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[Global NK Commentary] The Ukraine War and North Korea-Russia Relations
Editor's Note
Hyun Seung-soo, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, argues that the escalating Russia-West conflict following the Ukraine war is fueling North Korea's provocations. He analyzes that while Russia is unlikely to provide a breakthrough for the North Korean economy due to inherent factors like economic incompatibility and increasing financial burdens under sanctions, it is highly probable that Russia will block condemnation resolutions or new sanctions against North Korea. Hyun believes that as the post-Cold War international order falters and conflicts among Northeast Asian nations take on aspects of a new Cold War, attention must be paid to the changes in Russia-US, US-China, and China-Russia relations that will emerge after the Ukraine war concludes. Furthermore, he emphasizes that Russia should not be excluded from discussions aimed at resolving the Korean Peninsula issue, as the North Korean nuclear problem is difficult to resolve peacefully without Russia's support.
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Ten months have passed since Russia invaded Ukraine. Contrary to initial expectations, Russia has demonstrated significant military deficiencies, while Ukraine has surprisingly held its ground. Although the possibility of negotiations is being raised as Ukrainian forces recapture parts of Kherson, which Russia had declared its territory, it remains unknown when the war will end. Above all, it is unlikely that Ukraine, which has lost territory comparable to the Korean Peninsula, will back down easily. Even if a ceasefire or armistice is reached through negotiations, the conflict is likely to continue. It could remain a low-intensity conflict, similar to those in Palestine or Nagorno-Karabakh.
While some view this war as a confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism, others see it as a Western plot to dismantle Russia. Some also believe that the United States and the West provoked the war, while others, regardless of the cause, find President Putin's actions of crossing into a neighboring country and sacrificing innocent civilians unforgivable. There is also the view that Putin harbors ambitions to rebuild the former Soviet Union. In this era of rampant fake news, discerning the truth of the war is not easy. However, many agree with the prospect that this war could become a turning point that fundamentally alters the post-Cold War world order, which has persisted for 30 years. The global energy shortages and food crises that have swept the world also demonstrate that this war is not merely a conflict at the national or regional level.
North Korea's Provocations and North Korea-Russia Rapprochement
The Ukraine war casts a dark shadow over the distant Korean Peninsula as well. This is because North Korea's behavior, which has conducted over 30 ballistic missile launches this year alone, does not seem unrelated to this war. While the Biden administration's hardline stance towards North Korea, the Yoon Suk-yeol government in South Korea, and the resumption of joint US-ROK military exercises, which had been suspended for a while, are cited as the main causes of missile provocations, there are also considerable expert opinions suggesting that the exacerbated Russia-US conflict due to the Ukraine war is fueling North Korea's unusual provocations. The analysis suggests that Kim Jong Un, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, is seeking closer ties with Russia, using anti-US sentiment as a catalyst. There have also been persistent reports that Russia, suffering from a shortage of weapons and munitions needed for its war effort, has received ammunition, weapons, and even military uniforms from North Korea. Although North Korea and Russia dismiss these reports as mere US-orchestrated disinformation campaigns, the fact that North Korea and Russia have become noticeably closer in the wake of the Ukraine war is undeniable.
The international media was greatly surprised when North Korea officially declared its support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Few countries have openly supported Russia's military actions. Even China, Iran, and India, classified as pro-Russian nations, have maintained a neutral stance on the war waged by Russia. Furthermore, very few countries have formally recognized the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics, established by pro-Russian forces within Ukraine, as independent states. Apart from Russia, Syria is the only other country to do so. North Korea is included in this group. Moreover, when Putin announced in September 2022 the annexation of four regions seized from Ukraine—Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—as Russian territory, North Korea immediately issued a statement from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs supporting this move. Since the outbreak of the war, North Korea has voted against condemnation resolutions against Russia at the UN, and Russia has exercised its veto power to block new sanctions against North Korea, indicating a pattern of mutual protection.
Kim Jong Un may be calculating to elevate the relationship with Russia to a level comparable to an alliance, if not an actual alliance. He may wish to emulate the example of China and Russia, which have closely aligned their state relations to a quasi-alliance level. Kim Jong Un is well aware that while the geopolitical interests and national interests of China and Russia do not perfectly align, they have strengthened mutual solidarity and strategic closeness for common goals. The common goal of China and Russia is to depose the United States, the global hegemon, and establish a multipolar world order. Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping believe that the era where the United States dictates everything must end, and its end is near. The unified perception of the leaders of China and Russia is that if Russia, still the world's second-largest military power, and China, which has risen to G2 status in economic terms, join forces, they can end the unipolar US-dominated era that has prevailed for the past 30 years since the end of the Cold War.
Kim Jong Un appears to desire North Korea's inclusion within this closely aligned China-Russia relationship. Although North Korea is a small nation with insufficient scale and economic power, it threatens the United States by legalizing its nuclear arsenal. In January 2018, Putin praised Kim Jong Un as an "able and mature politician." Putin made the following remarks to reporters in relation to the situation where Kim Jong Un heightened pressure on the United States by repeatedly conducting nuclear and missile tests after the launch of the Trump administration in 2017: "I think Kim Jong Un has won this time. He has achieved his strategic objectives. He has nuclear warheads and, in fact, missiles with a range of 13,000 kilometers that can reach the territory of any potential adversary anywhere in the world. He is undoubtedly not only capable but also a mature politician." Two months later, in March 2018, during his State of the Nation address to parliament, Putin released a simulation video of a nuclear attack on the United States. He criticized the United States and the West, stating in a somber tone, "No one wanted to talk to us; no one wanted to listen to us. But now you have to listen."
Potential and Limitations of North Korea-Russia Relations
In fact, Russia has made various efforts to improve relations with North Korea since President Putin took office. The fact that he visited North Korea in his first year as president is highly significant. Even during the Cold War, when the two countries were called blood allies, no Soviet leader had ever visited North Korea. Putin believes that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost crucial strategic assets necessary for managing global affairs. For him, North Korea was a geopolitical asset to be recovered. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was more interested in developing relations with South Korea than in attending to North Korea. Facing severe economic hardship after the cessation of Soviet aid, North Korea attempted to overcome its difficulties through nuclear and missile development, to which the UN and the US responded with intensified sanctions. North Korea's economy showed no signs of recovery. For Russia to restore relations with North Korea, North Korea's economy needed to normalize to some extent. Russia took the step of writing off North Korea's debt, which had remained the biggest obstacle to North Korea-Russia cooperation. In 2014, the Russian State Duma ratified an agreement to forgive $10 billion of the $11 billion that North Korea had borrowed from the former Soviet Union, with the remaining $1 billion to be repaid over 20 years with a grace period.
Furthermore, since 2001, Russia has proposed what is known as the Trilateral Economic Cooperation Project between South Korea, North Korea, and Russia. This was a grand vision to connect the Trans-Siberian Railway, Russian gas pipelines, and power grids to South Korea via North Korea. Russia believed that the Trilateral Economic Cooperation Project would not only bring economic benefits to Russia, South Korea, and North Korea but also contribute to improving inter-Korean relations. In August 2011, during a summit meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and Russian President Medvedev in Russia, the Trilateral Economic Cooperation Project was a major agenda item. At that time, the Lee Myung-bak administration also showed interest in Russia's proposal, making it seem as though the historic economic cooperation project was on the verge of realization. However, the project did not gain momentum and ultimately stalled due to the strengthening of UN sanctions against North Korea following its repeated nuclear and missile provocations. Notably, after North Korea's fourth nuclear test in January 2016, during the process of adopting a UN Security Council resolution, Russia opposed North Korea's nuclear test and agreed on the necessity of sanctions but demanded and succeeded in modifying the sanctions to preserve the Trilateral Economic Cooperation Project. However, Russia's efforts did not lead to the resumption of the project. In June 2021, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, President Putin stated that to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, conditions for North Korea's security guarantees should be created rather than relying on sanctions, and that the Trilateral Economic Cooperation Project could be an effective means to achieve this.
There are also speculations that Russia's economic support for North Korea may increase following the strengthening of North Korea-Russia ties after the Ukraine war. However, over the past 30 years, North Korea-Russia economic relations have been extremely limited, and the inherent structural limitations between the two economies are difficult to overcome. The low economic compatibility between the two countries means that North Korea has few economic cards to offer Russia, and the trade volume between them is very small. Russia does not wish to return to an economic relationship with North Korea based on gratuitous aid, as it did during the Soviet era. Moreover, it is unlikely that Russia, facing increasing financial burdens under sanctions, will provide a breakthrough for the North Korean economy.
