[Global NK Commentary] The Road to Denuclearization of the DPRK: The DPRK’s Strategy and the ROK-U.S. Response Plan

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As of 2022, the denuclearization of North Korea remains a distant prospect. In his August 15th Liberation Day address, President Yoon Suk-yeol announced his North Korea policy, the 'Audacious Initiative.' However, three days later, North Korea, through Kim Yo-jong's statement, launched a scathing criticism. This paper analyzes North Korea's overall nuclear policy and forecasts its future actions. Based on this analysis, it aims to evaluate the Audacious Initiative and propose response plans by South Korea and the United States to the North Korean nuclear issue.

North Korea's Strategy

North Korea continues its hardline policy toward South Korea and the United States. Since the collapse of the Hanoi summit in February 2019, North Korea, in working-level talks in Sweden in October of the same year, advocated for the 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' rather than the 'denuclearization of North Korea,' stating, 'The complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is possible only when all obstacles that threaten our security and hinder our development are cleanly and undoubtedly removed.' Two months later, it effectively rejected a resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue through negotiations with the United States and officially adopted the 'frontal breakthrough strategy' ('Revolutionary Line on Waging a Frontal Breakthrough in Accordance with the Demands of the Present Situation and Revolutionary Development') at the 7th Central Committee's 5th Plenary Session, declaring, 'We will smash the U.S. imperialists' sanctions and blockade schemes through self-reliance.'

The frontal breakthrough line does not completely shut the door to dialogue with the United States, but it demands preemptive action from the U.S., stating, 'If dialogue is to be resumed between the U.S. and North Korea, it is possible only on the condition that the U.S. fully accepts the demands we have presented.' This assertion reiterates the stance from the October 2019 talks in Sweden: 'There will be no meaningful contact with the U.S. without the withdrawal of the hostile policy toward North Korea,' represented by the right to survival and development. The Party Congress, the highest body determining North Korea's foreign policy, also reaffirmed the 'frontal breakthrough strategy.' At the Party Congress held in August 2021, North Korea defined the United States as the 'arch-criminal of war' and 'greatest enemy,' declaring its aim to 'focus on and aim for subjugating and forcing the U.S. to yield, regardless of who is in power.'

Currently, North Korea is still pursuing the 'frontal breakthrough strategy' with the following intentions. First, it aims to maximally advance its nuclear capabilities after blocking dialogue with the United States. The condition North Korea demands from the U.S. for dialogue, the prior withdrawal of hostile policies, is a condition that the U.S. can practically not accept. North Korea divides hostile policies into the right to development and the right to survival, demanding the complete lifting of sanctions against North Korea for the former and the permanent cessation of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and strategic asset deployments for the latter. North Korea is aware that unilateral U.S. actions are impossible while it remains outside nuclear negotiations. Therefore, it demands the prior withdrawal of hostile policies as a means to buy time and justify its nuclear advancement.

Kim Jong-un's speech on July 27, Armistice Day, confirms this intention. Kim Jong-un emphasized that the U.S. is 'justifying its illegal and immoral hostile policy' and that 'we must fight against the U.S. imperialists with ideology and arms to the end.' While not completely closing the door to dialogue, he also stated, 'We must be more thoroughly prepared for confrontation.' He continues to cite the U.S. policy of hostility toward North Korea as an issue, focusing on the development of 'national defense capabilities,' i.e., nuclear development, rather than dialogue.

Second, North Korea has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The so-called 'diplomatic objective theory,' which posits that security guarantees, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S., are conditions for nuclear abandonment, was publicly denied by North Korea in 2009. On January 7, 2009, North Korea, through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), clearly stated, 'While we can live without normalizing relations with the U.S., we cannot live without nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Normalization of relations and the nuclear issue are entirely separate matters. What we aspire to is not the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations, but the strengthening of our nuclear deterrence by all means to more reliably protect the security of our nation.' Since then, North Korea has never expressed an exchange of denuclearization for diplomatic relations with the U.S. During the Korean Peninsula Peace Process in 2018-2019, North Korea agreed in the June 2018 Singapore Summit to (1) establish new U.S.-North Korea relations, (2) build a permanent and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and (3) 'work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' not the denuclearization of North Korea. The agreement did not link the denuclearization of North Korea with the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Singapore Summit was reaffirmed by Kim Jong-un at the 8th Party Congress in 2021, making it a principle that North Korea values. Therefore, North Korea's sole objective is recognition as a nuclear-weapon state, having removed the conditions for nuclear abandonment. In his July speech on Armistice Day, Kim Jong-un again emphasized North Korea as a 'nuclear-weapon state' possessing 'absolute weapons.'

Third, it exhibits a highly offensive and radical nuclear strategy. North Korea has dispelled any ambiguity regarding the potential use of nuclear weapons against South Korea, clearly indicating its willingness to use nuclear weapons against South Korea in the early stages of a war. On April 5th of this year, Kim Yo-jong stated, '[The mission of nuclear forces] is to eliminate the opposing military power at once,' adding, 'Nuclear combat power will be mobilized to seize the initiative in the early stages of war, burn the will to fight of the opposing side, prevent a protracted war, and preserve our military power.' On April 16th, while testing a new tactical guided missile, she further elaborated, 'This holds great significance in dramatically enhancing the firepower strike capability of the frontline long-range artillery units and in diversifying the effectiveness and firepower missions of the tactical nuclear operations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.' Frontline long-range artillery units are units operating long-range artillery and multiple rocket launchers concentrated in North Korea's front-line areas, targeting the South Korean capital region.

In summary, North Korea has signaled its intention to deploy new tactical nuclear missiles to strike Seoul in the early stages of a war on the Korean Peninsula. The 3rd Expanded Meeting of the 8th Central Military Commission in June discussed 'additional confirmation of the operational missions of the frontline units of the Korean People's Army according to the Party's military strategic intentions, revision of operational plans, and important military organizational restructuring,' implying that the aforementioned policy has been incorporated into operational plans. These attempts by North Korea lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in actual battlefield environments. It intends to use nuclear weapons in the early stages of a war, in combination with conventional weapons.

North Korea has declared its willingness to use nuclear weapons even in non-military situations. At the military parade on April 25th, Kim Jong-un himself stated, 'Our nuclear weapons cannot be confined solely to the mission of war prevention. If any force attempts to encroach upon the fundamental interests of our state, our nuclear armed forces will inevitably carry out their secondary mission without fail.' This means nuclear weapons can be used in non-military situations if the state's interests are undermined. The problem is that the concept of 'state interests' is extremely vague. North Korea considers raising human rights issues against it, economic sanctions, and even the distribution of anti-North Korean leaflets as infringements of its state interests. This is a radical nuclear doctrine that allows for the use of nuclear weapons based on arbitrary interpretation. In his July 27th speech, Kim Jong-un reiterated the threat, 'If they continue to seriously infringe upon our security and fundamental interests, they will have to face greater instability and crisis.'

Finally, North Korea consistently confirms that the preemptive use of nuclear weapons is included in its nuclear doctrine. Following the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, on April 30th of this year, Kim Jong-un stated, 'We will preemptively and thoroughly suppress and crush all dangerous attempts and threatening actions, including the nuclear threat that is being perpetuated and aggravated by hostile forces, if necessary.'

North Korea legislated this radical and offensive nuclear strategy through the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly in September 2022. Although North Korea had already enacted a decree in 2013 titled 'On Further Consolidating the Status of a Self-Defensive Nuclear-Weapon State,' it abolished this decree at the 7th Session this year and replaced it with a new decree titled 'On the Nuclear Force Policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.' This new law fully reflects the nuclear strategy expressed since April. First, the decree explicitly states that the decision-making authority for nuclear use rests with the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission alone. While there is a 'State Nuclear Force Command,' it is limited to an 'advisory' role, and decisions and execution related to nuclear weapons are attributed to the Chairman. This establishes a structure where nuclear use is decided by a single leader.

Second, it has been legislated to allow the use of nuclear weapons in virtually all circumstances. In addition to threats by nuclear weapons, North Korea has stipulated that it can use nuclear weapons even in situations where nuclear weapons are not used, such as 'weapons of mass destruction,' 'carrying out a deadly military attack,' and 'escalating and prolonging a war and seizing the initiative.' The most concerning provision is that nuclear weapons can be used 'in situations that pose a catastrophic crisis to the lives and safety of the people.' This phrase lacks specific circumstances, allowing for arbitrary interpretation. This resonates with Chairman Kim Jong-un's statement on April 25th that nuclear weapons could be used if 'state interests' are encroached upon. It leaves open the possibility of nuclear use even in non-military situations.

Third, 'preemptive strike' is included in the conditions for nuclear use. It allows for a preemptive nuclear strike when the opposing side's actual attack is judged to be 'imminent' under the presented circumstances. Furthermore, nuclear weapons can be used in virtually all war situations. Considering the provision that nuclear weapons can be used 'when operationally necessary to prevent the escalation and prolongation of war and to seize the initiative in case of war,' nuclear weapons can be used at the discretion of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission alone, even if the other side does not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons after the outbreak of war.

Fourth, it clarifies the possibility of nuclear use targeting South Korea. Article 5 (Principles of Nuclear Weapon Use), Paragraph 2, states, 'Non-nuclear-weapon states shall not be threatened with or use nuclear weapons against other non-nuclear-weapon states that do not participate in acts of aggression or attack against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in collusion with other nuclear-weapon states.' This provision effectively designates South Korea. Since South Korea forms a combined defense system with the United States, it is considered to be 'colluding' and 'participating in acts of aggression or attack,' thus making South Korea a target for nuclear use.

North Korea's revelation of detailed nuclear strategies through unprecedented legislation has the following political intentions. First, denuclearization of North Korea is no longer acceptable. Engaging in denuclearization negotiations with North Korea would itself be a violation of the law. By legislating the maximal advancement, diversification, and mass production of nuclear weapons under Article 9, 'Qualitative and Quantitative Enhancement and Renewal of Nuclear Forces,' it has made it possible only for nuclear disarmament or arms control negotiations in the future, not denuclearization of North Korea. Through this, North Korea is effectively preparing for a showdown with the United States as a nuclear-weapon state. The legislative action related to nuclear weapons and its public disclosure is a strategy for North Korea to gain a high degree of leverage in nuclear negotiations. North Korea will use the justification of being regulated by law to block any retreat and effectively pursue its maximum interests as a nuclear-weapon state in future negotiations.

Second, it signifies Kim Jong-un's achievements. In his policy speech, by mentioning 'our revolution that began with two pistols,' he invoked the 'gun barrel philosophy' created during the Kim Il-sung era. The logic is that Kim Jong-un has finally completed the defense capability construction initiated by Kim Il-sung through the 'absolute weapon' of nuclear weapons. This is linked to the 'historic great task of legally solidifying the nuclear force policy.' In his policy speech, by emphasizing increased production of food and daily necessities in the economic sector, he effectively admitted to economic difficulties and a lack of achievements. As Chairman Kim Jong-un cannot boast of achievements in the economic field, he seeks to secure legitimacy by emphasizing the expansion of nuclear capabilities, which is his sole accomplishment.

In summary, North Korea is sprinting towards becoming a complete nuclear-weapon state, blocking negotiations with the United States. As of August 17, 2022, North Korea has conducted a total of 19 missile provocations. Notably, it has focused on developing tactical nuclear-capable missiles such as the KN-23 and KN-24, their improved versions, and long-range cruise missiles, some of which have already been deployed and are undergoing random test firings ('acceptance firing'). It has also resumed firing the Hwasong-12, which has a range covering Guam, for the first time since 2017. North Korea is demonstrating its capability to strike key areas in the Indo-Pacific region, including South Korea, Japan, and Guam. North Korea will also continue to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Although White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan assessed in March that North Korea 'does not yet possess the capability to strike the U.S. mainland,' North Korea's determination to develop such capabilities is firm.

Ultimately, North Korea's goal is to be recognized as a de facto nuclear-weapon state and then pursue nuclear disarmament or arms control. Its advanced, mass-produced, and diversified nuclear arsenal has made the complete denuclearization of North Korea unrealistic. Voices are growing louder arguing that North Korea should be recognized as a de facto nuclear-weapon state and that efforts should focus on non-proliferation rather than preventing proliferation. North Korea aims to maximally advance its nuclear capabilities to make this a reality.

Anticipated North Korean Provocations

Given the above goals and intentions, North Korea will likely maintain an offensive posture for the time being. It is expected to continue provocations until it completes the development of strategic weapons ordered by Kim Jong-un at the 8th Party Congress, including a 7th nuclear test. At the 8th Party Congress, Kim Jong-un declared the acceleration of 'qualitative and quantitative enhancement of war deterrence and the development and production of essential strategic and tactical means for national security' under the 'Second Five-Year Plan for the Defense Industry Revolution (2021-2025).' Specifically, Kim Jong-un pledged to improve the accuracy of striking within a 15,000 km range, including the U.S. mainland; develop ICBMs with underwater and ground-based solid-fuel engines; possess nuclear submarines and underwater-launched strategic nuclear weapons; introduce hypersonic weapons; produce super-large nuclear warheads; operate military reconnaissance satellites; and develop 500 km-range unmanned reconnaissance aircraft.

Considering Kim Jong-un's direct orders, the authority of the Party Congress, and North Korea's behavior this year, the following provocations are anticipated. First, North Korea's missile provocations will resume. The missile launched on August 17th, after a halt since June 5th, is understood as a signal that North Korea is resuming 'weapons test launches.' North Korea did not publicly announce its missile provocations from late April to June 5th. Given that COVID-19 cases emerged in North Korea from late April, and it is highly likely that North Korean authorities were aware of this, it is judged that they intentionally withheld the announcement of missile launches. Amidst a severe COVID-19 situation where North Korean residents were on the brink of life and death, missile launches would not have been perceived positively. The North Korean leadership views the epidemic as a crisis for the regime rather than for the well-being of its citizens. While studies on North Korean regime instability assess the possibility of popular uprisings as low, they consider the possibility of uprisings when an epidemic combines with a severe economic crisis. <<Therefore, it is judged that the North Korean leadership proceeded with planned missile tests but did not disclose them to the public. It appears that missile tests were suspended after June 5th due to the severe COVID-19 situation. In this context, the cruise missile launch conducted 78 days after June 5th can be interpreted as a signal that North Korea has declared victory over COVID-19 and, after lifting the maximum emergency quarantine system, is resuming missile provocations.

North Korea will resume provocations to fulfill the weapons system development ordered by Kim Jong-un at the 8th Party Congress and, within a broader framework, to achieve the ultimate goal of 'recognition as a nuclear-weapon state.' Depending on the development status, the launch of a military reconnaissance satellite, which Kim Jong-un personally directed and declared would be 'operated in the near future' as the 'most important core task,' is anticipated. On February 27th, after launching a ballistic missile, North Korea stated that the 'National Aerospace Development Administration and the National Defense Science Academy conducted important tests according to the process plan for reconnaissance satellite development on the 27th.' It claimed to have tested a reconnaissance camera to be mounted on a reconnaissance satellite using a ballistic rocket and released photos of the Korean Peninsula. However, the credibility of the photos is questionable, and criticism has been raised that it was a 'disguised test,' especially since long-range ballistic rockets are identical to the development process of ICBMs. The important point is that the military reconnaissance satellite is a direct order from Kim Jong-un, and there is a need to secure reconnaissance capabilities that are significantly inferior to those of South Korea and the United States. Therefore, it is expected that a military reconnaissance satellite will be launched again in some form.

In conjunction, ICBM launch tests are also possible. Notably, the Hwasong-17, attempted on March 24th after breaking the moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests, was confidently identified by South Korea-U.S. intelligence authorities as a Hwasong-15. On April 15th, for the 110th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birthday, Kim Jong-un needed to promote that he had completed the 'nuclear force' through the 'absolute weapon' of the Hwasong-17, building upon the defense capabilities initiated by his predecessors. This is judged to be a desperate move by Kim Jong-un to offset his insufficient legitimacy with achievements. However, since the 8th Party Congress ordered improvements in accuracy for striking the U.S. mainland and the development of ICBMs with underwater and ground-based solid-fuel engines, and since securing the capability to strike the U.S. mainland is the final step for North Korea to be recognized as a de facto nuclear-weapon state, there is a possibility of resuming ICBM launch tests. In addition, 'underwater-launched strategic nuclear weapons,' also ordered at the 8th Party Congress but not yet completed, as well as the hypersonic missiles and long-range cruise missiles currently under development, could also be test-fired.

The possibility of a 7th nuclear test also remains open. A 7th nuclear test would be significant for North Korea both politically and militarily. Politically, it would serve as an important step toward being recognized as a de facto nuclear-weapon state. Although it broke the moratorium on ICBM launches that had been in place since April 2018, it did not attract as much global attention as expected. In particular, it did not draw significant attention within the United States and did not influence the Biden administration's denuclearization policy. It is judged that the completeness of North Korea's ICBMs and the periodic tests by ICBM-possessing countries, including the U.S., have reduced its attention-grabbing potential. However, in the case of nuclear tests, North Korea has been the only country to conduct them since the 1990s, making it a global news event. Through this, North Korea would aim to publicly declare the practical impossibility of 'complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization' (CVID) to the world and seek recognition as a nuclear-weapon state. Militarily, there is a need for miniaturization for tactical nuclear weapons and the deployment of multiple warheads on ICBMs. However, there is also the possibility of a nuclear test to produce 'super-large nuclear warheads' announced at the 8th Party Congress.

Finally, while the possibility of limited provocations by North Korea cannot be entirely ruled out, North Korea is expected to be cautious in its choices. Although debatable, the September 19, 2019, Inter-Korean Military Agreement was drafted in a manner favorable to North Korea. Therefore, North Korea may refrain from clear provocations against South Korea that would nullify the agreement. Instead, it is more likely to engage in political offensives by raising issues with the decision by South Korea and the U.S. to strengthen combined exercises to the division level or higher starting next year.

ROK-U.S. Cooperation

With dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea completely blocked, the diplomatic space for denuclearization is extremely limited. Furthermore, as discussed above, North Korea is relentlessly advancing its nuclear capabilities. Considering this situation, close cooperation between South Korea and the United States is essential in the following areas.

First, the nuclear race of North Korea must be stopped. Time is currently on North Korea's side. As time passes, North Korea pursues the advancement, mass production, and diversification of tactical nuclear missiles targeting South Korea, Japan, and Guam. Various missiles, including the KN-23, reduce the effectiveness of the missile defense systems of South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Therefore, South Korea, the United States, and Japan must strengthen their cooperation and significantly enhance their response to North Korean missile launches. For example, pre-announcing combined exercises in the region and the deployment of strategic assets can deter North Korean actions.

Second, the illegality of North Korea's nuclear possession and development must be continuously raised. Although additional UN Security Council sanctions are difficult due to the opposition of China and Russia, the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons must be continuously raised at the Security Council to highlight its illegality. Furthermore, cooperation with like-minded countries sharing democratic values, including NATO, is necessary to publicize the North Korean nuclear issue in the international community. In particular, if North Korea conducts a 7th nuclear test, South Korea and the United States, along with as many countries as possible, should impose additional individual (unilateral) sanctions on North Korea. These efforts will express a unified will that North Korea can never be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state, regardless of the circumstances.

Third, the U.S. extended deterrence commitment must be demonstrated in response to North Korea's offensive and radical nuclear strategy. In particular, a stern warning must be issued against North Korea's actions to lower the threshold for nuclear use, such as use in non-military situations and the combination of conventional and nuclear weapons. The U.S. must continuously state, through its President and high-ranking officials, that if North Korea uses nuclear weapons, it will respond strongly by mobilizing the entire three-axis system.

Fourth, South Korea and the United States must thoroughly coordinate denuclearization plans for North Korea. Although the specific details of the 'calibrated practical approach' pursued by the Biden administration are not known, it is presumed to be nuclear freeze at a minimum level, which can confirm the sincerity of North Korea's denuclearization. On the other hand, although North Korea publicly denies it, partial denuclearization, such as abandoning the Yongbyon nuclear facilities proposed at the Hanoi Summit, would be an acceptable level. Therefore, it is judged that there is a significant gap between the U.S. and North Korea.

Greater discrepancies are apparent in specific issues. A freeze is a process that requires verification, not just a declaration. In other words, a proper freeze would involve sending IAEA or international inspectors to North Korea to confirm facilities and continuously monitor the freeze, but North Korea is highly negative about this. Agreement on the scope of the freeze is also difficult. North Korea has never agreed to freeze its highly enriched uranium facilities outside of Yongbyon. As mentioned above, in recent times, arguments prioritizing non-proliferation and partial denuclearization or ICBM freeze have been growing in the U.S. and South Korea.

South Korea and the United States must agree on a clear definition, goal, and method of denuclearization. First, the definition of denuclearization must be 'denuclearization of North Korea,' not the 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' advocated by North Korea. While the U.S. uses the term 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' out of respect for the 2018 Singapore Agreement, the specific content must be 'denuclearization of North Korea.' The goal of North Korean denuclearization must also be 'complete, verifiable, and irreversible (CVID) denuclearization.' Even if the term CVID is not used due to North Korea's extreme opposition, the goal of completely eliminating all of North Korea's past, present, and future nuclear weapons must not be abandoned.

A denuclearization roadmap must be established at the beginning of negotiations. Approaching the issue piecemeal without an overall roadmap and accepting North Korea's demand for partial denuclearization must be avoided. North Korea may demand the lifting of sanctions in exchange for a moratorium on ICBM development or the freezing of some nuclear facilities without a comprehensive roadmap. If this is accepted, North Korea's economy, which is specialized in sanctions, can be sufficiently reactivated, and North Korea's nuclear possession is likely to become permanent. Even with a snapback clause to restore sanctions in case of a violation of the agreement, it is unlikely to be effective as China and Russia are unlikely to agree at the UN level.

In this regard, President Yoon Suk-yeol's 'Audacious Initiative,' proposed in his August 15th Liberation Day address, is significant in that it reaffirmed the goals and methods of denuclearization. It contains two principles. First, it positions South Korea as the subject for denuclearization negotiations. At a time when North Korea is threatening the possibility of nuclear use against South Korea, South Korea, in coordination with the United States, must play a central role as a direct party. The Audacious Initiative is driven by South Korea. The North Korean nuclear issue was strictly handled as an inter-Korean issue until the Kim Young-sam administration, launched in February 1993, requested the U.S. to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through U.S.-North Korea talks. Subsequently, although four-party talks or six-party talks were held, and agreements were reached through bilateral talks between the U.S. and North Korea, the denuclearization of North Korea ultimately failed. Especially considering the experience of unilateral approaches to the North Korean issue during the Trump administration, including the characterization of ROK-U.S. combined exercises, and the passive attitude of the current Biden administration, it is increasingly necessary for South Korea to function as a party again. Efforts must be made to re-establish South Korea as the subject of negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue through consultations with the United States. The Audacious Initiative should be the first step towards this.

Second, the Audacious Initiative emphasizes comprehensive agreement and phased implementation. It proposes a roadmap that includes a comprehensive agreement, with phased approaches rather than demanding unilateral denuclearization from North Korea. The roadmap includes the definition and goals of denuclearization, phased denuclearization measures, and corresponding measures in each sector. Furthermore, denuclearization implementation will be pursued in phases, minimizing the implementation stages, i.e., reducing the gap between substantial denuclearization and complete denuclearization to achieve rapid denuclearization. These are understood to be included in the Audacious Initiative.

North Korea previously requested the concept of 'disablement' in the 'February 13 Agreement' and 'October 3 Agreement' in 2007, subdividing the stages. The more stages there are, the more North Korea expands the scope of corresponding measures and extends the period of nuclear possession, making North Korea's denuclearization virtually unattainable. The Audacious Initiative rejects such North Korean behavior and reaffirms the principles for complete denuclearization. When negotiations resume, the deadline for denuclearization should be set at approximately two years, and the roadmap should focus on shortening the implementation period.

Additionally, the Audacious Initiative is understood to include principles regarding sanctions against North Korea. If North Korea engages in denuclearization negotiations, partial sanctions relief will be considered in the form of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, while utilizing partial sanctions exemption measures corresponding to substantial denuclearization actions by North Korea, the principle of maintaining sanctions against North Korea until denuclearization is fundamentally upheld. Although the effectiveness of sanctions remains a subject of debate, sanctions are the only means to drive denuclearization of North Korea in a situation where military means cannot be utilized. In particular, since North Korea's economy is specialized in sanctions, it can sufficiently recover its functionality with partial sanctions relief alone. Therefore, while partial sanctions exemption should be utilized as a corresponding measure, as proposed by the Audacious Initiative, sanctions must be maintained until the final stage of phased implementation, provided that a roadmap for a comprehensive agreement is firmly established.

Conclusion

Currently, North Korea is maintaining an offensive posture. The 'frontal breakthrough strategy,' adopted in December 2019 as a hardline policy toward South Korea and the United States, is still in effect. Even in a one-man dictatorial regime like North Korea, a 'line struggle' is necessary for policy change, but none has been confirmed. The Party Congress, held every five years with the highest authority, reaffirmed the existing line at the 8th Congress in August 2021, and since then, five plenary sessions of the Central Committee have been held without any known change in policy. In particular, the line toward South Korea and the United States articulated by Kim Jong-un on July 27th remains 'frontal breakthrough.'

Therefore, diplomatic engagement by South Korea and the United States is inevitably limited. While the overall assessment of being passive in its North Korea policy may be accurate, the two proposals attempted by the Biden administration are significant. At the end of last year, the U.S. offered to provide 60 million doses of vaccines to North Korean Ambassador Kim Song to the UN. It was also revealed that high-ranking U.S. officials sent a letter to North Korea earlier this year containing more specific denuclearization proposals. However, North Korea rejected the former offer with a series of missile launches and did not respond to the latter. Therefore, North Korea has no intention of accepting diplomatic proposals from South Korea, the United States, or both. The situation remains unchanged since the numerous proposals made by the Moon Jae-in administration were rejected by North Korea following the collapse of the Hanoi summit in February 2019. Thus, for the time being, North Korea will focus on advancing its nuclear capabilities.

Furthermore, even if North Korea resumes denuclearization negotiations, there is no possibility that it will abandon its nuclear weapons for economic gain. Kim Jong-un has already expressed his determination to possess nuclear weapons despite economic difficulties, stating that he is willing to 'tighten our belts again' and even endure a 'arduous march.' Kim Yo-jong unequivocally stated on August 18th that there is no possibility of 'exchanging our statehood, nuclear weapons, for something like economic cooperation.' In a situation where the North Korean regime has instilled in the entire population the perception that 'prioritizing one's stomach over ideology is a crime,' the economy does not take precedence over politics. North Korea's fierce criticism of then-President Lee Myung-bak's statement on February 21, 2009, 'If a society worries about eating three meals a day, it's better not to have it,' clearly demonstrates the nature of the North Korean regime. In this context, the core of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's Audacious Initiative, which proposed denuclearization through economic compensation, was unnecessary.

Conceptually, North Korea does not accept the 'economy-security exchange model.' Openness is common sense for national economic development. However, North Korea is a dictatorial regime that forms a victorious coalition centered around the core elite. It believes that regime maintenance is possible by managing the core elite, estimated to be around 300 individuals. Economic opening would benefit the North Korean masses but would also weaken the mechanisms of information manipulation and oppressive control used by the core elite. As long as extreme situations like the 'arduous march' of the late 1990s are avoided, the uncertainty for the entire regime arising from the well-being of the general populace and economic prosperity is likely to be too great for Pyongyang to choose. It is considered more advantageous for regime maintenance to secure only the resources for nuclear development, which are necessary to maintain the victorious coalition and assert regime legitimacy, rather than creating public goods that benefit the North Korean masses. Instead, it focuses on private goods that benefit a select few. This is then filled by propaganda and agitation as a 'theater state' that constantly instills a sense of 'besieged consciousness' due to perceived threats. North Korea faithfully practices the advice, 'A hungry person lacks the capacity to overthrow the leader.'

In conclusion, the denuclearization of North Korea is an arduous task, and currently, North Korea appears to hold the advantage. While South Korea and the United States must not cease their efforts at diplomatic engagement, they must also avoid compromises that undermine the principles of North Korean denuclearization. Therefore, the current focus for South Korea and the United States should be on cultivating the capability to deter North Korea's nuclear weapons. As South Korea and the U.S. enhance their capabilities, the utility of North Korea's nuclear weapons will decrease, thereby increasing the likelihood that North Korea will engage in denuclearization negotiations.■

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of 'The Road to Denuclearization of the DPRK: The DPRK’s Strategy and the ROK-U.S. Response Plan'.

■ Park Won-gonProfessor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. He holds a Ph.D. in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Vice President of the Peace Research Institute (KPI). He conducted research on the ROK-U.S. alliance and North Korea for 18 years at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and previously served as a professor of International Studies at Handong Global University. His main research areas include the ROK-U.S. alliance, North Korean diplomacy and military affairs, and Northeast Asian international relations.