[Global NK Commentary] Analysis of China's Foreign Policy in the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China Report

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1. Introduction

The National Congress of the Communist Party of China is the largest political event in China, where representatives from various regions and professions among the entire Party membership of over 96.71 million gather once every five years to elect approximately 200 Central Committee members, alternate members, and members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection who will lead the Party for the next five years, and to approve amendments to the Party Constitution. The 20th National Congress in 2022, with 2,296 delegates officially announced on September 25, 2022, was held for seven days from October 16 to October 22 at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, commencing with an opening declaration by Premier Li Keqiang.

The primary reason this Party Congress garnered significant domestic and international attention, alongside the question of Xi Jinping's third term, was likely the 'report' delivered by the top Chinese leadership at the opening ceremony. This report contains an assessment of the past five years' work and policy directions and key concepts for the next five years across major areas of national governance. In this 20th Party Congress, Xi Jinping delivered a 'report' of approximately 14,400 characters over 1 hour and 44 minutes. The report placed considerable emphasis on national security and 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,' while other topics such as Chinese-style modernization, building a strong socialist modernized country, Taiwan reunification, common prosperity, the non-public (private) economy, and maintaining the zero-COVID policy (Dynamic Zero-COVID) also attracted significant attention.

2. Current Issues in China's Foreign Policy as Revealed in the 'Report'

2-1. Korean Peninsula Situation Before and After the 20th Party Congress

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration, inaugurated in May 2022, has since clarified its policy direction towards strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and the ROK-U.S.-Japan regional security cooperation framework. Notably, the ROK-U.S. summit in May 2022 defined the ROK-U.S. alliance as a global comprehensive strategic alliance and agreed to reactivate the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) to counter North Korea's escalating nuclear and missile threats. Furthermore, efforts were made to improve ROK-Japan relations, and ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, which had been suspended or reduced during the previous Moon Jae-in administration, were resumed.

The Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea responded with a series of missile tests and showed signs of preparing for a nuclear test. Amidst escalating tensions around the Korean Peninsula, China faced an unfavorable situation in September, one month before the 20th Party Congress. The U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) docked in Busan on September 23, followed by ROK-U.S. joint maritime exercises from September 26-29, and ROK-U.S.-Japan anti-submarine warfare and missile defense exercises. In October, as North Korea continued its missile provocations, the USS Ronald Reagan re-entered waters near the Korean Peninsula, and ROK-U.S. forces conducted joint maritime maneuvering exercises in international waters of the East Sea on October 7-8.

Amidst the escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula, three days before the 20th Party Congress, on October 13, President Xi Jinping sent a reply message to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's congratulatory message on the 73rd anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. In his reply, Xi Jinping noted the "severe and complex changes" in the international and regional situation and the increasing importance of "enhancing strategic communication and strengthening unity and cooperation" between North Korea and China. North Korea, on the opening day of the 20th Party Congress, sent a congratulatory message from the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, stating that the two countries would continue to provide mutual support and cooperation amidst an "unprecedentedly complex and challenging international environment."

In light of this, North Korea-China relations are expected to maintain their strategic cooperative relationship after the 20th Party Congress to serve their respective interests in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian situations, including their relations with the U.S. However, mutual strategic distrust persists between the two countries. China, in particular, will likely experience growing dissatisfaction and concern over the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. and ROK-U.S.-Japan alliances and regional security cooperation frameworks resulting from North Korea's repeated missile provocations. The Xi Jinping leadership perceives that while the ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation ostensibly aims to strengthen deterrence against North Korea, it ultimately targets China under U.S. leadership.

2-2. China's Security Concerns and Determination to Enhance Military Power: U.S.-China Relations and Taiwan Reunification

In his 'report,' President Xi Jinping expressed a determination to strengthen overall defense capabilities, emphasizing the need to "deepen practical military training." He also pledged to increase investment in developing the People's Liberation Army into a world-class military and reiterated a strong commitment to Taiwan's reunification. These statements in the 'report' encapsulate China's military and security concerns stemming from the U.S.-China strategic competition, the political and strategic importance of the Taiwan issue, and the urgent need for military buildup.

(a) U.S.-led NATO and Military-Security Linkages in the Indo-Pacific Region

The 'report' of the 20th Party Congress mentioned 'security' 29 times, and various forms of security, including international, people's, economic, and food security, were mentioned a total of 91 times. Compared to 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,' which appeared 33 times, and 'common prosperity,' which garnered significant attention but was mentioned only 8 times, one can indirectly sense the concerns and importance the Communist Party of China leadership places on security issues. One of the primary reasons for this increased concern about security is the recent trend of strengthening military-security linkages between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and allied and partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region, led by the United States amid intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition.

From China's perspective, the U.S. was containing Russia through NATO in Europe and containing China through its Indo-Pacific strategy in Asia. However, recently, major EU and NATO countries have been concretizing their strategic interest and commitment to the Indo-Pacific region by releasing Indo-Pacific strategies, strategic guidelines, or integrated strategy documents addressing the region. Representative examples include Germany's 'Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region: Germany–Europe–Asia: shaping the 21st century together' in September 2020, and the Netherlands' 'Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia' in November 2020. In 2021, the UK released its 'Integrated Review 2021: Global Britain in a Competitive Age: Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy' in March, followed by France's 'La strategie de la France dans I'Indopacifique' (an updated version of its previous strategy, English title: France's Indo-Pacific Strategy) in April, and the EU's 'EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific' in September.Germany–Europe–Asia: shaping the 21st century togetherIndo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in AsiaGlobal Britain in a Competitive Age: Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign PolicyFrance's Indo-Pacific Strategy

Furthermore, in 2021, following the UK and France, German and Dutch naval vessels conducted joint exercises with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region, including the South China Sea, increasing military and security pressure on China. In September of the same year, the trilateral security pact AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) was established. Subsequently, in June 2022, the leaders of the Asia-Pacific Four (AP4: South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) were invited to the NATO summit.

China strongly criticized the AP4's participation in NATO. However, the fundamental reason for China's negative reaction is the continuous strengthening of strategic pressure and containment against China by the U.S. through enhanced linkages between NATO and allied and partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region in recent years. Simultaneously, China's military and security concerns in its relations with the U.S. have inevitably increased.

(b) Strategic Value and Political Weight of Taiwan Reunification

Regarding the Taiwan issue, President Xi Jinping stated in the 'report' that China would strive to achieve peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and effort, but would never commit to abandoning the use of force and would reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. He further clarified that this was not directed at the broad masses of Taiwan compatriots but at "interference by external forces and the very few 'Taiwan independence' separatists and their separatist activities." He emphasized that "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must be accomplished, and it will be accomplished."

The inclusion of the use of force option in Xi Jinping's statement on Taiwan will inevitably increase challenges for future cross-strait relations as well as U.S.-China relations. While China's limitation of "interference by external forces" (effectively referring to the U.S.) and "Taiwan independence and separatist activities" (referring to President Tsai Ing-wen and her supporters) to specific targets, while distinguishing them from the general population of Taiwan and the Kuomintang, who are open to cooperation with China, could be seen as an effort to reduce cross-strait conflict, it can also be interpreted as an attempt to induce political division within Taiwan and expand China's influence over Taiwan's elections, leading up to the January 2024 presidential and vice-presidential elections, following the local elections in November 2022.

Most importantly, after the 20th Party Congress, China will maintain its commitment to Taiwan reunification as a justification for Xi Jinping's long-term rule and will continuously and steadily strengthen related preparations, including military buildup. Politically, it will not retreat or compromise on the Taiwan issue. Consequently, the U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan and military tensions in the Taiwan Strait are expected to persist. However, it remains questionable whether China possesses the actual military capability to achieve reunification by overcoming U.S. military-security intervention and internal Taiwanese resistance in the Taiwan Strait, as declared in the 'report'.

Therefore, the statements regarding security and Taiwan reunification in this 'report' primarily served to convey a message to domestic and international audiences, confirming the Xi Jinping leadership's firm political will regarding China's sovereignty, territory, and reunification. Simultaneously, it reflects a determination to diligently prepare over the next five years to possess military capabilities in the People's Liberation Army that can achieve parity with the U.S. in the region and realize the reunification of Taiwan by force.

Ultimately, the situation in the Taiwan Strait is projected to remain tense, with 2027 serving as a critical juncture for cross-strait and U.S.-China relations. From China's perspective, rather than rushing towards Taiwan reunification through armed conflict, given its insufficient military strength and unfavorable domestic and international economic conditions, it is likely to adopt a strategy of maintaining a firm political stance while continuously enhancing its military capabilities.

Furthermore, for President Xi Jinping, 2027 marks the year of the 21st Party Congress, when he will need to decide whether to seek a fourth term. If he pursues a fourth term, Taiwan reunification could serve as a significant source of political legitimacy. Moreover, 2027 is the centenary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. China has consistently pursued meaningful military enhancements in preparation for this centenary. This 'meaning' includes the capability to repel external interference (from the U.S.) in Taiwan reunification.

Therefore, unless there are drastic changes in U.S. policy towards Taiwan in the future, China is likely to use the next five years to enhance its military capabilities, aiming for the historic centenary of the People's Liberation Army in 2027, rather than engaging in a premature military gamble. Finally, the outcome of the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election, the re-election of the Democratic Progressive Party, and the state of the domestic and global economies could also influence China's approach to Taiwan reunification as additional variables.

2-3. Promoting World Peace and Development and Building a Community of Shared Future for Mankind

In this 'report,' alongside the existing concepts of 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics' and 'building a strong socialist modernized country' as domestic policy concepts, the concept of 'Chinese-style modernization' (中国式现代化) was introduced. In terms of foreign policy, while existing concepts reappeared, particular emphasis was placed on building a 'Community of Shared Future for Mankind' (人类命运共同体). President Xi Jinping stated in the 'report' that China would adhere to a foreign policy of safeguarding world peace and promoting common development, and would focus on building a Community of Shared Future for Mankind.

Furthermore, China advocated for promoting common values of humanity, fostering mutual understanding and friendship among peoples, respecting the diversity of world civilizations, transcending civilizational barriers through exchange, learning from each other's strengths through exchange, and achieving coexistence of civilizations to transcend civilizational superiority and jointly respond to global challenges. Through this, the 'report' revealed China's intention to indirectly criticize the U.S., strengthen friendly cooperation with neighboring countries and developing nations, expand China's status and influence in the international community, and gain an advantage in its strategic competition with the U.S.

(a) Indirect Criticism of the United States

The 'report' of the 20th Party Congress did not directly mention the United States anywhere. However, it contained content that implicitly criticized U.S. actions in various places. For example, President Xi Jinping stated in the 'report' that China opposes all forms of hegemony, power politics, Cold War mentality, interference in internal affairs, and double standards. These phrases were largely used by China to criticize U.S. pressure on China.

Conversely, China declared that it would pursue a defensive national defense policy and would never seek hegemony or expansion. It also affirmed its commitment to upholding the basic norms of international relations based on the UN-centered international order and the UN Charter, and opposed all forms of unilateralism and the formation of exclusive blocs targeting specific countries. This was essentially a criticism of the exclusive alignment of U.S. alliances and partner countries targeting China.

Ironically, shortly before the 20th Party Congress, there were indications of potential improvement in U.S.-China relations. This was due to remarks made by Sun Yeli, spokesperson for the 20th Party Congress, at a press conference held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on the 15th, one day before the congress. At the time, Spokesperson Sun stated that the most important factor in international relations over the next 50 years would be "for the U.S. and China to get along well," leading some to interpret this as China sending a message of reconciliation to the U.S.

However, the content of the 'report' delivered at the opening ceremony of the Party Congress the following day ultimately focused on indirect criticism and the pursuit of competitive advantage over reconciliation with the U.S. Consequently, unless unforeseen new variables emerge, the likelihood of a significant shift in China's policy towards the U.S. after the 20th Party Congress does not appear high.

(b) Strengthening Neighboring Diplomacy and Cooperation with Developing Countries

The aspects of China's foreign policy direction revealed in this 'report' that hold implications for South Korea include the emphasis on friendly neighboring diplomacy and strengthened cooperation with developing countries. China stated that it would adhere to the neighborhood diplomacy principles of 'amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness' (친성혜용) and foster amity, mutual trust, and convergence of interests with neighboring countries. While neighborhood diplomacy, which includes South Korea, has been consistently emphasized since the launch of the first Xi Jinping administration in 2012, its continuation was reaffirmed in this Party Congress 'report'.

On the other hand, China's recent emphasis on cooperation with developing countries was also reaffirmed in the 'report.' China stated that it would increase resource allocation for global development cooperation, focus on reducing the gap between the Global South and the Global North, and support and cooperate with developing countries to accelerate their development. It also announced plans to expand the influence of multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and to enhance the representation and voice of emerging market economies and developing countries in international affairs.

In response to the U.S.'s strengthening of policies to contain or decouple from China in terms of global industrial supply chains, through initiatives like the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), China has recently been promoting the expansion of BRICS, including BRICS Plus, and the SCO, primarily among developing countries. Ultimately, through the expansion of China-led multilateral organizations and strengthened cooperation with developing countries, China has reaffirmed its intention through the 'report' to broaden its influence in the international community and overcome U.S. encirclement and pressure.

3. Conclusion: Outlook and South Korea's Response

Based on the content of the 20th Party Congress 'report,' China's foreign policy direction is not expected to undergo significant changes after the 20th Party Congress. Consequently, amid the intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition and China's proactive response policies, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's pursuit of strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and the ROK-U.S.-Japan regional security cooperation framework is expected to continue to increase challenges in ROK-China relations.

However, given the escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula due to North Korea's repeated missile provocations and the corresponding ROK-U.S. and ROK-U.S.-Japan joint exercises, ROK-China can seek to expand areas of cooperation by sharing a common interest in de-escalation. Furthermore, it is necessary to leverage China's friendly neighborhood diplomacy policy, which aims to avoid extending the front lines of conflict and confrontation to neighboring countries amidst the fierce U.S.-China strategic competition.

Although not covered in this article, as reaffirmed in the 'report,' China, despite strong U.S. containment, seeks independence in high-tech sectors, including semiconductors, and desires cooperation with South Korea in advanced industries. This aspiration for cooperation and avoidance of unnecessary conflict and confrontation with South Korea is expected to remain a positive factor in ROK-China relations for some time after the 20th Party Congress.

On the other hand, regarding the trend of gradual escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, South Korea needs to consider various scenarios with 2027 as a critical point and prepare specific response measures for each scenario. Of course, as an ally of the United States, South Korea's options are inevitably limited. However, China, around 2027, may also see changes in its Taiwan unification policy depending on the gap in comprehensive national power with the United States, including military and security, economic, and political realities and military strength. Therefore, South Korea must continuously observe the movements of the US and China across the Taiwan Strait, prepare responses for possible scenarios, and continuously review changes in the region.

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of "Evaluation and Suggestion on the ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group Meeting."

■ Kim Han-kwon_ Professor Kim Han-kwon is currently a Senior Professor at the China Research Center, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea National Diplomatic Academy, and a Professor in the Department of Asia-Pacific Studies. Prior to his tenure at the KNDA, he served as the Director of the China Research Center at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from American University.