[EAI Issue Brief] South Korea's Public Opinion on China Policy Amidst Unfavorability and Distrust

1. Introduction: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

The question of how important public opinion is in determining a nation's foreign policy has been debated in academia for half a century. In the past, due to various limitations of the general public (lack of information, insufficient strategic thinking, lack of consistency, excessive adherence to ethical principles, etc.), empirical analyses suggesting that public opinion's influence on foreign policy decision-making was limited, along with normative arguments that this influence should be limited, were both accepted as established theories. [1]However, as explained by theories such as democratic peace theory and audience costs theory, democratic states exhibit different behavioral patterns in international relations compared to authoritarian states. [2]Recently, research findings presented through various data and methodologies suggest that public opinion is central to these mechanisms, lending more weight to the view that public opinion is crucial in the study of foreign policy in democratic countries. In particular, experimental research has also demonstrated that the political costs incurred when pursuing policies contrary to public opinion significantly influence the thinking and expected utility calculations of political elites. [3]These research findings provide a basis for understanding why analyzing changing public opinion trends is important when predicting the foreign policy direction of democratic states.

In late August, to commemorate the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China, the East Asia Institute (EAI) jointly planned survey questions with the JoongAng Ilbo and conducted an interview survey to understand South Koreans' perceptions of China and their attitudes toward South Korea-China relations, and to explore future directions for the development of bilateral relations. The results were subsequently released. [4]This issue brief analyzes the results of this year's survey in comparison with data from past EAI <East Asia Perception Surveys> to identify notable trends in South Koreans' perceptions of China, discuss the causes behind the formation of these perceptions, and briefly outline future directions for South Korea's China policy.

2. South Koreans' Perceptions of China: Unfavorability and Distrust

The most striking aspect regarding South Koreans' perceptions of China is the overwhelming negativity. Although there has been a slight decrease (3.5%p) compared to 2021, an overwhelming majority of 70.3% still hold unfavorable impressions of China ([Figure 1]). Trust in China as a country has also shown a steady deteriorating trend, with 90.2% of respondents this year stating that China is not a trustworthy country ([Figure 2]). This represents the worst national trust rating among East Asian countries, with figures lower than Japan (84.3%), whose relations with South Korea have worsened since the Supreme Court ruling on forced labor in 2018, and even Russia (87.3%), which has become a target of international condemnation for its invasion of Ukraine in February.

[Figure 1] Impressions of China

[Figure 2] Trust in China

Perceptions of national character are also generally negative ([Figure 3]). A majority of respondents described Chinese people as stubborn, exclusive, and belligerent. While terms like "blunt," "impulsive," "bold," and "imitative" may not necessarily be negative evaluations, considering that the provided options included positive descriptors such as "kind," "methodical," "meticulous," and "creative," the perception of Chinese people among South Korean public opinion can be interpreted as predominantly negative.

[Figure 3] Evaluation of Chinese and Japanese National Character

Negative perceptions of China and Chinese people lead to negative evaluations of South Korea-China relations. While a majority of South Koreans still perceive the current state of relations with China as maintaining the status quo (51.2%), the proportion of negative evaluations indicating that relations are deteriorating has increased (25.3% → 37.6%), while positive evaluations suggesting improvement have decreased (20.8% → 9.6%). Notably, regarding the future of South Korea-China relations, the highest response was "will remain the same as now" (59.9%), indicating low expectations for improvement in bilateral relations. In summary, the majority of South Koreans currently hold negative perceptions of China and show no expectation or enthusiasm for improving bilateral relations in the future.

[Figure 4] Perception of South Korea-China Relations

[Figure 5] Future Outlook for South Korea-China Relations

3. Reasons for Overwhelmingly Negative Public Perceptions

What are the reasons behind such overwhelmingly negative perceptions of China among South Koreans? While more rigorous statistical analysis of correlations between variables is needed, three main factors can be identified from the responses to other questions.

1) Experience with China's Coercive Diplomacy towards South Korea

First, it is due to China's coercive actions towards South Korea. When respondents who held unfavorable impressions of China were asked for the reasons behind these perceptions, a majority (67.9%) cited China's coercive actions, such as the THAAD retaliation ([Figure 6]). When asked about the most concerning recent trends in China, the two key factors identified were "coercive diplomacy towards South Korea" (31.5%) and "conflict with the United States" (23%) ([Figure 7]). These results can be considered the most direct reasons, as they are stated by the respondents themselves as the source of their negative perceptions of China. Conversely, although a minority opinion, when those with favorable impressions of China were asked for the reasons for their positive views, the highest proportions cited "achieving high economic growth" (70.2%) and "having a large market with significant economic opportunities" (64.5%) ([Figure 8]). This indicates that while the economic value of the Chinese market itself is a positive factor that enhances favorability towards China, negative perceptions of China are significantly amplified when China strategically utilizes this to exert coercive diplomacy towards South Korea.

[Figure 6] Reasons for Unfavorable Impressions of China

[Figure 7] Concerns Regarding Recent Trends in China

[Figure 8] Reasons for Favorable Impressions of China

2) Changes in Perceptions of China's Rise

Second, South Koreans' views on China's growing national strength are changing. Looking at the survey results over the past three years ([Figure 9]), the proportion of respondents who see China's rise as an opportunity for South Korea, both in security and economic terms, has steadily decreased (22.6% → 21.9% → 19.3%). Conversely, the perception of it as a threat has rapidly expanded (66.9% → 69.2% → 75.4%). In a similar question asking whether China will become a leading global power surpassing the United States in the near future, negative responses have significantly increased this year compared to 2015. In the past, a majority of respondents predicted a high possibility of a shift in status between the US and China on the international stage (73.4%), but this year, a majority (51.8%) responded that China would not become a leading global power surpassing the US, showing a significant change ([Figure 10]).

It remains unclear whether the perception that China's rise poses a threat to South Korea has led to a lower (or desired lower) assessment of China's potential as a hegemonic power, or whether the belief that China will not become a global leader has led to the view that it does not present an opportunity for South Korea, or if there are other key variables mediating these two trends. However, it is clear that significant changes are occurring in South Koreans' perceptions of China's rise.

[Figure 9] Impact of China's Rise on South Korea's Economic and Security Interests

[Figure 10] Outlook on Whether China Will Become a Leading Power Surpassing the US in the Near Future

3) Increased Salience of Major Power Competition and Economic Issues

Third, South Koreans' interest in and concern about intensified competition among major powers and its economic repercussions are growing. When asked about the current government's top foreign policy priorities, combining the first and second ranked responses (allowing multiple answers) shows that last year, the top priorities were (1) strengthening economic diplomacy (35.9%), (2) strengthening diplomacy on infectious diseases, climate change, and the environment (33.6%), and (3) strengthening the South Korea-US alliance (30.9%). This year, the priorities were (1) strengthening economic diplomacy (38.8%), (2) international cooperation for North Korean denuclearization (31.2%), and (3) strengthening the South Korea-US alliance (28.5%). Despite the global COVID-19 crisis and North Korea's repeated missile provocations, including long-range ballistic missiles, the proportion of respondents emphasizing the importance of economic diplomacy has remained the highest for two consecutive years.

In the question asking about the most significant threat facing South Korea ([Figure 12]), last year, (1) the spread of infectious diseases like COVID-19 (45.7%), (2) military and strategic competition and conflict between the US and China (44.7%), and (3) trade and high-tech competition between major powers (43.8%) were all considered to be of similar importance. In contrast, this year's survey showed that (1) trade and high-tech competition between major powers (60.8%), (2) military and strategic competition and conflict between the US and China (54.8%), and (3) North Korea's nuclear and missile threats (44.4%) were ranked highest, respectively, confirming a significant increase in the perception of economic and military competition between major powers as a core issue. South Koreans' high interest in trade and technology competition, and economic diplomacy, naturally leads to increased interest in countries with close economic ties to South Korea. This heightened interest and issue salience can be an asset for relationship development when accompanied by positive interactions between the two countries, but it can also become a cause for relationship deterioration when negative exchanges are repeated. In other words, as mentioned earlier, the high economic value of the Chinese market, when combined with heightened interest in economic issues at the public opinion level, can provide an opportunity to significantly increase South Koreans' favorability towards China if positive interactions occur. Conversely, if China uses its economic dependence on South Korea to suppress South Korea's autonomy through economic retaliation, the issue salience can amplify the negative repercussions. The recent THAAD issue between South Korea and China appears to be strongly activating the latter mechanism, exacerbating the deterioration of South Koreans' perceptions of China.

[Figure 11] Top Foreign Policy Priorities for the Current Government

[Figure 12] Most Significant Threat Facing South Korea

In summary, South Koreans are currently displeased with China's economic retaliation regarding the THAAD issue, view China's rise more as a threat than an opportunity, and are sensitive to the economic repercussions of trade competition among major powers. These three issues appear to be closely interconnected, and their causal relationship is difficult to ascertain clearly at present. However, it is highly significant that respondents themselves cite China's behavior of expressing dissatisfaction with South Korea in the form of economic retaliation, from a security perspective, as the primary reason for the deterioration of their favorability towards China. Although further research is needed for clearer elucidation, it appears that China's coercive diplomatic behavior has significantly influenced the perceptions of South Koreans who view China's rise as a threat rather than an opportunity. This is believed to be the background for the rapid spread of negative perceptions of China among South Koreans who consider trade competition between major powers as the most critical national issue.

4. Direction of South Korea's China Policy

Within the structural limitations of unfavorability and distrust, what direction should South Korea's China policy take according to the South Korean public? The perceptions identified through the public opinion survey can be summarized as follows.

The top priority in South Korea-China relations is economic cooperation. When asked about the most important issue that the current government's China policy should prioritize, the response selecting "South Korea-China economic and high-tech cooperation" significantly increased compared to last year (20.8% → 33.9%). Conversely, expectations for cooperation with China in other issue areas such as "cooperation for North Korean denuclearization" (24.4% → 16.1%) and "cooperation on climate change, environment, and infectious diseases" (21.5% → 8.1%) are rapidly declining ([Figure 13]). Regarding the future development of South Korea-China relations, support for "strengthening functional cooperation centered on the economy" (43.7%) is the highest ([Figure 14]). This indicates that in the perception of the South Korean public, China is viewed less as a 'strategic partner' with whom comprehensive cooperation should be strengthened on core national interests, and more as a 'major trading partner' with whom functional cooperation, primarily in the economic sphere, should be pursued.

[Figure 13] Issues to Prioritize in China Policy

[Figure 14] Future Development Direction of South Korea-China Relations

This is also confirmed by responses to questions about China's role in resolving the THAAD deployment issue and the North Korean nuclear issue. Despite the Chinese government's official demand of "3 Noes and 1 Limit" (no additional deployment of THAAD, no participation in the US missile defense system, no formation of a trilateral alliance with the US and Japan), over half of South Koreans (58.4%) maintain a balanced stance of proceeding with the normal operation of already deployed THAAD assets while not deploying additional ones ([Figure 15]). Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, while many support China's role in bringing North Korea to the negotiating table (42.7%) and participating in international sanctions against North Korea (34.2%), there is low support for China integrating North Korea into the international community (8.3%) or directly influencing North Korea to prevent major provocations (14.8%) ([Figure 16]).

[Figure 15] Stance on THAAD Deployment

[Figure 16] China's Role in the North Korean Nuclear Issue

In conclusion, while strengthening economic cooperation between South Korea and China is likely to receive majority support from the public, pursuing expanded cooperation with China in other issue areas may face backlash. If the current trend continues, it may only be a matter of time before South Korean public opinion shows stronger support for strengthening the South Korea-US alliance over the development of South Korea-China relations. Compared to 2015, South Koreans in 2022 have significantly reduced their willingness to respect China's leadership on the world stage, and at the center of this is China's coercive diplomatic behavior. This is a painful point for China.

However, this is also a matter of perspective. Conversely, it can be said that amidst a situation full of unfavorability and distrust, the public consistently supports the strengthening of economic cooperation between South Korea and China. Reflecting on the past period of rapid expansion of bilateral economic cooperation despite differing ideologies and systems, there remains potential for both countries to restore and further develop bilateral relations by accumulating positive mutual exchanges centered on functional cooperation. This is an important fact to remember as we contemplate the next 30 years on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties between South Korea and China. ■

[1] Kertzer, Joshua D. 2021. “Public Opinion about Foreign Policy.” In Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, Third Edition, eds. Leonie Huddy, David Sears, Jack Levy, and Jennifer Jerit. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[2] Fearon, James D. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” The American Political Science Review 88, 3: 577-592.; Gelpi, Christopher. 2017. “Democracies in Conflict: The Role of Public Opinion, Political Parties, and the Press in Shaping Security Policy.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, 9: 1925-1949.

[3] Tomz, Michael, Jessica L.P. Weeks, and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2020. “Public Opinion and Decisions about Military Force in Democracies.” International Organization 74, 1: 119-143.

[4] Jeong Jin-woo. 2022. “A Graphic Look at China… Negative 70%, Trust 8%, Economic Cooperation 43% [30 Years Since ROK-China Diplomatic Ties].” JoongAng Ilbo, August 24. https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25096535#home (Accessed: September 20, 2022.)

■ Author: Kim Yang-gyu_ Senior Research Fellow, East Asia Institute; Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in French Education and Political Science and a Master of Arts in Political Science from Seoul National University, and a Ph.D. in International Politics from Florida International University. He previously served as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Florida International University and as a Visiting Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He is a recipient of the Fulbright Graduate Study Award and the Smith Richardson Foundation’s World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship. His main research areas include coercive diplomacy, nuclear strategy, power transition, U.S.-China relations, the North Korean nuclear issue, and international politics and security theory. His recent works include “At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis” and “The Feasibility of Punishment and the Credibility of Threats: Case Studies on the First Moroccan and the Rhineland Crises.”

■ Editor: Park Han-soo_ EAI Research Assistant

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