[EAI Issue Brief] 2022 Madrid NATO Summit: Implications of South Korea's Participation for its Diplomacy

President Yoon Suk-yeol will attend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit to be held in Madrid, Spain, on June 29 and 30, marking the first time a South Korean president has participated. In addition to South Korea, partner countries such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia will participate in this Madrid meeting. This diplomatic event, occurring for the first time in less than two months since the Yoon Suk-yeol administration took office, may invigorate the atmosphere at the presidential office in Yongsan. However, strategy begins with understanding that "my best move depends on how the other party acts."[1]Based on an analysis of the U.S. intentions in inviting key democratic nations in the region, including South Korea, to this summit, the South Korean government must carefully examine the implications for its diplomacy and prepare its response prudently.

I. U.S. Intentions and the Madrid NATO Summit

Around the time of the summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol on May 21, several high-level bilateral or trilateral meetings between South Korea and the U.S., and among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, were held.[2]Among these, the U.S. intentions behind inviting South Korea to the NATO summit were most clearly revealed in the keynote speech delivered by Kurt Campbell, White House Indo-Pacific Coordinator, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) "Transatlantic Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific" on May 9.[3]

Campbell strives to allay concerns stemming from the limitations of U.S. diplomatic resources, which can lead to a zero-sum perception among U.S. allies in Europe and Asia—that strengthening cooperation with allies in one region naturally weakens cooperation in others. In this context, he admits that the terms "rebalancing" or "pivot," which he frequently used during the Obama administration, were misleading and even calls them his "mistake." Campbell then highlights the unprecedented engagement from U.S. allies in Asia towards the European theater following the Russia-Ukraine war. He argues that since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, U.S. allies in Asia have actively supported NATO through arms donations, economic sanctions, and humanitarian aid, demonstrating that the U.S. efforts to connect the Indo-Pacific and Europe are beginning to bear fruit. Simultaneously, he points out that the more fundamental challenges of the 21st century will originate in the Indo-Pacific region and emphasizes that building a strategic cooperation framework linking Asia and Europe is his most important responsibility.

This fundamental U.S. stance is confirmed multiple times in numerous high-level meetings held over the past month. In the South Korea-U.S. summit on May 21, President Biden emphasized (1) strengthening trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan to build a rules-based international order, (2) deterring further Russian aggression against Ukraine and imposing punitive measures through economic sanctions and export controls, and providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and (3) enhancing South Korea's role in issues concerning the South China Sea, Taiwan, human rights, and the military coup in Myanmar.[4]The same U.S. position on these issues was confirmed through U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman.[5]Wendy R. Sherman[6]was confirmed.

This demonstrates that the U.S. is orchestrating a plan to mobilize the capabilities of like-minded countries scattered across the globe in preparation for intensifying strategic competition with authoritarian states such as China and Russia. Ultimately, recognizing that Russia and Ukraine are secondary issues and the fundamental challenge stems from China, the U.S. aims to establish a cooperative body similar to NATO, which exhibits the highest level of institutionalized cooperation among U.S. alliances, within the Asian region and link it with the European region, thereby building a security network system that allows for flexible yet powerful responses in times of crisis. The missing link in forming this network system is the strained relationship between South Korea and Japan, which has struggled to find breakthroughs since the 2019 forced labor compensation ruling, trade disputes, and the conditional suspension of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).

The simultaneous invitation of South Korea and Japan to this Madrid summit also appears to be part of the U.S. calculation to provide an opportunity for the leaders of South Korea and Japan to discuss strengthening trilateral cooperation and to deepen cooperation among South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. What specific issues warrant the invitation of all four major U.S. allies in the Asia-Oceania region to this particular summit?

At the Madrid meeting, discussions are scheduled to discard the seventh NATO Strategic Concept adopted in 2010 and introduce a new concept after 12 years. The NATO Strategic Concept, based on an assessment of the international security environment, defines the most critical threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security and discusses methods to address them.[7]Despite the significant changes in the security threats faced by Europe and the degree of these threats over more than half a century since NATO's establishment in 1949, the successful adaptation to new security environments and the maintenance of strong cohesion among member states have been attributed to the successful evolution of the Strategic Concept, adopted approximately once every ten years.[8]

The seventh Strategic Concept, adopted at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, focused on addressing issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, cyber attacks, and energy security in a post-Cold War era characterized by Western political and military-economic dominance and the absence of strategic rivals. It identified "crisis management" and "cooperative security" as key tasks in addition to traditional "collective defense." However, following the Arab Spring in 2011 and subsequent crises in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, coupled with the strains on alliances during the Trump administration and the strengthening of China under Xi Jinping and its assertive foreign policy,[9]it was decided at the 2021 Brussels Summit to adopt a new Strategic Concept that aligns with the "return of strategic competition between great powers" at the international system level.

Therefore, the two core agenda items to be discussed at the Madrid summit will be: first, the collective defense of NATO members against Russia's threat to the status quo and measures to deter further Russian aggression against Ukraine; and second, strategies to counter China's growing military power and its assertive diplomacy projected into Central Asia, South America, and Africa. While the former is a critical issue for European NATO members, the latter is a far more pressing concern for U.S. allies in the Asia-Oceania region, including South Korea, which are participating as partner nations. By encompassing both Russian and Chinese threats within the new NATO Strategic Concept, the U.S. aims to achieve two objectives with this Madrid summit.

II. South Korea's Position

What, then, will President Yoon Suk-yeol, who advocates for South Korea's role as a "Global Pivotal State," emphasize at the Madrid NATO summit? The foreign policy objectives of the current administration, highlighted since the presidential election campaign, were detailed in the 110 National Governance Tasks on the Presidential Office website[10]and in the opening remarks by Foreign Minister Park Jin at a CSIS roundtable on June 14.[11]were introduced in detail.

Foreign Minister Park Jin stated that the South Korea-U.S. alliance is evolving into a comprehensive partnership based on "common values and goals," and that an alliance founded on such values represents a "true evolution" of the bilateral relationship. In this context, he affirmed that South Korea will strengthen cooperation on issues threatening the rules-based international order, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and will further enhance its role and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region for international norms such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In this vein, at a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Blinken on June 13,[12]he emphasized the need to normalize the GSOMIA.

This indicates that the current South Korean government understands the U.S. demands well. That is, by participating in strong sanctions against Russia for its "unprovoked armed aggression," in addition to strengthening trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, South Korea, possessing the world's tenth-largest economy and military power, aims to elevate its international standing through contributions commensurate with its national strength. President Yoon Suk-yeol's remarks at Madrid will likely emphasize these points, and the U.S. and NATO countries will welcome South Korea's expanded role and commitment to contribute within the international community, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. The crucial question is whether this will indeed be a diplomatic endeavor that "secures practical benefits," as emphasized in the national governance tasks.

III. The NATO Summit and South Korea's Challenges

As explained above, the core agenda of the Madrid NATO Summit will be the newly adopted Strategic Concept, and the most critical issue will be defining the threats to European-Transatlantic security. Specifically, how to characterize the threats posed by Russia and China will emerge as the most significant question. Even the widely used term "strategic competitor" encompasses various spectrums. When emphasizing the "competitor" aspect, the focus is primarily on technological and economic issues; when emphasizing "partner," the focus shifts to global crises such as climate change or health cooperation; and when understanding the concept at the "rival" level, international order and norms become the main stage.[13]Given that South Korea will participate in the deliberations where NATO countries define the scope and nature of the threats from Russia and China, this occasion should prompt South Korea to carefully consider fundamental answers to three key questions at the national grand strategy level.

First, South Korea must consider its stance on the implications of the Ukraine war and the future of the European security order. This includes the extent to which South Korea will participate in NATO's sanctions against Russia. Russia has already published a list of countries that have "engaged in unfriendly activities towards Russia" on March 7,[14]including NATO countries and the four U.S. allied partner nations attending this summit (South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). In addition to the existing restriction requiring payment for gas purchases in rubles, on June 17, Putin announced export restrictions on food at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. It is difficult to predict how many more restrictive measures Russia will impose on unfriendly countries in the future. Bearing this in mind, South Korea must consider the level of its contribution to resolving the Ukraine crisis at the NATO summit.

Second, the issue of how to define the threat from China is a fundamental and far-reaching question for South Korea's foreign policy strategy, more so than considering Russia's position. During a meeting with the new Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari in Guangzhou on May 22, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi[15]strongly criticized the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy for fomenting division and confrontation in the region, undermining existing regional cooperation mechanisms, and weaponizing economic tools, particularly through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), to force regional countries into one-sided choices. He specifically accused the U.S. of causing regional instability by persistently raising issues related to Taiwan and the South China Sea, thereby threatening various countries in the Asia-Pacific region, which have historical memories of suffering significant damage from confrontations between great powers. At the Shangri-La Dialogue on June 10, Chinese Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe[16]declared that reunification is a long-cherished aspiration of the Chinese nation and that resorting to strong armed force if Taiwan attempts independence is the "only option" for the Chinese government. South Korea must carefully consider the implications of these repeated official warnings from China when determining its diplomatic stance.

Third, there is the issue of how to redefine relations with Japan. According to the 2021 Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey jointly conducted by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO,[17]an overwhelming majority of 74.6 percent of respondents stated that the current confrontational phase must be overcome. However, the issue of Japan-Korea relations is highly politicized domestically, to the extent that Foreign Minister Park Jin's remarks on normalizing GSOMIA were met with criticism of "humiliating diplomacy" and "giving away too much."[18]criticism, the issue of Japan-Korea relations is highly politicized domestically. Through this NATO summit, President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will have an opportunity to meet, even if not a formal one-on-one meeting. Taking this opportunity, the South Korean government should discuss how to set the long-term direction for South Korea-Japan relations and consider how to respond to domestic political opposition that may arise from strengthening bilateral cooperation, as well as devise strategies for effective trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan going forward. ■

[1]Schelling, Thomas C. 1960.The Strategy of Conflict.Harvard University Press, 3.

[2] Campbell, Kurt. 2022. “Keynote Address.” Presented in the CSDS-CSIS Transatlantic Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific, May 9. Washington D.C, U.S.A; The White House. 2022. “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement.” May 21; Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2022. “Outcome of Telephone Conversation between ROK Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyundong and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman.” May 24; U.S. Department of State. 2022. Joint Statement by Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayashi Yoshimasa, and Republic of Korea Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin. May 27; U.S. Department of State. 2022. Joint Statement on the Republic of Korea-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Vice Foreign Ministerial Meeting. June 8; U.S. Department of State. 2022. “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Park Jin At a Joint Press Availability.” June 13.

[3] Campbell, Kurt. 2022. “Keynote Address.” Presented in the CSDS-CSIS Transatlantic Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific, May 9. Washington D.C, U.S.A.

[4] The White House. 2022. “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement.” May 21.

[5] U.S. Department of State. 2022. “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Park Jin At a Joint Press Availability.” June 13.

[6] U.S. Department of State. 2022. “Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Meeting with Republic of Korea First Vice Foreign Minister Cho.” June 13.

[7] Simón, Luis. 2022. “The Madrid Strategic Concept and the future of NATO.” NATO Review. June 2.

[8] Cobo, Ignacio Fuente. 2022. “The Eight Strategic Concepts of Allied History.” In Cuadernos de Estrategia 211-B: The Future of NATO after the Madrid 2022 Summit. Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 23-25.

[9] Simón, Luis. 2022. “The Great Strategic Competition of the 21st Century and the Transatlantic Link.” Ibid, 36-44.

[10] Presidential Transition Committee. 2022. “White Paper of the 20th Presidential Transition Committee.” 20th Presidential Office.

[11] Park, Jin. 2022. “Opening Speech.” Opening Speech by Foreign Minister Park Jin at CSIS Roundtable, June 14. Washington D.C, U.S.A.

[12] U.S. Department of State. 2022. “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Park Jin At a Joint Press Availability.” June 13.

[13] Simón, Luis. 2022. “The Great Strategic Competition of the 21st Century and the Transatlantic Link.” In Cuadernos de Estrategia 211-B: The Future of NATO after the Madrid 2022 Summit. Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 46.

[14] The Russian Government. 2022. “The Government Approves the List of Unfriendly Countries and Territories.” March 7.

[15] Huaxia. 2022. “U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ Bound to Fail: Chinese FM.” Xinhua. May 23.

[16] Zain, Syawalludin and David Rising. 2022. “China Accuses U.S. of Trying to ‘Hijack’ Support in Asia.” Time. June 12.

[17] East Asia Institute. 2021. “[EAIㆍPress Conference] 9th Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey Announcement.” September 28.

[18] Kwon, Min-cheol. 2022. “Park Jin’s Mention of ‘Normalization of GSOMIA’ Causes Controversy…Government Issues Multiple Clarifications.” >No Cut News<. June 15.

■ Author: Kim, Yang-gyu_ Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute, Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He holds a bachelor's degree in French Education and Diplomacy and a master's degree in Diplomacy from Seoul National University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida International University. He served as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Florida International University and as a Visiting Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He received the Fulbright Graduate Study Award and the Smith Richardson Foundation’s World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship. His main research areas include coercive diplomacy, nuclear strategy, power transition, U.S.-China relations, North Korean nuclear issues, and international politics and security theory. His recent research includes “At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis” and “The Feasibility of Punishment and the Credibility of Threats: Case Studies on the First Moroccan and the Rhineland Crises.”

■ Managed and Edited by: Lee, Seung-yeon_ EAI Researcher

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