[New Year Special Commentary Series] ④ The Re-declared 'Head-on Breakthrough Campaign': North Korea's Pre-emptive Nuclear Stance in 2023 and its Limitations

"We will not pursue an improved tangible economic living environment as a benefactor of nuclear weapons that guarantee the safety of our republic's regime and future generations, and no matter the hardship, we will not change our choice."

(Kim Jong Un. "Speech at the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly." *KCNA*, September 8, 2022.)

In September 2022, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un promulgated the "Law on the State Nuclear Force Policy" during a session of the Supreme People's Assembly, clearly articulating a pre-emptive nuclear stance. In 2022, North Korea demonstrated its capabilities by launching approximately 70 ballistic missiles in 33 separate instances, including a record eight intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for the year. The regime has signaled its intention to create tension on the Korean Peninsula through nuclear acceleration and provocations against South Korea in 2023, similar to the previous year, under the banner of its pre-emptive nuclear doctrine, as announced at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee held at the end of the year.

This paper analyzes and forecasts North Korea's choices in 2023. First, it interprets the announced strategy in terms of continuity, then examines its actual implementation feasibility alongside its limitations, and finally predicts North Korea's actions in 2023. The paper concludes by analyzing the implications of the pre-emptive nuclear doctrine.

1. North Korea's Strategy in 2023: Continuity of the 'Head-on Breakthrough Campaign'

North Korea held the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea from December 26 to 31, 2022, for its longest duration ever, and revealed aspects of its strategy for 2023.[1]The foreign strategy announced by North Korea at this plenary meeting is a continuation of the 'head-on breakthrough campaign' declared at the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee in December 2019. Following the collapse of the Hanoi summit in February 2019 and the demand for the withdrawal of hostile policies, which would guarantee the right to survival and development, in October of the same year, North Korea proclaimed the following principles through the head-on breakthrough campaign, which it reaffirmed at this plenary meeting.

First, breaking through U.S. sanctions through self-reliance. At the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee, Kim Jong Un asserted, "All party organizations and officials must willingly shoulder the grave mission entrusted by the era and strive for the head-on breakthrough campaign to completely shatter the enemy's sanctions and blockade tactics with the power of self-reliance" (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2020). At the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee, Kim Jong Un evaluated 2022 by stating, "Only the great Korean people, who have endured harsh national difficulties with steadfastness and demonstrated the spirit and creativity of self-reliance and arduous struggle, can achieve this precious victory" (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2023).

Second, the advancement of nuclear capabilities. In April 2018, the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee announced a moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests, a commitment that was first declared to be abandoned at the December 2019 plenary meeting (*Rodong Sinmun*, April 21, 2018). Kim Jong Un argued, "There is no longer any basis for us to be unilaterally bound by a promise for which there is no corresponding party providing guarantees," and "We must vigorously push forward with the strategic weapons development program" (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2020). This plenary meeting reaffirmed the intention to enhance nuclear capabilities, emphasizing the "importance of strengthening nuclear force" and declaring the development of "another ICBM system," the "importance and necessity of mass-producing tactical nuclear weapons," and the intention to "increase the nuclear arsenal exponentially" (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2023). This confirms the commitment to continue strengthening nuclear capabilities, as declared in the head-on breakthrough campaign.

Third, emphasizing the long-term nature of the strategy toward the U.S. and South Korea. When introducing the head-on breakthrough campaign, it was declared a "difficult and protracted struggle." Kim Jong Un eliminated any room for compromise by stating, "Even if we tighten our belts, our firm revolutionary conviction is to achieve self-reliance and self-prosperity, thereby defending the dignity of our nation and defeating imperialism" (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2020). This plenary meeting invoked a new Cold War. Kim Jong Un declared that "the international relations structure has clearly shifted to a 'new Cold War' system" and presented "principles for external affairs that must be strictly adhered to for regional peace and stability" (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2023). This implies a protracted struggle inherent in the Cold War structure. Notably, unlike the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in 2021, the redefinition of inter-Korean relations as a "confrontational relationship" and the announcement of "concrete directions for response to the U.S. and confrontation" indicate an intention to continue creating tensions on the Korean Peninsula, extending from the trajectory of 2022 (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2023).

Finally, the continuation of ideological struggle against anti-socialist and non-socialist elements. The 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee in 2019 adopted as Article 5 of its decisions the "strengthening of the struggle against anti-socialist and non-socialist elements, establishing moral discipline, and intensifying ideological education in mass organizations" (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2020). The 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in 2022 also emphasized ideological struggle, including "fundamental transformation in the ideological and cultural spheres of the masses" in its first agenda report, and stated the intention to "enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of party ideological work" (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2023).

In summary, North Korea reaffirmed its policy for 2023: strengthening ideological armament as a core element of the head-on breakthrough campaign to maintain internal control, enduring sanctions through self-reliance without external assistance, and pursuing a long-term strategy to achieve de facto nuclear state status through maximum nuclear capability enhancement. Consequently, North Korea is expected to continue complex provocations similar to 2022. First, it will implement the "Transformative Strategy for Nuclear Force and National Defense Development in 2023" adopted at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee, based on the "Five-Year Plan for the Development of National Defense Science and Weapon System" adopted at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. In terms of strengthening "nuclear force," it will develop solid-fuel ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) targeting the U.S. mainland, along with warhead miniaturization, multiple warhead technology, and re-entry vehicle technology. Furthermore, it will seek to increase the number of tactical nuclear weapons targeting South Korea, Japan, and Guam. In terms of "national defense development," it will also enhance the development of conventional asymmetric weapons such as drones, aiming to fulfill Kim Jong Un's directive to "make it a year of transformation in war mobilization readiness and practical combat capability" (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2023).

Dialogue with South Korea and the U.S. is expected to be largely rejected under the pretext of the prior withdrawal of hostile policies. North Korea recognizes that South Korea and the U.S. cannot accept its preconditions for dialogue, which include the lifting of sanctions (implying the 'right to development') and the permanent cessation of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and strategic asset deployments, ultimately leading to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. North Korea intends to use dialogue as a pretext for maximizing nuclear development without genuine intent to negotiate, prolonging the situation.

2. Challenges Facing North Korea in 2023: Hopes and Realities

For North Korea to 'break through' its current situation, its external environment and domestic foundation, particularly its economy for maintaining durability, must be supportive. However, the external environment facing North Korea in 2023 presents significant challenges. Kim Jong Un's assertion at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in 2022 that "the international relations structure has clearly shifted to a 'new Cold War' system and the trend of multipolarization is accelerating" is an intentional emphasis aimed at escaping international isolation and legitimizing nuclear development, which is prohibited by the UN (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2023). North Korea attempts to frame the UN Security Council's dysfunctionality regarding the North Korean nuclear issue in 2022 as a new Cold War structure to solidify this stance. However, while Russian President Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine has paralyzed the UN Security Council, it has also served as an opportunity for key liberal democratic allies, led by the United States, to reunite. Particularly, given North Korea's alignment with Russia, sanctions relief has become even more difficult. With European countries imposing sanctions on Russia unanimously nine times, there is no justification for lifting sanctions on North Korea without its proactive denuclearization measures. More fundamentally, the confrontation structure North Korea envisions—between North Korea, China, and Russia on one side, and South Korea, the U.S., and Japan on the other—and the global division between liberal democracies and authoritarian states lack the sustained durability of the Cold War. There is an absence of ideological coherence to counter liberal democracy, and neither internal cohesion within blocs nor isolation between blocs is guaranteed. While the U.S. and China are in conflict, unlike the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, complete decoupling in economic and various other sectors is impossible.

Notably, the first face-to-face summit between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping in November last year opened the possibility of institutionalizing strategic competition between the two countries. At the time, Foreign Minister Wang Yi used the term "exploratory," and prior to that, Secretary of State Antony Blinken mentioned "coordination" in a May speech, indicating that both sides are seeking space for compromise.[2]Depending on the outcomes of Secretary Blinken's visit to China early this year, there is a possibility that U.S.-China tensions could be 'managed' to some extent. In that case, the U.S. and China might find common ground on issues of mutual interest, such as 'stability on the Korean Peninsula,' and impose constraints on North Korea's high-intensity provocations, including a seventh nuclear test.

Internal cohesion within blocs is also lacking in values that unite authoritarian regimes, and regionalization is emerging rather than bloc formation. Bilateral relations, such as North Korea-China, North Korea-Russia, and China-Russia, have historically been based on convenience rather than shared values or ideology, and this remains true today. While short-term cooperation against a common enemy like the United States may be possible, ensuring its sustainability is difficult. In this regard, if the solidarity of liberal democratic nations is maintained and strengthened amidst the Ukraine war and U.S.-China conflict in 2023, North Korea's aspirations for de facto nuclear state recognition and sanctions relief will remain distant.

For North Korea to achieve a 'head-on breakthrough,' its economy must be supportive, but the outlook for 2023 is negative. The 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee, held at the end of 2021, identified "socialist rural issues" as one of six major tasks, and economic matters were treated with importance, with Kim Jong Un setting targets for each industry. However, the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in December 2022, in its review of 2022, failed to present any economic achievements. There was no mention of improving economic management, and beyond housing construction, no specific plans were reported for 2023. Instead, emphasis was placed on self-reliance based on self-sufficiency and mobilization of labor. Kim Jong Un harshly criticized "ideological remnants of relying on others' technology" and called for overcoming the current difficulties through mass mobilization, invoking the "spirit and banner of struggle of the 1960s and 70s" and the "Chollima Movement." Furthermore, in response to the economic crisis of 2022, North Korea signaled a regression in 2023 with measures to strengthen state control over trade and food distribution. As early as September last year, Kim Jong Un declared, "Unified command and management over all state affairs, including economic work, are being further deepened, and socialist character is being restored" (*KCNA*, September 8, 2022).

Given the practice of setting annual industrial targets and the fact that 2023 marks the third year of the five-year economic development plan, requiring concrete achievements, the absence of mention at this plenary meeting can be interpreted as an acknowledgment by the North Korean authorities that achieving economic results this year will be difficult. Rather than presenting a new vision to overcome these challenges, North Korea seeks to revert to a model from 50 years ago by emphasizing its failed self-reliant economic policy and politicizing the economy through mass mobilization mechanisms.

The difficulties in North Korea's economy are exacerbated by constant natural disasters and COVID-19-related lockdowns. However, the fundamental causes lie in economic sanctions due to nuclear development and the policy of prioritizing resource allocation towards strengthening nuclear capabilities. For instance, even if trade between North Korea and China resumes in earnest, North Korea's exports to China will be limited by economic sanctions, while imports will increase. Rising global inflation will lead to currency depreciation and increased import prices, rapidly depleting North Korea's foreign exchange reserves. If the North Korean authorities restrict imports, industrial production will decrease, and shortages of essential goods will worsen the living conditions of the populace. Furthermore, strengthened government control will hinder the market supply of foreign currency and goods, leading to price increases and economic regression.

3. North Korea's Choices in 2023: Regime Transition vs. Siege Mentality Intensification

Given that the North Korean authorities acknowledge the difficulty of improving the economic situation in 2023, the regime's durability will be a crucial factor determining Pyongyang's actions. The interplay between recurring natural disasters, the potential resurgence of COVID-19, and the economic hardships caused by sanctions will impact the living standards of the North Korean people and, consequently, the regime's stability.

If durability deteriorates, Pyongyang may consider two options. First, it could dramatically shift the situation, similar to late 2017-early 2018, and engage in dialogue with South Korea and the U.S. To create a pretext for initiating dialogue, North Korea could declare its "nuclear state status" through a seventh nuclear test, following the "declaration of completion of nuclear force" after the Hwasong-15 missile launch on November 29, 2017, thereby transitioning the situation towards dialogue. It could seek a deal with the U.S. for partial denuclearization or some form of sanctions relief in exchange for a freeze.

Second, it could attempt to overcome difficulties by leveraging a "siege mentality," maximally highlighting surrounding threats. In a manner more familiar to North Korea, it has overcome extreme situations like the 'Arduous March' in the late 1990s through mass mobilization and solidarity fueled by a sense of crisis. Specifically, tension escalation linked to the "politics of spectacle" observed during the Kim Jong Un era, utilizing nuclear weapons, is also possible. For example, as Kim Yo Jong stated in her statement on December 20 last year, North Korea could launch an ICBM at a normal trajectory for a large-scale display (*KCNA*, December 20, 2022). This would be a high-intensity provocation effectively targeting the U.S. mainland, potentially leading to a strong U.S. response. Alternatively, considering the designation of inter-Korean relations as "confrontational" and the establishment of "concrete directions for response" at the recent plenary meeting, North Korea might carry out limited, localized provocations under the pretext of ROK-U.S. joint exercises, which are expected to normalize (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2023). North Korea could use this to create a Korean Peninsula war crisis again, strengthen the system of total mobilization of its populace, and thereby attempt to overcome the crisis.

4. North Korea After 2023: Kim Jong Un's Crisis

The past 30 years have confirmed that the simultaneous pursuit of economic development and nuclear capabilities, as demanded by North Korea, is impossible. Without abandoning its nuclear program, it is impossible for North Korea's economy to avoid "tightening its belt again." The formation of blocs in a new Cold War is a 'wishful thinking' for North Korea; rather, the increasing threat from North Korea serves as a driving force for the U.S. to fundamentally transform the security order through integrated deterrence. If the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific alliances are federated and deployed assets in the region and allied assets are rebuilt to maximize their 'multiplier effect,' the 'tailored deterrence capability' against North Korean nuclear weapons could evolve to a level that neutralizes the nuclear weapons themselves.[3]Even if China increases its military spending to counter the U.S., it will be insufficient to counter integrated deterrence utilizing allied assets, making a compromise at some level likely. This could be the moment when China's unconditional support for North Korea is withdrawn. Furthermore, as confirmed in the "Phnom Penh Statement on the ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Partnership in the Indo-Pacific" last November, South Korea and Japan can enhance their deterrence capabilities against North Korean nuclear weapons, overcoming historical grievances. Additionally, depending on the situation's progression, South Korea and Japan might enhance their latent nuclear capabilities.[4]

If North Korea does not abandon its pre-emptive nuclear (先核) policy, which has crippled its economy, and instead chooses pre-economic development (先經), its situation will become increasingly difficult. As time passes, the ROK-U.S. alliance and allied forces will strengthen their deterrence against North Korean nuclear weapons, diminishing their utility and potentially leading to their eventual elimination. If the political and military symbolic value of nuclear weapons, which Kim Jong Un has promoted through his 'politics of spectacle,' disappears, the regime's durability will be severely challenged. A nuclear-armed North Korea accepted by the international community does not exist.

[1]A formal characteristic of this plenary meeting was 'institutionalization.' Moving away from the 'monolithic leadership system' where the supreme leader makes all decisions unilaterally, the meeting presented an image of establishing strategic lines through discussion and consultation via institutionalized meetings such as plenary sessions and Politburo meetings. Since the Kim Jong Un era, the practice of replacing the New Year's address delivered orally with decisions from plenary meetings, which began in 2020, was repeated this year. Similar to last year, sub-committee research and discussion groups were held during the plenary session to adopt a decision document, and various opinions were solicited. Notably, during this plenary session, a Politburo meeting was held concurrently to finalize the draft decision document, which synthesized the opinions discussed at the plenary session. The omission of the New Year's address and the policy decision-making process through meetings can also be interpreted as Kim Jong Un's attempt to diffuse responsibility, as he is unable to showcase achievements beyond military weapons system development due to the internal economic difficulties stemming from the triple crisis. The shift to plenary meetings after the collapse of the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit in February 2019 supports this interpretation.

[2]Ha, Young-sun. 2023. "Changes in World Order and the Future of the Korean Peninsula in 2023: Prospects for ROK-U.S. Relations and North Korea." EAI Visible Commentary. January 2.https://eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=21653

[3]Kathleen Hicks. 2021. “Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Nominee for Appointment to be Deputy Secretary of Defense.” Senate Armed Services Committee. February 2.https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hicks_APQs_02-02-21.pdf; Antony J. Blinken and Lloyd J. Austin III. 2021. “America’s partnerships are ‘force multipliers’ in the world.”Washington Post, March 14; The White House. 2022.National Security Strategy. October. p. 20; The U.S. Department of Defense. 2022.2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States. October. pp. 8–10, 11–13.

[4]For details, see Ha, Young-sun. 2023. "Changes in World Order and the Future of the Korean Peninsula in 2023: Prospects for ROK-U.S. Relations and North Korea." EAI Visible Commentary. January 2.https://eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=21653; Park, Won-gon. 2023. "Future Development Plan for the ROK-U.S. Alliance: A Journey for the Next 30 Years." Paper presented at the 11th KRINS-Brookings Joint Conference. January 11; Park, Won-gon. 2022. "U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Integrated Deterrence and Global Posture." *Korea National Strategy* 19 (July 2022).

■ Author: Park Won-gon_Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies and Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. He holds a Ph.D. in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and has served as a policy advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification, Vice President of the Korean Peninsula Peace Institute (KPI), and Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of Peace and Unification*. He spent 18 years researching the ROK-U.S. alliance and North Korea at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and previously served as a professor of International Studies at Handong Global University. His main research areas include the ROK-U.S. alliance, North Korean foreign policy and military affairs, and Northeast Asian international relations. His recent works include "Kim Jong Un’s Policy Direction or 'Line': Heading for Radicalization."Journal of Peace and Unificationeditor-in-chief.The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 2, June 2022; “Continuous ‘Balancing’: A Decade of North Korea’s Strategy Toward the U.S. Under Kim Jong Un,” *The Korean Journal of National Strategy*, No. 19 (July 2022); “U.S. Policy Toward China and the Emergence of Biden: A Dual Confluence of Continuity and Change,” *Strategy Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (July 2021); “Quo Vadis America: The Decline of the United States and the Emergence of Biden,” *Peace Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring 2021), among others.

■ Contact and Editorial: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

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