align with the form of alliance policy supported by public opinion. While public opinion broadly supports the scope and role of the ROK-US alliance, and a majority positively assesses the recent strengthening measures of extended deterrence agreed upon by both governments, public opinion also desires distance from the Taiwan Strait crisis and continues to maintain the view that South Korea should possess its own nuclear weapons. Therefore, it must be remembered that South Koreans are not providing full support for the establishment of a global alliance network system within the context of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and integrated deterrence strategy, to the extent of accepting the risk of full-scale military conflict with China.

Second, enhancing the credibility of extended deterrence provided to South Korea may not necessarily lead to opposition to independent nuclear armament. The results of this survey show that while most South Koreans trust the US nuclear umbrella, a majority of respondents still tend to believe that South Korea needs to independently develop nuclear weapons. Therefore, even if the ROK and US establish stronger preparedness measures against North Korea's nuclear threat, such as through the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), it is unlikely to effectively quell public opinion favoring nuclear armament. To find ways to influence the direction of public opinion on nuclear armament development in South Korea for the stability of the global non-proliferation regime, separate research is needed to identify the most crucial variables driving South Koreans' support for nuclear armament. ■

■ Yeol Sun_Holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He has served at Chung-Ang University and is currently a Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, and President of the East Asia Institute (EAI). He has held positions such as Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies, Head of the Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies at Yonsei University. He has also been a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, and a Visiting Scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Political Science Association (2019) and President of the Association for Japanese Studies (2012). He has been a Fulbright Senior Scholar, a MacArthur Fellow, a Japan Foundation Fellow, and a Senior Fellow at the Advanced Research Center, Waseda University. He has served as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, and as a specialist member of the Committee for the Northeast Asian Era. His research areas include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. Recent publications include 'Conditions for Presidential Success in 2022' (co-editor, 2021), 'Policy Recommendations for the New Government's Foreign Policy in 2022' (co-editor, 2021), 'The Story of BTS's Global Appeal' (co-editor, 2021), 'South Korea's Choices After the Crisis' (co-editor, 2021), 'Japan and Asia's Contested Order' (2019, with T. J. Pempel), 'Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia' (2016, with Jan Melissen), 'South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in Trade Policymaking,' The Pacific Review 23, 6 (2019), and 'South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy' (co-editor, 2017).Japan and Asia's Contested Order(2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia(2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review 23, 6 (2019), 『한국의 중견국외교』(South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy) (co-editor, 2017).

■ Yangkyu Kim_Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. He holds a Bachelor's degree in French Education and International Relations and a Master's degree in International Relations from Seoul National University, and a Ph.D. in International Politics from Florida International University. He served as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Florida International University and as a Visiting Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He received the Fulbright Graduate Study Award and the Smith Richardson Foundation's World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship. His main research areas include coercive diplomacy, nuclear strategy, power transition, US-China relations, North Korea's nuclear issue, and international politics and security theory. Recent publications include 'Infeasible Punishment and Non-Effective Threats: Political Feasibility of Nuclear Punishment and Policy Choices after Direct Nuclear Deterrence Failure' and 'At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.'

■ Пак Хансу_Исследователь Института Востоковедения (EAI).

■ Ответственный за выпуск и редактор: Пак Хансу_Исследователь EAI

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