[New Year Special Commentary Series] ① Changes in the World Order in 2023 and South Korea's Strategy Toward the U.S.

1. U.S. Perception of the World Order and the Historical Significance of 2022

In October of last year, the Biden administration released its National Security Strategy, outlining the general principles of U.S. foreign policy and its future strategic direction. The U.S. argues that the 30-year post-Cold War era has clearly ended and that the next decade will be decisive in shaping the world order and U.S. interests. It defines China as the "pacing threat" that influences the overall landscape of U.S. foreign strategy, while simultaneously identifying Russia as a short-term threat. The U.S. delineation of historical periods in the world order carries significant implications for other nations.

While accurately dividing historical epochs is challenging, a turning point emerges when latent structural trends combine with events that starkly reveal them. In this regard, 2022 was a significant year in international politics. The war in Ukraine demonstrated that the liberal, rules-based order, led by the U.S., is being directly challenged by other great powers. While it is true that U.S. power has been waning, more importantly, the inherent problems of the international order that the U.S. constructed and led during the post-Cold War period manifested collectively in a single event.

The war in Ukraine is a clear violation of international law and an act of aggression by Russia. However, we must also consider that since the 1990s, the U.S. has shown limitations in creating a sustainable security order that comprehensively addresses the security interests of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia. Furthermore, the U.S. post-Cold War European security policy faces criticism for failing to accurately anticipate and deter Russia's imminent invasion of Ukraine. The U.S.'s powerlessness in various issues, such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan, China's annexation of Hong Kong, and the strengthening of military dictatorship in Myanmar, has already signaled the U.S.'s significant limitations in safeguarding the world order. While the decline of U.S. power is a fact, it is more prominent that international political affairs have become increasingly complex and diverse, marking the end of an era where a single great power could play a hegemonic or world police role.

In this context, the war in Ukraine, the largest conflict in Europe since World War II, described as "Europe's 9/11" for fundamentally altering European security perceptions, is becoming a turning point in various aspects. Russia is pursuing a strategy of "weaponizing winter" to gain the upper hand in the war, while Ukrainian President Zelensky, during his recent visit to the U.S., has intensified his strategy of appealing to the U.S. and Western countries for the recovery of all lost territories and victory in the war.

While navigating the unexpected variable of the Ukraine war in 2022, the Biden administration has been reorienting its vision for the revival of U.S. hegemony and the strengthening of global leadership. Throughout the past year, the U.S. has reorganized NATO in the wake of the Ukraine war, encouraged European countries to strengthen their military and security policies, intensified international economic sanctions against Russia, and continued its efforts to secure the legitimacy and value of the U.S.-led order. The Ukraine war has the potential to become a turning point that strengthens the foundation of U.S. global strategy, as evidenced by the U.S. securing international support for the illegality of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, strengthening military cooperation across the Atlantic, and attempting to link the European alliance system with the Indo-Pacific alliance system.

U.S. administrations have often found it difficult to consistently pursue the foreign policy objectives they set out upon entering office. It has been common for their policies to shift in response to newly emerging events during their tenure. A symbolic example is the George W. Bush administration, which initially advocated for a self-interest-centered approach focused on reducing global intervention, but subsequently pursued global military intervention after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Similarly, the Biden administration, while prioritizing containment of China as its key policy, saw the Ukraine war shift the focus of its strategy from Asia to Europe. However, the Biden administration is striving to maintain its focus on China strategy and is simultaneously working to strengthen its global strategy, using the Ukraine war as a catalyst, while also reinforcing the foundation of its China strategy.

The U.S. is highlighting the potential for Taiwan to become an "Ukraine of Asia," drawing attention to the implications for the world order of strategic alignment between China and Russia, the dangers of authoritarian solidarity against the democratic camp, and the evolving Eurasian landscape, including Russia's increasing dependence on China.

Even amidst the war in Ukraine, the U.S. emphasizes that its focus remains on China, identifying it as the sole power with the capability and will to challenge the U.S.-led order. The visit of Speaker Pelosi to Taiwan in August of last year reinforced this trend.

2. U.S. Foreign Policy in 2023

Key variables determining the direction of U.S. foreign policy in 2023 include the war in Ukraine, the U.S. strategy toward China, U.S. domestic politics, and the U.S. perception of and response to global crises facing humanity. First, the war in Ukraine is likely to reach a critical juncture in the first half of this year. Russia is increasingly losing its military capabilities, economic strength, domestic political support, and international consensus to sustain the war. President Putin, while alluding to the possibility of nuclear attacks, is also weighing diplomatic negotiations while leaving open the possibility of prolonging the war. The trajectory of the Ukraine war will be determined by the U.S. strategy toward Ukraine in the first half of the year, international support for Ukraine, and domestic support for President Putin in Russia.

