[EAI Issue Brief] Macron's Re-election: Will it Boost European Sovereignty? The 2022 French Presidential Election and the Politics of the European Union

I. Macron's Re-election and France's 'Political Revolution'

The 2022 French presidential election, unfolding as a replay of the 2017 election, strongly evoked a sense of déjà vu. The first round saw centrist Emmanuel Macron and far-right Marine Le Pen advance to the runoff, mirroring the previous election, and Macron's victory by a significant margin was also repeated. As emphasized by the media, Macron will be recorded in political history as the only incumbent president of the Fifth Republic to win re-election since Charles de Gaulle. In 1988, François Mitterrand and in 2002, Jacques Chirac were both re-elected under cohabitation governments, meaning they were president but did not control the government (Faye 2022). This indicates he benefited from France's unique "Dégagisme" (get out-ism) tendency to oust the incumbent party in every election.[1] he benefited from.

[Table 1] 2017 and 2022 Presidential Election Results (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2022) (%)

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Despite the déjà vu, this election revealed significant changes. Firstly, the runoff recorded the lowest turnout since the 1969 election, indicating that a considerable number of voters expressed dissatisfaction and apathy towards politics. Secondly, Le Pen's support in the runoff sharply increased to 42% from around 34% five years prior. This represents more than a doubling of her father Jean-Marie Le Pen's support of only 18% in his first runoff appearance in 2002, over two decades ago. Furthermore, the combined votes for far-right candidate Éric Zemmour and far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round reached 58%, highlighting a peak in dissatisfaction with the current system.

Conversely, the traditional ruling parties of French politics, the Socialist Party and the Republicans, experienced a severe decline. In 2017, the left-wing Socialist candidate Benoît Hamon had already fallen to a minor candidate with around 6% support, and in 2022, even the right-wing Republican candidate Valérie Pécresse garnered only 5%, demonstrating the disintegration of traditional parties.

The 21st-century revolution in French politics, initiated by Macron five years ago, appears to be reaching completion. His "La République En Marche" (LREM) has unified the previously divided centrist political forces, completing a realignment into a triangular structure involving the far-right Le Pen and the far-left Mélenchon. While the center still leads the political landscape, the long-term prospect is precarious, with extreme forces exerting pressure from both the left and right, creating a sandwich effect.

II. Macron's Second Term and the Prospects for European Integration

Macron's re-election in France brought a sense of relief to European Union (EU) politics. Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, secured his fourth term in the general election on April 3rd, advocating for a "Europe of Nations" and supporting Le Pen's victory in France. Macron himself emphasized to voters that the runoff election was a "referendum on the European Union," framing the French presidential election as a contest between Europeanism and nationalism within the EU (Chastand et Iwaniuk 2022). Macron's re-election on April 24th, coupled with the centrist coalition's victory in the Slovenian general election, symbolized the securing of a Europeanist future for EU politics.

During his first term, Macron achieved significant progress towards European integration. Immediately after his election in September 2017, he presented a key objective in his Sorbonne University speech: a democratically integrated Europe must serve to protect its citizens (Macron 2017). The concept of "European sovereignty" was fully articulated in this speech and, despite initial ridicule, has gradually taken shape.

At that time, Macron proposed six areas for European sovereignty: ▼Security sovereignty in all domains including defense, terrorism, and citizens' daily lives ▼Sovereignty to control immigration flows ▼Sovereignty to strengthen cooperation towards the Mediterranean and Africa ▼Sovereignty pursuing sustainable development ▼Sovereignty in the digital industry ▼Sovereignty in monetary and financial matters. In other words, he expressed an ambition to unite Europe in key areas such as security, immigration, neighborhood foreign policy, ecology, digital technology, and monetary and financial affairs.

Entering his second term after winning re-election, Macron is poised to play a leading role in the European Union. With the United Kingdom's departure from the EU, the dual leadership of France and Germany has become even more critical. Combined with France's traditional strength in military and diplomatic leadership, Macron could emerge as Europe's representative voice, much like Angela Merkel in the past. Given Macron's "monarchical president" demeanor, which is more pronounced than that of the coalition government formed in Germany in December, he is likely to exert stronger leadership in driving Europe forward.

Macron already demonstrated leadership in the process of appointing the new European Commission following the 2019 European Parliament elections. He secured significant influence within the European Council, representing member state governments, and played a crucial role in the appointment of Ursula von der Leyen of Germany as Commission President (The Economist 2019). Subsequently, he spearheaded the €750 billion Next Generation EU recovery program at the European level and, in principle, established the issuance of EU bonds to finance it. This was a significant event, considered the first step towards fiscal federalism in Europe.

Macron's second term offers an opportunity for substantial progress in European integration. With the new coalition government established in Germany last year and the French presidential election concluded this year, Europe appears to have secured the stability of the "Franco-German engine." Five years ago, after Macron's election, his first diplomatic engagement was with German Chancellor Merkel. This time as well, Macron will first meet with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. A close reading of the Sorbonne speech reveals the goal of achieving perfect integration between France and Germany to become a model for Europe. This signifies that the momentum of Franco-German leadership is central to European integration.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, while the French presidential election campaign was in full swing, presented a shocking challenge to Europe. Over the past two months, Europe has experienced a rapid and profound shift in thinking, as impactful as the war itself. It has led to serious contemplation about Europe's place in the 21st-century world order.

III. World Order and "European Sovereignty"

Russia's swift invasion of Ukraine was a tsunami that completely overturned Europe's geopolitical thinking. Europe, particularly Germany, had applied the principle of achieving peace through trade not only to East Germany but also to post-Cold War Russia and China since the 1970s. This was the background for Germany's pursuit of gas pipelines from Russia, despite U.S. opposition. However, Russia's brutal invasion has brought about a fundamental shift in thinking (Zeitenwende) in Germany and across Europe (The Economist 2022b). Germany is increasing its defense spending to 2% of its GDP and has begun providing weapons to Ukraine. These developments may herald a historic change in German policy since World War II.

In the lead-up to the war in Ukraine, France experienced two bitter diplomatic setbacks with the United States. Following the inauguration of the Joe Biden administration in 2021, tensions between the U.S. and Europe, which had been high during the Donald Trump era, eased, and Europe had expected a restoration of close alliance ties. However, the U.S. unilaterally decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, and Europe was merely informed of the outcome. Furthermore, France experienced the shock of being excluded from the AUKUS military alliance formed by the U.S., the UK, and Australia. This event was so significant that the French Minister of the Armed Forces described it as a "betrayal" by allies. While the alliance with the U.S. is important, this incident instilled in France the realization that it cannot be blindly trusted (Kauffmann 2022).

Russia's direct military threat and the uncertainty of the US alliance have created an atmosphere in Europe that necessitates independent diplomatic and security capabilities and a distinct path. The concept of 'European sovereignty' that Macron introduced at the Sorbonne has gradually gained traction in international affairs. Furthermore, the COVID-19 crisis of the 2020s has heightened Europe's vigilance towards China. In 2019, Europe had already designated China as a 'systemic rival' (European Commission 2019). In the face of the COVID-19 crisis, Europe confirmed its dependence on China through supply chains for masks and other essential goods, and experienced the recklessness of China's vaccine diplomacy aimed at dividing Europe. China's handling of its diplomatic dispute with Lithuania, an EU member state, in 2021 was also shocking. The diplomatic difference over the naming of the Taipei Representative Office in Lithuania appeared as if a superpower was arbitrarily attacking a small country. The European Union is jointly confronting China's coercion of Lithuania.

Thus, following Russia and the United States, China is also a factor prompting Europe to seek its own path. Of course, European sovereignty is still merely a slogan. Some people prefer strategic autonomy, considering it unreasonable to apply sovereignty, traditionally associated with nation-states, to Europe. Within the European Union, there are still forces, such as Hungary's Orbán government, that maintain close ties with Russia, and conversely, Atlanticism, prevalent in countries like Poland and the Baltic states, which believe closer alliance with the United States is more necessary than Europe's independent path (The Economist 2022a).

The direction of foreign policy that Macron, having secured re-election, will pursue over the next five years is to present the integration of Germany and France as a model for Europe through close cooperation, to drive forward the stalled fiscal and security integration of Europe, and to lay the groundwork for Europe to voice its position on the global stage where major powers like Russia, the United States, and China compete. It remains to be seen whether the slogan 'One Europe' will remain a mere dream or if the historical experience accumulated over more than 70 years will continue. ■

References

Chastand, Jean-Baptiste et Jakub Iwaniuk. 2022. “De Budapest à Varsovie, le silence et l’embarras des gouvernements populistes d’Europe centrale.” Le Monde April 24.

European Commission. 2019. EU-China. A Strategic Outlook. Strasbourg: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Faye, Olivier. 2022. “Emmanuel Macron : une réélection sans état de grâce.” Le Monde April 24.

Kauffmann, Sylvie. 2022. “« Macron l’européen ? Cinq ans plus tard, ses partenaires de l’UE sont plus conscients du chemin accompli que ses concitoyens ».” Le Monde April 20.

Macron, Emmanuel. 2017. “President Macron gives speech on new initiative for Europe.” https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/president-macron-gives-speech-on-new-initiative-for-europe (Accessed: 2022.4.26.)

Ministère de l’Intérieur. “Elections – Les résultats.” https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats (Accessed: 2022.4.26.)

The Economist. 2019. “Ursula von der Leyen’s bumpy start.” Oct 17th.

The Economist. 2022a. “Crisis in Ukraine: How Russia has revived NATO.” Feb 12th.

The Economist. 2022b. “The reticent Mr Scholz: Why Olaf Scholz hesitates to send Ukraine heavy weapons.” Apr 23rd.

[1]“Dégage!” is a vulgar expression that can be translated as “Get out!”. The political phenomenon of periodic regime change driven by disillusionment and rejection of the incumbent power is called Dégagisme.

■ Author: Cho Hong-sikProfessor of Political Science and International Relations, Soongsil University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Sciences Po Paris. His main research areas include international political economy, European studies, and the politics of identity. His representative works include "The Web of Civilizations: A Panorama of European Culture," "One Europe: The History and Policies of the European Union," and "European Integration and the Future of 'Nation'."

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyeon_EAI Research Fellow

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr