[Global NK Commentary] U.S.-North Korea Relations After the U.S. Midterm Elections

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The U.S. midterm elections were held on November 8th, with all 435 members of the House of Representatives being newly elected, and voters choosing 35 Senate seats, one-third of the total. As is well known, in U.S. midterm elections, the president's party typically loses seats and loses the election. Since the establishment of the two-party system by the Democratic and Republican parties, from Lincoln's first midterm election in 1862 to Trump's midterm election in 2018, the president's party has lost seats in 36 out of 40 midterm elections. In particular, since 1934, the president's party has lost an average of 28 seats in the House and 4 seats in the Senate in midterm elections. Presidential approval ratings are a key factor; historically, if below 50 percent, the president's party has lost an average of 37 seats, and if above 50 percent, an average of 14 seats.

Were the results of this U.S. midterm election as expected or surprising? Two hypotheses emerged before the election. Hypothesis 1: Due to inflation, crime rates, gas prices, and border chaos, the Democratic Party, the president's party, will suffer an unprecedented defeat. Hypothesis 2: Biden's Democratic Party, leveraging the Supreme Court's unilateral decision on abortion and campaigning against extremist candidates who do not accept election results, will not suffer significant losses. Upon opening the results, exit polls confirmed that centrist voters and young voters, who held the key to victory in competitive districts, participated at relatively high rates and generally sided with the Democratic Party. Regardless of the remaining vote counts, it is possible to summarize that the Democratic Party performed well and the Republican Party underperformed. Ultimately, politics is a game of expectations; after the election, Biden was reportedly smiling and Trump was reportedly angry. To summarize, the traditional midterm assessment, which holds the president and his party responsible for inflation, the worst in 40 years, has been significantly diminished. Instead, the backlash and retribution against the conservative-leaning Supreme Court and candidates who deny the foundations of democracy were the core narrative of this election. Of course, the increased interest from citizens who value procedural democracy, such as election fairness, is desirable. At the same time, the weakening role of retributive democracy, which objectively evaluates economic failures, presents a dilemma that the divided American democracy will continue to face.

In fact, these midterm elections held significant meaning for President Biden. The election results would greatly influence his governance for the next two years and his potential bid for re-election. If the House were to fall to the Republicans, regardless of the Senate election results, Biden would find it difficult to legislate his agenda during his remaining term. After the 2018 midterm elections, Republican President Trump and Democratic House Speaker Pelosi reached agreements in areas such as protectionist trade and Middle East peace. The background for this was the changing U.S. emphasis on "America First" and non-interventionism. Conversely, instances of policy cooperation between a Democratic president and a Republican-controlled House are rare, except for the president's shift to the right. Therefore, it is clear that President Biden, a former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would turn his attention to foreign policy.

The problem is the 2024 presidential election. If Biden had made the shocking decision to forgo re-election after a disastrous midterm election, there might have been a possibility for him to seek innovative North Korea relations during his remaining term. This is because a Democratic president without the prospect of a next election, like Clinton in 2000, is well-suited to improve relations with North Korea. However, given that the election results concluded with Biden and the Democratic Party performing well, it appears more likely that he will run for re-election, using his past victory over Trump as justification. This would actually reduce President Biden's options. If North Korea's security threats, including ICBM launches, materialize again, a Democratic president facing an election would have no choice but to adopt a hardline stance. He would also likely resort to pressuring or shifting blame to Xi Jinping. Ultimately, it does not seem likely that Biden will proactively move at this point. Paradoxically, this may be a time and space for our government to act and lead. Of course, establishing a firm security posture against North Korea's nuclear threat is an undeniable top priority.

Looking at the U.S. situation, Biden's foreign policy and national security team, including Blinken, Sullivan, Sherman, and Campbell, who are well-versed in North Korea, might become interested in seeking new breakthroughs regarding the North Korean issue. However, the problem with the Washington foreign policy team is that extensive experience with North Korea does not necessarily translate into positive outcomes. Given the extremely low trust in North Korea and strong aversion to Trump-style top-down approaches, it may be more difficult than with other administrations to achieve a breakthrough on North Korea due to a form of groupthink. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that the U.S. history of normalizing relations with former adversaries shows a certain regularity. Normalization primarily involves the mutual establishment of embassies and can be understood as improving relations leading to diplomatic ties, with the notable aspect that there was no prior or subsequent congressional approval, and it was mainly through the subsequent independent positions/legislation of Congress. A well-known example is the U.S.-China normalization announcement in 1979, which was made abruptly, and in response, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act.

Indeed, the breakdown of North Korea-U.S. negotiations during the Trump administration demonstrated the impracticality of the so-called "Big Deal." However, the phased approach also takes a long time, and if the issue of low trust between North Korea and the U.S. resurfaces during the process, systematic implementation will likely face difficulties. In conclusion, while an agreement that includes phased steps is necessary rather than a Big Deal, it has become a situation where a bold approach is more needed than a phased approach. In other words, a breakthrough in North Korea-U.S. relations would at least require the establishment of liaison offices in Washington and Pyongyang to be meaningful. Realistically, close and continuous consultation between South Korea and the United States is urgently needed regarding what cards the U.S. and North Korea will exchange.

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of "The Future of U.S.-North Korea Relations after the 2022 U.S. Midterm Elections."

■ Seo Jeong-geonGraduated from the Department of Political Science at Seoul National University and received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Texas at Austin, focusing on the U.S. Congress and foreign policy. He served as an Assistant Professor at the University of North Carolina Wilmington (2007-2012) and is currently a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Kyung Hee University. He was a Fulbright Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in the U.S. (2019) and served as President of the Association for American Political Studies (2020). He is currently active as a policy advisor for the Ministry of Unification, a senior researcher at the National Research Foundation of Korea, and a guest commentator for KBS. His co-authored books, "When American Politics Meets International Issues (2019)" and "American Politics and East Asian Foreign Policy (2017)," were both selected as excellent academic books by the National Academy of Sciences, Republic of Korea, and his paper, "The China Card: Playing Politics with Sino-American Relations," was chosen as the best paper in foreign policy by the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 2009. He has also published numerous other papers, including "Vote Switching on Foreign Policy in the U.S. House of Representatives," "A Historical Review of U.S. Midterm Elections," and "The Jacksonian Turn in Trump Administration and U.S. Foreign Policy."