At the U.S.-China summit in Bali last November, President Xi Jinping clearly expressed his opposition to nuclear war. This firm stance against the potential use of nuclear weapons by President Putin suggests that the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons is unlikely to materialize beyond political rhetoric. Within the U.S., voices, particularly from Republicans, oppose providing a blank check to Ukraine. The timing and manner in which the Ukraine war is resolved through diplomatic negotiations will be a crucial factor in determining whether the U.S. foreign policy focus can return to Asia.

Second, the U.S. strategy toward China has manifested as the Biden administration's more sophisticated containment strategy, particularly its "integrated deterrence" strategy and its strategy of strategic decoupling from China. However, debates surrounding the U.S. strategy toward China continue. The competition between U.S. interventionist and restraint strategies at the global level persists, and regarding China strategy, the spectrum ranges from a hardline military deterrence strategy to a coordination strategy that leaves room for structural engagement. The uncertainty surrounding the ultimate goals of the U.S. strategy toward China also carries the potential for confusion in the China strategies of both the U.S. and its allies. The Biden administration has presented a comprehensive China strategy that includes strengthening U.S. national power, cooperating with allies and partner countries, and pursuing bilateral competition with China. Secretary of State Blinken's speech at George Washington University on May 26 last year effectively conveyed these key points. The U.S.-China summit at the end of November last year was a summit between the two superpowers that fully showcased their strategic competition and indicated the potential direction of their past competition and cooperation.

The leaders of both countries explored avenues for managing competition to prevent escalation into confrontation, respecting each other's interests, and maintaining continuous dialogue, crisis management policies, and coordination. This year, China will likely focus on addressing domestic issues such as the COVID-19 situation, economic challenges, and the political stability following President Xi Jinping's third term. The U.S., while intensely engaging in competition surrounding its China strategy, will also face significant considerations in defining its relationship with China.

The core of U.S.-China competition converges on who can secure more allies and strategic partners, and who will gain the upper hand in cutting-edge technologies. Both the U.S. and China are striving to expand their networks of strategic partners through initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative, respectively. Securing dominance in advanced technologies, which will determine superiority in all fields during the Fourth Industrial Revolution, is also a key area of competition. The atmosphere that once discussed the inevitability of U.S.-China cooperation in science and advanced technology is gradually weakening, and competition to gain an advantage over each other is intensifying. In the economic sphere, trends such as the weaponization of interdependence and the formation of exclusive supply chains are strengthening, and companies pursuing economic interests are proactively responding to U.S.-China decoupling by considering geopolitical variables.

In this process, the U.S. strategy toward China is causing considerable concern and even backlash among its allies. This is because there are contradictions between the U.S. policy of strengthening its national power and its policy of cooperating with allies. Economic conflicts of interest between the U.S. and its allies, as exemplified by the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), highlight these internal contradictions within U.S. strategy. The U.S. must dedicate significant effort this year to resolving these issues and persuading its allies and strategic partners that the U.S.-led order remains normatively correct and also advantageous in terms of benefits.

Third, following last year's midterm elections, the U.S. political landscape has entered a period of intense competition ahead of next year's presidential election. With the next presidential nominee still uncertain for both the Democratic and Republican parties, debates will likely revolve around the Biden administration's foreign policy achievements. In this context, foreign policy will emerge as a significant issue of competition, with China strategy holding particular importance. Kevin McCarthy, the likely next Speaker of the House of Representatives and a Republican, has pledged to visit Taiwan, and it is highly probable that many congressional members from both parties will visit Taiwan this year, competitively pursuing support for Taiwan and containment of China. A key question is whether the U.S. can manage the issue of overbalancing toward China stemming from its domestic political landscape and adequately consider China's grievances.

Fourth, as Secretary Blinken has indicated, cooperation between the U.S. and China is a crucial element in areas such as health, environment, non-proliferation, and the regulation of new technologies. If the U.S. and China fail to make concerted efforts to address global crises, humanity could face existential threats. As environmental issues worsen and the COVID-19 pandemic persists, it is paramount that both the U.S. and China demonstrate the wisdom to pursue both competition and cooperation simultaneously.

3. South Korea's Foreign Strategy and ROK-U.S. Relations

Throughout last year, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has strived to strengthen ROK-U.S. cooperation and find South Korea's appropriate role within the world order pursued by the U.S. Simultaneously, it has recognized the importance of minimizing risks while acknowledging the potential for backlash from China and North Korea.

Crucially, when considering ROK-U.S. relations, it is essential to have an accurate understanding of the evolving world order. It is important to recognize that the U.S. no longer possesses the hegemonic power to unilaterally shape the global order, and that the strategic competition between the U.S. and China is unlikely to escalate into a hegemonic war for supremacy. As discussed earlier, international politics has become too complex, and the demand for international public goods too vast, for any single nation to be solely responsible for the international order. The sheer volume of frequent events makes it difficult even for superpowers like the U.S. or China to pursue consistent foreign strategies.

While U.S.-China relations are often discussed in terms of a bipolar system, the monopolistic power of the top-tier great powers has weakened to the point where defining "polar states" is no longer straightforward. Cooperative frameworks among great powers, or among major countries including middle powers, have become critically important for future governance due to close supply chain cooperation, the horizontal dispersion of technology, and the necessity of military collaboration. The presence of polar states has diminished, and horizontal power distribution among developed nations has expanded. In this context, South Korea, in sectors like semiconductors and batteries, possesses partial policy assets comparable to great powers. While the gap between rich and poor nations globally, particularly in technology, is widening, there is also a simultaneous characteristic of horizontal distribution of power among developed nations. South Korea has historically pursued foreign policies predicated on the assumption of U.S. hegemonic status; however, it must now pursue foreign policies that consider a U.S. that is increasingly becoming a "normal" great power and a U.S. that requires greater cooperation from South Korea.

Considering the factors that should be taken into account in ROK-U.S. relations this year, the following points are relevant. First, as the U.S. remains the world's strongest power and a crucial axis of cooperation for South Korea's security, economic development, and technological advancement, continuous efforts must be made to explore new directions for ROK-U.S. cooperation. While the U.S.-China relationship is an important consideration in ROK-U.S. cooperation, the benefits of bilateral ROK-U.S. cooperation must always be accurately assessed. ROK-U.S. cooperation is a core area of partnership for South Korea, encompassing deterrence against North Korea within the broader framework of integrated deterrence, future-oriented technological development, the re-establishment of global multilateralism, partnership between the ROK and the U.S. in establishing a new world order, and cooperation with various countries centered around the U.S.

Second, regarding the issue of value-based diplomacy, the U.S. will continue to pursue foreign policies that prominently feature values. The importance of alliances in U.S. foreign policy is growing, and the framework of democracy versus authoritarianism, or democracy versus dictatorship, is useful given the U.S.'s limited capacity to provide tangible benefits to its allies.

Korea, too, as an advanced middle power or an emerging developed country, can benefit its national interest by pursuing diplomacy that emphasizes universal discourse and global roles, moving beyond a narrow definition of national interest. The issue is how to harmonize values and national interest. It is a matter of coordination between diplomacy that takes values as national interest and diplomacy that takes national interest as values. There is no doubt that national interest is the most important value in foreign policy, as the modern state system structurally demands such normative orientation.

Utilizing values as a justification for pursuing national interest beyond a narrow definition, enhancing Korea's status and soft power, and employing them as material for public diplomacy are important in terms of practical benefits. In this context, the challenge of how to combine U.S. value diplomacy and Korean value diplomacy from the perspectives of national interest and values will continue to emerge. Efforts are needed to simultaneously emphasize that Korea's pursuit of values is not confined to a narrow definition of national interest, while sometimes agreeing with the universal aspects of U.S. value diplomacy and at other times pointing out its biases.

Third, within the context of the U.S. presidential election this year, China policy will become an even more significant subject of competition and debate. As both the Democratic and Republican parties will competitively emphasize U.S. national interest and engage in a contest of ideological hardline clarity, it will inevitably place a burden on ally Korea. As geoeconomic competition intensifies, the space for strategic autonomy shrinks amidst value polarization, and security competition surrounding immediate issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea escalates, not only Korea but also the foreign policies of various U.S. allies may face difficulties. The U.S., too, due to its closely intertwined national interests with China, cannot help but exhibit a duality of pursuing strategic competition while adjusting interests. Korea must strive to devise policies toward the U.S. that China can accept and strategies toward China that the U.S. can understand.■

■ Author: Jeon Jae-sung_Director of EAI's Center for National Security Studies, Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "Threats of War and Peace Between the Two Koreas" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | hspark@eai.or.kr