[Global NK Commentary] Dealing with a Radicalized North Korea: Limitations of the Moon Jae-in and Biden Administrations' North Korea Policies and the Tasks for the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration

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North Korea's Radicalization

Since the collapse of the Hanoi summit in February 2019, Kim Jong-un's North Korea has exhibited signs of radicalization. North Korea is reasserting its identity as a revolutionary state and reviving the "siege mentality" of being constantly threatened by external forces. In 2018, North Korea emphasized the discourse of a "socialist civilized power" to become a "normal country" in the international community and, after consolidating the "parallel development line" pursuing both economic development and nuclear development, declared the "line of concentrating all efforts on economic construction." However, the maximum dignity trampled in Hanoi in February 2019 appears to have led them to choose the familiar formula of "radicalization" to restore pride and control the populace. As of April 2022, North Korea has become radicalized across the board, including in ideology, economy, foreign policy, and nuclear strategy.

The movement to eradicate anti-socialist and non-socialist elements, emphasized by North Korea throughout 2021, represents ideological radicalization. This is manifested in the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideological Culture and the Law on Guaranteeing Youth Education, which regulate even the hairstyles and speech of young people. In economic terms, since the 8th Party Congress on January 8, 2021, market and economic elements have been rejected, and central-level economic control has been emphasized to build a foundation for "self-reliance and self-sufficiency." In particular, the "Restoration of the State's Sole Trading System" announced at the 6th Supreme People's Assembly of the 14th term in February of this year revived a centralized trading system instead of enterprise liberalization, which is also a phenomenon of radicalization.

Foreign policy has also become radicalized. At the 7th Party Congress in 2016 and the 7th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee in April 2018, North Korea stated that it could seek improved relations with hostile forces if its sovereignty was respected. However, at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, it declared that it would "create a peaceful atmosphere that the international community can sympathize with through a bold line change and aggressive strategy." Furthermore, it announced the opening of "a new chapter of friendly relations between North Korea and China (North Korea-China) based on nuclear weapons." This indicates a return to confrontation with the West and a strengthening of relations with China.

Nuclear strategy has become even more overtly radicalized. On March 24, North Korea claimed to have launched the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile, with Kim Jong-un directly issuing belligerent remarks. Kim Jong-un stated, "Our strategic forces are fully prepared to thoroughly thwart and deter any dangerous military provocations by U.S. imperialists. We will possess overwhelming military technological power that will not be shaken by any military threat or blackmail, and we will thoroughly prepare for a long-term confrontation with U.S. imperialists," clearly targeting the United States. On the 28th, Kim Jong-un again stated, "We must become strong. We must possess formidable offensive power and overwhelming military strength that no one can stop," expressing his will to further advance, diversify, and mass-produce nuclear weapons.

A statement issued in the name of Kim Yo-jong on April 5 detailed a more audacious nuclear doctrine. It stated that the mission of the "nuclear forces is to eliminate the enemy's military power at once" and that against South Korea, "nuclear combat power will be mobilized at the beginning of the war to seize the initiative, burn the enemy's will to fight, prevent a protracted war, and preserve our military strength."

Various views have been raised regarding North Korea's nuclear doctrine. These include the credibility of the claim that South Korea is not the target North Korea has always emphasized, as well as the timing, method, and objectives of nuclear use. Some argue that North Korea's nuclear development is purely for self-defense to counter U.S. threats and will only function as a last resort. However, Kim Yo-jong has thoroughly denied this. She clarified that North Korea's nuclear weapons can certainly be used against South Korea and that their use at the beginning of a war is to achieve military-tactical objectives such as seizing the initiative. This suggests that nuclear weapons could be used early in the conflict to counter the superior air power of the ROK-U.S. alliance at the outset of hostilities and, in particular, to prevent the deployment of U.S. reinforcements, thereby achieving victory in a short period. This nuclear doctrine is highly radical, offensive, and dangerous. Most wars begin with minor military clashes that escalate due to mutual misunderstanding and distrust. For example, a limited clash along the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea could lead to North Korea's belligerent nuclear doctrine causing them to misinterpret the intentions of South Korea and the U.S. to the maximum extent and decide to use nuclear weapons. In other words, a military conflict caused by a minor clash between the South and North could easily escalate into a nuclear war.

