[EAI Issue Briefing] Will Public Opinion Urging Improvement in Korea-Japan Relations Lead to Policy Changes?

The 10th Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey, conducted in August 2022, clearly shows that public opinion in both countries supports improving relations. Although bilateral relations faced their worst situation since normalization of diplomatic ties due to diplomatic conflicts stemming from the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on wartime forced labor in 2019, trade disputes over export restrictions, and security conflicts such as the termination of GSOMIA, public opinion in both countries has rapidly improved since then. Perceptions of the other country (favorability), aspirations for improved bilateral relations, and future outlook for Korea-Japan relations have reached levels close to the highest since the survey began in 2013. Furthermore, there is a noticeable trend of convergence between the two countries on foreign policy, security, and economic issues. Opinions are converging between the publics of both countries on issues such as perceptions of China, responses to North Korea's nuclear program, security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, and responses to economic security.

What are the reasons for this positive shift in public opinion? Will the governments respond to public expectations? The governments of both countries are still hesitant to improve relations, as they have not yet resolved pending issues such as the liquidation of assets related to the wartime forced labor ruling. Interestingly, the public in both countries has lowered its expectations for government-level efforts. Perceptions of their own government's policies toward the other country and the prospects for improving Korea-Japan relations under the new administrations are not high. There is a gap between the level of goodwill at the government level and at the public level.

Behind this lies a 'loss of trust' between the governments. The governments of both countries are caught in a vortex of distrust due to emotional confrontations over historical issues, hesitating to cooperate with each other, underestimating the strategic value of the other, and often acting confrontationally. Both governments, rather than coolly examining the differences in historical and legal perceptions regarding the resolution of wartime forced labor and comfort women issues, remain unwilling to abandon their assertive stances, prioritizing national pride and nationalistic sentiments. Therefore, even if the asset liquidation issue is resolved, it will be difficult to resolve the decade-long structural conflict (or 'lost decade'). As revealed in the public opinion survey, efforts should be made to manage historical issues to prevent diplomatic conflicts, while simultaneously undertaking various trust-building measures from a future-oriented cooperative perspective. Both countries must strive for a broad consensus on historical issues and, in parallel, prepare for and lead multifaceted and substantive cooperation in areas such as trade, supply chains, advanced technologies, ecological environment, and military security.

I. Spread of Favorable Public Opinion Toward the Other Country

The most striking feature of this survey is the favorable public opinion in both countries toward improving Korea-Japan relations, which have been in a prolonged stalemate. In South Korea, favorable impressions of Japan were 30.6% and unfavorable impressions were 52.8%. This represents an increase of 10.1 percentage points and a decrease of 10.4 percentage points in unfavorable impressions compared to the previous year. The rate of increase recorded the highest level in 10 years. In Japan, favorable impressions were 30.4% and unfavorable impressions were 40.3%, with favorability increasing by 5 percentage points and unfavorability decreasing by 8.5 percentage points compared to the previous year ([Figure 1]).

[Figure 1] 10-Year Trend of Perceptions of the Other Country

Looking back at the past decade, two events critically influenced mutual perceptions: the complex conflicts that erupted across historical, economic, and security dimensions in 2012, including the GSOMIA controversy, President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo, the termination of the currency swap, and the suspension of talks on comfort women issues; and another complex conflict across historical, economic, and security dimensions around 2019, including diplomatic confrontations following the Supreme Court's ruling on wartime forced labor and trade disputes. As the worst-case scenario unfolded with negative linkages between historical issues and cooperation matters in security and economy, public opinion rapidly deteriorated. However, in both instances, a rebound followed.

The rise in favorability observed in this year's survey has reached near-record highs in both countries, while unfavorability is approaching its lowest point. After hitting a low in 2013-2014 during the early stages of the Park Geun-hye and Abe administrations, perceptions steadily rose, then sharply declined due to the major confrontation between the Moon Jae-in and Abe administrations in 2018-2019, before successfully rebounding. In South Korea, perceptions increased by 18.3 percentage points, and in Japan, they also increased by 10.4 percentage points.

[Figure 2] Future of Korea-Japan Relations

The favorable atmosphere toward the other country has led to an improved outlook for the future. South Korea showed a 12 percentage point increase, and Japan showed an 11 percentage point increase. In South Korea, the outlook for improvement increased by 11.6 percentage points compared to the previous year, while the outlook for deterioration decreased by 7.5 percentage points. In Japan, the outlook for improvement surged by 12.7 percentage points compared to the previous year, while the outlook for deterioration plummeted by 12.9 percentage points ([Figure 2]). Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of South Koreans (81%) and a majority of Japanese (53.4%) supported improving relations. This represents an increase of 10 percentage points in South Korea and 6.7 percentage points in Japan compared to the previous year ([Figure 3]).

[Figure 3] Necessity of Efforts to Restore Korea-Japan Relations

II. Factors Behind the Rise in Favorable Opinion

What factors have enabled Korea-Japan relations, which saw trust between governments hit rock bottom and public sentiment deepen in 2019 due to major confrontations between the two governments, to rebound in 2021 and continue its upward trend this year? The following three factors can be considered.

1. Lessons from Excessive Confrontation

Most notably, there is a growing perception among the public in both countries that the excessive verbal exchanges between the two governments since 2019 are not in the national interest. The public generally holds negative views of their own government's responses and attitudes toward the other country. In both countries, negative evaluations outweigh positive ones, and the proportion of those who hold a reserved opinion, stating 'cannot say either way,' is also increasing. In other words, they do not support the hardline stances taken by the Moon Jae-in or Abe administrations toward the other party ([Figures 4], [Figure 5]).

[Figure 4] Evaluation of the Japanese Government's Response and Attitude Toward South Korea

[Figure 5] Evaluation of the South Korean Government's Response Toward Japan

In particular, the cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation surrounding the export restrictions imposed by the Abe administration in July 2019 is proving to have been an overreaction. In Japan's case, the Abe administration's declaration of export restrictions on three types of semiconductor materials (photoresists, hydrogen fluoride, and polyimides) failed to exert effective pressure on South Korea because it did not result in a significant reduction or cessation of actual exports. Currently, exports of the other two items, excluding hydrogen fluoride, have actually increased. In South Korea, in response, a strategy of 'self-reliance in materials, components, and equipment' was broadly pursued, but without significant results. Instead, it has been proven that the supply chains between Korean and Japanese companies are tightly integrated and highly resilient to external shocks. Ultimately, both countries engaged in a war of attrition due to unnecessary government responses, leading to a burden of deteriorating public opinion toward each other.

The South Korean government's decision to terminate GSOMIA in response to Japan's economic retaliation was also an overreaction. The United States perceived South Korea's strong backlash as detrimental to ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation and exerted diplomatic pressure, forcing South Korea to back down. It became a self-inflicted wound for South Korea. Furthermore, this action contradicted public opinion. The public supports trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, yet the government and political circles, swayed by anti-Japanese sentiment, ended up undermining it ([Figure 6]).

[Figure 6] Stance on Strengthening Trilateral Security Cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan

2. U.S.-China Strategic Competition and the China Factor

U.S. pressure, as an external factor, is acting as a major driving force for improving Korea-Japan relations. Through the disputes over GSOMIA between South Korea and Japan, the U.S. recognized that the recovery of Korea-Japan relations is a key element in securing its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region, and this was reflected in the <Indo-Pacific Strategy> report released by the White House in February 2022. Amidst the rising tide of U.S.-China strategic competition, the U.S. has strongly urged the improvement of Korea-Japan relations and trilateral cooperation, emphasizing that historical issues should not undermine its core security interests, and has been raising domestic public awareness. In particular, the rising strategic and economic preference for the U.S. in domestic public opinion can be considered a factor that strengthens the U.S.'s call for improving Korea-Japan relations.

China's challenge is also increasingly emerging as a factor defining Korea-Japan relations. Last year's issue briefing also pointed out that the intensification of U.S.-China confrontation and the emergence of the China threat theory served as a driving force for improving Korea-Japan relations.[1]

This year's survey also reveals the China threat theory in various aspects. Perceptions of China in South Korea have worsened to 11.8%, less than a third of that of Japan ([Figure 7]). A significant 75.4% believe that China's rise poses a threat to South Korea's economic and security interests, overwhelmingly outweighing the view that it presents an opportunity (19.3%) ([Figure 8]). In both South Korea and Japan, the view of China as a military threat is approaching the level of the threat posed by North Korea (Figure 9).

The link between the increase in the China threat perception and the increased incentive for cooperation with Japan stems from the need to strengthen military and security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. In South Korea, 51.7% believe that trilateral cooperation should be strengthened to counter China, which is close to the 56% who believe it should be strengthened to counter North Korea. In Japan, in addition to stability on the Korean Peninsula (73.9%), countering China is cited as a reason (42.7%) (Figure 10). Furthermore, strong support (62%) exists for ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation to counter excessive dependence on China in terms of economic security ([Figure 11]). This trend in public opinion aligns with the joint statements from the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan summits in May, which explicitly mentioned strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation to 'counter common security and economic threats.'

In a broader sense, as China's cautionary and threat perceptions spread, the sense of shared identity as countries that share values between South Korea and Japan is gradually increasing. As a recent example, the proportion of respondents citing 'because we are both liberal democracies' as a reason for having a favorable impression of the other country has sharply increased from 12.1% in 2021 to 23.7% in 2022 (an increase of 11.6 percentage points) in South Korea, and from 15.1% to 21.4% in Japan.

[Figure 7] Perceptions of China

[Figure 8] Impact of China's Rise on South Korea's Economic and Security Interests

[Figure 9] Countries/Regions Perceived as Military Threats

[Figure 10] Reasons for Believing ROK-U.S.-Japan Military Security Cooperation Should Be Strengthened

[Figure 11] Support/Opposition for U.S. and Japanese Measures to Restrict Economic Relations with China

3. Effect of Regime Change

What impact has the departure of the Abe and Moon Jae-in administrations had on bilateral relations? Survey results show a high correlation between impressions of leaders and impressions of the country as a whole. Unfavorable impressions of a leader have led to unfavorable impressions of the country. Conversely, public opinion tends to improve with the departure of unfavorable leaders. In Japan, negative impressions of South Korea sharply declined after President Moon Jae-in left office. In South Korea, negative impressions of leaders have decreased since the resignation of Prime Minister Abe in the summer of 2020 and the subsequent administrations of Suga and Kishida ([Figures 12], [Figure 13]). While the departure of Prime Minister Abe and President Moon Jae-in has not directly translated into favorable impressions of their successors, it at least opens the possibility for future improvement.

[Figure 12] Leaders of the Other Country: South Korea

[Figure 13] Leaders of the Other Country: Japan

III. Will Public Opinion Translate into Policy?

While public opinion in both countries is favorable and prefers improved relations, expectations for their own government's ability to improve relations are low. As mentioned earlier, the public in both countries has tended not to support their own government's responses and attitudes toward the other country. More specifically, opinions are divided between those who believe relations will improve and those who believe they will not under the Yoon Suk-yeol and Kishida administrations ([Figure 14]).

[Figure 14] Prospects for Improving Korea-Japan Relations under the New Yoon Suk-yeol Administration and the Kishida Administration

The key issue is for the Yoon Suk-yeol and Kishida administrations to agree on a solution for the wartime forced labor liquidation, which is a stumbling block and a litmus test for improving relations. This entails significant domestic political burdens. First, public opinion in both countries remains divided on the solution to the pending issue. While 30% of the Japanese public believes that the Supreme Court ruling violates the 1965 Korea-Japan Claims Agreement and therefore Japanese companies are not obligated to comply with the ruling, 36% of the South Korean public believes that forced execution and liquidation of Japanese corporate assets should proceed in accordance with the Supreme Court ruling ([Figure 15]).

[Figure 15] Proposed Solutions for the Situation Where Both Countries Are in Conflict Due to the Supreme Court Ruling

Meanwhile, a majority of the public (60-70%) believes that a method other than these principled stances should be found. However, the reason they cannot identify a clear alternative is that neither government has yet presented a viable 'third way.' The core of the liquidation issue involves bilateral negotiations: on one hand, with the plaintiffs (victims and their legal representatives), and on the other hand, with Japan. The former, in particular, requires a high degree of domestic political caution and statecraft, placing a considerable burden on the South Korean government and political circles. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration faces the political challenge of consolidating the ruling party while also securing the cooperation of the opposition party in a situation of minority rule, making it difficult to make a political decision on liquidation. The Kishida administration, based on a minority faction within the ruling party, also lacks the political incentive to pursue a breakthrough.

In summary, despite the formation of favorable public opinion between the two countries, if the issue of compensation and liquidation for wartime forced labor is unlikely to be resolved promptly through political decisions by the political circles and government, then efforts to negotiate the liquidation issue should be continuously pursued, while simultaneously advancing consultations between the two countries on various future-oriented issues such as security and economy.

As can be seen from the analysis of the Korea-Japan mutual perception survey results over the past decade, the structural deterioration of relations and loss of trust ('lost decade'), negatively linked across historical, economic, and security dimensions, are difficult to overcome easily. The prospect that improving Korea-Japan relations will be achieved by resolving the liquidation issue is wishful thinking. Various measures for long-term trust-building must be pursued, which will then create an atmosphere for resolving historical issues. Indeed, as shown in [Figure 16], the public in both countries increasingly believes that 'if we build a future-oriented cooperative relationship between the two countries, historical issues will also be gradually resolved.'

[Figure 16] Stance Both Countries Should Take in Relations with the Other Country

Both countries must approach each other with an attitude of resolving common challenges at the regional and global levels, not just within the framework of a special bilateral relationship. The pressure of U.S.-China strategic competition, the greatest diplomatic challenge facing both South Korea and Japan now and in the future, offers an opportunity for building trust between the two countries. In particular, cooperation between South Korea and Japan in various fields such as trade, supply chains, technology, climate change, health, military affairs, and cybersecurity is situated within the framework of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation, allowing it to be pursued wisely by leveraging the U.S. Both countries should pursue security cooperation on North Korea's nuclear and missile development, and through multilateral forums such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) or Quad plus, and the expansion of trade agreements like CPTPP, they should pursue cooperation in various areas including defending free trade, enhancing supply chain resilience, innovation in emerging technology fields, joint efforts in building infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region, and cooperation in responding to climate change and clean energy. Only when these are achieved can progress be made on historical issues. ■

[1] Son Yeol. 2021. "The Intensification of U.S.-China Conflict Demands Improvement in Korea-Japan Relations." EAI Issue Briefing (October 8, 2021).

■ Author: Son Yeol_ Director of EAI, Professor at Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and, after serving at Chung-Ang University, is currently a professor at Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies and Director of the East Asia Institute (EAI). He has served as Dean of Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies, Head of Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies. He was a specially appointed visiting professor at the University of Tokyo and a visiting scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Political Science Association (2019) and President of the Association for Modern Japanese Studies (2012). He has been a Senior Fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, Japan Foundation, and Waseda University Institute for Advanced Study, and has served as a consultant for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, as well as a specialist member of the Committee for the Northeast Asian Era. His areas of expertise include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include "Conditions for Presidential Success in 2022" (co-editor, 2021), "Policy Recommendations for the New Government's Foreign Policy in 2022" (co-editor, 2021), "The Global Appeal of BTS" (co-editor, 2021), "South Korea's Choices After the Crisis" (co-editor, 2021), Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel),Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia(2016, with Jan Melissen), "South Korea under U.S.-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking," The Pacific Review 23, 6 (2019), and "South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy" (co-editor, 2017).

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Eun-jin_ EAI Researcher

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