[EAI Commentary] Dealing with a Radicalized North Korea: Limitations of the Moon Jae-in and Biden Administrations’ North Korea Policies and the Tasks for the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration

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Radicalization of North Korea

Since the collapse of the Hanoi summit in February 2019, Kim Jong Un’s North Korea has shown signs of radicalization. As a revolutionary state, North Korea reaffirms its identity and evokes a “siege mentality” of being constantly threatened by external forces. In 2018, North Korea emphasized the discourse of a “socialist civilized power” to become a “normal state” in the international community and declared a “line of focusing all efforts on economic construction” after consolidating the “parallel development line” pursuing both economic development and nuclear development. However, the maximum dignity trampled in Hanoi in February 2019 appears to have chosen the familiar path of “radicalization” to restore pride and control its populace. As of April 2022, North Korea has become radicalized in all areas, including ideology, economy, foreign policy, and nuclear strategy.

The movement to eradicate anti-socialist and non-socialist elements, emphasized by North Korea throughout 2021, represents ideological radicalization. This is manifested in the Law on Combating Anti-Ideology and Culture and the Law on Guaranteeing Youth Education, which regulate even the hairstyles and speech of young people. In economic terms, since the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, market-economic elements have been rejected, and central-level economic control has been emphasized to build a foundation of “self-reliance and self-sufficiency.” In particular, the “restoration of the state’s sole trading system” announced at the 6th Supreme People's Assembly of the 14th term in February of this year revives a centralized trading system instead of enterprise liberalization, which is also a phenomenon of radicalization.

Foreign policy has also been radicalized. At the 7th Party Congress in July 2016 and the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee in April 2018, North Korea stated that it could seek improved relations with hostile forces if its sovereignty was respected. However, at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, it declared that it would “create a peaceful atmosphere that the international community can sympathize with through bold line changes and aggressive strategies.” Furthermore, it announced the opening of “a new chapter of friendly relations between North Korea and China (North Korea-China), which are based on socialism and nuclear weapons.” The statement indicated a return to confrontation with the West and a further strengthening of relations with China.

Nuclear strategy has become even more overtly radicalized. On March 24, North Korea claimed to have launched the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile, with Kim Jong Un personally making belligerent remarks. Kim Jong Un stated, “(North Korea’s) strategic forces are fully prepared to thoroughly thwart and deter any dangerous military provocations by US imperialists. We will maintain overwhelming military technological capabilities that will not be shaken by any military threats or blackmail and thoroughly prepare for a long-term confrontation with US imperialism,” clearly targeting the United States. On the 28th, Kim Jong Un again stated, “We must become strong. We must possess formidable offensive power and overwhelming military strength that no one can stop,” expressing his will to further enhance, diversify, and mass-produce nuclear weapons.

The statement issued in the name of Kim Yo Jong on April 5th provides a more detailed explanation of a bolder nuclear doctrine. It states that the mission of the nuclear forces is “to eliminate the enemy’s military power in one fell swoop,” and regarding South Korea, it explains that “in the early stages of war, nuclear combat power will be mobilized to seize the initiative, burn the enemy’s will to fight, prevent a protracted war, and preserve our military strength.”

Various views have been raised regarding North Korea’s nuclear doctrine. These include the credibility of the claim that North Korea’s nuclear use targets are not South Korea, as North Korea has always emphasized, and the timing, method, and objectives of nuclear use. Some argue that North Korea’s nuclear development is purely for self-defense to counter US threats and will only function as a last resort. However, Kim Yo Jong thoroughly denied this. She clarified that North Korea’s nuclear weapons can certainly be used against South Korea and that their use in the early stages of war is to achieve the military-tactical objective of seizing the initiative. This means that nuclear weapons could be used in the early stages as a means to check the ROK-US alliance, which possesses superior air power, and especially to prevent the deployment of US reinforcements, thereby leading to a swift victory. Such a nuclear doctrine is very radical, offensive, and dangerous. Most wars begin with minor military clashes that escalate due to mutual misunderstanding and distrust. For example, if a limited clash occurs between the North and South at the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea, North Korea’s belligerent nuclear doctrine could lead to the misinterpretation of ROK-US intentions and the decision to use nuclear weapons. In other words, it means that a military conflict caused by a minor clash between the North and South could easily escalate into a nuclear war.

The test launch of a new tactical guided missile, personally observed by Kim Jong Un on April 16th, the day after Kim Il Sung’s 110th birthday, confirms that North Korea is developing means to apply its radical nuclear doctrine to actual battlefield environments. North Korea announced that this weapon system “has great significance in dramatically enhancing the firepower strike capability of front-line long-range artillery units and in enhancing the effectiveness and diversification of tactical nuclear operations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.” Front-line long-range artillery units are units equipped with long-range artillery and multiple rocket launchers concentrated in the front-line areas of North Korea, which are responsible for the threat of turning Seoul into a sea of fire in case of emergency. This is interpreted as an intention to deploy new tactical nuclear missiles to front-line positions, thereby acquiring the capability to strike Seoul in the early stages of a war on the Korean Peninsula. What is serious is that it can also be interpreted to mean that the decision to use nuclear weapons may not be under central control of strategic forces but could be made by frontline units based on battlefield conditions. If the use of nuclear weapons is delegated to individual judgment based on front-line situations, the possibility of nuclear war increases significantly.

North Korea’s Future Actions

This radicalization of North Korea makes the security environment on the Korean Peninsula extremely unstable. The deepening radicalization in ideology and economy drives the entire North Korean society into a state of extreme tension. In terms of foreign policy, radicalization narrows the space for compromise and increases the possibility of confrontation. An offensive nuclear strategy implies the possibility of war. In summary, the following actions by North Korea are expected.

North Korea will race towards its goal of becoming a complete nuclear-weapon state. The missile provocations attempted by North Korea up to mid-April 2022 are interpreted as attempts to secure both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Missiles capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads, such as the KN-23, KN-24, and their improved versions, as well as long-range cruise missiles, are aimed at South Korea and Japan, while the Hwasong-12 has Guam within its range. North Korea is demonstrating its capability to strike key areas in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, although Jake Sullivan, White House National Security Advisor, stated that the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) “does not yet possess the capability to strike the US mainland,” North Korea’s direction and will towards its completion are clearly confirmed. In addition, North Korea will continue to develop the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that Kim Jong Un directly ordered at the 8th Party Congress in January of last year.

Такой разнообразный портфель тактического и стратегического ядерного оружия делает полную денуклеаризацию Северной Кореи нереалистичной. В обеих странах, Корее и США, усиливаются голоса, призывающие к «ядерному разоружению», что означает фактическое признание Северной Кореи ядерной державой, как реалистичной альтернативы. Северная Корея, не упустив этой возможности, будет стремиться максимально усовершенствовать свою ядерную стратегию, чтобы занять прочные позиции и функционировать как ядерная держава, когда переговоры возобновятся в будущем.

Нельзя исключать и возможности эскалации напряженности на Корейском полуострове посредством агрессивных действий Северной Кореи против Южной Кореи. Во время формирования нового правительства в Южной Корее Северная Корея уже совершала провокации, независимо от политической окраски правительства — будь то прогрессивное или консервативное, — чтобы получить контроль над будущими отношениями. В феврале 2013 года, в период работы комитета по передаче власти правительству Пак Кын Хе, Северная Корея провела третье ядерное испытание, а в июле 2017 года, вскоре после вступления в должность правительства Мун Джэ Ина, запустила межконтинентальную баллистическую ракету «Хвасон-14». COVID-19 также может оказать влияние. Учитывая, что страна уже третий год фактически находится в режиме изоляции, страдания северокорейского народа, вероятно, усилились. Поступают также сообщения о случаях голодной смерти в некоторых регионах. Существует вероятность, что Ким Чен Ын, выбрав радикальный путь, может выбрать ограниченные провокации, ставя под сомнение консервативную направленность недавно сформированного правительства Юн Сок Ёля для внутреннего контроля. Однако, учитывая, что положения военного соглашения от 9 сентября в целом не являются невыгодными для Северной Кореи, ожидается, что она будет стремиться сохранить его в максимально возможной степени.

Evaluation of the Policies of the Moon Jae-in Administration and the Biden Administration

The newly inaugurated Yoon Suk-yeol administration will face a very difficult environment. The Korean Peninsula peace process pursued by the Moon Jae-in administration over the past five years is virtually extinct. Only the September 19th Military Agreement, signed by North and South Korea in 2019, barely maintains its existence; most of it has lost its meaning, and the situation is reverting to that of 2017. As North Korea’s nuclear race is likely to continue for the time being, tensions on the Korean Peninsula are expected to escalate.

The failure of the Moon Jae-in administration stems from its inability to respond to North Korea’s changed policies and its stubborn adherence to existing ones. Since the collapse of the North Korea-US summit in Hanoi in February 2019, North Korea declared a “frontal breakthrough line” at the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee in December of the same year, clarifying its confrontational stance towards South Korea and the US. In June 2020, it blew up the Kaesong inter-Korean joint liaison office, a symbol of the Korean Peninsula peace process. Subsequently, through the 8th Party Congress in 2021, North Korea reaffirmed its position that there would be no dialogue until South Korea and the US withdraw their hostile policies. Simultaneously, North Korea focused on developing missiles capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads starting in May 2019 and demonstrated various medium- and short-range missile capabilities in early 2022. Despite these confrontational policies by North Korea, the Moon Jae-in administration stubbornly maintained its existing policy of unconditional engagement with North Korea. It did not even properly raise objections to North Korea’s provocative actions. Furthermore, rather than deterring the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, it was solely focused on an “end-of-war declaration.”

Another difficulty facing the Yoon Suk-yeol administration comes from the United States. The Biden administration’s North Korea policy, announced in May 2021 as a “calibrated and practical approach,” has essentially not even been attempted. While the US continuously calls for “unconditional dialogue” with North Korea for discussions, North Korea publicly rejected this through a series of statements by Kim Yo Jong and Ri Son Gwon in June of last year. Although North Korea eventually broke its moratorium this year, the Biden administration’s North Korea policy has not changed significantly. Although additional sanctions were imposed, they remained symbolic as China was not sanctioned. Ultimately, the North Korea policy shown by the Biden administration over the past year or so is indistinguishable from the Obama administration’s “strategic patience,” which called for North Korea to withdraw its claims and return to dialogue, essentially asking North Korea to change first. The Biden administration has made no proactive efforts to “break through” the stalemate, either by actively pursuing dialogue with North Korea or by inducing a change in North Korea’s attitude through increased sanctions.

Policy Recommendations

The newly launched Yoon Suk-yeol administration must pursue North Korean denuclearization while managing the situation on the Korean Peninsula together with the United States. First, South Korea and the US must attempt “strategic communication” with North Korea. The goal to pursue in the current situation is to deter North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests. In particular, North Korea’s development of increasingly sophisticated and diversified missiles must be prevented. Therefore, a clear message must be conveyed to North Korea. If North Korea conducts additional nuclear tests and missile launches, it is necessary to foreshadow corresponding measures, such as the rotational deployment of US strategic assets, the resumption of ROK-US joint exercises, and strengthened sanctions, including sanctions against China. Efforts for dialogue must also be strengthened. As mentioned earlier, continuing to offer “unconditional dialogue,” which North Korea has already rejected, is tantamount to saying that dialogue will not occur. More creative and proactive efforts are required. It is also a task for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration to drive the passive and hesitant North Korea policy demonstrated by the Biden administration.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration must establish a balanced North Korea policy, learning from the Moon Jae-in administration. A policy is needed that skillfully and complexly combines peace and security, engagement and deterrence, and carrots and sticks. In particular, in the early stages of the term, a drastic shift in the balance towards security, deterrence, and sticks due to a reaction against the Moon Jae-in administration should be avoided. While the “non-nuclear, open 3000” policy pursued by the Lee Myung-bak administration during its term was correct in principle, it was not appropriate considering North Korea’s system, which prioritizes politics far above economics. North Korea uses its regime’s superiority as the legitimacy of its rule. If South Korea pursues a North Korea policy that demands North Korea acknowledge its economic failures, North Korea will strongly resist.

Conclusion

North Korean denuclearization is a arduous task. Especially given the process so far, it is highly likely that North Korea will be treated as a de facto nuclear-weapon state and that the issue of denuclearization will be handled within the framework of nuclear disarmament negotiations. Although the Moon Jae-in administration made efforts, its one-sided policy, which failed to adapt to the changed policies and environment, has left little legacy of the Korean Peninsula peace process. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration must uphold clear denuclearization principles and lead the US’s passive North Korea policy. Furthermore, it must pursue a multidimensional policy that manages the extreme deterioration of the situation on the Korean Peninsula while deterring North Korea. ■

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of “Yoon’s Key North Korea Challenges: Pyongyang’s Increasing Hostility and Washington’s Backslide Into Strategic Patience.”

※ Parts of this article were excerpted from Park Won-gon, “North Korea Pursues All-Round Radicalization,” <Munhwa Ilbo> (2022/04/07) and Park Won-gon, “The Biden Administration’s North Korea Policy: Confusion Between Reality and Ideals,” 『Geopolitics and Policy』 March 2022 issue.

■ Author: Park Won-gon_Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. He holds a Ph.D. in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as Vice President of the Korea Peninsula Future Forum (KPI). He researched the ROK-US alliance and North Korea for 18 years at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and taught International Studies at Handong Global University. His main research areas include the ROK-US alliance, North Korean diplomacy and military affairs, and Northeast Asian international relations.

■ Editor: Lee Seung-yeon_EAI 연구원

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