The test launch of a new tactical guided weapon, personally observed by Kim Jong-un on April 16, the day after Kim Il-sung's 110th birthday, confirms that North Korea is developing means to apply its radical nuclear doctrine to actual battlefield environments. North Korea announced that this weapon system "has great significance in dramatically enhancing the firepower strike capability of the front-line long-range artillery units and in increasing the effectiveness and diversification of tactical nuclear operations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." Front-line long-range artillery units are units operating long-range guns and multiple rocket launchers concentrated in the front-line areas of North Korea, and they are the forces that carry out the threat of turning Seoul into a "sea of fire" in case of emergency. This is interpreted as an intention to deploy newly developed tactical nuclear missiles to the front lines, thereby acquiring the capability to strike Seoul in the early stages of a war on the Korean Peninsula. What is serious is that it can also be interpreted to mean that nuclear weapons may be used not under central control of strategic forces but at the discretion of front-line units depending on the situation. If the use of nuclear weapons is delegated to individual judgment based on the front-line situation, the possibility of nuclear war increases significantly.

North Korea's Future Actions

This radicalization of North Korea makes the security environment on the Korean Peninsula highly unstable. The deepening radicalization in ideology and economy plunges North Korean society as a whole into a state of extreme tension. In terms of foreign policy, radicalization narrows the space for compromise and increases the possibility of confrontation. An offensive nuclear strategy presupposes the possibility of war. In summary, the following actions by North Korea are expected.

North Korea will sprint toward its goal of becoming a complete nuclear power. North Korea's missile provocations attempted by mid-April 2022 are interpreted as attempts to secure both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. The KN-23, 24 and their improved versions, capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads, and long-range cruise missiles are targeting South Korea and Japan, while the Hwasong-12 has a range that includes Guam. It is demonstrating its strike capabilities against key areas in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, although Jake Sullivan, the U.S. National Security Advisor, assessed that the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) touted as the Hwasong-17 "does not yet possess the capability to strike the U.S. mainland," North Korea's direction and will toward completion are clearly confirmed. In addition, the SLBM directly ordered by Kim Jong Un at the 8th Party Congress last January will continue to be developed.

This diverse portfolio of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons makes the complete denuclearization of North Korea itself unrealistic. Voices are growing in both South Korea and the United States that 'nuclear disarmament,' implying the de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state, is a realistic alternative. North Korea will not miss this opportunity and will attempt to advance its nuclear strategy to the maximum extent possible to secure a clear advantage and function as a nuclear state if negotiations resume in the future.

The possibility of North Korea escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula through provocations against South Korea cannot be ruled out. Around the time a new government was inaugurated in South Korea, North Korea has previously carried out provocations regardless of the government's political leaning (progressive or conservative) to assert control over future relations. North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in February 2013 during the transition period of the Park Geun-hye administration, and in July 2017, shortly after the inauguration of the Moon Jae-in administration, it launched the Hwasong-14, an ICBM. COVID-19 may also have an impact. In a situation where it has been effectively three years of lockdown, the suffering of the North Korean people must have intensified. There are also reports of starvation deaths in some rural areas. It is possible that Kim Jong Un, who has chosen radicalization, may opt for limited provocations to maintain internal control while challenging the conservative orientation of the newly inaugurated Yoon Suk-yeol administration. However, in the case of the September 19 Military Agreement, it is expected that North Korea will try to maintain it as much as possible, as the overall content of the agreement is not unfavorable to it.

Policy Evaluation of the Moon Jae-in Administration and the Joe Biden Administration

The newly inaugurated Yoon Suk-yeol administration will face a very difficult environment. The Korean Peninsula peace process pursued by the Moon Jae-in administration over the past five years is virtually extinct. Only the September 19 Military Agreement signed by South and North Korea in 2019 is barely maintaining its existence, and most of it has lost its meaning, returning to the situation of 2017. North Korea's nuclear sprint is likely to continue for the time being, and tensions on the Korean Peninsula are expected to escalate.

The failure of the Moon Jae-in administration stems from its inability to respond to North Korea's changed policies and its stubborn adherence to existing ones. Since the collapse of the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit in February 2019, North Korea declared the 'frontal breakthrough line' (정면돌파전) at the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee in December of the same year, clearly establishing a confrontational stance against South Korea and the U.S. In June 2020, it blew up the Kaesong inter-Korean joint liaison office, a symbol of the Korean Peninsula peace process. Subsequently, at the 8th Party Congress in 2021, North Korea reaffirmed its position that there would be no dialogue unless South Korea and the U.S. first withdraw their hostile policies. Simultaneously, since May 2019, North Korea has focused on developing missiles capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads, demonstrating various medium- and short-range missile capabilities in early 2022. Despite these confrontational policies by North Korea, the Moon Jae-in administration stubbornly maintained its existing policy of unconditional engagement with North Korea. It did not even properly raise issues regarding North Korea's provocations. Furthermore, rather than deterring the advancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, it was solely focused on the 'end-of-war declaration'.

Another difficulty facing the Yoon Suk-yeol administration comes from the United States. The Biden administration's North Korea policy, announced in May 2021 as a "calibrated and practical approach," has been virtually unable to be implemented. The U.S. continuously calls for "unconditional dialogue" with North Korea for discussions, but North Korea publicly rejected this through a series of statements by Kim Yo Jong and Ri Son Gwon in June of last year. Although North Korea eventually broke its moratorium this year, the Biden administration's North Korea policy has not changed significantly. Additional sanctions against North Korea were imposed, but they remained symbolic as China was not sanctioned. Ultimately, the North Korea policy demonstrated by the Biden administration over the past year or so is indistinguishable from the Obama administration's strategic patience, which called for North Korea to withdraw its claims and return to dialogue, meaning North Korea should change first. The Biden administration has not made any active attempts to 'break through' the stalemate, such as actively pursuing dialogue with North Korea or inducing a change in North Korea's attitude through strengthened sanctions.

Policy Proposals

The newly launched Yoon Suk-yeol administration must pursue North Korean denuclearization while managing the situation on the Korean Peninsula together with the United States. First, South Korea and the U.S. must attempt sophisticated "strategic communication" with North Korea. The goal to pursue in the current situation is to deter North Korea's missile and nuclear tests. In particular, the development of increasingly sophisticated and diversified missiles by North Korea must be prevented. Therefore, a clear message must be delivered to North Korea. If North Korea conducts additional nuclear tests and launches missiles, it is necessary to foreshadow corresponding measures, such as the rotational deployment of U.S. strategic assets, the restoration of ROK-U.S. combined exercises, and strengthened sanctions including sanctions against China. Efforts to promote dialogue must also be intensified. As mentioned earlier, continuously offering 'unconditional dialogue,' which North Korea has already rejected, is tantamount to saying there will be no dialogue. More creative and proactive efforts are required. Driving the passive and inactive North Korea policy demonstrated by the Biden administration is also a task assigned to the Yoon Suk-yeol administration.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration must establish a balanced North Korea policy, learning from the Moon Jae-in administration. A policy that skillfully and complexly combines peace and security, engagement and deterrence, carrots and sticks is needed. In particular, it should be avoided to rapidly shift the balance towards security, deterrence, and sticks due to the reaction against the Moon Jae-in administration in the early part of the term. Although the '3000 economic plan for denuclearization and opening' pursued during the previous Lee Myung-bak administration was correct in principle, it was not appropriate considering North Korea's system, which prioritizes politics far above economics. North Korea uses its regime's superiority as the legitimacy of its rule. If South Korea pursues its North Korea policy in a way that demands North Korea acknowledge its economic failures, North Korea will strongly react.

Conclusion

North Korean denuclearization is an arduous task. In particular, given the process so far, North Korea is more likely than ever to be de facto recognized as a nuclear state and to address denuclearization within the framework of nuclear disarmament negotiations. Although the Moon Jae-in administration made efforts, the legacy of the Korean Peninsula peace process has been largely lost due to unilateral policies that failed to adapt to the changed policies and environment. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration must adhere to clear denuclearization principles and lead the passive U.S. North Korea policy. Furthermore, it must pursue a multidimensional policy that deters North Korea while managing the extreme deterioration of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. ■

※ This commentary is a Korean translation of "Yoon’s Key North Korea Challenges: Pyongyang’s Increasing Hostility and Washington’s Backslide Into Strategic Patience."

※ Some content in this article is excerpted from Park Won-gon, "North Korea Pursues All-Round Radicalization," <Munhwa Ilbo> (2022/04/07) and Park Won-gon, "Biden Administration's North Korea Policy: Confusion Between Reality and Ideal," 『Current Affairs and Policy』 March 2022 issue.

■ Author: Park Won-gon_Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. He holds a Ph.D. in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Vice President of the Institute for Peace and Korean Peninsula Studies (KPI). He conducted research on the ROK-U.S. alliance and North Korea for 18 years at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and previously served as a professor of International Studies at Handong Global University. His main research areas include the ROK-U.S. alliance, North Korean diplomacy and military affairs, and Northeast Asian international relations.

■ Editor: Lee Seung-yeon _EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr