[EAI Issue Brief] 2022 Madrid NATO Summit: Implications of South Korea's Participation for its Diplomacy

President Yoon Suk-yeol will attend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Madrid, Spain, on June 29-30, marking the first time a South Korean president has participated. In addition to South Korea, partner nations such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia will also attend this Madrid summit. This diplomatic event, occurring within two months of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration taking office and marking another 'first,' may lead to an upbeat atmosphere at the Yongsan Presidential Office. However, strategy begins with understanding that "my best move depends on how the opponent acts."[1] Based on an analysis of the US's intentions in inviting major democratic countries in the region, including South Korea, to this summit, the South Korean government must examine the implications of this meeting for its diplomacy and prepare its response carefully.

I. US Intentions and the Madrid NATO Summit

Leading up to and following the summit between US President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol on May 21, several high-level bilateral or trilateral meetings between South Korea and the US, and among South Korea, the US, and Japan, were held.[2] Among these, Kurt Campbell, White House Indo-Pacific Coordinator, most clearly revealed the US's intentions in inviting South Korea to the NATO summit in his keynote speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) "Transatlantic Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific" on May 9.[3]

Campbell strives to alleviate concerns stemming from the zero-sum perception of competition prevalent among US allies in Europe and Asia, which arises from the limitations of US diplomatic resources – namely, the belief that strengthening cooperation with allies in one region inherently weakens cooperation in others. In this context, he admits that the terms "rebalancing" or "pivot," which he frequently used during the Obama administration, were misleading and even calls them his "mistake." Campbell then highlights the unprecedented engagement from US allies in Asia towards the European theater following the Russia-Ukraine war. He argues that since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, US allies in Asia have actively supported NATO through arms donations, economic sanctions, humanitarian aid, and refugee assistance, which serves as evidence that the US's efforts to connect the Indo-Pacific and European regions have begun to bear fruit. Simultaneously, he points out that the more fundamental challenges of the 21st century will originate in the Indo-Pacific region and emphasizes that building a strategic cooperation framework linking Asia and Europe is his most important responsibility.

This fundamental stance of the United States is confirmed multiple times in numerous high-level meetings held over the past month. In the South Korea-US summit on May 21, President Biden emphasized:[4](1) Strengthening South Korea-US-Japan cooperation to build a rules-based international order, (2) Deterring further Russian aggression against Ukraine and imposing punitive measures through economic sanctions and export controls, along with providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and (3) Enhancing South Korea's role in issues such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, human rights, and the military coup in Myanmar. The same position of the United States on these issues was confirmed through meetings with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.[5] 셔먼(Wendy R. Sherman) 미 국무부 부장관을[6]confirmed.

This demonstrates that the US is orchestrating a plan to mobilize the capabilities of like-minded countries scattered across the globe in preparation for intensifying strategic competition with authoritarian states such as China and Russia. Ultimately, with the recognition that Russia and Ukraine are secondary issues and the fundamental challenge stems from China, the US aims to establish a cooperative body similar to NATO, which exhibits the highest level of institutionalized cooperation among US alliances, within the Asian region and link it with the European region to build a security network system that allows for flexible yet powerful responses in times of crisis. The missing link in forming this network system is the South Korea-Japan relationship, which has been stagnant since the 2019 forced labor compensation ruling, trade disputes, and the conditional suspension of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), failing to find a breakthrough.

The invitation of both South Korea and Japan to this Madrid summit also appears to include the US's calculation to provide an opportunity for the leaders of South Korea and Japan to discuss strengthening trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan, and to deepen cooperation among South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. So, what specific issues warrant the invitation of all four major US allies in the Asia-Oceania region to this summit?

At the Madrid summit, discussions will be held to discard the seventh NATO Strategic Concept adopted in 2010 and introduce a new concept after 12 years. The NATO Strategic Concept[7]diagnoses the international security environment, defines the most critical threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, and discusses methods to address them. Despite significant changes in the nature and scale of security threats facing Europe over more than half a century since NATO's inception in 1949, the successful adaptation of the Strategic Concept, adopted approximately every 10 years, has allowed NATO to maintain its resilience and the strong cohesion among its member states.[8]

The seventh Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, focused on addressing issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, cyberattacks, and energy security in a post-Cold War era characterized by Western political hegemony and military-economic superiority, and the absence of a strategic rival. It designated "crisis management" and "cooperative security" as core tasks in addition to traditional "collective defense." However, following the Arab Spring in 2011 and subsequent crises in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, its military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the rifts within alliances during the Trump administration, and the strengthening of China's national power and its assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping,[9]it was decided at the Brussels Summit in 2021 to adopt a new Strategic Concept aligned with the "return of strategic competition between great powers" at the international system level.

Therefore, the two core agenda items to be discussed at the Madrid summit will be: first, the issue of collective defense for NATO members against Russia's threats to the status quo and measures to deter further Russian aggression against Ukraine; and second, countermeasures against China's growing military power and its assertive diplomacy projected into Central Asia, South America, and Africa. While the former is a critical issue for European NATO members, the latter is of far greater concern to US allies in the Asia-Oceania region, including South Korea, participating as partner nations. By encompassing both Russian and Chinese threats within the new NATO Strategic Concept, the US aims to kill two birds with one stone through this Madrid summit.

II. South Korean Government's Position

What, then, will President Yoon Suk-yeol, who advocates for South Korea's role as a "Global Pivotal State," emphasize at the Madrid summit? The policy directions of South Korean diplomacy, emphasized by the current administration since the presidential election campaign, were introduced in detail in the 110 National Tasks on the Presidential Office website and[10] in the opening remarks by Foreign Minister Park Jin at a CSIS roundtable on June 14.[11]were introduced.

Minister Park stated that the South Korea-US alliance is evolving into a comprehensive partnership based on "common values and goals," and that an alliance based on such values represents the "true evolution" of the bilateral relationship. In this context, he announced that South Korea will strengthen cooperation on issues threatening the rules-based international order, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and further enhance its role and responsibility in the Indo-Pacific region for international norms such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In this context, at a joint press conference with US Secretary of State Blinken on June 13,[12]he emphasized the need to normalize the GSOMIA.

This indicates that the current South Korean government understands the US's demands well. That is, by participating not only in strengthening trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan but also in imposing strong sanctions against Russia for its "unprovoked armed aggression," South Korea, possessing the world's tenth-largest national power in terms of economic and military strength, aims to elevate its international standing through contributions commensurate with its national capabilities. President Yoon Suk-yeol's statements in Madrid will also emphasize these points, and the US and NATO countries will welcome South Korea's expanded role and commitment to contribute within the international community, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. The key question is whether this will be a diplomatic move that "secures practical benefits," as emphasized in the national tasks.

III. The NATO Summit and South Korea's Challenges

As explained above, the core agenda of the Madrid NATO Summit will be the newly adopted Strategic Concept, and the most crucial issue will be defining the elements that threaten security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Specifically, how to define the threats posed by Russia and China will emerge as the most significant problem. Even the widely used term "strategic competitor" encompasses various spectrums. When emphasizing the "competitor" aspect, the focus is primarily on technological and economic issues; when emphasizing "partner," the focus is on global crises such as climate change and health cooperation; and when understanding the concept in terms of "rival," the international order and norms become the main stage.[13] Given that South Korea will participate in the discussions where NATO countries define the threats from Russia and China and in what areas, this occasion should prompt us to carefully consider fundamental answers to three key issues from a national grand strategy perspective.

First, we must consider what stance to take on the implications of the Ukraine war and the future of the European security order. This includes the extent to which South Korea will participate in NATO's sanctions against Russia. Russia, in its announcement on March 7 of a list of countries that have committed "unfriendly activities towards Russia",[14]included NATO countries and the four US allied partners attending this summit (South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). Regarding the disadvantages imposed on unfriendly countries, in addition to the existing restriction requiring payment in rubles for gas purchases, Putin announced export restrictions on food at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 17. It is difficult to predict how many more disadvantages Russia will impose on unfriendly countries in the future. Keeping this in mind, we must consider the level of South Korea's contribution to resolving the Ukraine crisis at the NATO summit.

Second, there is the issue of how to define the threat from China. This is a fundamental and far more impactful issue for South Korea's foreign policy strategy than considering Russia's position. During his meeting with the new Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari in Guangzhou on May 22, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi[15]strongly criticized the US's Indo-Pacific strategy for fomenting division and confrontation in the region, undermining existing regional cooperation frameworks, and weaponizing economic means, particularly through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), to force unilateral choices upon regional countries. He specifically accused the US of causing regional turmoil by constantly invoking issues related to Taiwan and the South China Sea, pointing out that this threatens various countries in the Asia-Pacific region, which have historical memories of suffering significant damage from great power confrontations and conflicts. At the Shangri-La Dialogue on June 10, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe[16]declared that unification is the aspiration of the Chinese nation and that if Taiwan attempts to seek independence, a strong military response is the "only option" for the Chinese government. We must carefully consider the implications of these repeated official warnings from China and determine South Korea's diplomatic stance.

Third, there is the issue of how to redefine relations with Japan. According to the South Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey on Mutual Perceptions conducted jointly by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO in 2021,[17]an overwhelming majority of 74.6 percent of respondents answered that the current confrontational phase must be overcome. However, the issue of South Korea-Japan relations is highly politicized in domestic politics, to the extent that Foreign Minister Park Jin's remarks on normalizing GSOMIA were criticized as "humiliating diplomacy" and "giving away too much."[18]At this NATO summit, President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will meet, even if not for a formal one-on-one summit. Taking this opportunity, the South Korean government must consider how to establish South Korea-Japan relations from a long-term perspective, devise strategies to address domestic political opposition that may arise from strengthening bilateral cooperation, and consider ways to build an effective trilateral cooperation framework among South Korea, the US, and Japan going forward. ■

[1] Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 3.

[2] Campbell, Kurt. 2022. “Keynote Address.” Presented in the CSDS-CSIS Transatlantic Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific, May 9. Washington D.C, U.S.A; The White House. 2022. “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement.” May 21; Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2022. “Outcome of Telephone Conversation between ROK Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyundong and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman.” May 24; U.S. Department of State. 2022. Joint Statement by Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayashi Yoshimasa, and Republic of Korea Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin. May 27; U.S. Department of State. 2022. Joint Statement on the Republic of Korea-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Vice Foreign Ministerial Meeting. June 8; U.S. Department of State. 2022. “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Park Jin At a Joint Press Availability.” June 13.

[3] Campbell, Kurt. 2022. “Keynote Address.” Presented in the CSDS-CSIS Transatlantic Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific, May 9. Washington D.C, U.S.A.

[4] The White House. 2022. “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement.” May 21.

[5] U.S. Department of State. 2022. “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Park Jin At a Joint Press Availability.” June 13.

[6] U.S. Department of State. 2022. “Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Meeting with Republic of Korea First Vice Foreign Minister Cho.” June 13.

[7] Simón, Luis. 2022. “The Madrid Strategic Concept and the future of NATO.” NATO Review. June 2.

[8] Cobo, Ignacio Fuente. 2022. “The Eight Strategic Concepts of Allied History.” In Cuadernos de Estrategia 211-B: The Future of NATO after the Madrid 2022 Summit. Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 23-25.

[9] Simón, Luis. 2022. “The Great Strategic Competition of the 21st Century and the Transatlantic Link.” Ibid, 36-44.

[10] Переходный комитет 30-го президента. 2022. «Белая книга переходного комитета 20-го президента». Президентский офис 20-го созыва.

[11] Park, Jin. 2022. “Opening Speech.” Opening Speech by Foreign Minister Park Jin at CSIS Roundtable, June 14. Washington D.C, U.S.A.

[12] U.S. Department of State. 2022. “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Park Jin At a Joint Press Availability.” June 13.

[13] Simón, Luis. 2022. “The Great Strategic Competition of the 21st Century and the Transatlantic Link.” In Cuadernos de Estrategia 211-B: The Future of NATO after the Madrid 2022 Summit. Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 46.

[14] Правительство Российской Федерации. 2022. «Правительство утвердило перечень недружественных стран и территорий». 7 марта.

[15] Huaxia. 2022. “U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ Bound to Fail: Chinese FM.” Xinhua. May 23.

[16] Zain, Syawalludin and David Rising. 2022. “China Accuses U.S. of Trying to ‘Hijack’ Support in Asia.” Time. June 12.

[17] EAI. 2021. «Совместная пресс-конференция EAI и NPO по СМИ: Публикация 9-го опроса взаимного восприятия между Кореей и Японией». 28 сентября.

[18] Квон Мин Чхоль. 2022. «Заявление Пак Чжина о «нормализации Соглашения о безопасности обмена информацией» вызвало переполох… Правительство неоднократно пыталось успокоить ситуацию». >Нокут Ньюс<. 15 июня.

■ Автор: Ким Ян Гю_ Старший научный сотрудник Института Восточной Азии (EAI), преподаватель факультета международных отношений Сеульского национального университета. Получил степень бакалавра французского языка и дипломатии, а также степень магистра дипломатии в Сеульском национальном университете, и степень доктора международных отношений во Международном университете Флориды (Florida International University). Работал адъюнкт-профессором на факультете политологии и международных отношений Международного университета Флориды и приглашенным научным сотрудником в Институте изучения войны и мира Арнольда А. Зальцмана Колумбийского университета (Columbia University). Получил стипендию Фулбрайта для обучения за рубежом (Fulbright Graduate Study Award) и стипендию Фонда Смита Ричардсона (Smith Richardson Foundation) «Стипендия по мировой политике и государственному управлению» (World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship). Основные области исследований включают принудительную дипломатию (coercive diplomacy), ядерную стратегию, смену баланса сил, отношения между США и Китаем, северокорейскую ядерную проблему, а также теорию международных отношений и безопасности. Среди недавних работ: «На грани ядерной войны: Осуществимость ответных мер и решения политики США во время Карибского кризиса 1962 года» и «Осуществимость наказания и достоверность угроз: Тематические исследования по Первому Марокканскому кризису и Рейнскому кризису».

■ Ответственный редактор: Ли Сын Ён_ Исследователь EAI

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