However, it is clear that the benefits North Korea could receive from strengthened North Korea-Russia relations far outweigh the benefits Russia might gain. As mentioned earlier, North Korea has consistently supported Russia's position regarding the Ukraine war. In return, Russia, starting with its veto vote alongside China on a UN Security Council resolution condemning North Korea's ballistic missile launch in January 2022, has repeatedly blocked condemnation resolutions and decisions to impose new sanctions against North Korea. For North Korea, supporting Russia is a symbolic display of solidarity, as it does not directly relate to its own affairs. In contrast, Russia's protective stance towards North Korea is an exercise of power that blocks external pressures that could cause tangible harm to North Korea. If the division into blocs in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula solidifies, as it did during the Cold War, North Korea stands to benefit the most.
Future Outlook and Recommendations
It is difficult to predict the extent to which North Korea and Russia will deepen their relationship in the future. We must observe how the Ukraine war concludes. If Russia suffers a decisive defeat in the war and falls into diplomatic isolation and economic hardship, the nature of its support for North Korea will also change significantly. Furthermore, attention must be paid to how relations between the US and Russia, the US and China, and China and Russia evolve. While US-China tensions are escalating and China-Russia solidarity appears robust, how China treats Russia in the future is an indispensable variable in predicting North Korea-Russia relations. China may not welcome closer ties between Russia and North Korea.
As the post-Cold War international order falters and conflicts among Northeast Asian nations exhibit characteristics of polarization and a new Cold War, the relationship between South Korea and Russia, marking its 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties, faces a significant test. The fundamental framework of South Korea's Russia diplomacy, which has sought to leverage the development of Russia's Far East and the Trilateral Economic Cooperation Project to gain Russia's support in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, is now inevitably due for a major revision. As long as Russia highly values North Korea's strategic importance in countering the United States in Northeast Asia and can exercise its veto power as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, South Korea will face significant constraints in cooperating with Russia on North Korean issues, particularly concerning North Korea's nuclear and missile development. Russia perceives the geopolitical challenges posed by the United States as a greater threat than the crisis posed by North Korea's nuclear program. Even if Russia does not overtly pursue a strategy to solidify the North Korea-China-Russia bloc, North Korea and Russia are likely to speak with one voice under the common strategic objective of countering the US in the process of reshaping the global order, which will pose a major obstacle to the South Korean government's pursuit of its North Korea and unification policies.
However, even amidst these challenging circumstances, it is crucial for South Korea to maintain an approach that does not exclude Russia from discussions on the North Korean nuclear issue. The multilateral resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem is Russia's consistent stance, and Russia remains an important partner for South Korea, as the North Korean nuclear issue is extremely difficult to resolve peacefully without Russia's support. Above all, it is necessary to develop logical arguments to convey the South Korean government's strong commitment to denuclearization and its efforts for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue to the Russian side. Only a consistent policy stance on unification and North Korea, unchanged by changes in administration, can persuade Russia. It is difficult to counter Russia's long-term perspective, which has remained unchanged for over 20 years, with South Korea's short-term, five-year policy cycles.
※ This commentary is the Korean translation of "The Russia-Ukraine War and North Korea-Russia Relations."
■ Hyun Seung-soo_ is a Research Fellow at the Peace and Security Division, Korea Institute for National Unification. He holds master's and doctoral degrees from the University of Tokyo, Japan, and previously served as a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and as a HK Professor at the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, Hanyang University. He is currently an adjunct professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University, and Vice President of the Korean Association for Eurasian Studies. His main research areas include Russian and Eurasian international politics, Russian security policy, and North Korea-Russia relations. He is the author of several works, including "China-Russia Cooperation and Peace and Prosperity on the Korean Peninsula" (co-authored), "Border Cooperation for Peace and Prosperity on the Korean Peninsula" (co-authored), and "Multilateral Approaches to Promoting Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation and Eurasian Cooperation" (co-authored).
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.