[North Korea's New Cold War Discourse Series] IV. Russia's Stance on North Korea's Perception of a New Cold War

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North Korea's Perception of the Current International Order

In recent years, Chairman Kim Jong Un has drawn the attention of domestic and international observers by candidly revealing his and North Korea's perceptions of the international situation, mentioning the "new Cold War" and the "multipolarization of the international order" on various occasions.

From the author's perspective, North Korea's perception of the international situation stems from its strong expectation and belief in the relaxation and dismantling of the US-centric unipolar international order. In fact, North Korea began to define the nature of the international order as a new Cold War after the 2008 global financial crisis, which coincided with the widespread circulation of the concept of "G2" in the international community. This event accumulated trends of relative decline and rise in power between the US and China, creating strong doubts about the path dependency of the existing international order and intense tension. Furthermore, North Korea's perception has been further strengthened since the launch of the Trump administration in 2017, as the US and China have fully engaged in what is known as US-China strategic competition. In reality, the competition between the two countries, which began in the trade sector and has expanded to all areas including politics, security, values, and norms, is rapidly intensifying the trend of polarization on a global scale. In this regard, the underlying basis of North Korea's rhetoric of a new Cold War appears to be an awareness of the situation of long-term continuation of competition and confrontation between two hostile blocs, similar to the Cold War era.

In addition, it is noteworthy that North Korea began to more actively raise the issue of the multipolarization of the international order around the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. This seems to be an attempt to emphasize the new reality of the emergence of additional centers of power besides the two strong "centers of power (influence)" represented by the US and China. In fact, during the post-Cold War era, "spheres of influence" were perceived as an outdated and unjust concept from the imperialist era, and their use was virtually taboo on the international stage. However, as Emma Ashford has aptly pointed out recently, this situation may have stemmed from the United States' overwhelming global influence and the absence of competing spheres of influence. But as the war in Ukraine vividly demonstrates, the world today is entering an era where major powers such as China and Russia are reshaping spheres of influence where they can assert their interests in their surrounding regions and compete with the US over the limits of power. In other words, North Korea's recent intensification of rhetoric on the multipolarization of the international order is judged to be an attempt to reflect these trends.

However, what we should note here is that North Korea perceives the current transitional international order, represented by the new Cold War and multipolarization, as a space of significant strategic opportunity. North Korea has recently emphasized "strategic and tactical cooperation" in its relations with China and Russia. This demonstrates that North Korea shares the strategic goal of dismantling the US-led hegemonic unipolar order with these countries and is tactically coordinating its actions on various international and regional issues to achieve this goal. Pyongyang has consistently and strongly criticized the coercion, high-handedness, and hegemony of the US and the Western world. In this respect, the new Cold War and multipolarization are intrinsically significant for North Korea as they reflect the process of relaxation and dismantling of the US-centric hegemonic unipolar order. Furthermore, the current transitional international order is a welcome environmental factor in that it opens up a broad "gray zone" for North Korea to significantly strengthen its military power and escape its long-standing international isolation. In reality, Pyongyang is currently seeking opportunities through these two countries to block and mitigate international pressure related to its nuclear and missile programs and to modernize its outdated conventional weapon systems. North Korea is also striving to overcome its economic isolation and undermine the sanctions regime against it by resuming and expanding economic cooperation with China and Russia.

Differences in Perception Between Russia and North Korea Regarding the New Cold War and Multipolarization

It is difficult to explicitly assess Russia's stance, as North Korea has not officially commented on the specific details of its perception of the current international order. However, we can infer its general outline and framework through the series of foreign policy lines that Russia has expressed and pursued since Putin came to power.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia sought to become an equal member of the Western world through a "dual transition" and therefore pursued a thoroughly pro-Western foreign policy line in the first half of the 1990s. However, this optimistic expectation soon turned into greater disappointment and frustration. Moscow felt that the US and the West treated Russia and its people as a defeated nation and its constituents. Above all, this epistemological shift was significantly influenced by the strengthening of the US-centric unipolar international order, the continuous eastward expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, NATO's bombing of Kosovo, and the failure of economic reforms and economic collapse according to Western solutions. Since then, Russia has judged that the US-centric unipolar order does not serve the achievement of its national interests and has aspired to the formation of a multipolar order, a structure that can most effectively reflect its interests. And to achieve this goal, Russia has continuously pursued the establishment of anti-US and anti-hegemonic solidarity within the international community. The deepening of strategic alliance and partnership with China, represented by "no-limit" cooperation, is a prime example.

In this regard, it appears clear that Russia shares a significant portion of North Korea's perception of the current state and alternatives of the international order at a broad level. However, we need to distinguish the subtle qualitative differences in the perception of the international order between the two countries. In fact, as discussed above, North Korea seems to tend to accept the concepts of the new Cold War and multipolarization as a single, interconnected concept without strict conceptual distinction. However, Russia seems to attach its own meaning to the qualitative difference between the two concepts. In fact, the term "new Cold War" is rarely used in the official foreign policy discourse of Putin and the diplomatic authorities, and only the necessity and will to build a "just and democratic multipolar international order" are consistently mentioned. This indicates that Russia has considerable concerns about the use and actualization of the concept of a new Cold War, and we can speculate the following reasons.

First, the new Cold War may be an unfavorable concept for Russia as it reawakens long-standing psychological trauma from its experience as a loser in the Cold War. More fundamentally, the concept of a new Cold War presupposes bipolarization and hierarchy, and Russia feels strong resistance to this. In reality, Russia desires the collapse of the US-led hegemonic and unipolar international order, but it does not seek the formation of a bipolar international order as its replacement. A new Cold War may not necessarily be an exact repetition of the old Cold War. However, the existence of two hostile blocs and the grammar of the Cold War, represented by "inter-bloc confrontation" and "intra-bloc solidarity," still largely govern our perceptions. Therefore, for Russia, accepting the formation of two major blocs or poles led by the US and China, and the hierarchical order governed by that structure, is not the best option. In reality, Russia currently possesses limited capabilities and potential compared to the US and China, and is likely to continue to do so. This is precisely why Russia pursues a multipolar order as an alternative that can most effectively reflect its interests.

In the short to medium term, North Korea and Russia will likely expand their support and solidarity by pursuing the common goal of dismantling the US-centric hegemonic and unipolar international order. Naturally, the subtle differences in the perception of the international order between the two countries mentioned above are unlikely to hold significant meaning in the process. However, if a situation where the US's international influence is markedly reduced becomes visible, then these differences may emerge as a significant turning point between North Korea and Russia, as well as between Russia and China, and North Korea and China, regarding the new paradigm of the alternative international order.■

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of "Russia's Stance on the North Korean Narrative of a New Cold War."

■ Jang Se-ho_Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Saint Petersburg State University, Russia. He currently serves as a consultant for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a policy advisor for the Ministry of Unification, a standing member of the National Unification Advisory Council, vice president of the Eurasian Society of Korea, and vice president of Eurasia 21 Association. He previously served as a research professor and adjunct professor at the Graduate School of Russian Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, and as a specialist member of the Committee for Northward Economic Cooperation. His main research areas include Russian domestic politics, foreign relations, and Korea-Russia relations.

■ Managed and edited by: Park Jeong-hoo_EAI Research Fellow

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