[New Year Special Commentary Series] VI. The Yoon Suk Yeol Administration's Value Diplomacy and Democracy Diplomacy

In his inaugural address, keynote speech at the NATO Summit, Liberation Day address on August 15, and keynote speech at the UN General Assembly on September 20, President Yoon Suk Yeol has emphasized the importance of the value of "freedom." This focus on individual freedom marks a significant departure from previous presidents who centered their discourse on the community or the nation. This shift has generated expectations in South Korea for engaging in democracy diplomacy, particularly among Western liberal democracies. Reflecting this, the White House requested that the South Korean government host the Indo-Pacific regional meeting of the Summit for Democracy. Following the global summit held online on March 29, the regional meeting is scheduled to take place in Seoul on March 30. While it has been known through various channels that the new administration would adopt "value diplomacy" or "values-based diplomacy" as part of its foreign policy, questions remained about specific plans and outcomes. In this regard, hosting the Indo-Pacific regional Summit for Democracy is a welcome development as the first major achievement of value diplomacy. If the South Korean government formulates and implements concrete action plans for value diplomacy through this initiative, it will remain a significant legacy of the current administration.

Despite these expectations, value diplomacy remains on the defensive due to its abstractness and ambiguity. Simply put, value diplomacy can be defined as diplomacy that uses values as criteria for diplomatic judgment and action, but it is often accompanied by the following concerns: Diplomacy is a means to realize national interests, so cost-benefit calculations should take precedence over values. This premise assumes that values are something that transcends interests. However, as we will see later when examining the question of what constitutes a value, value is not a concept opposed to interest. Values encompass both ideals and utility, so while we can speak of a conflict between human rights values and economic values, we cannot speak of a conflict between values and interests. Furthermore, even if we limit the domain of values to those that are precious and must be protected morally, these values operate alongside interests in real politics and diplomacy. For example, as the war in Ukraine prolongs, causing global energy and food crises, the international community still supports Ukraine's victory not only because the protection of territorial sovereignty and democracy itself has value, but also because upholding related international laws and norms is beneficial to their own security.

Meanwhile, "democracy diplomacy," which seeks to defend and promote democracy, is a specific form of value diplomacy, akin to human rights diplomacy or peace diplomacy. The promotion and support of democracy have been embedded in the foreign policy of Western democratic blocs, and the recent prominence of this approach is due to the foreign policy direction of the Biden administration. In stark contrast to President Trump's "America First" and transactional diplomacy, President Biden has advocated for the defense of democracy since his election campaign. He views the world as a contest between autocracy and democracy, asserting that democracy is a superior system politically and economically. He has also called for cooperation and unity among democratic nations to stabilize the rules-based international order that emphasizes international law. Furthermore, as values such as openness, transparency, and reliability have become criteria for technological alliances and supply chain realignments, the issue of values is now considered alongside market principles in trade and investment matters.

This article aims to assist the South Korean government in more systematically conceptualizing value diplomacy, propose realistic strategies for its pursuit, and suggest specific agendas where South Korea can excel.

1. Value Diplomacy

When "common values" are mentioned in diplomatic documents such as joint statements between leaders or speeches by political leaders, we often think of them in terms of political and economic systems related to democracy and market economies. However, values are used and understood in various ways depending on their dimension and context.

In its dictionary definition, value means "something important or useful," encompassing both moral and utilitarian values. In social sciences, values are considered "socially shared principles that regulate behavior," serving as goals and standards for individuals or societies. Braithwaite [1] has distinguished between security values, considered important for protecting oneself or one's group from oppression by others, and harmony values, which involve sharing resources and cooperating with mutual respect. Security values pertain to individual physical safety and survival, and at the societal level, they relate to economic development and the rule of law. Harmony values, at the individual level, relate to self-reflection, self-esteem, forgiveness, tolerance, and love, while at the societal level, they are associated with peace, environmental preservation, civic cooperation, and international cooperation. He states that security values are linked to "exchange trust norms" due to the calculation of self-interest to reduce risk, and harmony values are linked to "community trust norms" that foster bonds and shared identity.[1] is linked to "community trust norms" that foster bonds and shared identity.

Viewed through this conceptual lens, both economic diplomacy pursuing prosperity and security diplomacy for national security become forms of value diplomacy. When the Yoon Suk Yeol administration speaks of value diplomacy, it sometimes expresses it as freedom, peace, and prosperity, or at other times as freedom, human rights, and the rule of law. The latter is often referred to as "universal values," which is likely intended to distinguish them from peace and prosperity, which are public goods. This is not an incorrect expression, as values encompass both ideal aspirations and instrumental utility at the individual and collective (organizational, societal, national) levels. However, peace and prosperity have always been fundamental public values pursued by our diplomacy, even without the term "value diplomacy," making it awkward and overly broad to newly label them as such. Therefore, limiting value diplomacy to freedom, human rights, and the rule of law, which are considered universal values, is the way to avoid ambiguity. Fortunately, the recently published "Indo-Pacific Strategy" report by the South Korean government clearly distinguishes between "vision" (freedom, peace, prosperity) and "universal values" (freedom, human rights, rule of law), designating "cooperation on the rule of law and promotion of human rights" as one of the nine priority tasks.

What is noteworthy here is that these universal values are primarily individual-level values. Compared to freedom and human rights, the rule of law encompasses both individual and societal dimensions. While the rule of law has a social contract element where individuals bind themselves to laws governing the public, it more strongly emphasizes the protection of individual rights by placing everyone equally before the law, ensuring that no ruler is above the law. Given that the President's discourse highlights individual freedom, it can be said that the current administration places importance on the ideals of liberalism.

President Yoon Suk Yeol's philosophy on freedom is perhaps best articulated in his UN General Assembly speech last fall, titled "Freedom and Solidarity: Answers to the Watershed Moment." The speech characterizes the current international community as facing a situation where the freedom and peace of global citizens are threatened again by changes in the status quo by force, weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons, and the collective violation of human rights. The President argued that solutions lie in the spirit of solidarity, sharing the universal value of freedom and working together to protect and expand it, and that the role of the UN must be strengthened. The word "freedom" appears frequently in this speech, with universal freedom being described as freedom from disease and hunger, freedom from illiteracy, and freedom from energy and cultural deprivation. Consequently, the South Korean government has pledged to strengthen the global health system, expand development aid to support the socially vulnerable, and provide decarbonization and green aid for climate crisis response. These concepts of freedom primarily focus on freedom from deprivation; it is regrettable that the speech did not call for solidarity for political freedom, given that a major characteristic of the global retreat of democracy is the suppression of freedom of the press and expression, and the fearful persecution of minorities and dissenters.

In reality, if freedom is an intrinsic aspect of human nature, such as free will and self-determination, it can only be enjoyed when the external political and social conditions are in place. Since the UN proclaimed individual freedom as a fundamental right, it has established international covenants with numerous provisions to protect the social conditions necessary for its enjoyment. The "Four Freedoms" articulated by U.S. President Roosevelt in his January 1944 address to Congress—freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear—are enshrined as numerous fundamental rights in the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which proclaims the equality of all human beings in dignity and rights. These include freedom of expression and association, freedom of religion, as well as the right to a fair trial, the right to work, and the right to an adequate standard of living, health, and education. To give these declarations legal force, the UN adopted the "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)" and the "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)" in 1966. South Korea ratified both covenants in 1990, thus having a legal as well as a moral obligation to promote human social and freedom rights through its diplomacy.

In striving to protect universal values such as freedom and human rights, efforts to foster the necessary social conditions naturally arise, which inevitably leads to supporting the system that practices these values: democracy. Therefore, value diplomacy, despite conceptual distinctions, cannot help but extend to democracy diplomacy.

2. Democracy Diplomacy

In the United States and European countries, the term "democracy diplomacy" or "human rights diplomacy" is used rather than "value diplomacy." The South Korean government tends to avoid these terms, perhaps fearing that they might alienate non-liberal states. Japan also exhibits a similar tendency. The first Abe Shinzo cabinet (September 2006 - August 2007), which established the concept of "expanding diplomatic horizons" with the term value diplomacy, explicitly defined values as freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market economy, calling them "universal values." Under the banner of value diplomacy, it proposed a blueprint for building an "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" centered on emerging democracies in the Eurasian periphery and sought to strengthen diplomatic relations with the United States, Australia, the EU, and NATO. The value diplomacy initiative, which had faltered due to the short tenure of Abe's first cabinet, evolved into the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" concept with the start of the second Abe cabinet in December 2012. This concept significantly influenced the development of the Indo-Pacific strategy by the U.S. administration. The background for the U.S. using the term value diplomacy instead of democracy diplomacy, for instance, lies in its desire to maintain inclusivity or avoid being caught in an ideological framing of democracy versus autocracy. As the Indo-Pacific region, integrating the Indian and Pacific Oceans, has become increasingly important, major powers have developed their own Indo-Pacific strategies. While European countries like the UK, France, and Germany speak of democracy as a key norm in the region, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific [2] emphasizes dialogue and cooperation in maritime security, connectivity, and development cooperation, without mentioning the word democracy. This reflects the hesitation of Asian countries to use the term democracy in their diplomatic documents.[2] ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific [2] emphasizes dialogue and cooperation in maritime security, connectivity, and development cooperation, without mentioning the word democracy. This reflects the hesitation of Asian countries to use the term democracy in their diplomatic documents.

China claims that it is also a democracy and has various forms of democracy. Therefore, arguing that democratic values exist in all countries and that democracy is a universal value is indeed useful for inclusive democracy diplomacy. In fact, proponents of democracy believe that democratic values exist within the societies of autocratic states as universal values, and therefore, they should protect and assist free democratic citizens from governments that suppress such universal values. However, if even autocratic governments claim to embody democratic values, a sophistical situation arises where all countries become democratic, rendering the struggle for democratization unnecessary.

Democracy scholars clearly distinguish between autocracy and democracy. It is not difficult to differentiate non-democratic countries based on how well individual freedom, minority rights, freedom of the press, competitive free elections, and the rule of law are implemented. Researchers of democratic diversity classify political systems as "liberal democracies" where these democratic elements are well-implemented, "electoral democracies" where elections are held but these elements are not properly practiced, "electoral autocracies" where these elements are very poor but elections are held formally, and "closed autocracies" where free direct elections are absent. The Economist Intelligence Unit also categorizes the world's countries into "full democracies," "flawed democracies," "hybrid regimes," and "authoritarian regimes" annually assessing the state of global democracy. The problem is the increasing trend of autocratization, marked by the continuous rise in the suppression of the press and dissenters, the persecution of minority rights, and the political oppression of opponents, starting around 2006.[3]

It is natural that movements arise for democratic countries to defend and support democracy in response to this democratic recession. The rise of democracy diplomacy is driven more by the motivation to restore declining democracy than by the desire to contain the influence of autocratic states like China and Russia. Among multilateral intergovernmental alliances for democracy, the "Community of Democracies," founded in Warsaw in 2000, is a notable example. With 31 member states and invitations extended to other countries and civil societies, it has held nine meetings to date. In contrast to the Trump administration's passive hosting of a meeting in 2017, the Biden administration convened a large-scale Summit for Democracy on December 11, 2021, inviting over 110 countries. While the former was an alliance of democratic nations, the latter was framed as a conference for democracy, not exclusively among democratic nations. Of course, criticisms remain regarding the inclusion and exclusion of certain countries. What is important to consider here is that democracy diplomacy is not diplomacy among democratic nations but diplomacy that broadens the spectrum of democratization levels and assists many countries in their democratization efforts. Viewed in this light, we can see that there is no need to shy away from the term "democracy diplomacy" for fear of excluding non-democratic countries.

As seen above, while "regime-neutral" value diplomacy has the advantage of being implemented inclusively according to the level and scope of shared values and norms across specific countries, "advocacy-oriented" democracy diplomacy can be implemented by targeting even civil societies within autocratic states, provided they have adopted at least minimal democratic institutions. Therefore, the South Korean government can simultaneously pursue value diplomacy and democracy diplomacy, a very important form of value diplomacy.

3. South Korea's Value Diplomacy Strategy and Key Agendas

Considering that global democracy has been in decline for the past 16 years, it is imperative for South Korea, as a dynamic democracy in Asia that has achieved democratic consolidation as remarkable as its economic miracle, to actively contribute to democracy diplomacy. South Korea has blossomed economically and democratically through its colonial experience, the Korean War and division, authoritarian rule, and rapid industrialization. This experience offers rich narratives for many developing countries aiming for both development and democratization. Notably, despite several periods of democratic backsliding, South Korea has demonstrated a resilient democracy. It hosted the second meeting of the Community of Democracies in 2003 and the World Movement for Democracy in 2015, participated in the Summit of 10 Democracies held in Cornwall, UK, in 2021, and will host the Indo-Pacific regional meeting of the Summit for Democracy in 2023. Moving beyond the role of a mere convenor, South Korea must identify democracy agendas where it can excel and focus its value diplomacy on protecting and restoring democracy in cooperation with like-minded countries. What strategies would be realistic for implementing value diplomacy or democracy diplomacy? The following strategies can be considered:

First, a strategy of expanding engagement within multilateral organizations and creating regional platforms. To advocate for universal values and norms, engagement in multilateral organizations must be strengthened. South Korea has pursued value diplomacy through multilateral organizations by contributing to the UN Democracy Fund and actively engaging in agendas related to women and peace. However, the scope of these activities is currently limited, necessitating significant expansion. Unlike the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), established by EU member states in 2013 to promote democracy in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, there is no such regional fund in the Asia-Pacific region. A potential approach could involve establishing a fund among like-minded countries in the region and operating it through a consortium of relevant institutions. It could also involve leading efforts to strengthen laws and institutions for universal values within ASEAN.

Second, a strategy of promoting inclusive and open solidarity. To clarify that participation in U.S.-led democracy diplomacy is not a choice between the U.S. and China, we should pursue issue-based, small-group cooperation with European and Asian democracies to broaden the scope of value diplomacy and democracy diplomacy partners. [4] Leveraging experiences such as the D10 summit of major democracies led by the UK as part of the G7 summit, the 1.5-track D10 meetings in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has participated, and Sweden's recent "Drive for Democracy" initiative, cooperation with major European democracies should be pursued. In Asia, key partners for cooperation can be identified as Japan, Australia, India, and Indonesia. South Korea could also exercise leadership by specifying value diplomacy agendas within the Quad Plus cooperation network.[4] Leveraging experiences such as the D10 summit of major democracies led by the UK as part of the G7 summit, the 1.5-track D10 meetings in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has participated, and Sweden's recent "Drive for Democracy" initiative, cooperation with major European democracies should be pursued. In Asia, key partners for cooperation can be identified as Japan, Australia, India, and Indonesia. South Korea could also exercise leadership by specifying value diplomacy agendas within the Quad Plus cooperation network.

Third, establishing an domestic policy structure to coordinate and expand value diplomacy. Currently, departments involved in value diplomacy-related activities are dispersed across the government, hindering shared vision and policy coordination. The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Averment (KCR) under the Ministry of the Interior and Safety organizes international conferences, but its primary mandate is domestic democratization commemoration projects. The Korea Foundation, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is primarily focused on public diplomacy to promote Korea abroad, making it unsuitable for pursuing value diplomacy. The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), which implements grant aid, can expand its good governance capacity-building programs, but it faces limitations in encompassing value diplomacy or democracy diplomacy. Establishing a new institution, similar to the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy [5] or Taiwan's Foundation for Democracy, which receives bipartisan support from the legislature, appears difficult given the confrontational political climate in South Korea. The establishment of a purely private foundation or fund for similar activities also seems unrealistic at present.[5] or Taiwan's Foundation for Democracy, which receives bipartisan support from the legislature, appears difficult given the confrontational political climate in South Korea. The establishment of a purely private foundation or fund for similar activities also seems unrealistic at present.

If a new independent institution for value diplomacy were to be established, a "Democracy Foundation" under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could be created to promote international support for democratic governance. While receiving government funding as a public institution, it should be granted maximum autonomy to cooperate with domestic and international civil society organizations. The Overseas Koreans Foundation could serve as a model. If establishing a new independent institution is difficult, a bureau within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, similar to the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, could be created to elevate value agendas in foreign policy and coordinate related programs with relevant institutions such as the Korea Foundation and KOICA.

Key agendas for value diplomacy that South Korea can relatively excel in include the following:

First, many studies emphasize the independence of the judiciary to implement the rule of law and prevent democratic backsliding. The problem of expanding executive power is observed in many countries. To ensure checks and balances, the judiciary must fulfill its role as the ultimate arbiter of justice to prevent the autocratization of the executive branch. Given the significant impact of judicial independence and the diffusion of democracy from neighboring countries in preventing democratic regression, [6] exchanges and training programs can be expanded to enhance judicial independence in regional countries. While some judicial exchange programs are operated as part of overseas aid, their scale and scope are limited, necessitating significant expansion.[6] Given the significant impact of judicial independence and the diffusion of democracy from neighboring countries in preventing democratic regression, [6] exchanges and training programs can be expanded to enhance judicial independence in regional countries. While some judicial exchange programs are operated as part of overseas aid, their scale and scope are limited, necessitating significant expansion.

