[EAI Briefing] One Thing to Add to the ROK's North Korea Policy Stance in the 2023 National Security Strategy

On June 7, the National Security Office of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration published 『National Security Strategy of the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration: A Global Pivotal State of Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity』, presenting the broad framework of South Korea's foreign and security policy principles, goals, and direction of pursuit. This marks South Korea's fifth National Security Strategy, following the first one, 『Peace and Prosperity and National Security』, published by the Roh Moo-hyun administration in 2004, and subsequent strategies by the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2009, the Park Geun-hye administration in 2013, and the Moon Jae-in administration in 2017. Externally, unlike Japan's 『National Security Strategy』, released in December of the previous year, which elicited an immediate welcoming stance from the U.S. government and concerns from neighboring countries including China, this strategy has not garnered significant attention. Domestically, opinions have been sharply divided, ranging from criticism as a “strategy prioritizing great power interests”[1] to high praise as “nothing more can be added or removed.”[2] Given that domestic debates have primarily revolved around South Korea's foreign policy direction toward North Korea and Japan, and that the strengthening of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation stems from efforts to “respond to North Korean provocations,” the core of the stark difference in opinions between the ruling and opposition parties can be seen as lying in the North Korea policy stance outlined in the 2023 National Security Strategy.[3]Compte tenu du fait qu'ils sont issus des efforts visant à, le cœur du problème, où les partis au pouvoir et d'opposition ont montré une différence de température flagrante, peut être considéré comme le ton de la politique envers la Corée du Nord contenu dans la Stratégie nationale de sécurité de 2023.

This paper examines the characteristics of the newly released National Security Strategy in defining North Korea's threats and South Korea's responses, comparing it with previous South Korean strategies and those of the United States and Japan. It also explains the challenges the current North Korea policy stance is likely to face. Furthermore, it organizes the flow of domestic North Korea policy debates around the spiral and deterrence models, emphasizing that to break through the current stalemate on the Korean Peninsula, efforts must be made to induce North Korea to change its strategic orientation, beyond merely distinguishing whether it is a 'revisionist' or 'status quo power.' To this end, it points out the need for a '4D' North Korea policy by adding 'North Korea's Alternative Future and Development Path' to the current 'Deterrence-Dissuasion-Dialogue' (3D) policy, and offers recommendations for the future direction of South Korea's North Korea policy.

Core Tenets of the 2023 National Security Strategy

The etymology of the word 'strategy' is from the Greek word 'strategia,' which originally meant "the art of a general."[4] Considering Clausewitz's theory on the nature of war, which is organized around the "purpose" and "means" of war,[5] the core of strategy can also be organized around the goals to be achieved and the means to achieve them. South Korea's first National Security Strategy defined the concept of national security strategy as “a comprehensive and systematic plan that mobilizes the nation's available resources and "means" to achieve national security "goals" amidst domestic and foreign security circumstances,”[6] and other countries also organize their national security strategies by systematically describing the means to secure their key national interests in the process of responding to the challenges they face.

The United States' National Security Strategy (NSS), released in October 2022, defines the challenges facing the U.S. as 'defending the "rules-based international order," including human rights, freedom, and the rule of law, amidst the confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism' and 'responding to transnational threats such as climate change, food security, health, terrorism, and energy crises.' As means of response, it presents (1) investing in the resources and means that form the foundation of American power, (2) building the strongest possible alliances, and (3) modernizing the military to respond to evolving threats. The policy priorities are to overwhelmingly surpass China and contain Russia, followed by responses to the threats posed by Iran's growing missile and drone capabilities and North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.[7]

Japan's National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, defines Japan's three main national interests as 'Japan's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national safety,' 'creating an international environment that guarantees Japan's prosperity and security,' and 'defending universal values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.' To achieve these goals, it presents (1) strengthening and reforming Japan's defense capabilities, (2) exercising international cooperation and leadership to defend universal values, (3) maintaining a defense-oriented doctrine and the principle of non-nuclear armament, (4) strengthening U.S.-Japan extended deterrence, and (5) co-existence and common prosperity through multilateral cooperation with like-minded countries. Japan ranks threats in the following order: China's strategic opacity and military buildup, North Korea's missiles and nuclear weapons, Russia's military actions against its neighbors, and its alliance with China.[8]

National Security Strategies of previous South Korean administrations have a similar structure. Although there are differences in expression and priorities, the core national interests in the strategies published by the Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye administrations were the protection of national security and territorial sovereignty, peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, and common prosperity in Northeast Asia, with the ROK-U.S. alliance, international cooperation, and the establishment of an advanced security system presented as means or tasks to achieve these goals.[9] The Moon Jae-in administration's national security strategy aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, achieving peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and the world, and ensuring national safety. As means to achieve these goals, it presented "strengthening our independent defense capabilities based on the ROK-U.S. alliance," "pragmatic diplomacy centered on the people and national interests," and "strengthening the national crisis management system for a safe South Korea."[10]

The National Security Strategy of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, released this time, also identifies 'sovereignty, territory, and national safety,' 'establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula and preparing for a unified future,' and 'laying the foundation for prosperity in East Asia and expanding global roles' as core national security objectives. Apart from the expansion of the diplomatic space from Northeast Asia to the global level, there is no significant difference in how national interests are defined compared to previous strategies. While it does not emphasize self-reliant defense or the transfer of wartime operational control, the emphasis on defense innovation, building a strong military based on cutting-edge technology, and strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance into a more comprehensive global alliance aligns with the national security strategies of previous administrations. In defining factors threatening national interests, it identifies North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, intensifying U.S.-China competition, the deepening linkage between economy and security, and new security threats such as infectious diseases, climate change, and cyber hacking. Although there are differences in priorities, it closely resembles the threat perception of the United States.[11]

Some have voiced strong opposition to this National Security Strategy, pointing to the closure of avenues for dialogue and diplomacy with North Korea, a perceived subservient stance toward Japan on historical and territorial issues, and an excessive reliance on ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation.[12] However, it could be argued that these criticisms are excessive, as this strategy, similar to the "all-directional diplomacy" and "comprehensive pragmatic diplomacy" of past administrations, adopts "pragmatic diplomacy" as its core tenet, and therefore does not limit itself to a strategy confined to simplistic and uniform "means."

Nevertheless, the core reason for these concerns is that the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's National Security Strategy prominently features a stance that clearly distinguishes it from previous administrations' strategies. This is the emphasis on "value diplomacy" and "principles and reciprocity." By advocating the principle of "strengthening solidarity based on the values of freedom and democracy," issues of 'human rights' and 'international norms' are important. While cooperation can be strengthened with the United States and Japan, which share the same values, not only in security but also in economic, supply chain, and socio-cultural exchanges, a "dignified diplomatic stance based on national interests and principles" and "stable management based on international norms" are emphasized in dealing with countries like China and Russia that do not share these values.[13] Toward North Korea as well, a diplomatic approach that is "consistent with principles" and "maintains pragmatic flexibility while upholding our national dignity and core values" is emphasized.[14]

Spiral and Deterrence Models: Two Models for Viewing the North Korean Issue and the 2023 National Security Strategy

How does the North Korea policy direction of the 2023 National Security Strategy, which emphasizes values, specifically differ from previous approaches? Since the inception of National Security Strategies, South Korea's North Korea policy stance has largely been divided into two streams. One is the 'peace and common prosperity on the Korean Peninsula' stance emphasized by the Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in administrations, and the other is the 'justice and peace' and 'trustpolitik' centered stance put forth by the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations. The clash between these two perspectives, which can also be seen as a confrontational view between the conservative and progressive camps in South Korea regarding North Korea policy, is sometimes summarized as "Sunshine Policy" versus "Sanctions Policy."[15] This has similarities to the debate within the U.S. policy community during the Cold War regarding policy direction toward the Soviet Union, which Robert Jervis explained by distinguishing between the Deterrence and Spiral models.[16]

The deterrence model is based on the game of Chicken. This model posits that moderate and conciliatory gestures are perceived as a lack of willingness to defend one's core interests, thus prompting the other party to attempt stronger pressure. Consequently, one inevitably faces a situation where further concessions must be made once concessions begin, and therefore, only by demonstrating the capability and willingness to go to war can one avoid a diplomatic catastrophe of being forced into more concessions. This is because the way to win the game of Chicken is to never swerve the steering wheel until the end. According to the deterrence model, all issues are closely interconnected, so even conceding on a minor issue carries the risk of being interpreted by the other party as a sign of one's own weakness. Therefore, the U.S. must respond firmly and principledly to all Soviet provocations occurring in every region of the world to prevent opportunistic Soviet expansionist attempts.

The spiral model points out the problems that arise when both parties in a conflict simultaneously apply the deterrence model. As seen in the Anglo-German naval arms race before World War I, attempts by one party to ensure its security invariably undermine the security of the other. This is similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma, where the infinite pursuit of narrow self-interest ultimately harms everyone's interests. If the U.S. and the Soviet Union simultaneously engage in deterrence, exchanging threats and punishments, fear breeds suspicion and distrust, leading to more severe security crises and ultimately resulting in the worst-case scenario where everyone loses. To overcome this security dilemma, it is necessary to break the vicious cycle of threat exchange and transform it into a virtuous cycle of conciliatory measure exchange by making the first move and having the other party reciprocate.

The question of which of the two models to choose actually depends on the 'scope condition' of the two theories. That is, the deterrence model views the other party as a revisionist with offensive intentions who seeks to change the status quo whenever possible, while the spiral model assumes that the other party is a status quo power that seeks to ensure its own security with defensive intentions, rather than seeking to change the status quo. As Hans Morgenthau pointed out, if applied in reverse, and if a policy based on the spiral model is pursued against a revisionist, a major diplomatic failure may be experienced, similar to Britain's appeasement policy toward Hitler before World War II. Conversely, if the deterrence model is applied to a status quo power, problems similar to those where Britain's containment policy toward Germany before World War I ultimately led to war may arise.[17]

Therefore, Jervis suggests that the choice of which model to apply in formulating policy toward the Soviet Union must begin with accurately assessing the Soviet Union's intentions, and that a comprehensive examination of how the Soviet Union perceives the intentions of South Korea and the United States is necessary.[18] However, Morgenthau advises that accurately assessing the intentions of the other party is impossible, and intentions can easily change relative to capabilities, so foreign policy should be formulated based on capabilities rather than intentions. Applying these two viewpoints to the case of North Korea leads to the conclusion that, first, a strategy that carefully observes changes in North Korea's capabilities is fundamentally necessary, and second, rather than choosing one between the Sunshine Policy or sanctions policy and pursuing it consistently, it is important to respond flexibly by considering both North Korea's current strategic orientation and its perceptions of South Korea's and the United States' intentions.

The difficulties that the 2023 National Security Strategy, which sets South Korea's foreign policy direction centered on values and presents a North Korea policy based on principles and reciprocity, will face can be anticipated in this context. It is natural for South Korea, as a mature democracy, to value freedom, the rule of law, and human rights. However, it is by no means easy to simultaneously satisfy both these 'principles' and 'pragmatic flexibility' when determining (1) who to align with and (2) what means to choose to formulate foreign policy toward that country based on value orientation.

For example, while the current National Security Strategy emphasizes 'flexibility' as a core principle of its North Korea policy, its specific policy means are focused on possessing overwhelming Kill Chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) capabilities; establishing a Strategic Command to further enhance deterrence against North Korea using cutting-edge technology; and acquiring independent surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities using reconnaissance satellites, ultra-small satellite systems, and medium-altitude reconnaissance drones. Although the three principles for denuclearization negotiations are presented as 'Deterrence,' 'Dissuasion,' and 'Dialogue' (3D), detailed policy means for deterrence and dissuasion, both through South Korea's own efforts and international cooperation, are extensively presented, whereas the methods for dialogue are not sufficiently discussed. The content of the "Bold Initiative" also carries the precondition of "if North Korea genuinely returns to denuclearization negotiations." The normalization of inter-Korean relations also starts from "establishing inter-Korean relations based on mutual respect by ensuring that North Korea's wrongful actions have consequences, under the principle that North Korean military provocations are unacceptable under any circumstances."[19]

As is well known, North Korea has explicitly expressed its rejection of this North Korean policy stance by the South Korean government. In a statement on August 19, 2022, Kim Yo Jong vehemently criticized, "What is most disgusting is that they read out a preposterous speech about offering a 'bold and comprehensive audacious plan' that could significantly improve the economy and people's livelihoods if we stop nuclear development and switch to practical denuclearization, which is beneath our dignity and presumptuous." Chairman Kim Jong Un, in his speech at the 7th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly on September 8, 2022, assessed that the intentions of South Korea and the U.S. were "ultimately to make us give up nuclear weapons and even the right to self-defense, thereby collapsing our regime at any time." Instead of officially responding to the newly released National Security Strategy, North Korea's external propaganda media criticized it as "a heinous war script and confrontation script attempting to confront us with the help of foreign powers," and described South Korea's strengthening of its response capabilities as "an attempt to hasten preparations for a northward invasion war by squandering enormous military funds to develop and acquire more war-killing equipment."[20]

Policy Recommendation: Considering a 4D Model of Deterrence-Dissuasion-Dialogue-Development

As Morgenthau pointed out, the basic strategy of foreign policy should always begin with an assessment of the opponent's capabilities, and in a situation where North Korea's intentions are unclear, national security strategy should be formulated as conservatively as possible for safety. Therefore, measures to strengthen South Korea's deterrence capabilities in response to North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile capabilities are essential. This is particularly dangerous not to prepare for, given that North Korea adopted the "Law on the Policy of State Nuclear Force" on September 9, 2022, legalizing an offensive doctrine that allows the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and to "prevent the escalation and protraction of war and seize the initiative in war" in the early stages of a conflict. However, it is difficult to conclude that North Korea's nuclear capability advancement and adoption of an offensive nuclear strategy are irreversible measures that will determine North Korea's foreign policy orientation for the next 50 or 100 years. It is a relatively common phenomenon for states with inferior conventional military power to adopt security strategies based on nuclear weapons, and this was also a strategy used by the U.S. during the Cold War to protect European allies from the Soviet threat.

One issue to keep in mind is that South Korea's policy toward the North Korean nuclear threat forms a feedback loop that influences North Korea's external perceptions and strategic orientation. Consequently, South Korea's North Korea policy does not end with simply choosing and consistently pursuing one option among 'spiral or deterrence?', 'Sunshine or sanctions?', or 'dialogue or dissuasion?'. It is also a matter of 'what stimuli and information South Korea will provide during the process of North Korea choosing its own strategic orientation?'

In this context, efforts to strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance's deterrence against North Korea and to enhance international cooperation and dissuasion measures to increase the effectiveness of sanctions are essential to clearly show the North Korean regime that clinging to nuclear weapons will not open a path forward. However, alongside this, efforts must also be made to concretely demonstrate that there is a path for the North Korean regime to ensure its stability and for North Korean society to prosper even if it gives up nuclear weapons. Therefore, in addition to the "sanctions, deterrence, and engagement" comprehensive strategy proposed by existing research, a strategy incorporating North Korea's "self-reliance" and information technology[21] or a '4D' model that includes 'Development' alongside 'Deterrence,' 'Dissuasion,' and 'Dialogue' in the "Bold Initiative" 2.0.[22] Il faut prêter attention aux modèles alternatifs.

Plus précisément, le « développement » tel qu'entendu par le modèle 4D doit inclure une image concrète des « futurs alternatifs et des trajectoires de développement de la Corée du Nord ». Plutôt qu'une approche conditionnelle du type « nous ne pourrons discuter de l'avenir de la péninsule coréenne qu'une fois que la Corée du Nord aura renoncé à ses armes nucléaires », il est nécessaire d'envoyer des signaux concrets indiquant que la Corée du Sud réfléchit sincèrement à la prospérité commune du Sud et du Nord et aux stratégies de survie futures de la Corée du Nord. À cette fin, il est nécessaire de dialoguer et de coopérer non seulement avec le « monde libre », mais aussi avec des pays qui ne partagent pas les mêmes valeurs. Par exemple, on pourrait envisager des efforts visant à discuter des garanties de sécurité du régime acceptables pour la Corée du Nord avec la Chine, qui a réussi sa réforme et son ouverture tout en maintenant un système similaire, à concrétiser cela par le biais d'un dialogue stratégique sino-japonais-coréen, puis à servir de médiateur dans les pourparlers nord-américains. De plus, il est nécessaire d'inclure la Corée du Nord dans les discussions sur la chaîne d'approvisionnement mondiale sino-américaine qui se restructure sous le slogan de « réduction des risques » et de discuter dans diverses conférences de piste 2 ou 1.5 sur les moyens de garantir la croissance économique continue de la future Corée du Nord.[23] En fin de compte, pour inciter la Corée du Nord à rechercher sincèrement la dénucléarisation, la Corée du Sud doit également montrer qu'elle poursuit sincèrement la coexistence et la prospérité de la péninsule coréenne, et non l'effondrement du régime nord-coréen. Il n'y a rien à « retirer » de cette Stratégie nationale de sécurité, mais il y a des choses à « ajouter ».

[1] Go Sang-min et Jeong Su-yeon. 2023. « La stratégie de sécurité nationale du gouvernement Yoon est une « stratégie privilégiant les intérêts des grandes puissances » ». <Yonhap News>, 8 juin.https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20230608053200001 (Consulté le : 29 juin 2023).

[2] Han Ye-seul. 2023. « Na Kyung-won : « La suppression de la déclaration de fin de guerre par Moon m'a émue… La stratégie de sécurité nationale du gouvernement Yoon est achevée » ». <JoongAng Ilbo>, 8 juin.https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25168410#home (Consulté le : 29 juin 2023).

[3] Bureau de la sécurité nationale. 2023. 『Stratégie nationale de sécurité du gouvernement Yoon Suk-yeol : Une nation charnière mondiale de liberté, de paix et de prospérité』. Séoul : Bureau de la sécurité nationale, 33.

[4] Harper, Douglas. « strategy ». Etymology.https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=harper (Consulté le : 29 juin 2023).

[5] Clausewitz, Carl von. 1989. On War. Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press.

[6] Conseil de sécurité nationale. 2004. 『Les concepts de politique de sécurité du gouvernement participatif : Paix, prospérité et sécurité nationale』. Séoul : Secrétariat du Conseil de sécurité nationale, 23.

[7] La Maison Blanche. 2023. « Discours du conseiller à la sécurité nationale Jake Sullivan sur le renouveau du leadership économique américain à la Brookings Institution ». 27 avril.https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf (Consulté le : 29 juin 2023).

[8] Bureau du Premier Ministre. 2022. « Stratégie nationale de sécurité (NSS) ».https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf 4-11. (Consulté le : 29 juin 2023).

[9] Jeon Bong-geun. 2017. « Le concept d'intérêt national dans la stratégie de sécurité nationale et son système ». 『Analyse des principaux problèmes internationaux de l'IFANS』 2017-15, 2-6.

[10] Bureau de la sécurité nationale. 2018. 『Stratégie nationale de sécurité du gouvernement Moon Jae-in』. Séoul : Bureau de la sécurité nationale, 35-109.

[11] Bureau de la sécurité nationale. 2023, Op. cit., 8-25 ; 58-65.

[12] Go Sang-min et Jeong Su-yeon, Op. cit.

[13] Bureau de la sécurité nationale. 2023, Op. cit., 13-14 ; 34 ; 38-39.

[14] Ibid., 71 ; 74.

[15] Ha Young-sun et Cho Dong-ho. 2010. 『Corée du Nord 2032 : Stratégie de coexistence pour atteindre la civilisation avancée』. Séoul : East Asia Institute, 22-23.

[16] Jervis, Robert. 2017. Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition. Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 58-67.

[17] Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, Kenneth W. Thompson et W. David Clinton. 2005. Politics Among Nations. 7e éd. New York : McGraw-Hill Education.

[18] Jervis, Robert, Op. cit., 112-113.

[19] Bureau de la sécurité nationale. 2023, Op cit., 68-74.

[20]Yoon Hyung-seon. 2023. « La Corée du Nord réagit au « document de planification de guerre » du « Rapport sur la stratégie de sécurité » du gouvernement de Yoon Suk-yeol ». <Nam Buk Gyeong Hyup News> 18 juin. https://www.snkpress.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1135 (Consulté le : 2023.06.29).

[21]Ha Young-sun et Son Yeol (dir.). 2021. 『Recommandations de politique étrangère pour le nouveau gouvernement en 2022 : Reconstruction de la diplomatie de coexistence du nouveau gouvernement』. Séoul : East Asia Institute, 65.

[22]Jeon Jae-seong (dir.). 2023. « Évaluation de la première année du gouvernement Yoon Suk-yeol et tâches pour les quatre prochaines années ① : Domaine de la diplomatie et de la sécurité ». 『EAI Special Report Series』 1, 17.

[23]The White House. 2023. « Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership at the Brookings Institution ». 27 avril. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/04/27/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-renewing-american-economic-leadership-at-the-brookings-institution/ (Consulté le : 2023.06.29).

■ Kim Yang-gyu, Chercheur principal à l'East Asia Institute. Chargé de cours au Département de sciences politiques et de relations internationales de l'Université nationale de Séoul.

■ Responsable et éditeur : Park Ji-soo, Chercheur à l'EAI

    Contact : 02 2277 1683 (poste 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr