[North Korea's New Cold War Discourse Series] III. The U.S. Stance on North Korea's Perception of the New Cold War

■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.

Current International Situation

The Biden administration is pursuing strategic competition with China. It has concluded that the transformation or collapse of the Chinese Communist Party is realistically difficult and aims to win the strategic competition with China. The policy tools for this are being advanced one by one. The core of Biden's foreign policy is to regain leadership by strengthening alliances and fostering international cooperation centered on democratic values. The top foreign policy agenda is to unite with free nations to counter rising authoritarian regimes and to unite with democratic countries while pointing out human rights issues. Building global supply chains is a key policy of the Biden administration to contain China.

The Biden administration's containment of China is gradually evolving into a global new Cold War structure. Recently, the Biden administration has begun to strengthen regulations on its allies to contain China. The CHIPS and Science Act is an example. It prohibits semiconductor companies of allied nations from expanding their semiconductor production capacity in China for the next 10 years and requires them to use U.S. materials.

With the war in Ukraine, the new Cold War structure has begun to unfold even more starkly. The war prompted NATO members to join sanctions against Russia and to unite more than in the past. Asian countries have also begun to demand the strengthening of U.S. extended deterrence due to heightened concerns about regional security threats. They have begun to strengthen responses to regional security threats such as China and North Korea, and express doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to counter them.

North Korea's Foreign Policy and Perception of the New Cold War

Historically, China has altered its North Korea policy. Since North Korea's nuclear tests began in 2006, China criticized North Korea, but subsequently, upon witnessing the strengthening of North Korea-U.S. relations, it prioritized North Korea-China relations over North Korea's denuclearization starting in 2009. In other words, when the U.S. actively intervened in the Asia-Pacific region, China prioritized North Korea-China relations, and when the U.S. intervened passively, China actively pursued North Korea's denuclearization. An example of this is North Korea's third nuclear test in 2013. At that time, the Obama administration was preoccupied with its domestic economic situation, and China froze North Korea-China relations after North Korea's third nuclear test. Currently, the Biden administration's containment of China is very strong, and China is emphasizing the strengthening of North Korea-China relations. During North Korea's missile provocations in 2022, China sided with North Korea and expressed opposition to sanctions and statements against North Korea at the UN Security Council.

Amidst the COVID-19 situation and the U.S.-China competition, North Korea began to focus on its relationship with China. North Korea's economic policy prioritizes self-reliance while its military buildup is its primary goal. Although North Korea is pursuing economic assistance from China and Russia as the COVID-19 situation eases, the situation is not favorable. Russia lacks the capacity to provide economic assistance to North Korea due to the war, and China is also unable to provide substantial economic aid to North Korea due to its domestic economic management. North Korea has set military buildup as its priority goal, and with dialogue with the U.S. blocked, it is solidifying its status as a nuclear-weapon state through policies like the Nuclear Weapons State Law, leveraging China's backing.

U.S. Foreign Policy and North Korea Policy

The Biden administration's policy priority is to contain China. Regarding strategic competition with China, it asserts that the post-Cold War era has ended and refers to the U.S.-China competition as a competition between democracy and autocracy. It states that China is the only competitor with the capacity and will to reshape the international order. It also perceives Russia as an acute threat to the United States and its allies and friends, and maintains that China and Russia are attempting to rebuild the international order for personalized and oppressive autocratic regimes.

The United States refers to North Korea as a 'violent extremist group' and defines it as a 'persistent threat.' The Nuclear Posture Review Report mentions North Korea as an increasing risk and warns of the possibility of escalation into a regional war involving multiple nuclear-armed states if a crisis occurs on the Korean Peninsula. It explicitly states that if North Korea launches a nuclear attack, it will mean the 'end of the regime.' It clarifies that in no scenario will the Kim Jong Un regime survive a nuclear weapons use, and it will prevent North Korea from transferring nuclear technology externally. Of course, it will pursue continuous diplomacy with North Korea to make progress toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while simultaneously strengthening extended deterrence to counter North Korea's WMD and missile threats.

The U.S. currently assesses that North Korea is strengthening its ties with China within the new Cold War framework. Because China is the U.S.'s policy priority, its North Korea policy is very passive. Furthermore, there is no solution for North Korea's denuclearization, and the U.S. intends to respond to North Korea's provocations by strengthening deterrence based on trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. In other words, it considers China the most significant threat and seeks to utilize trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan as a mechanism to counter the threat from China. In this context, the U.S. emphasizes integrated deterrence in its defense strategy, highlighting the maintenance of a forward posture and integrated air and missile defense to deter North Korean attacks.

U.S. Perception of China and Russia, which Emphasize a Multipolar System

The United States holds differentiated perceptions of China and Russia. Although the National Security Strategy mentions strategic competition with China and Russia, it defines the strategic competition with China, which has fully intensified across the entire international system beyond the dimension of the Indo-Pacific regional order, as the most extensive and significant challenge, and most military security strategies are aimed at China. In particular, the recent transformation of the US-Japan alliance in relation to the threat from China is noteworthy. Japan, through the release of three security documents at the end of last year, emphasizes 'counterattack capabilities,' meaning it will strike command and control functions in response to an attack by an adversary nation. In other words, it is shifting from past deterrence by punishment to a direction of being willing to wage war. The threat perceptions of both the US and Japan are beginning to converge regarding the Taiwan Strait situation. US support for Japan's long-range missiles is becoming visible, and both the US and Japan are currently accelerating the transformation of their military command systems.

However, regarding nuclear weapons, the U.S. is increasing its threat perception of both China and Russia. It estimates that China will possess 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2023 and defines China as a 'pacing challenge.' It also estimates that Russia possesses 1,550 strategic warheads and 2,000 non-strategic warheads and defines it as an 'existential threat.' The U.S. is concerned that it will have to face the new challenge of confronting two nuclear powers for the first time in history in the 2030s.

Considerations for South Korea

Even if North Korea's provocative actions escalate, the U.S. will not offer incentives to draw North Korea into dialogue. North Korea is no longer a dialogue partner that the U.S. needs to pay special attention to. Therefore, within the new Cold War structure between the U.S. and China, North Korea's only viable strategy is to maximize crisis to change the current situation. This is likely to worsen the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea needs to prepare for crisis situations on the Korean Peninsula by establishing a defense posture with the U.S.■

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of "U.S. Stance on North Korea's New Cold War Narrative."

■ Kim Hyun-wook_ Dr. Kim Hyun-wook is currently a professor and head of the Americas Division at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. His research areas include the ROK-U.S. alliance, North Korea-U.S. relations, and Northeast Asian security. He served as an advisor to the Presidential Transition Committee's Inauguration Preparation Committee for the 20th Presidential term and is currently active as a policy advisor to the National Security Council, a non-standing director of the Korea Foundation, and a policy advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He graduated with a degree in Political Science and International Relations from Yonsei University, earned a Master's and Ph.D. in Political Science from Brown University, and conducted postdoctoral research at the University of Southern California.

■ Contact and Editing: Park Jeong-hoo_EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jhpark@eai.or.kr