[Global NK Commentary] Assessment and Recommendations on the ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation Group Meeting

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The ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation Group (EDSCG) meeting was held in Washington D.C. on September 16. The meeting was a vice-ministerial (2+2) meeting of foreign affairs and defense officials from both countries, attended by First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyun-dong and Vice Minister of National Defense Shin Beom-chul from the ROK side, and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Bonnie Jenkins and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl from the U.S. side. The EDSCG was first held in December 2016 during the Park Geun-hye administration, followed by a second meeting in January 2018 under the Moon Jae-in administration, making this the third meeting. Notably, this meeting is significant as it implemented the agreement made by the leaders of both countries at their summit in May, shortly after the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, to relaunch the high-level Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation Group in the near future. Despite the escalating North Korean nuclear threat, the high-level ROK-U.S. foreign affairs and defense consultation, which had not been held since the inter-Korean reconciliation mood in 2018, resumed after 4 years and 8 months.

Key Contents of the Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation Group Meeting

As a high-level foreign affairs and defense consultation body, the EDSCG broadly emphasized the ROK and U.S. foreign affairs and defense postures in response to North Korea's nuclear threat. The most important message was the clarification that any North Korean nuclear attack would be met with an overwhelming and decisive response. Both sides pledged to make every effort together to strengthen the alliance's deterrence posture, and the U.S. particularly reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to provide extended deterrence to the Republic of Korea utilizing the full spectrum of its military capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and advanced non-nuclear capabilities.

Specific measures included the timely and effective deployment and operation of strategic assets in the region. The joint training of F-35A fifth-generation fighter jets in July and the joint naval exercise in the East Sea on September 26, involving the Ronald Reagan carrier strike group, were cited as examples demonstrating the U.S. commitment. Furthermore, both countries announced plans to strengthen the alliance's strategic readiness through enhanced information sharing, training, and exercises related to nuclear and non-nuclear threats, utilizing tabletop exercises (TTX). The importance of continuous cooperation in space and cyber domains, including participation in multi-domain exercises, as well as the alliance's missile defense capabilities, was also emphasized. Meanwhile, the EDSCG delegation's inspection of a B-52 strategic bomber drew attention, and both sides assessed it as an opportunity to enhance their common understanding of extended deterrence.

Assessment of Meeting Outcomes and Future Tasks

The EDSCG meeting is assessed as a timely event that sent a necessary message to North Korea and the ROK public amidst the escalating North Korean nuclear threat. North Korea has recently conducted successive missile test launches and declared the legislative codification of its nuclear force on September 8. While continuously developing its nuclear and missile capabilities, it has normalized its status as a nuclear-weapon state and proclaimed its nuclear doctrine domestically and internationally. In this context, it is significant that the ROK and U.S. reaffirmed their resolve to respond to North Korea's nuclear threat in a united front. Extended deterrence is a matter of military commitment in response to North Korea's nuclear threat, but fundamentally, it is a function of the ROK-U.S. alliance. If the alliance demonstrates a robust stance based on a shared threat perception, the credibility of extended deterrence will naturally increase. The convening of the EDSCG meeting is thus evaluated as significant in that it is being carried out in conjunction with strengthening the alliance's cohesion.

While there were positive outcomes in the broader framework, there were also considerable disappointments. Although the U.S. commitment and timely deployment of strategic assets were mentioned at this meeting, there was a lack of substantive content on how to deepen the extended deterrence mechanism. Beyond rhetorical expressions such as "reaffirming unwavering commitment" and "strengthening bilateral cooperation," there was no specific mention of how to ensure the effectiveness of extended deterrence or how the "tailored deterrence" posture on the Korean Peninsula would be established in the future.

Therefore, in the future, the ROK and U.S. need to make greater efforts toward the substantive deepening and institutionalization of extended deterrence, beyond mere message management. First, the effectiveness of extended deterrence must be enhanced through expanded information sharing and strengthened joint planning. The level of consultation between the two countries needs to be deepened regarding when, under what circumstances, and by what means nuclear and non-nuclear options will be pursued, rather than simply reaffirming extended deterrence commitments. To this end, information sharing regarding U.S. nuclear capabilities and planning processes should occur, and measures should be sought for the ROK military to participate in the identification of plans and options at the U.S. Strategic Command level during peacetime and crisis. The use of nuclear weapons falls under the exclusive authority of the U.S. President, and even for an ally, operational-level participation concerning nuclear weapons is not easy. However, as North Korea's nuclear capabilities advance to a "war-fighting capability" level, extended deterrence cannot remain at the level of verbal commitment indefinitely.

Second, to enhance the effectiveness of extended deterrence, various consultation bodies must be utilized and developed. Given its nature as a high-level foreign affairs and defense consultation body, the EDSCG finds it difficult to move beyond the level of message dissemination and management. Therefore, separately, the Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC) should be utilized at the defense level to address issues related to extended deterrence, including posture, in depth from a military perspective.

Third, since the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, there has been a tendency to focus excessively on the deployment of strategic assets and joint exercises. While these measures are important means of demonstrating the resolve of the ROK and U.S. and sending a clear message to North Korea, the excessive reliance on such actions, which are essentially displays of military power, is not desirable. If used too frequently, their effectiveness may diminish, and excessive use carries the risk of unnecessarily escalating military tensions. As pointed out earlier, the response to North Korea's nuclear threat should now be through the deepening and institutionalization of extended deterrence, rather than symptomatic treatment.

Finally, the ROK and U.S. must manage the North Korean nuclear threat while paying attention to crisis stability, alongside strengthening deterrence. As its law on nuclear armament indicates, North Korea's nuclear weapons are evolving from a last resort for war deterrence to a form of rejection deterrence through operational missions. The move to operationalize tactical nuclear weapons is evidence of this. This implies that the threshold for nuclear use may be lowered, and the risk of accidental nuclear war due to miscalculation or accident increases. In this regard, it is necessary to refrain from messages that could unnecessarily provoke North Korea, such as preemptive strikes or decapitation operations. The ROK and U.S. face the dual challenge of guarding against the failure of crisis stability as much as the failure of deterrence. ■

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of "The Influence of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the DPRK-China Economic Ties and their Impact on the Korean Peninsula."

■ Kim Jung-sup_ Vice President of the Sejong Institute. He holds a Master's degree in Public Policy from Harvard University and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Oxford. Prior to retiring as Chief of Policy Planning at the Ministry of National Defense, he served for 27 years in the Ministry of National Defense and the Presidential Security Office. His research primarily focuses on defense and security issues such as nuclear strategy, transfer of wartime operational control, and defense reform.

■ Editor: Park Jeong-hoo_EAI Researcher

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