[EAI Issue Brief] 2022 Madrid NATO Summit: Implications of South Korea's Participation for its Diplomacy

President Yoon Suk-yeol will attend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit to be held in Madrid, Spain, on June 29 and 30, marking the first time a South Korean president has participated. In addition to South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia will participate as partner nations in this Madrid summit. The atmosphere at the Yongsan Presidential Office may be buoyed by this diplomatic event, which occurs less than two months into the Yoon Suk-yeol administration and marks another "first." However, strategy begins with understanding that "my best move depends on how the opponent acts."[1] Based on an analysis of the US's rationale for inviting key democratic countries in the region, including South Korea, to this summit, the South Korean government must examine the implications for its diplomacy and prepare its response cautiously.

I. US Rationale and the Madrid NATO Summit

Numerous bilateral and trilateral high-level meetings between South Korea and the United States were held around the summit between Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol on May 21.[2] Among these, the US's underlying intentions in inviting South Korea to the NATO summit were most clearly revealed in the keynote speech delivered by Kurt Campbell, White House Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on "Transatlantic Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific" on May 9.[3]

Campbell strives to allay concerns about the zero-sum perception of competition among US allies in Europe and Asia, where strengthening cooperation with allies in one region is seen as naturally weakening cooperation in others, due to the limitations of US diplomatic resources. In this context, he admits that the term "rebalancing" or "pivot," which he frequently used during the Obama administration, was misleading and even calls it his "mistake." Campbell then introduces the unprecedented engagement of US allies in the Asia-Pacific region towards the European theater following the Russia-Ukraine war. He argues that since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, US allies in Asia have actively assisted NATO through arms support, economic sanctions, humanitarian aid, and refugee assistance, which is evidence that the US's efforts to connect the Indo-Pacific and Europe have begun to bear fruit. At the same time, he points out that the more fundamental challenges of the 21st century will originate in the Indo-Pacific region and emphasizes that building a strategic cooperation framework connecting Asia and Europe is his most important task.

This fundamental US stance is confirmed multiple times in numerous high-level meetings held over the past month. In the South Korea-US summit on May 21, President Biden emphasized (1) strengthening trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan to build a rules-based international order, (2) deterring further Russian aggression against Ukraine and imposing punitive measures through economic sanctions and export controls, and providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and (3) strengthening South Korea's role in issues such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, human rights, and the military coup in Myanmar.[4]The same US position on these issues was confirmed through Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman.[5]Wendy R. Sherman[6]through.

This demonstrates that the US is orchestrating a plan to mobilize the capabilities of like-minded countries scattered across the globe in preparation for intensifying strategic competition with authoritarian states such as China and Russia. Ultimately, with the recognition that the fundamental challenge stems from China, not Russia and Ukraine, the US aims to establish a cooperative framework similar to NATO, which exhibits the highest level of institutionalized cooperation among US alliances, within the Asia-Pacific region and link it with Europe, thereby building a security network system that allows for flexible yet powerful responses in times of crisis. The missing link in forming this network system is the strained relationship between South Korea and Japan, which has shown little progress since the 2019 ruling on forced labor compensation, the trade war, and the conditional suspension of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).

The simultaneous invitation of South Korea and Japan to the Madrid summit also reflects the US's calculation to provide an opportunity for the leaders of South Korea and Japan to discuss strengthening trilateral cooperation and to deepen cooperation among South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. So, what specific issues warrant the invitation of all four major US allies in the Asia-Pacific region to this summit?

At the Madrid summit, discussions will be held to discard the seventh Strategic Concept of NATO adopted in 2010 and adopt a new concept after 12 years. The NATO Strategic Concept defines the most critical threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security based on an assessment of the international security environment and discusses ways to respond to them.[7] Although the nature and extent of security threats facing Europe have changed dramatically over more than half a century since NATO was first established in 1949, the successful adaptation of the Strategic Concept, adopted approximately every 10 years, has enabled NATO to maintain strong cohesion among its members and adapt to the new security environment.[8]

The seventh Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, focused on addressing issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, cyber attacks, and energy security in a post-Cold War era characterized by Western political hegemony, military-economic superiority, and the absence of strategic rivals. It designated "crisis management" and "cooperative security" as core tasks in addition to traditional "collective defense." However, following the Arab Spring in 2011, crises in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, its military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the rifts within the alliance during the Trump administration, and the strengthening of China under Xi Jinping and its aggressive foreign policy, it was decided at the Brussels Summit in 2021 to adopt a new Strategic Concept that aligns with the "return of strategic competition between great powers" at the international system level.[9]experienced, it was decided at the Brussels Summit in 2021 to adopt a new Strategic Concept that aligns with the "return of strategic competition between great powers" at the international system level.

Therefore, the two core agenda items to be discussed at the Madrid summit will be: first, the issue of collective defense for NATO members against Russia's threat to alter the status quo and measures to deter further Russian aggression against Ukraine; and second, strategies to counter the growing military power of China and its assertive diplomacy projected into Central Asia, South America, and Africa. While the former is a crucial issue for European NATO members, the latter is a far more relevant issue for US allies in the Asia-Pacific region, including South Korea, participating as partner nations. By encompassing both the Russian and Chinese threats in the new NATO Strategic Concept, the US aims to achieve two objectives with this Madrid summit.

II. South Korean Government's Position

What, then, will President Yoon Suk-yeol, who advocates for South Korea as a "Global Pivotal State," emphasize at the Madrid summit? The direction of South Korean diplomacy, emphasized by the current administration since the presidential election campaign, was detailed in the 110 National Tasks on the Presidential Office website[10] and in the opening remarks by Foreign Minister Park Jin at a CSIS roundtable on June 14.[11]detailed.

Foreign Minister Park Jin stated that the South Korea-US alliance is evolving into a comprehensive partnership based on "common values and goals," and that an alliance based on these values represents a "true evolution" of the bilateral relationship. In this context, he announced that South Korea will strengthen cooperation on issues threatening the rules-based international order, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and will further enhance its role and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region for international norms such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In this context, at a joint press conference with US Secretary of State Blinken on June 13,[12] he also emphasized the need to normalize the GSOMIA.

This indicates that the current South Korean government understands the US's demands well. In other words, by not only strengthening trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan but also imposing strong sanctions on Russia for its "unprovoked armed aggression," South Korea, with its economic and military power ranking among the top 10 globally, plans to elevate its international standing through contributions commensurate with its national strength. President Yoon Suk-yeol's statements in Madrid will also emphasize these points, and the US and NATO countries will welcome South Korea's expanded role and commitment to contribute within the international community, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. The key question is whether this will indeed be a diplomatic endeavor that "secures practical benefits," as emphasized in the national tasks.

III. The NATO Summit and South Korea's Challenges

As explained above, the core agenda of the Madrid NATO summit will be the newly adopted Strategic Concept, and the most critical issue will be defining the elements that threaten Euro-Atlantic security. Specifically, how to define the threats from Russia and China will emerge as the most significant problem. Even the widely used term "strategic competitor" encompasses various spectrums. When emphasizing the "competitor" aspect, the focus is primarily on technological and economic issues; when emphasizing "partner," the focus is on global crises such as climate change and health cooperation; and when understanding the concept in terms of "rival," the international order and norms become the main stage.[13] Since South Korea will also participate in the discussions where NATO countries deliberate on how to define Russia and China as threats and in what areas, this occasion should prompt us to carefully consider fundamental questions at the level of national grand strategy.

First, we must consider what stance to take on the implications of the Ukraine war and the future of the European security order. This includes the extent to which South Korea will participate in NATO's sanctions against Russia. Russia, in its list of countries that have engaged in "unfriendly activity towards Russia" announced on March 7,[14] included NATO countries and the four US allied partner nations attending this summit (South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). Regarding disadvantages imposed on unfriendly countries, in addition to the previously announced restriction requiring payment in rubles for gas purchases, Putin announced export restrictions on food at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 17. It is difficult to predict how many more disadvantageous measures Russia will impose on unfriendly countries in the future. Keeping this in mind, we must consider the level of South Korea's contribution to resolving the Ukraine crisis at the NATO summit.

Second, there is the issue of how to define the threat from China. This is a fundamental and far more impactful issue for South Korea's foreign policy strategy than considering Russia's position. During a meeting with the new Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari in Guangzhou on May 22, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi[15] strongly criticized the US's Indo-Pacific strategy for fomenting division and confrontation in the region, undermining existing regional cooperation frameworks, and weaponizing economic means, particularly through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), to force regional countries into one-sided choices. He specifically accused the US of causing regional instability by constantly raising issues of Taiwan and the South China Sea, pointing out that this threatens various countries in the Asia-Pacific region, which have historical memories of suffering significant damage from confrontations and conflicts between great powers. At the Shangri-La Dialogue on June 10, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe[16] declared that unification is the aspiration of the Chinese nation and that resorting to strong armed retaliation if Taiwan attempts independence is the "only option" for the Chinese government. We must carefully consider the implications of these repeated official warnings from China and determine South Korea's diplomatic stance.

Third, there is the issue of how to redefine relations with Japan. According to the 2021 Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey jointly conducted by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO,[17] an overwhelming majority of 74.6 percent of respondents answered that the current confrontational phase must be overcome. However, the issue of Japan-Korea relations is highly politicized in domestic politics, to the extent that Foreign Minister Park Jin's remarks on normalizing GSOMIA were criticized as "humiliating diplomacy" and "giving away too much."[18] At the NATO summit, President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will have the opportunity to meet, even if not a formal one-on-one summit. Taking this opportunity, the South Korean government must consider discussions on how to set the long-term direction of South Korea-Japan relations, devise responses to domestic political opposition that may arise from strengthening bilateral cooperation, and consider ways to build an effective trilateral cooperation system among South Korea, the US, and Japan in the future. ■

[1] Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 3.

[2]Campbell, Kurt. 2022. “Keynote Address.” Presentado en el Diálogo Transatlántico sobre el Indo-Pacífico CSDS-CSIS, 9 de mayo. Washington D.C., EE. UU.; La Casa Blanca. 2022. “Declaración Conjunta de los Líderes de Estados Unidos y la República de Corea.” 21 de mayo; Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de la República de Corea. 2022. “Resultado de la conversación telefónica entre el Viceministro de Asuntos Exteriores de la República de Corea, Cho Hyundong, y la Subsecretaria de Estado de EE. UU., Wendy R. Sherman.” 24 de mayo; Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. 2022. Declaración Conjunta del Secretario de Estado Antony J. Blinken, el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de Japón, Hayashi Yoshimasa, y el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de la República de Corea, Park Jin. 27 de mayo; Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. 2022. Declaración Conjunta sobre la Reunión Trilateral de Viceministros de Asuntos Exteriores de la República de Corea-EE. UU.-Japón. 8 de junio; Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. 2022. “Secretario Antony J. Blinken y el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de la República de Corea, Park Jin, en una rueda de prensa conjunta.” 13 de junio.

[3]Campbell, Kurt. 2022. “Keynote Address.” Presentado en el Diálogo Transatlántico sobre el Indo-Pacífico CSDS-CSIS, 9 de mayo. Washington D.C., EE. UU.

[4]La Casa Blanca. 2022. “Declaración Conjunta de los Líderes de Estados Unidos y la República de Corea.” 21 de mayo.

[5]Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. 2022. “Secretario Antony J. Blinken y el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de la República de Corea, Park Jin, en una rueda de prensa conjunta.” 13 de junio.

[6]Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. 2022. “Reunión de la Subsecretaria Sherman con el Primer Viceministro de Asuntos Exteriores de la República de Corea, Cho.” 13 de junio.

[7]Simón, Luis. 2022. “El Concepto Estratégico de Madrid y el futuro de la OTAN.” NATO Review. 2 de junio.

[8]Cobo, Ignacio Fuente. 2022. “Los Ocho Conceptos Estratégicos de la Historia Aliada.” En Cuadernos de Estrategia 211-B: El Futuro de la OTAN tras la Cumbre de Madrid 2022.Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 23-25.

[9]Simón, Luis. 2022. “La Gran Competición Estratégica del Siglo XXI y el Vínculo Transatlántico.” Ibid, 36-44.

[10]Comité de Transición Presidencial del 30º Presidente. 2022. “Libro Blanco del Comité de Transición Presidencial del 20º Presidente.” Oficina Presidencial del 20º Presidente.

[11]Park, Jin. 2022. “Discurso de Apertura.” Discurso de Apertura del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Park Jin en la Mesa Redonda CSIS, 14 de junio. Washington D.C., EE. UU.

[12]Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. 2022. “Secretario Antony J. Blinken y el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de la República de Corea, Park Jin, en una rueda de prensa conjunta.” 13 de junio.

[13]Simón, Luis. 2022. “La Gran Competición Estratégica del Siglo XXI y el Vínculo Transatlántico.” En Cuadernos de Estrategia 211-B: El Futuro de la OTAN tras la Cumbre de Madrid 2022.Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 46.

[14]Gobierno Ruso. 2022. “El Gobierno aprueba la lista de países y territorios no amistosos.” 7 de marzo.

[15]Huaxia. 2022. “La ‘Estrategia del Indo-Pacífico’ de EE. UU. está destinada al fracaso: Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores chino.” Xinhua. 23 de mayo.

[16]Zain, Syawalludin y David Rising. 2022. “China acusa a EE. UU. de intentar ‘secuestrar’ el apoyo en Asia.” Time.12 de junio.

[17]Instituto de Estudios de Asia Oriental (EAI). 2021. “[EAIㆍDeclaración Conjunta de ONG de Medios] Presentación de la 9ª Encuesta de Percepción Mutua entre Corea y Japón.” 28 de septiembre.

[18]Kwon, Min-cheol. 2022. “Comentario de Park Jin sobre la ‘Normalización de GSOMIA’ causa controversia… El gobierno intenta apaciguar.” >No Cut News<. 15 de junio.

■ Autor: Kim, Yang-gyu_ Investigador Principal del Instituto de Estudios de Asia Oriental (EAI), Profesor Adjunto del Departamento de Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Nacional de Seúl. Obtuvo una licenciatura en Educación Francesa y Relaciones Internacionales y una maestría en Relaciones Internacionales en la Universidad Nacional de Seúl, y un doctorado en Política Internacional en la Universidad Internacional de Florida (Florida International University). Se desempeñó como Profesor Adjunto en el Departamento de Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Internacional de Florida y como Investigador Visitante en el Instituto Arnold A. Saltzman de Guerra y Paz de la Universidad de Columbia (Columbia University). Recibió la Beca Fulbright para Estudios de Posgrado en el Extranjero (Fulbright Graduate Study Award) y la Beca de Política Mundial y Gobernanza Estatal (World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship) de la Fundación Smith Richardson (Smith Richardson Foundation). Sus principales áreas de investigación incluyen la diplomacia coercitiva, la estrategia nuclear, la transición de poder, las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y China, la cuestión nuclear norcoreana, y las teorías de política internacional y seguridad. Sus investigaciones recientes incluyen “At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis” y “The Feasibility of Punishment and the Credibility of Threats: Case Studies on the First Moroccan and the Rhineland Crises”.

■ Coordinación y Edición: Lee, Seung-yeon_ Investigador del EAI

    Contacto: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr