[EAI Issue Brief] Macron's Re-election, Will It Give Wings to European Sovereignty: The 2022 French Presidential Election and the Politics of the European Union

I. Macron's Re-election and the French 'Political Revolution'

The 2022 French presidential election, unfolding like a reenactment of the 2017 election, strongly evoked a sense of déjà vu. The fact that centrist Emmanuel Macron and far-right Marine Le Pen advanced to the runoff in the first round was identical, and Macron's victory by a large margin was also repeated. As the media emphasized, Macron will be recorded in political history as the only incumbent president of the Fifth Republic to be re-elected since Charles de Gaulle. In 1988, François Mitterrand and in 2002, Jacques Chirac were both re-elected under cohabitation governments, meaning they were president but could not control the government (Faye 2022). This means he benefited from France's unique "Dégagisme"[1]which drives out the incumbent power in every election.

[Table 1] 2017 and 2022 Presidential Election Results (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2022) (%)

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Despite the déjà vu, this election showed many changes. First, the runoff recorded the lowest turnout since the 1969 presidential election, indicating that a significant number of voters expressed dissatisfaction and apathy towards politics. Furthermore, Le Pen's support in the runoff sharply increased to 42% from around 34% five years prior. This represents more than a doubling of her support in 20 years, from only 18% when her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, first reached the runoff in 2002. Additionally, the combined votes for far-right candidate Éric Zemmour and far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon reached 58% in the first round, highlighting a peak in dissatisfaction with the current system.

Conversely, the traditional ruling parties of French politics, the Socialist Party and the Republicans, have experienced a severe decline. In 2017, the Socialist candidate Benoît Hamon had fallen to a minor candidate with around 6% of the vote, and in 2022, even the Republican candidate Valérie Pécresse garnered only 5%, demonstrating the disintegration of traditional parties.

The 21st-century revolution in French politics, initiated by Macron five years ago, appears to be nearing completion. Macron's 'La République En Marche' (LREM) has consolidated the traditional centrist political forces that were divided into left and right, completing a realignment into a triangular structure with Le Pen on the far-right and Mélenchon on the far-left. While the center still leads the political landscape, the long-term pressure from the extremes, sandwiching it from both left and right, presents a highly precarious situation.

II. Macron's Second Term and the Prospects for European Integration

Macron's re-election in France has brought a sense of relief to European Union (EU) politics. Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, had secured victory in his general election on April 3rd, winning his fourth term and advocating for a 'Europe of Nations,' he had cheered for Le Pen's victory in France. Macron himself emphasized to voters that this runoff election carried the character of a 'referendum on the European Union.' In essence, the confrontation between Europeanism and nationalism within the EU played out through the French presidential election (Chastand et Iwaniuk 2022). Macron's re-election on April 24th, along with the victory of the centrist coalition in the Slovenian parliamentary elections, marked a symbolic event securing the future of Europeanism in EU politics.

During his first term, Macron achieved significant progress towards European integration. Immediately after his election, in his September 2017 Sorbonne University speech, he presented the main objective that a democratically integrated Europe should play a role in protecting its citizens (Macron 2017). The concept of "European sovereignty" was fully articulated in this speech, and although initially met with ridicule, it has gradually taken shape.

At that time, Macron proposed six areas for European sovereignty: ▼Sovereignty in all areas such as defense, terrorism, and citizens' daily lives ▼Sovereignty to control migration flows ▼Sovereignty to strengthen cooperation towards the Mediterranean and Africa ▼Sovereignty pursuing sustainable development ▼Sovereignty in the digital industry ▼Sovereignty in monetary and financial matters. In other words, he expressed an ambition to unite Europe in key areas such as security, immigration, neighborhood foreign relations, ecology, digital, and monetary/financial matters.

With his re-election and entry into his second term, Macron is poised to play a pivotal role as the de facto leader of the European Union. With the United Kingdom's departure from the EU, the dual leadership of France and Germany has become even more crucial, and coupled with France's tradition of strong leadership in military and foreign affairs, Macron could become the voice representing Europe, much like Angela Merkel in the past. Given Macron's 'monarchical president' demeanor, compared to the coalition government formed in Germany in December, he is likely to exert stronger leadership in driving Europe forward.

Macron already demonstrated leadership in 2019 during the appointment process for the new European Commission following the European Parliament elections. He secured strong influence within the European Council, representing the governments of the member states, and played a decisive role in appointing Ursula von der Leyen of Germany as Commission President (The Economist 2019). Subsequently, he spearheaded the €750 billion COVID-19 recovery program (Next Generation EU) at the European level and, in principle, established the issuance of EU bonds to finance it. This was a significant event, considered the first step towards fiscal federalism in Europe.

Macron's second term offers an opportunity for significant progress in European integration. With the new coalition government established in Germany last year and the election of a president for the next five years in France this year, Europe appears to have secured the stability of the 'Franco-German engine.' Five years ago, after Macron's election, his first diplomatic engagement was with German Chancellor Merkel. This time as well, Macron will meet with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz first. A close reading of the Sorbonne speech reveals a goal for France and Germany to achieve perfect integration and become a model for Europe. This signifies that the momentum of Franco-German leadership is central to European integration.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, while the presidential election campaign was in full swing in France, presented a shocking challenge to Europe. Over the past two months, Europe has experienced a rapid and profound shift in thinking, as significant as the shock of the war. It has led to serious contemplation about Europe's place in the 21st-century world order.

III. World Order and "European Sovereignty"

Russia's swift invasion of Ukraine was a tsunami that completely overturned Europe's geopolitical thinking. Europe, particularly Germany, had applied the principle of achieving peace through trade since the 1970s, not only to East Germany but also to post-Cold War Russia and China. This was the background for Germany's pursuit of the gas pipeline from Russia, despite US opposition. However, Russia's brutal invasion has brought about a paradigm shift (Zeitenwende) in Germany and Europe (The Economist 2022b). Germany is increasing its defense spending to 2% of its GDP and has begun providing weapons to Ukraine. These moves may herald a historic change in German policy since World War II.

Just before the Ukraine war, France experienced the bitter experience of being diplomatically sidelined by the United States twice. With the advent of the Joe Biden administration in 2021, tensions between the US and Europe during the Donald Trump era eased, and Europe had expected a restoration of close alliance relations. However, the US unilaterally decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, and Europe was only informed of the outcome. France also experienced the shock of being excluded from the AUKUS military alliance formed by the US, the UK, and Australia. This was an event that the French Minister of Defense strongly described as a 'betrayal' by allied nations. While the alliance with the United States is important, it has instilled in France the realization that it cannot be blindly trusted (Kauffmann 2022).

La amenaza militar directa de Rusia y la incertidumbre de la alianza estadounidense han creado un ambiente en el que Europa necesita sus propias capacidades y líneas diplomáticas y de seguridad. El concepto de "soberanía europea" que Macron planteó en la Sorbona ha ido ganando terreno gradualmente en el panorama internacional. Además, la crisis de la COVID-19 en la década de 2020 ha elevado el nivel de alerta de Europa hacia China. En 2019, Europa ya había definido a China como un "rival sistémico" (Comisión Europea 2019). Ante la crisis de la COVID-19, Europa confirmó su dependencia de China a través de la cadena de suministro de mascarillas, etc., y experimentó la imprudencia de la diplomacia de vacunas de China que buscaba dividir a Europa. La forma en que China manejó la disputa diplomática con Lituania, un estado miembro de la UE, en 2021 también fue impactante. La diferencia diplomática en torno al nombre de la Oficina de Representación de Taiwán/Taipéi pareció un ataque indiscriminado de una superpotencia contra un país pequeño. La Unión Europea está resistiendo conjuntamente la intimidación de China a Lituania.

Así, China, al igual que Rusia y Estados Unidos, es un factor que impulsa a Europa a buscar su propio camino. Por supuesto, la soberanía europea sigue siendo solo un eslogan. Algunas personas prefieren la "autonomía estratégica", considerando irrazonable aplicar la soberanía, tradicionalmente aplicada a los estados-nación, a Europa. Dentro de la UE, todavía existen fuerzas que mantienen estrechas relaciones con Rusia, como el gobierno de Orbán en Hungría, y por otro lado, el atlantismo de países como Polonia y los países bálticos, que consideran que una estrecha alianza con Estados Unidos es más necesaria que el camino independiente de Europa, sigue siendo fuerte (The Economist 2022a).

La dirección de la política exterior que Macron, reelegido, perseguirá durante los próximos cinco años es: ▼ Presentar la integración de ambos países como un modelo para Europa a través de una estrecha cooperación con Alemania, ▼ Impulsar la integración fiscal y de seguridad de Europa, donde la integración ha sido lenta hasta ahora, y ▼ Sentar las bases para que Europa pueda hacer oír su voz en el escenario donde compiten los pesos pesados de la política mundial como Rusia, Estados Unidos y China. Queda por ver si el eslogan "Una Europa" seguirá siendo un simple sueño o si la experiencia histórica acumulada durante más de 70 años continuará. ■

Referencias

Chastand, Jean-Baptiste et Jakub Iwaniuk. 2022. “De Budapest à Varsovie, le silence et l’embarras des gouvernements populistes d’Europe centrale.” Le Monde le 24 avril.

Comisión Europea. 2019. EU-China. A Strategic Outlook. Estrasburgo: Alto Representante de la Unión para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad.

Faye, Olivier. 2022. “Emmanuel Macron : une réélection sans état de grâce.” Le Monde le 24 avril.

Kauffmann, Sylvie. 2022. “« Macron l’européen ? Cinq ans plus tard, ses partenaires de l’UE sont plus conscients du chemin accompli que ses concitoyens ».” Le Monde le 20 avril.

Macron, Emmanuel. 2017. “President Macron gives speech on new initiative for Europe.” https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/president-macron-gives-speech-on-new-initiative-for-europe (Fecha de consulta: 26.4.2022.)

Ministerio del Interior. “Elections – Les résultats.” https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats (Fecha de consulta: 26.4.2022.)

The Economist. 2019. “Ursula von der Leyen’s bumpy start.” 17 de octubre.

The Economist. 2022a. “Crisis in Ukraine: How Russia has revived NATO.” 12 de febrero.

The Economist. 2022b. “The reticent Mr Scholz: Why Olaf Scholz hesitates to send Ukraine heavy weapons.” 23 de abril.

[1] "Dégage!" es una expresión vulgar que puede traducirse como "¡Fuera!". El "dégagisme" se refiere al fenómeno político de la alternancia de poder que surge de la desilusión y el rechazo hacia el establishment político existente.

■ Autor: Cho Hong-sik_Profesor de Relaciones Internacionales en la Universidad Soongsil. Obtuvo un doctorado en Ciencias Políticas en el Instituto de Estudios Políticos de París (Sciences Po). Sus principales áreas de investigación incluyen la economía política internacional, los estudios europeos y la política de la identidad. Sus obras publicadas incluyen "The Web of Civilizations: A Panorama of European Culture", "One Europe: The History and Policies of the European Union" y "European Integration and the Future of the 'Nation'".

■ Editor y responsable: Jeon Ju-hyeon_Investigador del EAI

    Contacto: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr