[EAI Briefing] 2022 NATO Madrid Summit: Implications of South Korea's Participation for its Diplomacy

President Yoon Suk-yeol will attend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit to be held in Madrid, Spain, on June 29 and 30, marking the first time a South Korean president has participated. In addition to South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia are participating in this Madrid meeting as partner nations. The atmosphere at the Yongsan Presidential Office may be buoyed by this diplomatic event, which is another "first" occurring less than two months into the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. However, strategy begins with understanding that "my best move depends on how the opponent acts."[1] Based on an analysis of the U.S. rationale for inviting key democratic countries in the region, including South Korea, to this summit, the South Korean government must examine the implications for its diplomacy and prepare its response carefully.

I. U.S. Rationale and the Madrid NATO Summit

Following the summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol on May 21, several high-level bilateral or trilateral meetings between South Korea and the U.S. have been held.[2] Among these, the U.S. intention behind inviting South Korea to the NATO summit was most clearly revealed in the keynote speech delivered by Kurt Campbell, White House Indo-Pacific Coordinator, on May 9 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) during a "Transatlantic Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific."[3]

Campbell strives to allay concerns stemming from the limitations of U.S. diplomatic resources, which lead European and Asian allies to perceive cooperation with the U.S. in one region as naturally weakening cooperation in others—a zero-sum perception of competition. In this context, he admits that the terms "rebalancing" or "pivot," which he frequently used during the Obama administration, were misleading and even calls them his "mistake." Campbell then introduces the unprecedented engagement of U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region towards the European theater following the Russia-Ukraine war. He argues that since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, U.S. allies in Asia have actively assisted NATO through arms support, economic sanctions, humanitarian aid, and refugee assistance, which is evidence that the U.S. effort to connect the Indo-Pacific and Europe has begun to bear fruit. At the same time, he points out that the more fundamental challenges of the 21st century will originate in the Indo-Pacific region and emphasizes that building a strategic cooperation framework connecting Asia and Europe is his most important responsibility.

This fundamental U.S. stance is confirmed multiple times in numerous high-level meetings held over the past month. In the South Korea-U.S. summit on May 21, President Biden emphasized (1) strengthening South Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation to build a rules-based international order, (2) deterring further Russian aggression against Ukraine and imposing punitive measures through economic sanctions and export controls, and providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and (3) enhancing South Korea's role in issues such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, human rights, and the military coup in Myanmar.[4]The same U.S. position on these issues was confirmed through U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman.[5]Wendy R. Sherman[6]was confirmed.

This demonstrates that the U.S. is orchestrating a plan to mobilize the capabilities of like-minded countries scattered across the globe in preparation for intensifying strategic competition with authoritarian states such as China and Russia. Ultimately, with the recognition that Russia and Ukraine are secondary issues and the fundamental challenge stems from China, the U.S. aims to establish a cooperative body similar to NATO, which exhibits the highest level of institutionalized cooperation among U.S. alliances, within the Asia-Pacific region and link it with Europe to build a security network system that is both flexible and capable of strong response in times of crisis. The missing link in forming this network system is the strained relationship between South Korea and Japan, which has seen little progress since the 2019 ruling on wartime forced labor compensation, trade disputes, and the conditional suspension of the termination of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).

The invitation of both South Korea and Japan to the Madrid summit also appears to be part of the U.S. calculation to provide an opportunity for the leaders of South Korea and Japan to discuss strengthening trilateral cooperation and to deepen cooperation among South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. So, what specific issues warrant the invitation of all four major U.S. allies in the Asia-Oceania region to this summit?

At the Madrid meeting, discussions are planned to discard the seventh NATO Strategic Concept adopted in 2010 and introduce a new concept after 12 years. The NATO Strategic Concept, based on an assessment of the international security environment, defines the most critical threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security and discusses ways to respond to them. Despite the fact that the nature and extent of security threats facing Europe have changed dramatically over more than half a century since NATO was first established in 1949, its successful adaptation to new security environments and maintenance of strong cohesion among member states have been due to the successful evolution of the Strategic Concept, which has been adopted approximately once every ten years.[7]The successful evolution of the Strategic Concept, adopted approximately once every ten years.[8]

The seventh Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, aimed to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, terrorism, cyber attacks, and energy security in a post-Cold War era characterized by Western political and military-economic dominance and the absence of strategic rivals. It designated "crisis management" and "cooperative security" as core tasks in addition to traditional "collective defense." However, following the Arab Spring in 2011, crises in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, its military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the rifts within alliances during the Trump administration, and the strengthening of China's national power and its assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping, it was decided at the Brussels Summit in 2021 to adopt a new Strategic Concept that aligns with the "return of strategic competition between great powers" at the international system level.[9]experienced, it was decided at the Brussels Summit in 2021 to adopt a new Strategic Concept that aligns with the "return of strategic competition between great powers" at the international system level.

Therefore, the two core agenda items to be discussed at the Madrid Summit are: first, the collective defense of NATO members against Russia's threat to the status quo and measures to deter further Russian aggression against Ukraine; and second, responses to the growing military power of China and its assertive diplomacy projected into Central Asia, South America, and Africa. While the former is a critical issue for European NATO members, the latter is a far more pressing concern for U.S. allies in the Asia-Oceania region, including South Korea, which are participating as partner nations. By encompassing both the Russian and Chinese threats in the new NATO Strategic Concept, the U.S. aims to kill two birds with one stone at this Madrid Summit.

II. South Korean Government's Position

What, then, will President Yoon Suk-yeol, who advocates for South Korea as a "Global Pivotal State," emphasize at the Madrid NATO Summit? The direction of South Korean diplomacy, emphasized by the current administration since the presidential election campaign, was detailed in the 110 National Tasks on the Presidential Office website and in the opening remarks by Foreign Minister Park Jin at a CSIS roundtable on June 14.[10] on June 14[11] were introduced in detail.

Foreign Minister Park Jin stated that the South Korea-U.S. alliance is evolving into a comprehensive partnership based on "common values and goals," and that an alliance based on such values represents a "true evolution" of the bilateral relationship. In this context, he announced that South Korea will further strengthen its role and responsibility in the Indo-Pacific region for international norms such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, including cooperation on issues threatening the rules-based international order, such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In this context, at a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on June 13,[12] he also emphasized the need to normalize the GSOMIA.

This shows that the South Korean government understands the U.S. demands well. In other words, by not only strengthening trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan but also imposing strong sanctions on Russia for its "unprovoked armed aggression," South Korea, with its global standing as the 10th largest economy and military power, plans to elevate its international status through contributions commensurate with its national strength. President Yoon Suk-yeol's statements in Madrid will also emphasize these points, and the U.S. and NATO countries will welcome South Korea's expanded role and commitment to contribute within the international community, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. The key question is whether this will indeed be a diplomatic move that "secures practical benefits," as emphasized in the national agenda.

III. NATO Summit and South Korea's Challenges

As explained above, the core agenda of the Madrid NATO Summit will be the newly adopted Strategic Concept, and the most critical issue will be defining the threats to Euro-Atlantic security. Specifically, how to define the threats from Russia and China will emerge as the most important question. Even the widely used term "strategic competitor" encompasses various spectrums. When emphasizing the "competitor" aspect, it primarily addresses issues in technology and economics; when focusing on "partner," the emphasis is on global crises such as climate change or health cooperation; and when understanding the concept in terms of "rival," international order and norms become the main stage.[13] Since South Korea will also participate in the discussions where NATO countries define Russia and China as threats and in what areas, this occasion should prompt us to carefully consider answers to three fundamental questions from the perspective of national grand strategy.

First, we must consider what stance to take on the implications of the Ukraine war and the future of the European security order. This includes the extent to which South Korea will participate in NATO's sanctions against Russia. Russia, in its announcement on March 7 of a list of countries that have committed "unfriendly activities towards Russia," included NATO countries and the four U.S. allied partner nations attending this summit (South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). Regarding disadvantages imposed on unfriendly countries, in addition to the previously announced restriction requiring payment in rubles for gas purchases, Putin announced export restrictions on food at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 17. It is difficult to predict how many more disadvantageous measures Russia will impose on unfriendly countries in the future. Keeping this in mind, we must consider the level of South Korea's contribution to resolving the situation in Ukraine at the NATO Summit.[14]announced on March 7

Second, there is the issue of how to define the threat from China. This is a fundamental and far more consequential issue for South Korea's foreign policy strategy than considering Russia's position. In a meeting with the new Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari in Guangzhou on May 22, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi strongly criticized the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy for fomenting division and confrontation in the region, undermining existing regional cooperation frameworks, and weaponizing economic means through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to force regional countries into one-sided choices.[15] He particularly criticized the U.S. for causing regional turmoil by constantly citing Taiwan and the South China Sea issues, pointing out that this threatens many countries in the Asia-Pacific region, which have historical memories of suffering significant damage from confrontations and conflicts between great powers. At the Shangri-La Dialogue on June 10, Chinese Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe declared that unification is the aspiration of the Chinese nation and that if Taiwan attempts independence, a strong armed response is the "only option" for the Chinese government.[16] declared that a strong armed response is the "only option" for the Chinese government.

Third, there is the issue of how to redefine relations with Japan. According to the 2021 Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey jointly conducted by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO, an overwhelming majority of 74.6 percent of respondents answered that the current confrontational phase must be overcome. However, the issue of Korea-Japan relations is highly politicized domestically, to the extent that Foreign Minister Park Jin's remarks on normalizing GSOMIA were met with accusations of "humiliating diplomacy" and "giving away too much."[17] accusations of "humiliating diplomacy" and "giving away too much."[18] accusations of "humiliating diplomacy" and "giving away too much."

[1] Schelling, Thomas C. 1960.The Strategy of Conflict.Harvard University Press, 3.

[2] Campbell, Kurt. 2022. “Keynote Address.” Présenté lors du Dialogue Transatlantique sur l'Indo-Pacifique CSDS-CSIS, le 9 mai. Washington D.C., États-Unis ; The White House. 2022. « Déclaration conjointe des dirigeants des États-Unis et de la République de Corée ». 21 mai ; Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République de Corée. 2022. « Résultat de l'entretien téléphonique entre le vice-ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République de Corée, Cho Hyundong, et la secrétaire d'État adjointe des États-Unis, Wendy R. Sherman ». 24 mai ; Département d'État des États-Unis. 2022. Déclaration conjointe du secrétaire d'État Antony J. Blinken, du ministre japonais des Affaires étrangères Hayashi Yoshimasa et du ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République de Corée Park Jin. 27 mai ; Département d'État des États-Unis. 2022. Déclaration conjointe de la réunion trilatérale des vice-ministres des Affaires étrangères de la République de Corée-États-Unis-Japon. 8 juin ; Département d'État des États-Unis. 2022. « Secrétaire Antony J. Blinken et Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République de Corée Park Jin lors d'une conférence de presse conjointe ». 13 juin.

[3] Campbell, Kurt. 2022. « Discours d'ouverture ». Présenté lors du Dialogue Transatlantique sur l'Indo-Pacifique CSDS-CSIS, le 9 mai. Washington D.C., États-Unis.

[4] The White House. 2022. « Déclaration conjointe des dirigeants des États-Unis et de la République de Corée ». 21 mai.

[5] Département d'État des États-Unis. 2022. « Secrétaire Antony J. Blinken et Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République de Corée Park Jin lors d'une conférence de presse conjointe ». 13 juin.

[6] Département d'État des États-Unis. 2022. « Réunion du Secrétaire d'État adjoint Sherman avec le Premier Vice-Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République de Corée Cho ». 13 juin.

[7] Simón, Luis. 2022. « Le Concept Stratégique de Madrid et l'avenir de l'OTAN ». NATO Review. 2 juin.

[8] Cobo, Ignacio Fuente. 2022. « Les Huit Concepts Stratégiques de l'Histoire Alliée ». Dans Cuadernos de Estrategia 211-B : L'avenir de l'OTAN après le Sommet de Madrid 2022. Institut Espagnol d'Études Stratégiques, 23-25.

[9] Simón, Luis. 2022. « La Grande Compétition Stratégique du XXIe siècle et le Lien Transatlantique ». Ibid, 36-44.

[10] Comité de Transition du 30e Président. 2022. « Livre blanc du Comité de Transition du 20e Président ». Bureau présidentiel du 20e Président.

[11] Park, Jin. 2022. « Discours d'ouverture ». Discours d'ouverture du Ministre des Affaires étrangères Park Jin lors de la table ronde du CSIS, le 14 juin. Washington D.C., États-Unis.

[12] Département d'État des États-Unis. 2022. « Secrétaire Antony J. Blinken et Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République de Corée Park Jin lors d'une conférence de presse conjointe ». 13 juin.

[13] Simón, Luis. 2022. « La Grande Compétition Stratégique du XXIe siècle et le Lien Transatlantique ». Dans Cuadernos de Estrategia 211-B : L'avenir de l'OTAN après le Sommet de Madrid 2022. Institut Espagnol d'Études Stratégiques, 46.

[14] Gouvernement russe. 2022. « Le Gouvernement approuve la liste des pays et territoires non amicaux ». 7 mars.

[15] Huaxia. 2022. « La 'Stratégie Indo-Pacifique' des États-Unis est vouée à l'échec : Ministre des Affaires étrangères chinois ». Xinhua. 23 mai.

[16] Zain, Syawalludin et David Rising. 2022. « La Chine accuse les États-Unis de tenter de 'détourner' le soutien en Asie ». Time. 12 juin.

[17] Institut d'Études d'Asie de l'Est. 2021. « [Conférence de presse conjointe EAI et Kyodo News] Annonce de la 9e enquête sur la perception mutuelle entre la Corée et le Japon ». 28 septembre.

[18] Kwon, Min-cheol. 2022. « La déclaration de Park Jin sur la 'normalisation de GSOMIA' suscite la controverse... Le gouvernement tente de calmer le jeu ». >Kukmin Ilbo<. 15 juin.

■ Auteur : Kim, Yang-gyu_ Chercheur principal à l'Institut d'Études d'Asie de l'Est, chargé de cours au Département de Science Politique et de Relations Internationales de l'Université Nationale de Séoul. Il est titulaire d'une licence en éducation française et en relations internationales, ainsi que d'une maîtrise en relations internationales de l'Université Nationale de Séoul, et d'un doctorat en politique internationale de l'Université Internationale de Floride (Florida International University). Il a été professeur auxiliaire au Département de Science Politique et de Relations Internationales de l'Université Internationale de Floride et chercheur invité au Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies de l'Université Columbia. Il a reçu la bourse Fulbright Graduate Study Award et la bourse World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship de la Smith Richardson Foundation. Ses principaux domaines de recherche comprennent la diplomatie coercitive, la stratégie nucléaire, le changement de puissance, les relations sino-américaines, la question nucléaire nord-coréenne, ainsi que les théories des relations internationales et de la sécurité. Ses recherches récentes comprennent « At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis » et « The Feasibility of Punishment and the Credibility of Threats: Case Studies on the First Moroccan and the Rhineland Crises ».

■ Responsable et éditeur : Lee, Seung-yeon_ Chercheur à l'EAI

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