[Global NK Commentary] Analysis of North Korea's Nuclear Force Policy Act: Intentions and Drawbacks

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Since the mid-2010s, as North Korea's nuclear capabilities have advanced, there has been intense interest among experts regarding whether their future nuclear doctrine would remain based on China's concept of minimal deterrence or evolve towards denial deterrence. North Korea's pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons, which intensified after the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in January 2021, or its efforts to operationalize nuclear weapons, provided a clear answer from Pyongyang to this question. It represents an official shift from its initial stance of using nuclear weapons solely for ultimate retaliation to an attitude where nuclear weapons could be used first during a conventional war on the Korean Peninsula.

Of course, the calculation of making even conventional military actions difficult for the adversary by threatening the use of nuclear weapons during conventional warfare is not new. This is because countries like Pakistan in the 2010s or the United States/NATO in the 1960s, which share ▲ a border with a potential adversary and ▲ feel inferior in conventional military strength compared to the adversary, have commonly adopted doctrines of repelling conventional invasion with tactical nuclear attacks.[1]However, given that the doctrines and postures of these countries at the time all mentioned situations such as a large-scale ground invasion by the adversary as conditions for nuclear use, North Korea's recently formalized policy and nuclear doctrine are significantly lower and more arbitrary in their threshold for nuclear use compared to previous precedents.

This attempt to maximize deterrence effects by showcasing extreme uncertainty reached its peak with the 'Nuclear Force Policy Act' adopted by Pyongyang on September 8. The specific wording, format, and premises of this legislation clearly illustrate the direction of the nuclear operationalization doctrine and posture that Pyongyang has been developing.

I. Mission and Command and Control of Nuclear Forces

North Korea adopted the 'Law on the Status of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defense' (hereinafter referred to as the 'Nuclear State Law') in April 2013. The Nuclear Force Policy Act explicitly stated in Article 11, Paragraph 1, that it supersedes the Nuclear State Law of 2013. The most significant difference between the two laws in their detailed content lies in the section addressing the 'mission of nuclear forces.' While Article 2 of the 2013 law defined the use of nuclear weapons as 'to deter and repel aggression and attack against our Republic and to deliver a devastating retaliatory strike against the strongholds of aggression,' the new law, in Article 1, Paragraph 1, states 'to deter war as its primary mission,' while Paragraph 2 stipulates 'to fulfill its operational mission to repel the aggression and attack of hostile forces and achieve decisive victory in war if war deterrence fails.'

In other words, the 2013 law focused on deterring the adversary's use of nuclear weapons by threatening 'devastating retaliation.' In this case, the use of nuclear weapons, regardless of its feasibility, was a threat premised on the mutual annihilation of both sides. In contrast, the new law adds 'decisive victory in war,' indicating an intention to make nuclear weapons a usable force in actual combat. It aims to devise a method for survival or victory even after the use of nuclear weapons.

These characteristics of the new law are more clearly revealed in the five specific situations stipulated in Article 6, 'Conditions for the Use of Nuclear Weapons.' These provisions can be considered a significant lowering of the threshold for nuclear use compared to the declared policies of other nuclear-armed states, as they clearly express an intention not to distinguish whether the adversary's attack is nuclear or conventional. In other words, it is an extreme form of the operationalization doctrine that allows for the use of nuclear weapons at any time during a conventional war. The intention is to deter any military action by the adversary through the maintenance of a precarious posture where nuclear weapons can be used at any time by lowering the nuclear threshold as much as possible.

Thus, the question of 'under what circumstances nuclear weapons will be used' is two sides of the same coin as the question of 'how nuclear weapons will be managed and controlled.' Especially for a country like North Korea that threatens preemptive nuclear escalation in conventional warfare, there is a need to showcase that the procedures for deciding and executing the actual use of nuclear weapons in case of emergency are very simple or delegated to field commanders. This is the issue of nuclear command and control. Articles 3, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the new Nuclear Force Policy Act stipulate that 'Nuclear forces shall obey the sole command of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission' and 'The Chairman of the State Affairs Commission holds all decision-making authority related to nuclear weapons.' However, Paragraph 3 states that 'if the command and control system for nuclear forces is endangered by an attack from hostile forces, a nuclear strike to annihilate the hostile forces shall be carried out automatically and immediately according to pre-determined operational plans.' While Paragraphs 1 and 2 mention the principle of centralized (assertive) command and control, Paragraph 3 indicates an attempt at flexible application by mentioning the parallel establishment of delegated (delegative) command and control for emergencies.

If Pyongyang pursues a doctrine of gaining an advantage on the battlefield by preemptively using tactical nuclear weapons during conventional warfare, it will face the risk of decapitation strikes or disarming strikes imposed by the overwhelming nuclear power of the United States. While there might be limitations to these response options if Washington is seriously concerned about North Korea's ICBMs surviving such first strikes and missile defense (MD) to inflict significant damage on the U.S. mainland, it does not seem likely that Washington will judge North Korea's nuclear capabilities to have crossed the threshold of Assured Retaliation Capability in the near future.[2]

Therefore, in the current situation, North Korea lacks adequate means to deter a large-scale nuclear retaliation from the United States. Without such a card, Pyongyang's calculation of using nuclear weapons first during conventional warfare to gain an advantage becomes militarily untenable. The mention of so-called 'automatic nuclear strikes' is a makeshift measure to somehow avoid large-scale nuclear retaliation from the United States until its assured retaliation capability reaches a certain level through the acquisition of multi-warhead (MIRV) ICBMs or reliable SLBM capabilities. It is an attempt to prevent extreme situations such as the annihilation of the leadership or the decapitation of the supreme leader even after preemptive nuclear use.

II. Similarities with Russia's 2020 Nuclear Policy Documents

Another distinct feature evident in the structure, wording, and vocabulary of the Nuclear Force Policy Act is its similarity to Russia's official nuclear policy literature. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has produced five documents related to its nuclear doctrine. Among these, the most recent version, the June 2020 Presidential Decree 'Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence' (hereinafter referred to as 'Basic Principles'), appears to be the document most heavily referenced by Pyongyang in drafting its Nuclear Force Policy Act. Firstly, both are legislated documents, one as a law and the other as a presidential executive order, and their length and the composition of major sections are also similar, showing clear formal commonalities.

Substantive commonalities are also prominent. The conditions for nuclear use discussed in Article 3, Paragraph 19 of Russia's 2020 'Basic Principles,' the purpose of the guidelines mentioned in Article 1, Paragraph 4, and the simultaneous maintenance of nuclear deterrence and operational use mentioned in Article 2, Paragraph 15, are remarkably similar to the main contents of the Nuclear Force Policy Act examined earlier. In other words, ▲ the display of preemptive nuclear use options during conventional warfare, ▲ the dual doctrine of utilizing nuclear weapons for both deterrence and operational purposes, and ▲ offsetting conventional inferiority by lowering the threshold for nuclear use can all be confirmed as commonalities in both documents.

The 2020 'Basic Principles' document concretely illustrated Russia's 'Escalate to De-escalate' doctrine, which aims to deter or force the withdrawal of military actions by the United States or NATO through the threat of tactical nuclear escalation on the battlefield. The existence of this doctrine, which had previously been suspected by the U.S. military and academic circles, was substantiated by this document. The 'Escalate to De-escalate' doctrine is generally considered to have been realized through Moscow's repeated insinuations of potential nuclear use following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine earlier this year. While it cannot be definitively stated that this is the sole reason for the restraint of direct military intervention by the United States and NATO, it is plausible that Pyongyang, at the very least, perceived the Russian doctrine as effective and thus hastened the active disclosure of related doctrines and declared policies. The fundamental objective of the Nuclear Force Policy Act is likely to create a similar situation on the Korean Peninsula to deter the activation of U.S. extended deterrence and wartime reinforcements.

III. Implications: The Disconnect Between Capability and Doctrine

However, there is a critical limitation: North Korea is not Russia. It goes without saying that 'Escalate to De-escalate' is a doctrine that can be contemplated by a country like Russia, which possesses nuclear capabilities on par with the United States at the level of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The underlying calculation is that escalation ultimately leads to mutual annihilation, compelling the United States to seriously consider Russia's threat of escalation. In contrast, as explained earlier, the U.S. perception of North Korea's strike capabilities does not even reach the level of assured retaliation, let alone assured destruction. Therefore, even if North Korea threatens preemptive nuclear use, following Russia's example, it is unlikely that the United States will feel constrained in executing extended deterrence. At least, Washington's perception is much closer to this reality.

Due to this disconnect between the pursued doctrine and actual capabilities, or between Pyongyang's perception and the actual reality, North Korea is constantly searching for a way to create a 'peculiar structure of mutual nuclear deterrence' that would allow it to avoid large-scale nuclear retaliation from the United States even after preemptively using nuclear weapons. The extreme lowering of nuclear use conditions, the display of arbitrariness, and the threats of delegated or automated retaliatory nuclear use, as discussed above, are all makeshift measures aimed at achieving this.

The problem is that such attempts by Pyongyang dramatically increase the risk of accidental nuclear use. If a localized conflict between North and South Korea or between North Korea and the United States escalates into Pyongyang's reckless use of nuclear weapons in actual combat, there is a significant probability that the subsequent outcome would be a nuclear catastrophe not only for the Korean Peninsula but for all of Northeast Asia. Pyongyang believes it can achieve security through this, but in reality, it is only jeopardizing its security. Making the policymakers in Pyongyang realize this cold truth is the most urgent task for the surrounding parties, including China and Russia.

■ Hwang Ildo_ He is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea National Diplomatic Academy, specializing in North Korean issues, nuclear deterrence, and military security. He holds a Master's degree in North Korean Studies with a specialization in Military Security from the Graduate School of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science with a specialization in International Politics from Yonsei University. He previously worked as a reporter for The Dong-A Ilbo, a research fellow at the Center for Peace and Future Studies, Hwa-Jeong Peace Foundation, and a Visiting Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). His major publications include 'The DNA of North Korea's Military Strategy' (2013) and 'Kim Jong-il Fires the Fear' (2009).

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of "Analysis of North Korea’s Nuclear Force Policy Act: Intentions and Drawbacks."

[1]Ildo Hwang, "Common Pattern of Nuclear Doctrine Evolutions and North Korea’s Recent Concept of Nuclear Escalation," National Strategy 27, no. 3 (2021).

[2]Hwang Ildo, "Resumption of ICBM Tests: North Korea’s Intentions Seen from the Nuclear Deterrence Perspective," IFANS FOCUS, no. 7 (2022).