[EAI Issue Brief] One Thing to Add to South Korea's North Korea Policy Stance in the 2023 National Security Strategy

On June 7, the National Security Office of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration published "Yoon Suk-yeol Administration's National Security Strategy: A Global Pivotal State of Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity," which presents the overarching framework for South Korea's foreign and security policy principles, goals, and direction. This is South Korea's fifth National Security Strategy, following the first one, "Peace and Prosperity and National Security," published by the Roh Moo-hyun administration in 2004, and subsequent strategies by the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2009, the Park Geun-hye administration in 2013, and the Moon Jae-in administration in 2017. Internationally, unlike Japan's "National Security Strategy" released in December of the previous year, which was immediately welcomed by the U.S. government but raised concerns from neighboring countries including China, this strategy has not garnered significant attention. Domestically, its reception has been polarized, with criticisms such as "a strategy prioritizing great power interests" [1] and high praise like "nothing more can be added or removed" [2]. Given that domestic debates primarily revolved around South Korea's foreign policy direction towards North Korea and Japan, and that the strengthening of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation stemmed from efforts "to respond to North Korean provocations" [3], the core of the starkly divided opinions between the ruling and opposition parties can be seen as lying in the North Korea policy stance outlined in the 2023 National Security Strategy.[1]"a strategy prioritizing great power interests"[2]"nothing more can be added or removed"[3]"to respond to North Korean provocations"

This paper examines the characteristics of the recently released National Security Strategy in defining North Korea's threats and South Korea's responses, comparing it with previous South Korean strategies and those of the U.S. and Japan. It also explains the challenges this North Korea policy stance is likely to face. Furthermore, it organizes the flow of domestic North Korea policy debates around the spiral and deterrence models, emphasizing that to break through the current stalemate on the Korean Peninsula, efforts must be made to induce North Korea to change its strategic orientation, beyond merely distinguishing between 'revisionist' and 'status quo' powers. To this end, it points out the need for a 4D North Korea policy by adding 'North Korea's Alternative Future and Development Path' to the current 3D policy of Deterrence-Dissuasion-Dialogue, and offers recommendations for the future direction of South Korea's North Korea policy.

Core Tenets of the 2023 National Security Strategy

The term 'strategy' originates from the Greek word 'strategia,' which originally meant "the art of a general." [4] Considering Clausewitz's theory on the nature of war, which centers on the 'purpose' and 'means' of war [5], the core of strategy can also be organized around the goals to be achieved and the means to achieve them. South Korea's first National Security Strategy defined the concept of national security strategy as "a comprehensive and systematic plan that mobilizes national resources and 'means' to achieve national security 'goals' amidst domestic and foreign security dynamics" [6]. Similarly, other countries organize their national security strategies by systematically outlining the means to secure their primary national interests in response to the challenges they face.[4]Considering Clausewitz's theory on the nature of war, which centers on the 'purpose' and 'means' of war[5]South Korea's first National Security Strategy defined the concept of national security strategy as "a comprehensive and systematic plan that mobilizes national resources and 'means' to achieve national security 'goals' amidst domestic and foreign security dynamics"[6]Similarly, other countries organize their national security strategies by systematically outlining the means to secure their primary national interests in response to the challenges they face.

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), released in October 2022, defines the challenges facing the U.S. as 'defending the "rules-based international order," including human rights, freedom, and the rule of law, amidst the confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism' and 'responding to transnational threats such as climate change, food security, health, terrorism, and energy crises.' The means of response include (1) investing in the resources and means that form the foundation of American power, (2) building the strongest possible alliances, and (3) modernizing military capabilities to respond to evolving threats. The policy priorities are to outcompete China and deter Russia, followed by responses to the threats posed by Iran's missile and drone capabilities and North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. [7][7]

Japan's National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, defines Japan's three major national interests as 'Japan's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and the safety of its people,' 'fostering an international environment that ensures Japan's prosperity,' and 'defending universal values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.' To achieve these goals, it proposes (1) strengthening and reforming Japan's defense capabilities, (2) exercising international cooperation and leadership to defend universal values, (3) adhering to a defense-oriented policy and the principle of non-nuclear armament, (4) strengthening extended deterrence with the U.S., and (5) achieving coexistence and co-prosperity through multilateral cooperation with like-minded countries. Japan ranks threats in the following order: China's strategic opacity and military buildup, North Korea's missiles and nuclear weapons, Russia's military actions against its neighbors, and its alliance with China. [8][8]

Previous South Korean administrations' National Security Strategies have a similar structure. Although there are differences in expression and priorities, the strategies published by the Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye administrations identified national interests as protecting public safety and territorial sovereignty, achieving peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, and ensuring common prosperity in Northeast Asia. The means or tasks to achieve these included strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, international cooperation, and building an advanced security system. [9][9]The Moon Jae-in administration's National Security Strategy aimed to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, achieve peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and the world, and ensure public safety. The means proposed included "strengthening our independent defense capabilities based on the ROK-U.S. alliance," "pragmatic diplomacy centered on the public and national interests," and "strengthening the national crisis management system for a safe South Korea." [10][10]

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration's National Security Strategy, released this time, also identifies 'sovereignty, territory, and public safety,' 'establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula and preparing for a unified future,' and 'laying the foundation for prosperity in East Asia and expanding global roles' as core national security objectives. Apart from the expansion of the diplomatic space from Northeast Asia to the global arena, there is no significant difference in how national interests are defined compared to previous strategies. While it does not emphasize self-reliant defense or the transfer of wartime operational control, the emphasis on defense innovation, building a strong military based on advanced technology, and strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance into a more comprehensive global partnership aligns with the national security strategies of previous administrations. In defining factors threatening national interests, it identifies the advancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, the intensifying competition between the U.S. and China, the deepening linkage between economy and security, and new security threats such as infectious diseases, climate change, and cyber hacking. Although there are differences in priorities, these closely resemble the threat perceptions of the United States. [11][11]

Some have voiced strong opposition to this National Security Strategy, citing its closure of avenues for dialogue and diplomacy with North Korea, its perceived subservience to Japan on historical and territorial issues, and its excessive reliance on ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. [12][12]However, it could be argued that these criticisms are excessive, as this strategy, similar to the "all-directional diplomacy" and "comprehensive pragmatic diplomacy" of past administrations, adopts "pragmatic diplomacy" as its core tenet, and therefore does not present a strategy limited to simplistic and uniform 'means.'

Nevertheless, the core reason for these concerns is that the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's National Security Strategy prominently features a stance that clearly distinguishes it from previous administrations' strategies: "value-based diplomacy" and "principles and reciprocity." Because it upholds the principle of "strengthening solidarity based on the values of freedom and democracy," issues of 'human rights' and 'international norms' are important. While it allows for strengthened cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, which share the same values, not only in security but also in economy, supply chains, and people-to-people exchanges, it emphasizes "dignified diplomacy based on national interests and principles" and "stable management" based on "international norms" with countries like China and Russia that do not share these values. [13][13]Regarding North Korea, it emphasizes "consistent diplomacy based on principles" and an approach that "maintains pragmatic and flexible approaches while safeguarding our national dignity and core values." [14][14]

Spiral and Deterrence Models: Two Models for Viewing the North Korean Issue and the 2023 National Security Strategy

How does the North Korea policy direction of the 2023 National Security Strategy, which emphasizes values, specifically differ from previous approaches? Since the inception of National Security Strategies, South Korean government policy towards North Korea has largely fallen into two main streams. One is the 'peace and common prosperity on the Korean Peninsula' stance emphasized by the Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in administrations, and the other is the 'justice and peace' and 'trustpolitik' centered stance of the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations. The conflict between these two perspectives, which can also be seen as the confrontational views between the conservative and progressive camps in North Korea policy, is sometimes summarized as 'Sunshine Policy' versus 'Sanctions Policy.' [15][15]This bears similarities to the debate within the U.S. policy community during the Cold War regarding policy direction towards the Soviet Union, which Robert Jervis explained by distinguishing between the Deterrence and Spiral models. [16][16]

The deterrence model is based on the "game of Chicken." This model posits that moderate and conciliatory gestures are perceived as a lack of will to defend core interests, prompting the other party to attempt stronger pressure. Consequently, one may face a situation where further concessions are inevitable once a concession is made. Therefore, only by demonstrating the capability and willingness to go to war can one avoid a diplomatic disaster of being forced into greater concessions. This is because the way to win the game of Chicken is to never swerve the steering wheel. According to the deterrence model, all issues are closely interconnected, and even a concession on a minor issue carries the risk of being interpreted by the other party as a sign of one's own weakness. Thus, the U.S. must respond firmly and principledly to all Soviet provocations occurring in every region of the world to prevent opportunistic expansionist attempts by the Soviets.

The spiral model points out the problems that arise when both parties in a conflict simultaneously apply the deterrence model. As seen in the naval arms race between Britain and Germany before World War I, attempts by one party to ensure its security invariably undermine the security of the other. This is similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma, where the infinite pursuit of narrow self-interest ultimately harms everyone's interests. When the U.S. and the Soviet Union simultaneously engage in deterrence, exchanging threats and punishments, fear breeds suspicion and distrust, leading to a more severe security crisis and ultimately a worst-case scenario where everyone loses. To overcome this security dilemma, it is necessary to break the vicious cycle of exchanging threats by making concessions first and having the other party reciprocate, thereby initiating a virtuous cycle of exchanging conciliatory measures.

The choice between these two models actually depends on their 'scope conditions.' That is, the deterrence model views the other party as a revisionist with aggressive intentions seeking to alter the status quo whenever possible, while the spiral model assumes the other party is a status quo power seeking to ensure its own security with defensive intentions, rather than seeking to change the status quo. As Hans Morgenthau pointed out, if these are applied in reverse—if a policy based on the spiral model is pursued against a revisionist power—it can lead to major diplomatic failures, such as Britain's appeasement policy towards Hitler before World War II. Conversely, if the deterrence model is applied to a status quo power, it can lead to problems similar to Britain's containment policy towards Germany before World War I, which ultimately resulted in war. [17][17]

Therefore, Jervis suggests that the decision of which model to apply to policy towards the Soviet Union should begin with accurately understanding Soviet intentions, while comprehensively considering how the Soviets perceive U.S. intentions. [18][18]However, Morgenthau advises that accurately understanding the intentions of the other party is impossible, and intentions can easily change relative to capabilities. Therefore, foreign policy should be constructed based on capabilities rather than intentions. Applying these two perspectives to the North Korean case leads to the conclusion that, first, a strategy of carefully observing North Korea's capability changes is fundamentally necessary, and second, rather than choosing one of the Sunshine Policy or Sanctions Policy and pursuing it consistently, it is important to respond flexibly by considering both North Korea's current strategic orientation and its perceptions of South Korea's and the U.S.'s intentions.

The difficulties that the 2023 National Security Strategy, which sets South Korea's foreign policy direction based on values and presents a North Korea policy based on principles and reciprocity, will face can be anticipated in this context. As a mature democracy, it is natural for South Korea to value freedom, the rule of law, and human rights. However, when determining (1) who to align with and (2) what means to employ in formulating foreign policy towards a given country based on these values, it is by no means easy to simultaneously satisfy both 'principles' and 'pragmatic and flexible approaches.'

For example, while this National Security Strategy advocates for 'flexibility' as a core principle of its North Korea policy, its specific policy instruments are focused on possessing overwhelming Kill Chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) capabilities; establishing a Strategic Command to further enhance deterrence against North Korea using new technologies; and securing independent surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities through the use of reconnaissance satellites, ultra-small satellite systems, and medium-altitude reconnaissance drones. Although the three principles for denuclearization negotiations are presented as 'Deterrence,' 'Dissuasion,' and 'Dialogue' (3D), detailed policy instruments for deterrence and dissuasion, both through South Korea's own efforts and international cooperation, are extensively presented, whereas the methods for dialogue are not sufficiently discussed. The "Audacious Initiative" also carries the prerequisite condition of "if North Korea returns to denuclearization negotiations with sincerity." Normalization of inter-Korean relations also begins with establishing inter-Korean relations based on mutual respect, under the principle that "any North Korean armed provocation is unacceptable, and North Korea's wrongful actions must have consequences." [19][19]

As is well known, North Korea has explicitly rejected the South Korean government's North Korea policy stance. In a statement on August 19, 2022, Kim Yo-jong vehemently criticized the proposal of an "audacious and comprehensive initiative" that would "drastically improve economy and people's livelihoods if nuclear development is halted and denuclearization is pursued with sincerity," calling it "the most repulsive and absurd." Chairman Kim Jong-un, in his policy speech at the 7th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly on September 8, 2022, assessed that the U.S. and South Korea's intention was "ultimately to make us give up nuclear weapons and even the exercise of self-defense rights, thereby collapsing our regime at any time." Instead of officially responding to the National Security Strategy released this time, North Korea's propaganda outlets have criticized it as an "extremely malicious war script and confrontation script attempting to confront us by borrowing foreign forces" and described South Korea's strengthening of its response capabilities as a "scheme to hasten preparations for a northward invasion war by squandering vast military funds to develop and purchase more war-killing equipment." [20][20]

Policy Recommendation: Considering the 4D Model of Deterrence-Dissuasion-Dialogue-Development

As Morgenthau pointed out, foreign policy strategy should always begin with an assessment of the adversary's capabilities. In a situation where North Korea's intentions are unclear, national security strategy should be formulated as conservatively as possible for safety. Therefore, measures to strengthen South Korea's deterrence capabilities in response to the advancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities are essential. This is particularly crucial given that North Korea adopted the "Law on the State Policy on Nuclear Force" on September 9, 2022, legalizing an offensive doctrine that allows for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and to "prevent the escalation and protraction of war and seize the initiative in war" in the early stages of conflict. However, it is difficult to conclude that North Korea's advancement of nuclear capabilities and adoption of an offensive nuclear strategy are irreversible actions that will determine its foreign policy orientation for the next 50 or 100 years. It is a relatively common phenomenon for states with inferior conventional forces to adopt security strategies reliant on nuclear weapons, and this was also a strategy used by the U.S. during the Cold War to protect its European allies from the threat of the Soviet Union.

One point to consider is that South Korea's policy towards the North Korean nuclear threat forms a feedback loop that, in turn, influences North Korea's external perceptions and strategic orientation. Consequently, South Korea's North Korea policy is not simply a matter of choosing one option and pursuing it consistently—whether 'spiral or deterrence,' 'sunshine or sanctions,' or 'dialogue or dissuasion'—but also a question of 'what stimuli and information South Korea injects into the process of North Korea's own strategic orientation selection.'

In this context, it is essential to strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the ROK-U.S. alliance and enhance the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea, while also reinforcing international cooperation and dissuasion measures, to clearly show the North Korean regime that clinging to nuclear weapons will not open a path forward. However, alongside this, efforts must be made to concretely demonstrate that there is a path for regime and system stability and for the prosperity of North Korean society if it abandons nuclear weapons. Therefore, a comprehensive strategy that includes North Korea's informatization and "self-reliance" [21] to the existing research's "sanctions, deterrence, and engagement" complex strategy, or a "Bold Initiative" 2.0 that includes 'Development' alongside 'Deterrence,' 'Dissuasion,' and 'Dialogue' [22] is needed.[21]or a "Bold Initiative" 2.0 that includes 'Development' alongside 'Deterrence,' 'Dissuasion,' and 'Dialogue'[22] Attention should be paid to alternative models.

Specifically, the 'development' referred to in the 4D model must include a concrete vision for 'North Korea's alternative future and development path.' Rather than a conditional approach, such as arguing that discussions on the future of the Korean Peninsula can only begin once North Korea first changes its strategic orientation to abandon nuclear weapons, concrete signaling is needed that South Korea is also genuinely contemplating the common prosperity of the South and North and North Korea's future survival strategies. To this end, dialogue and cooperation are necessary not only with the 'free world' but also with countries that do not share values. For example, discussions on regime security guarantees that North Korea can accept could be considered, involving dialogue with China, which has succeeded in reform and opening while maintaining a similar system, then concretizing this through South Korea-China-Japan strategic dialogues, and subsequently mediating dialogue between North Korea and the United States. Furthermore, within the context of the global supply chain reorganization under the 'de-risking' trend,[23] it is necessary to include North Korea and discuss ways to ensure the sustained growth of North Korea's future economy in various Track 2 or Track 1.5 international conferences. Ultimately, to induce North Korea to genuinely pursue denuclearization, South Korea must also demonstrate that it is genuinely pursuing coexistence and common prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, not the collapse of the North Korean regime. While there is nothing to 'remove' from this National Security Strategy, there are elements to 'add'.

[1] Ko Sang-min and Jeong Su-yeon. 2023. “Park Kwang-on: 'Yoon Administration's National Security Strategy is a Strategy Prioritizing Great Power Interests'.” <Yonhap News> June 8. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20230608053200001 (Accessed: June 29, 2023).

[2] Han Ye-seul. 2023. “Na Kyung-won: 'Moon Administration's Deletion of End-of-War Declaration Was Touching... Yoon Administration's Security Strategy is Complete'.” <JoongAng Ilbo> June 8. https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25168410#home (Accessed: June 29, 2023).

[3] Office of National Security. 2023. *The Yoon Suk Yeol Administration's National Security Strategy: A Global Pivotal State of Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity*. Seoul: Office of National Security, 33.

[4] Harper, Douglas. “strategy.” Etymology. https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=harper (Accessed: June 29, 2023).

[5] Clausewitz, Carl von. 1989. *On War*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

[6] National Security Council. 2004. *The Participatory Government's National Security Policy Vision: Peace, Prosperity, and National Security*. Seoul: National Security Council Secretariat, 23.

[7] The White House. 2023. “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership at the Brookings Institution.” April 27. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf (Accessed: June 29, 2023).

[8] Prime Minister’s Office. 2022. “National Security Strategy(NSS).” https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf 4-11. (Accessed: June 29, 2023).

[9] Jeon Bong-geun. 2017. “The Concept and System of National Interest in National Security Strategy.” *IFANS Major International Issues Analysis* 2017-15, 2-6.

[10] Office of National Security. 2018. *The Moon Jae-in Administration's National Security Strategy*. Seoul: Office of National Security, 35-109.

[11] Office of National Security. 2023, Op cit., 8-25; 58-65.

[12] Ko Sang-min and Jeong Su-yeon, Op cit.

[13] Office of National Security. 2023, Op cit., 13-14; 34; 38-39.

[14] Ibid., 71; 74.

[15] Ha Young-sun and Cho Dong-ho. 2010. *North Korea 2032: A Co-Prosperity Strategy Towards Advancement*. Seoul: East Asia Institute, 22-23.

[16] Jervis, Robert. 2017. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 58-67.

[17] Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, Kenneth W. Thompson, and W. David Clinton. 2005. *Politics Among Nations*. 7th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Education.

[18] Jervis, Robert, Op cit., 112-113.

[19] Office of National Security. 2023, Op cit., 68-74.

[20]Yoon, Hyung-seon. 2023. “North Korea Reacts to Yoon Suk-yeol Government’s ‘Security Strategy Document’ as War Plan.” <Nam Buk Kyung Hyup News>, June 18. https://www.snkpress.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1135 (Accessed: June 29, 2023).

[21]Ha, Young-sun, and Son, Yeol, eds. 2021. *Rebuilding Cooperative Diplomacy for the New Government: Policy Recommendations for the New Government’s Foreign Policy*. Seoul: East Asia Institute, 65.

[22]Jeon, Jae-sung, ed. 2023. “Assessment of the First Year of the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration and Tasks for the Next Four Years ①: Foreign Affairs and Security.” *EAI Special Report Series* 1, 17.

[23] The White House. 2023. “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership at the Brookings Institution.” April 27. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/04/27/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-renewing-american-economic-leadership-at-the-brookings-institution/ (Accessed: June 29, 2023).

■ Kim, Yang-gyu, Senior Research Fellow, East Asia Institute; Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Editor: Park, Ji-soo, Research Fellow, EAI

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