[Global NK Commentary] 30 Years of ROK-China Relations: A Review of China's Role in the North Korean Nuclear Issue

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It is no exaggeration to say that the past 30 years of ROK-China political and diplomatic relations have been overwhelmingly dominated by the North Korean and nuclear issue. This highlights the significant weight of the North Korean and nuclear issue in South Korea's diplomacy with China. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China, controversies surrounding China's role in the North Korean and nuclear issue have persisted until recently. Following the establishment of diplomatic ties, South Korea's relations with China developed rapidly, primarily through economic cooperation, fostering expectations that China's role in the North Korean and nuclear issue could be steered according to South Korea's wishes. Particularly after the ROK-China relationship was self-assessed as having developed into an "optimal relationship" in 2015, expectations for China's role in the North Korean nuclear issue also rose. In other words, following President Park Geun-hye's attendance at China's Victory Day celebrations in September 2015, the theory of China's role reached its peak with expectations of China's support for unification on the Korean Peninsula.

However, when China's role was put to the test by North Korea's fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China did not play the active role that the South Korean government had expected and requested. It was confirmed that the South Korean government's expectations of China's role were based on arbitrary hopes. This quickly led to disappointment and criticism of China, giving rise to the

Regarding China's role in the North Korean nuclear issue, there have been a confusing array of controversies. However, China has fundamentally maintained inertia rather than change in its North Korea and nuclear policy. China has consistently adhered to its so-called three principles on North Korea's nuclear weapons, even as North Korea's nuclear weapons development rapidly advanced. As an extension of this, China proposed measures such as "dual suspension" (雙中斷) and "dual track parallel" (雙軌竝行). For the past 30 years, China has essentially maintained a consistent policy of "stabilizing the Korean Peninsula through maintaining the status quo." It is true that North Korea-China relations became strained to the point where annual summit talks, which were customary during the first half of Xi Jinping's tenure, could not even be held. Nevertheless, China has continued its efforts to consider North Korea's strategic value and to restore or at least maintain minimal relations with North Korea.

In the process of maintaining its policy stance on the North Korean nuclear issue, China has sought its own role. When North Korea declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on March 12, 1993, initiating the North Korean nuclear crisis, China pursued four notable and distinct responses and roles.

First, during the first North Korean nuclear crisis, China adopted a passive stance, primarily playing a behind-the-scenes coordinating role. However, in October 1994, a General Framework Agreement was adopted through negotiations between North Korea and the United States in Geneva, excluding China. At the time, China was still facing scrutiny and pressure from the United States following the Tiananmen Square incident, and it reacted sensitively to any moves towards improved North Korea-U.S. relations in which it was excluded. In response to the North Korea-U.S. agreement, China launched a diplomatic offensive towards South Korea. In October 1994, then-Premier Li Peng visited South Korea for the first time since the establishment of diplomatic relations. The following year, in April 1995, Qiao Shi, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, visited South Korea, followed by President Jiang Zemin's state visit in November, marking an unprecedented situation where the top three figures in China's power hierarchy visited South Korea within two years. Notably, during his visit to South Korea, Premier Li Peng stated, "The current armistice system remains valid until a new peace regime is established, and therefore, the Armistice Agreement must be observed," sending a message of restraint to North Korea, which was attempting to undermine the Armistice Agreement itself and discuss a peace treaty directly with the United States.

Second, as the second North Korean nuclear crisis unfolded with North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003, China began to seek a new role. China engaged in shuttle diplomacy between North Korea and the United States, mediating and arranging successive trilateral talks among North Korea, the U.S., and China, followed by the Six-Party Talks. While applying a combination of pressure and persuasion in a strained North Korea-China relationship, China began to exert influence primarily through economic aid to North Korea after the second round of the Six-Party Talks. China clearly played a significant role in inducing North Korea's participation in the Six-Party Talks, which it had initially rejected. The underlying reason for China's transformation into an active mediator after 2003 was the U.S. invasion of Iraq under the Bush administration. Specifically, the Bush administration designated North Korea, along with Iraq, as part of the "axis of evil," raising the possibility that North Korea could also be a target of U.S. attack, prompting China to transform into an active mediator to manage the crisis of the North Korean regime.

Third, following North Korea's sixth nuclear test in September 2017, China exceptionally and swiftly participated in high-intensity sanctions against North Korea. Within nine days of the nuclear test, China agreed to the adoption of Resolution 2375, which included high-intensity additional sanctions limiting fuel supplies to North Korea. As the crisis on the Korean Peninsula escalated due to North Korea's successive nuclear and missile provocations, with the Trump administration raising the possibility of a "bloody nose" preemptive strike, China exceptionally strengthened sanctions against North Korea to manage the escalating crisis on the peninsula.

Fourth, as the "China passing" theory emerged following the ROK-North Korea and North Korea-U.S. summits held in rapid succession after the Pyeongchang Olympics in February 2018, China began to seek a role again. Not only did the North Korea-China summit talks, which had been suspended for seven years since 2011, resume abruptly, but an exceptionally high number of five North Korea-China summit meetings were held between March 2018 and June 2019, including four visits by Chairman Kim Jong-un to China. Following Kim Jong-un's second and third visits to China, President Trump expressed caution regarding China's involvement. In particular, during the process of sending the letter to cancel the North Korea-U.S. summit in Singapore, President Trump explicitly revealed suspicions of "Chinese backing." As a result, discussions on China's role on the Korean Peninsula entered a new phase.

The four cases of China seeking a role in the North Korean nuclear issue over the past 30 years since the establishment of ROK-China relations clearly illustrate the characteristics of China's policy towards the Korean Peninsula and its perception and stance on the North Korean nuclear issue. Although China played different roles in the North Korean nuclear crises of 2003 and 2017, through mediation in dialogue and strengthening sanctions, respectively, there were commonalities. In both instances, the possibility of the U.S. using military options was raised, leading to an escalation of the crisis for the North Korean regime and the situation on the Korean Peninsula. China has judged that denuclearization is ultimately an issue between North Korea and the U.S., and therefore, its role is limited, and there is no need to unnecessarily expend its "cards." On the other hand, in situations where crises are likely to escalate, China has played a role in facilitating dialogue and easing tensions. Nevertheless, China has also maintained caution, refraining from pressuring North Korea to the extent that it would lead to instability or crisis of the North Korean regime, or a breakdown in North Korea-China relations. China considers the instability or crisis of the North Korean regime as a major destabilizing factor on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the cases of 1994 and 2018 demonstrate that when relations between China and the U.S. deteriorated, and when North Korea-U.S. relations rapidly advanced without China's involvement, or when significant changes in the strategic landscape of the Korean Peninsula, such as a declaration of the end of war, were being sought, China actively intervened to secure its position and influence on the Korean Peninsula.

In summary, in situations of escalating confrontation with the United States, the strategic value of North Korea as a buffer zone has been highlighted, leading China to play a minimal role in maintaining and managing the North Korean regime. China perceives the crisis of the North Korean regime as a significant security challenge, no less so than North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations. In other words, the United States and North Korea have been important variables in China's search for a role. It is necessary to objectively and accurately grasp the factors influencing China's policy stance and changes regarding the North Korean and nuclear issue, and to soberly and clearly set the maximum extent of China's role that South Korea can persuade and guide. As U.S.-China strategic competition intensifies and North Korean nuclear tests loom, it remains highly important and realistic to guide China's role, at least in managing the crisis on the Korean Peninsula originating from North Korea.

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of "Reviewing 30 Years of China’s Role in North Korea’s Nuclear Issue."

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryul_ Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies. Professor at Dongduk Women's University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the School of International Studies at Peking University. He has served as President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies and is currently a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Policy Advisory Committee. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and minority issues. Recent research includes "China's Strategy and Role in the Denuclearization and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," "The Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s," "Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas of Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Initiative," "Deciphering China's Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea," and "China's Territorial Disputes" (co-authored).

■ Editor: Park Jeong-hoo_ EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jhpark@eai.or.kr