[EAI Issue Briefing] The Active Response of 'I Don't Know'

I. Korea-Japan Relations are Bad, But Important

The author began to closely examine the 'Korea-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey' by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO starting with the 8th survey in 2020. This was a period when news of the worst Korea-Japan relations was continuously reported, following the forced labor compensation ruling and subsequent export control measures, leading to the suspension of visa exemptions between the two countries. While some argued that Korea-Japan relations had always been at their worst, the mutual perception survey by EAI and Genron NPO revealed that public favorability had hit rock bottom, and pessimistic forecasts for the future of Korea-Japan relations were at their peak, confirming that Korea-Japan relations are indeed expressed through public sentiment.

In the 2022 survey, negative responses such as 'Korea-Japan relations are bad, and I have a negative impression of the other country' were still numerous, but their proportion had decreased. Conversely, responses like 'The future of Korea-Japan relations will improve' and 'I want to visit the other country' increased in both nations, indicating a slight easing of heightened emotions.

[Figure 1] Importance of Korea-Japan Relations

[Figure 2] 10-Year Trend of the Importance of Korea-Japan Relations

The majority of South Koreans (81.1%) wish for the recovery of Korea-Japan relations, but over half of respondents (52.0%) predict that relations will remain 'the same as they are now' in the future. When examining the reasons why people do not have a bright outlook despite wanting improved relations, it is noteworthy that both South Korea (57.7%) and Japan (66.3%) cite 'resolution of historical issues' as a task for improving relations. Faced with the obstacle of historical issues, and aware that it is a persistent challenge for both governments to reach appropriate agreements and for the public in both countries to respond favorably, people are unable to view the future of Korea-Japan relations optimistically. The reason why South Koreans and Japanese people do not have positive impressions of each other is also intertwined with 'historical issues.'

However, a consistent perception over the decade of Korea-Japan perception surveys is that 'Korea-Japan relations are important.' There is a difference in perception between South Korea and Japan regarding the importance of Korea-Japan relations. The proportion of respondents who believe 'Korea-Japan relations are important' is about 30% higher in South Korea. However, looking closely at the responses from Japan, the proportion of 'important' responses (56.5%) is four times higher than 'not important' (14.2%). Furthermore, in addition to the affirmative and negative responses of 'important' and 'not important,' the 30% 'I don't know' response is also worth noting. Amidst the emergence of questions like 'Are South Korea and Japan equal?' and the increasing response of 'Japan's future is not bright,' this 30% 'I don't know' response is also significant for analyzing recent Japanese society, where both the Korean Wave and anti-Korean sentiment have erupted simultaneously.

In the Japanese survey regarding 'Why is it important?', the response 'Because South Korea is a neighboring country with deep historical, geographical, and cultural ties' was overwhelmingly high at 71.9%. In the South Korean responses, the answer 'Because it is a neighboring country' accounted for 64%, and slightly more cited the importance of economic interdependence. As 'neighboring countries' with high interdependence, Korea-Japan relations present an endless challenge of 'bad, but important.' And when seeking to communicate to improve Korea-Japan relations, temporarily setting aside the difficult issue of historical problems, popular culture is often cited as the most reliable clue.

II. Mutuality and Contemporaneity of Popular Culture Exchange

The question 'Are South Korea and Japan in an equal relationship?' asks, 'Given that South Korea's per capita GDP has surpassed Japan's, and defense expenditures are also at a similar level for both countries, can South Korea and Japan be considered to be in an equal relationship?' While this question focuses on economic aspects to ask about 'equality,' the meaning of this 'equal relationship' becomes much clearer when focusing on socio-cultural changes, particularly in popular culture. The background of the ban on Japanese cultural imports until the 1990s stemmed from resentment over colonial rule, but there was also strong concern that the opening up of Japanese popular culture would stifle the South Korean popular culture industry. Therefore, in reality, while imitation of Japanese culture was rampant, official barriers were maintained. However, just over 20 years have passed since the 'Joint Declaration on a New Partnership between Japan and the Republic of Korea in the 21st Century' by President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in 1998, and the subsequent opening of Japanese culture in South Korea. Today, South Korean popular culture has become the most meaningful keyword for mutuality and contemporary communication, surpassing mere 'equality' between the two nations.

[Figure 3] Reasons for Having a Positive Impression of the Other Country

Looking at the reasons for having a positive impression of the other country, a majority of South Koreans (over half) favor 'the diligent national character of the Japanese people.' This response significantly exceeds that of 'because it is a developed country with a high standard of living' (37.8%). It is impossible not to notice that 'positive impressions of Japanese people' persist despite the escalation of historical issues between South Korea and Japan. This contrasts with the reason for having a negative impression, where 80% of respondents cited 'statements and actions of Japanese political leaders.' Meanwhile, among Japanese respondents, 'Korean popular culture (44.7%)' and 'food culture and shopping (43.4%)' were cited as reasons for having a positive impression of South Korea, confirming that the consumption of the so-called 'Hallyu' is the source of positive impressions of South Korea. By age group, the response 'have a positive impression of South Korea through popular culture' was overwhelmingly high among those under 20 (75%) and in their 20s (64.7%). Both South Korea and Japan responded that 'relations with China are more important,' but they feel familiarity with Japan and South Korea, respectively, and this familiarity is likely based on communication mediated by popular culture.

[Figure 4] Does Japanese Popular Culture Improve Impressions of Japan?

[Figure 5] Degree of Consumption of Popular Culture of the Other Country

Regarding the question of whether one enjoys Korean popular culture, the responses for 'very much so' and 'yes' were 7.3% and 27.3%, respectively. While the proportion of respondents who enjoy Korean popular culture is highest among those under 20 (56.5%) and in their 20s (49.6%), the response from those in their 60s (31.4%) also indicates that interest in Korean popular culture is distributed across all age groups. Notably, among women, over 60% in their 20s and over 40% in their 50s and 60s enjoy Korean popular culture.

The question of whether popular culture improves impressions of South Korea received high positive responses regardless of age and gender. A total of 86.2% of respondents answered that their impression of South Korea had improved, and the low response rate for 'I don't know' (5.8%) is also a characteristic. The reason for emphasizing communication through 'popular culture' when seeking clues to mitigate anti-Korean sentiment and anti-Japan sentiment is, as seen in this perception survey, that people naturally develop positive feelings towards the other country through the daily consumption of popular culture products.

III. From Hallyu to K, From Dramas to K-Pop

The Hallyu (Korean Wave) boom in Japan officially began in April 2003 with the 'Yonsama' craze for Bae Yong-joon in NHK's 'Winter Sonata.' 'Winter Sonata' set an unprecedented record by being rebroadcast four times on NHK in December 2003, April 2004, and late that same year. In 2008, a fandom for K-pop artists emerged among the younger generation, leading to the so-called second Hallyu boom. However, President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo in 2012 and his demand for an apology from the Emperor poured cold water on Hallyu and stimulated anti-Korean sentiment. The explosive popularity of K-pop stars like BTS in 2018 ignited the third Hallyu wave, and the Shin-Okubo district buzzed again. In 2020, amidst the 'worst Korea-Japan relations,' dramas like 'Crash Landing on You' topped Netflix charts, leading to a fourth Hallyu boom during the COVID-19 'border closures.'

So, what aspects of each other's popular culture do South Korea and Japan appreciate? South Koreans favor Japanese manga and anime, while Japanese people favor Korean dramas and popular music. Focusing on the Japanese survey, it is characteristic that younger people prefer K-pop, while older people prefer dramas. Those under 20 and in their 20s favor K-pop at 84.6% and 55.9%, respectively, while those aged 60 and over favor dramas at 64.5%.

[Figure 6] Areas of Interest in the Other Country's Popular Culture

[Figure 7] Does the Deterioration of Korea-Japan Relations Affect Consumption of the Other Country's Popular Culture?

As the consumer base for Korean popular culture expanded through global new media environments like YouTube, 'K' began to be used instead of 'Hallyu,' which carried nationalistic connotations. Charting the waves of 'which Hallyu generation' also quickly became an outdated topic. While the first Hallyu, represented by 'Winter Sonata,' was broadcast on public broadcaster NHK, today individual consumers are at the center of the platform, and with the changes in media, popular culture consumption and the associated sense of closeness have moved beyond the influence of Korea-Japan political dynamics.

The opinion that enjoying popular culture remains unchanged even if Korea-Japan relations worsen is more pronounced in Japan (61.0%) than in South Korea (35.6%). By sharing the daily lives of idols and consuming music 'regardless of nationality,' the sphere of cultural consumption is not diminished by political issues. The reason for consuming K-pop stems from the 'coolness' that consumers perceive sensually, making it unlikely that a phenomenon similar to the temporary freeze of 'Hallyu' due to former President Lee Myung-bak's Dokdo visit will occur again. This is as long as K-pop maintains its 'coolness.' However, it is also important to note that the open and free anonymous spaces of new media such as YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook have provided sporadic focal points that have driven 'anti-Korean sentiment' by spewing unrestrained hate speech.

The 'young people' who are most active in consuming Korean popular culture are also the group with the highest proportion of 'I don't know' responses regarding Korea-Japan relations. It might be easy to assume that young people with a high sense of closeness to South Korea would have a positive outlook on the future of Korea-Japan relations, but their answers are surprisingly not so. When asked about the future of Korea-Japan relations, the 'positive' responses were 39% for those under 20, 29.4% for those in their 20s, 20.2% for those in their 30s, 30.6% for those in their 40s, 30.6% for those in their 50s, and 26.1% for those aged 60 and over, with no clear difference according to age, except for 38% for those aged 70 and over. (Note: The original text seems to have a slight inconsistency in age ranges or data presentation here, as the 70+ group is listed separately and shows a higher positive outlook than some younger groups.)

Furthermore, when asked 'Should Korea-Japan relations be improved?', older age groups were more likely to respond 'should be improved.' While only 39.5% of those in their 20s opted for 'improvement,' 67.9% of those aged 70 and over believed they should be improved. For young women, who are most active in consuming Korean popular culture, 44.4% responded that relations 'should be improved,' while an equal 44.4% responded 'I don't know.' Is responding 'I don't know' to a question that could be answered even without prior knowledge an 'active' expression beyond ignorance or indifference? I would like to interpret this 'I don't know' response as an active expression of wanting to enjoy K-pop without linking it to changes in political situations such as Korea-Japan relations.

IV. Heavy Steps Towards the Future

[Figure 8] Outlook on One's Own Country's Future

Regarding the future of their own country, optimistic views (66.8%) were more common in South Korea, while pessimistic views (50.8%) were more common in Japan. What is particularly noteworthy about the 'pessimism' regarding Japan's future is that it is prevalent among respondents around the age of 40, and among them, 40-something men (64.8%), who are most active in society, are the most pessimistic about Japan's future.

In terms of per capita GDP, South Korea has surpassed Japan, and defense expenditures are also at a similar level for both countries. Regarding the question 'Are South Korea and Japan in an equal relationship?', the response 'equal' (48.1%) was more common in South Korea than 'not yet equal' (40.1%). For the same question, the response that South Korea and Japan are 'equal' was 27.8% in Japan, and 'not yet equal, but moving in that direction' was slightly higher at 28.9%. And a slightly larger proportion, 32.6%, responded 'I don't know.' If we analyze Japan's xenophobia as being born out of economic recession and subsequent social anxiety, we can infer the impatience felt by Japanese people in response to the question about their country's future and South Korea's surpassing them.

[Figure 9] Evaluation of the Fairness of Domestic Media Coverage on Korea-Japan Relations

What, then, are the responses of Japanese people regarding anti-Korean expressions that arise within Japan? In the Japanese survey, when asked, 'There are many aggressive expressions about South Korea on the internet; do you think these appropriately reflect the will of the Japanese people?', only 13.8% answered 'appropriately reflect.' In contrast, 34.6% expressed a critical stance, stating 'do not appropriately reflect.' 88% of Japanese people obtain information about South Korea or Korea-Japan relations through news media, and 63.9% answered that they consume news through television. When asked, 'Does the media report objectively and fairly on Korea-Japan relations?', only 20.6% of Japanese respondents answered 'yes.'

However, while they do not agree with anti-Korean expressions and do not trust the media, more than half of respondents in both categories answered 'I don't know.' This indicates a 'gray area' response from over half of the population, who neither agree nor criticize. Anti-Korean expressions, represented by hate speech, have subsided through institutional mechanisms within Japanese society, such as the hate speech prohibition bill. However, the response of the majority, who answer 'I don't know,' also suggests an atmosphere that allows and condones xenophobia. ■

■ Author: Park Seung-hyun_Assistant Professor, Department of Japanese Language and Japanese Culture, Keimyung University. Ph.D. in Anthropology, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo. Researches Japanese society and culture on themes such as disaster and civil society, demographic change, and housing and welfare. Major works include "Aging Housing Complexes: Aging and Redevelopment in a Tokyo Public Housing Complex" (2019, Tokyo Moruwa Publishing), "Anthropology of Zainichi Koreans" (2021, co-edited), and "Pandemic, Urban Response" (2022, co-authored). Recent papers include "The Atmosphere of 'Sekken' Triggered by COVID-19 Self-Restraint: The Resurgence of Japanese Cultural Theory and the Problem of 'Corona Isolationism'" (2022), "The Genealogy of Kobe's Urban Management and 'Reconstruction Disaster': Focusing on the Redevelopment Project South of Shin-Nagata Station after the Great Hanshin Earthquake" (2022), "Japan's Unipolar Concentration Society, COVID-19 in Tokyo: Dynamics between Center-Periphery and Central-Local Government" (2021, co-authored), and "COVID-19 Pandemic and Japan's Anxiety-Suppressing Society: Anxiety, Self-Restraint, and Solidarity in Disaster Communities" (2020).

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Eun-jin_EAI Researcher

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