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[Global NK Commentary] The South Korea-U.S. Summit and Measures to Enhance Bilateral Cooperation on North Korea
Editor's Note
Kim Jae-cheon, Professor at Sogang University, points out that despite the escalating nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, the North Korean issue has been relegated in priority by the Biden administration due to U.S.-China competition, the Taiwan issue, and the war in Ukraine. Therefore, he proposes that President Yoon Suk-yeol and President Biden adopt a "Joint Statement on North Korea in 2023" during this state visit. The author suggests that this would allow both South Korea and the U.S. to express the urgency of the North Korean nuclear issue and their resolve to address it, thereby securing the Biden administration's support for the Yoon administration's North Korea policy, the "Bold Initiative," and fostering an environment conducive to peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, especially at a time when the discourse on Korean unification is losing momentum both domestically and internationally.
■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.
President Yoon Suk-yeol returned to Korea on April 26th after a state visit to the United States. This was the first state visit by a South Korean president in 12 years. Since the launch of the Biden administration in January 2021, the only other head of state to have made a state visit to the U.S. has been President Emmanuel Macron. When a foreign head of state makes a state visit, the host country extends the highest level of hospitality. Typically, the head of state of the host country personally greets the visitor at the airport, and the ceremony is elaborate, featuring various official events including a state banquet. The host country also generally bears most of the expenses associated with the state visit and its events. Due to this complexity and grandeur, most foreign heads of state opt for an "official visit" to the U.S., which involves a simpler protocol and lower costs.
There must have been compelling reasons for the Biden administration to extend a state visit invitation to President Yoon and hold a summit with such elaborate courtesies. This is because Korea's importance as a comprehensive and strategic alliance partner has grown. In this era of renewed great power competition, Korea is not only a traditional security partner for the U.S. but also a crucial economic security partner. Korea is a key partner for the U.S. in its policy to reshape global supply chains. Although the U.S. and South Korea reaffirmed the development of the ROK-U.S. alliance into a comprehensive strategic alliance during the Moon-Biden summit in May 2021 and agreed on various measures to that end, no significant follow-up actions have materialized since the summit. In contrast, substantial measures for a comprehensive strategic alliance have been implemented following the Yoon-Biden summit in May 2022. The two leaders demonstrated the advanced nature of their comprehensive strategic alliance at the April 2022 summit.
The warm reception President Yoon received likely also reflected gratitude for his courageous decision to improve South Korea-Japan relations. Smooth relations between South Korea and Japan are a prerequisite for effective trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. While the Trump administration observed the deterioration of South Korea-Japan relations, the Biden administration urged improvement through various channels. The Biden administration fundamentally held the position that South Korea should take more forward-looking steps to create an opportunity for the restoration of relations. This was because the Obama administration had painstakingly mediated the difficult South Korea-Japan relationship, leading to the 2015 agreement on comfort women, which was effectively undermined by the Moon Jae-in administration in 2018, and the subsequent Supreme Court rulings on forced labor compensation had pushed relations to their worst point. Therefore, they warmly welcomed President Yoon's "generous" decision that could break the ice in South Korea-Japan relations. The day after President Yoon made his decision, the then-National Security Advisor visited the U.S. to finalize President Yoon's state visit and the April 26th summit.
The Biden administration also warmly welcomed South Korea's Indo-Pacific (hereinafter IP) strategy, unveiled by the Yoon administration in December 2022. South Korea's IP strategy advocates for goals of freedom, peace, and prosperity that are acceptable to all countries in the region, and principles of inclusivity, trust, and reciprocity, without excluding any specific country. However, it is undeniable that South Korea has become strategically closer to the U.S. by adopting an IP strategy.
While there are many hurdles ahead for South Korea-Japan relations and South Korea's IP strategy is still in its nascent stages, the Yoon administration, having facilitated a summit with Japan after 12 years and adopted an IP strategy, has significantly eased its burden in relations with the U.S. It appears to have leveraged this opportunity to strengthen its voice in dealings with the U.S. during the summit. Despite a turbulent atmosphere leading up to the summit due to the national security advisor personnel shake-up and the wiretapping issue involving the presidential office, the Yoon administration was able to achieve an "Washington Declaration" at the April 26th summit, which upgraded extended deterrence against North Korea. Moving forward, it should emphasize not only North Korean nuclear deterrence but also the importance of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and, ultimately, the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
On October 16, 2015, President Park Geun-hye and President Obama adopted the "Joint Statement on North Korea in 2015" after their summit, specifically addressing North Korea's nuclear and missile issues and the unification of the Korean Peninsula. This marked the first time in history that the two heads of state adopted a joint statement solely dedicated to North Korea and the issue of Korean unification. Examining the background of this joint statement reveals significant similarities to the current situation in 2023.
The Obama administration's "strategic patience" policy toward North Korea faced considerable criticism, particularly in South Korea, where it was argued that the North Korean issue was being sidelined in U.S. foreign policy priorities. Relations between South Korea and Japan were strained throughout President Park Geun-hye's term due to historical issues. Despite President Park Geun-hye's lack of engagement with Prime Minister Abe, the Obama administration persistently persuaded her, and the 2015 agreement on comfort women provided momentum for restoring relations. Although the South Korea-Japan agreement on comfort women came after the Park-Obama summit, the fact that President Park Geun-hye was able to adopt a separate "Joint Statement on North Korea in 2015" with President Obama at the summit was likely facilitated by the Park administration's efforts to improve relations between the two countries.
Despite the escalating nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, it is also true that the North Korean issue has been relegated in priority by the Biden administration due to U.S.-China competition, the Taiwan issue, and the war in Ukraine. President Yoon, who has undertaken significant political risks to improve South Korea-Japan relations, announced the Washington Declaration at this summit, which clarified nuclear deterrence, and agreed to establish a ROK-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to operationalize its content. At the next summit, a comprehensive "Joint Statement on North Korea" should be adopted separately with President Biden. It would be acceptable to repeat much of the content from the 2015 joint statement. The next joint statement should also express the "utmost urgency" of the North Korean nuclear issue and the "determination" of both countries to resolve it. It should call for international cooperation for resolution, which would continue to put pressure on China and Russia. Recently, there have been voices of resignation in U.S. policy circles suggesting that North Korean denuclearization is no longer feasible. The next joint statement, like the 2015 statement, should emphasize that while the U.S. and South Korea will not adopt hostile policies toward North Korea, they will never recognize North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state, and the ultimate goal regarding North Korean nuclear weapons remains the peaceful achievement of CVID (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization).
While the 2015 statement called for North Korea's preemptive actions for dialogue, the next joint statement should express readiness for dialogue with North Korea without any preconditions. In this regard, the Biden administration's support for the Yoon administration's North Korea policy, the "Bold Initiative," should be included in the statement. Unlike previous North Korea initiatives, the Bold Initiative does not demand preemptive actions from North Korea and instead encourages North Korea to engage in denuclearization talks. Furthermore, the Yoon administration needs to supplement the existing Bold Initiative with political-military compensation measures and South Korea's bridging role between North Korea and the U.S., developing it into a mid-to-long-term "Korean Peninsula Peace Building Plan."
The 2015 statement not only addressed the North Korean nuclear issue but also explicitly stated "strong U.S. support for peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula." It also mentioned that "high-level consultations would be strengthened to create an environment conducive to the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula." Currently, the discourse on Korean unification is losing momentum both domestically and internationally. To revitalize this discourse, future ROK-U.S. summits should be actively utilized. Similar to the 2015 statement, strong U.S. support for Korean unification should be secured and included in the next joint statement.
In the 2013 ROK-U.S. summit, President Park Geun-hye and President Obama agreed to work together for the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula based on the principles of denuclearization, democracy, and a free market economy. For the next summit declaration, how about including content that frames the unification of the Korean Peninsula as a global public good that contributes to humanity by resolving issues such as nuclear proliferation and safety, human rights abuses, environmental destruction, and cybercrime? While President Yoon's visit to the U.S. yielded considerable achievements, the most remarkable outcome was undoubtedly the "Washington Declaration." As President Yoon mentioned, the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1953 was based on conventional weapons. Given the escalating nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, an update to the ROK-U.S. defense treaty, encompassing not only conventional but also nuclear weapons, was inevitable. The next ROK-U.S. summit declaration must include a stronger commitment to the urgency and resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue at a more comprehensive level. It should also explicitly state the Biden administration's support for South Korea's "Bold Initiative" and the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.■
※ This commentary is the Korean translation of "The South Korea-U.S. Summit and Measures to Enhance Bilateral Cooperation on North Korea."
■ Kim Jae-cheon_Professor at Sogang University. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University and has been teaching international politics at the Graduate School of International Studies at Sogang University since 2003. He currently serves as the Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at Sogang University. He has also served as a policy advisor to the National Security Office and the Ministry of Unification, and as a member of the National Unification Advisory Council and the Government Performance Evaluation Committee, and a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has also served as Director of the Institute for International Studies at Sogang University, a visiting fellow at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University, and a visiting professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. His research interests include U.S. foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, the East Asian international order, and inter-Korean relations.
■ Editor:Park Jeong-hoo_EAI Researcher Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jhpark@eai.or.kr
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.