[New Year Special Commentary Series] ② China's Strategy Toward South Korea Following the Launch of Xi Jinping's Third Term

1. Foreign Policy Orientation of Xi Jinping's Third Term: A Trio of Development, Regime Security, and Enhanced Influence

China has completed the establishment of the Xi Jinping's third-term regime through the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party. The 20th Party Congress presented 'building a strong country with Chinese modernization' as the national development goal, and 2023 effectively marks its inaugural year. Through Foreign Minister Wang Yi, China presented its 'six major diplomatic missions' under the theme of 'major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,' expressing a strong will to pursue proactive diplomacy that supports the realization of the goal of 'building a strong modernized country.'[1] The Xi Jinping's third-term regime reaffirms that its foreign policy objectives and tasks are concentrated on development, regime security, and enhancing influence. Firstly, the six major diplomatic missions include diplomacy for opening up and development. Among the three major national interests, development and security interests are prioritized over sovereign interests. It advocates for 'resolute struggle against all forces attempting to delay or obstruct the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.' This indicates a subtle shift from the previous stance of asserting Taiwan's territorial sovereignty as the core of core interests.

In his report to the Party Congress, President Xi Jinping focused on emphasizing the goals and vision for China's development. He specifically enumerated the importance of self-reliance and self-strengthening in cutting-edge technologies, nurturing scientific and technological talent, improving people's livelihoods and welfare, enhancing the ecological environment, and achieving common prosperity for the construction of a modernized strong country.[2] In essence, Xi Jinping's third term is judged to have the urgent tasks of rapidly achieving economic recovery and laying the foundation for the realization of a modernized socialist strong country to secure the legitimacy of his long-term rule.

However, despite the ambitious vision and goals, the domestic and international environment currently facing the Chinese economy is unstable and uncertain. Some even argue that China's growth has peaked and is in structural decline, leading to theories of China's economic decline. The United States is continuously urging and pressuring its allies and partner countries to decouple from China to curb its growth. In particular, the strengthening of the Xi Jinping's one-man rule is likely to provoke anti-China sentiment internationally and spread consensus on containing China, placing China in a serious complex challenge both domestically and internationally.

The perception of this complex reality facing Xi Jinping's third term can be seen in the fact that the word 'security' (安全) appeared a remarkable 91 times in the Party Congress report, compared to 55 times in the 19th Party Congress. In China, the term 'security' encompasses both domestic safety and external security. However, the security primarily referred to in this Party Congress report includes people's security, political security, and economic security, effectively emphasizing the importance of regime security. This suggests that despite the concentration of power around Xi Jinping, there are considerable concerns about the security of the Communist Party regime internally. While temporary suppression of internal discontent and resistance may be achieved through strong control and ideological education, substantial achievements are ultimately needed to secure the legitimacy of long-term rule. In this situation of complex challenges and dilemmas, to focus on domestic development, it is necessary to pursue a cooperative and managed diplomacy externally.

However, the Xi Jinping government is also signaling that its foreign policy strategy for development will not be purely defensive. It perceives that the domestic and international conditions are not favorable for China's development and that it faces challenges and risks. Therefore, it asserts that it will respond actively and strongly to external challenges and risks. It even advocates for 'struggle' beyond 'defense' regarding core interests. In particular, China is actively utilizing multilateral platforms to strengthen its influence and leadership in the international community. China has been gradually but consistently strengthening its commitment to reforming global governance. The expression evolved from 'active participation' (主动参与) to 'active leadership' (积极引领) in 2022. In 2023, it shows a willingness to build consensus within the international community on the discourse of 'Chinese-style' global governance and strengthen solidarity based on it. For example, it has set enhancing international communication and voice to foster understanding and recognition of Chinese-style modernization, the construction of a community of shared future for mankind, the Chinese path, ideology, and systems as one of its six major diplomatic missions. China has effectively and officially clarified its intention to counter and compete with the system and value offensive led by the United States by prominently presenting the 'Chinese-style' approach.

In this regard, President Xi Jinping's resumption of active face-to-face summit diplomacy through multilateral platforms, following his confirmation of a third term, is noteworthy. President Xi attended the BRICS virtual summit in June 2022 and began attending multilateral events in person for the first time in nearly three years since the COVID-19 pandemic. Starting with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in September, he attended the G20 summit (November 15-16), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit (November 18-19), and in December, he successively attended the first China-Arab States Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit. Through these events, he engaged in extensive diplomatic activities, holding bilateral summits with over 40 countries. China has actively promoted the expansion of BRICS and SCO membership and strived to broaden the scope of solidarity and cooperation among them. At the summits, common support for mutual 'core interests' was confirmed, and China's agenda, including the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), community of shared future for mankind, and the Belt and Road Initiative cooperation, was consistently highlighted to emphasize solidarity.

There appear to be two main objectives behind President Xi's resumption of summit diplomacy utilizing multilateral mechanisms. First, after securing his third term, he sought to showcase his standing as a global leader on the international stage to secure legitimacy for his long-term rule abroad.[3] Second, the multilateral systems and organizations that President Xi participated in share the commonality of not being led by the United States. China argues that the United States intends to contain China through 'exclusive' mini-lateral cooperation and advocates for the promotion of 'true multilateralism.' In other words, China aims to secure allies and expand its influence in the international community by actively participating in and leading multilateral systems that can weaken the US-led encirclement of China, thereby competing with the United States.

2. US-China Diplomacy under Xi Jinping's Third Term: Resistance, Competition, and Exploration

China protests that the Biden administration is pressuring China across the board, from economy and trade, cutting-edge technology, to regime and values, and security domains. It particularly criticizes the United States for launching an offensive using various 'exclusive' mini-lateral cooperation frameworks such as Five Eyes, Quad, AUKUS, and bilateral alliances. Nevertheless, China is also presenting a diplomatic message of needing to 'restore China-US relations to a healthy and stable track.' China is highlighting a framework of pressure versus resistance, arguing that it is not seeking to reshape the existing international order and replace the United States as a hegemonic power, but rather to resist succumbing to US pressure and offense. The emphasis on the resistance framework in China's US diplomacy has domestic political considerations behind it. In his report to the Party Congress, President Xi Jinping emphasized that humanity faces unprecedented challenges. He argued that in this critical period of global, epochal, and historical change (世界之变、时代之变、历史之变), it is necessary to unite and strive under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and President Xi Jinping as the core to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Xi Jinping government calculates that maintaining a certain level of conflict and confrontation, rather than making hasty concessions or compromises without securing tangible benefits with the United States, can help consolidate domestic unity and secure political support.

Despite this, there are concerns that prolonged and deteriorating confrontation with the United States will increase political burdens on China and pose significant obstacles to economic growth. While China appears to be resisting the United States more fiercely than ever, it is also continuing dialogue. Of course, there has been no concrete progress or results from these dialogues, with harsh exchanges occurring. Both the US and China are compelled to continue competition and confrontation for domestic political and economic reasons, but at the same time, they both recognize the need to avoid and manage the escalation of confrontation into conflict for the same reasons. That is, the higher the possibility of conflict, the greater the need for dialogue. Since June, there have already been five high-level meetings between the US and China, and finally, the US and Chinese presidents held their first face-to-face summit on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia. Although this US-China summit did not yield any distinct tangible results, it lasted for a relatively long time of three hours. Both leaders shared the understanding that competition and confrontation should not escalate into conflict due to misunderstanding or miscalculation and showed a willingness to continue communication.

In reality, China's strategy toward the US is not solely characterized by response and resistance; it employs a variety of complex strategies. Firstly, while development remains a primary goal, China is shifting its stance to acknowledge that competition is inevitable in areas directly impacting its development, while maintaining a policy of circumventing excessive power competition with the US. For example, as mentioned earlier, it does not shy away from competing for leadership in global governance. In the field of cutting-edge science and technology, such as semiconductors, where the most intense competition between the US and China is currently taking place, China considers it an area where circumventing US pressure is difficult. In his report to the Party Congress, President Xi Jinping warned about the inadequacy of scientific and technological innovation and the vulnerability of supply chains, mentioning 'scientific and technological self-reliance' five times, thereby effectively expressing its competitive intent towards the US. President Xi also stated his opposition to the politicization and weaponization of economic and technological exchanges, raising issues of decoupling and supply chain disruption.[4] Self-reliance and self-strengthening in science and technology are crucial prerequisites for realizing the 'Chinese-style modernization' proposed by President Xi. Therefore, in this domain, China is prepared for long-term competition without avoiding it.

Furthermore, although China is concerned about the strengthening of the US-led alliance system, it also believes that the trust of allied nations in the US is not entirely solid. For instance, it is exploring opportunities by paying attention to the dissatisfaction and backlash from key allies caused by the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which benefits only North American products. China's recent proactive diplomatic offensive toward traditional US allies such as Australia, Germany, and Saudi Arabia through various means is part of this exploration. These three countries rely on the US for security but share the commonality of China being their largest trading partner, which is also similar to South Korea's situation. Australia and Germany have directly and indirectly experienced the crises caused by economic dependence on China. Australia has directly suffered from China's economic retaliation. Germany, although indirectly, has keenly recognized the need to manage its economic dependence on China in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In short, both countries are wary of the challenges posed by excessive economic dependence on China and perceive it as a country with which democratic values are difficult to share.

Nevertheless, China is seeking pragmatic diplomacy to weaken US-led decoupling solidarity by employing economic means. For example, China responded to Chancellor Scholz's visit with a gift of 140 Airbus passenger aircraft worth $17 billion and the purchase of German vaccines. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese also held a summit with President Xi Jinping for the first time in six years on the sidelines of the G20 summit. China has resumed imports of Australian wheat, which were suspended due to economic retaliation measures, and has already imported the largest quantity in 18 years. The improvement of relations with Saudi Arabia through President Xi Jinping's surprise visit to Saudi Arabia also centered on economic cooperation, including oil imports and Belt and Road Initiative cooperation.

3. China's Offensive on the Taiwan Issue and the Dilemma of Management

President Xi Jinping's strong stance on the Taiwan issue in his 20th Party Congress report has led to heightened instability in the Taiwan Strait. President Xi has expressed a firm position, not ruling out the possibility of using force to prevent Taiwan's independence. The possibility of China using force against Taiwan cannot be entirely dismissed. However, considering the domestic and international challenges facing the Xi Jinping government, the use of force against Taiwan is not highly realistic. China has specifically defined the red lines for the use of force to control the possibility of accidental clashes in the Taiwan Strait. That is, it presented seven provisions in the Anti-Secession Law of 2005 and has recently presented specific conditions for the use of force in line with that. China has set three conditions as the threshold for the use of force: a declaration of Taiwan's independence, the development of nuclear weapons, and the stationing of US troops. China's red lines imply that it will not take preemptive actions to alter the status quo, such as a military invasion. The three conditions presented by China are essentially held by the United States, and the red lines are presented targeting the US. However, the US is also wary of the possibility of accidental conflict with China and fundamentally seeks to avoid direct military conflict with China over the Taiwan issue unless China preemptively invades Taiwan.

Nevertheless, the main reason for the escalating US-China confrontation surrounding the Taiwan Strait is the weakening or erosion of the implicit agreement and trust regarding the maintenance of the status quo in Taiwan, which has been in place for the past 50 years, as the US-China relationship has expanded into a power competition. In other words, the US is concerned and vigilant about the possibility of China forcibly using force against Taiwan, noting the movements of the Xi Jinping government to strengthen its military power while advocating for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Conversely, China reacts sensitively, claiming that the US is undermining the One China Principle and gradually encouraging the independence aspirations of the Tsai Ing-wen government in Taiwan. Ultimately, it is difficult to see the US having a strong motivation or capacity to support Taiwan's independence, and it is also unlikely that China will recklessly invade Taiwan by force. On one hand, China is resorting to military threats to prevent the US from undermining the One China Principle and gradually stimulating the independence aspirations of the Tsai Ing-wen government. On the other hand, it is also concerned about the possibility of accidental clashes in the Taiwan Strait and seeks to manage them by continuing communication with the US. However, if the Xi Jinping government continues to exert pressure on Taiwan targeting the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election, tensions in the Taiwan Strait may further escalate, and the risk of accidental clashes may increase.

4. South Korea's Diplomacy Toward China

The Xi Jinping government is keenly observing the extent to which the South Korean government, which is focusing on rebuilding its alliance with the United States, will participate in the US-led international coalition to pressure China. China faces the dilemma of choosing the next best option, which is to minimize the expansion of US influence, if securing it as an ally is realistically difficult. Recent pragmatic diplomatic moves by Germany, Australia, and Saudi Arabia toward China warrant attention. The actions of these three countries appear highly unusual and contradictory. While seeking to restore economic cooperation with China, they are also diversifying economic cooperation, wary of economic dependence. They have no intention of damaging their traditional diplomatic and security cooperation with the United States. The common denominator behind the complex calculations of these three countries is economic hardship and uncertainty in international affairs. The convergence of multiple crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the global economic downturn and supply chain disruptions, has led these countries, along with many others, to face economic difficulties and seek foreign policy actions prioritizing their national economies to overcome them. In particular, the self-interest underlying the fierce competition between the two great powers, the US and China, to expand their spheres of influence, paradoxically creates an environment where pragmatic diplomacy for self-reliance is activated. South Korea also needs creative and flexible new explorations to actively respond to changes in the international situation more than ever before and to create an environment and space to expand its diplomatic autonomy.

South Korea must find solutions to various complex diplomatic challenges while facing security 불안 (anxiety) stemming from North Korea. It needs to find ways to respond to the Inflation Reduction Act with the United States and prepare for US demands regarding the Taiwan issue. Relations with China are also precarious, like walking on thin ice. While the THAAD issue is in a state of containment, public sentiment in both countries has worsened, and economic cooperation, the sole driving force of bilateral relations, has significantly weakened. The decrease in exports to China is exacerbating South Korea's economic difficulties. Japan demands that the forced labor issue be resolved for the restoration of relations. All these issues require urgent solutions but are also so complexly intertwined that there is a risk of falling into a total quagmire if one tries to resolve them hastily. South Korea's diplomatic strategy toward China must be based on a comprehensive plan that simultaneously considers relations with North Korea, the US, and Japan. Given the complex interconnections of security, economy, cutting-edge technology, energy, and environmental issues with China, close inter-agency cooperation within the government is essential. Meanwhile, to avoid being engulfed in the vortex of US-China competition, South Korea must proactively and multi-facetedly seek roles befitting its international status as a middle-income developed country. Furthermore, to expand South Korea's new status and role, it is inevitable to create a breakthrough starting with stability on the Korean Peninsula. If high-intensity provocations such as North Korea's seventh nuclear test occur, the confrontation between the US and China on the Korean Peninsula could intensify, leading to increased security anxiety on the peninsula and a deterioration of South Korea-China relations, similar to the THAAD incident. Both China and South Korea are in difficult and sensitive domestic political and economic situations, and thus are wary of North Korean provocations. First, South Korea and China must reaffirm their common ground on stability on the Korean Peninsula and prepare for strategic communication to at least deter North Korean provocations. This is a critical juncture to prevent further deterioration of relations and, moreover, to create new momentum for their recovery.■

[1] Wang Yi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, State Councilor, and Foreign Minister. 2022. "Embracing the World, Bravely Moving Forward, and Writing a New Chapter in Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics - Speech at the Seminar on the International Situation and China's Diplomacy." (December 25.)https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202212/t20221225_10994826.shtml

[2] Xi Jinping, 2022. "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects - Report at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China." (October 25.)https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202210/t20221025_10791901.shtml

[3]"President Xi Jinping's G20 Time: Practicing the Great Way of China," People's Daily Online, 2022-11-21https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1750094087254035629&wfr=spider&for=pc

[4]Xi Jinping Meets with US President Biden in Bali (2022-11-14)https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202211/t20221114_10974651.shtml

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryul_Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies. Professor at Dongduk Women's University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the School of International Studies at Peking University. He has served as President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies, a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Korea-China Future Development Committee. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and minority issues. His recent works include "Geoeconomics: Origins and Transition in the 21st Century" (co-authored), "South Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History (Modern Period 3)" (co-authored), "China's Strategy and Role in the Denuclearization and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," "Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s," "Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas of Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Initiative," and "Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea."

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

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