Second, to foster electoral democracy, which is the foundation of democracy, efforts can be focused on strengthening norms of electoral integrity and providing technical support such as mechanizing the vote counting process. South Korea's National Election Commission has established the Association of World Election Bodies to assist the development of free and democratic elections in developing countries, but its achievements are limited due to insufficient budget and personnel. Financial support, combined with overseas aid, could be provided to enable the established cooperative body to fulfill its role effectively.

Third, the anti-corruption agenda adopted during the hosting of the Indo-Pacific regional meeting of the Summit for Democracy can be led and expanded in the future. Anti-corruption measures help economic development by ensuring that resources and funds are allocated equitably throughout society, rather than being siphoned off by those in power or specific groups through corrupt networks. Furthermore, trust in a clean government fosters public trust, and the expectation of a clean society promotes social integration and advances democracy. The South Korean government has taken the lead in increasing government transparency, eradicating corruption, and promoting civil society participation through the Open Government Partnership. In particular, South Korea's e-government aid to developing countries has been well-received for its anti-corruption effects. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in conjunction with the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission and the Ministry of Justice, should engage in international cooperation to strengthen anti-corruption conventions. Additionally, support can be provided for civil society organizations to engage in anti-corruption advocacy in collaboration with international non-profit organizations such as Transparency International.

Fourth, in response to acts of political expression suppression, persecution of dissenters, violent suppression of popular demands for democratization, and the violation of human rights of religious or ethnic minorities, condemnation and sanctions should be imposed through multilateral engagement. Multilateral engagement makes it difficult to single out South Korea for accusations of interference in internal affairs by authoritarian governments, and collective action by multiple governments is highly effective. The response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the military coup in Myanmar through multilateral and unilateral sanctions has provided valuable experience.

The 2022 Democracy Report by democracy researchers indicates that only 13% of the world's population, or 34 countries, live under liberal democratic regimes. South Korea ranks 17th globally in terms of liberal democracy, higher than the United States or Japan, and between France and Spain. As South Korea has become a globally recognized democratic nation, it must now more actively engage in value diplomacy to support and share this precious asset and value with citizens of other countries.■

[1] Valerie Braithwaite. 1998. “Communal and Exchange Trust Norms: Their Value Base and Relevance to Institutional Trust,” in V. Braithwaite and M. Levi, Trust And Governance (Russell Sage Foundation 1998). 46-74.

[2] “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf

[3] Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) reports that between 1972 and 2020, the number of liberal democracies increased from 20 to 32 countries, and electoral democracies from 16 to 60 countries, while electoral autocracies increased from 36 to 62 countries, and closed autocracies decreased from 86 to 20 countries in 2010 before increasing to 25 countries in 2021.

[4] Lee, Sook Jong. 2021. “Beyond the US-China Rivalry: Developing a Shared Democratic Vision for the Indo-Pacific.” East Asia Institute. January 15; Lee Sook-jong. 2021. “From G7 to D10: The Complexity of Regime Competition within the Multilateral Order Amidst US-China Rivalry.” EAI Issue Briefing. July 7.

[5] The U.S. National Endowment for Democracy is a private institution established in 1984 with bipartisan budgetary support from the U.S. Congress, utilizing an annual budget of approximately 400 billion KRW in recent years. Half of this budget is allocated to related democracy-support organizations such as NDI, IRI, CIPE, and ACILS, which directly support civil society organizations and individuals for the protection and promotion of democracy worldwide.

[6] Vanessa Boese et als. 2021. “How democracies prevail: democratic resilience as a two stage process.” Democratization 28, 5: 885-907; Melis G. Laebens, Melis G. and Anna Lührmann. 2021. “What halts democratic erosion? The changing role of accountability.” Democratization. 28, 5: 908-928,

■ Author: Suk-Jong Lee_EAI Senior Fellow and Director, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University. Dr. Lee holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University. She has served as a Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute, a Visiting Scholar at the Brookings Institution, a Lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, President of the Association for Modern Japanese Studies, a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Director of EAI. She is a member of the Steering Committee for the World Movement for Democracy (WMD) and founded and operates the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN). Her recent co-edited works include Populism in Asian Democracies: Features, Structures, and Impacts (co-edited, 2021), Collaborative Governance in East Asia: Evolution Towards Multi-stakeholder Partnerships (Co-edited, 2020), "Social Problems to Solve Together: Cases of Conflict and Cooperation" (Co-edited, 2019), Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (edited), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (co-edited), 《세계화 제2막: 한국형 세계화와 새 구상》(co-edited), 《2017 대통령의 성공조건》(co-edited).

■ Responsible Editor: Hansu Park_EAI Research Fellow

    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr