[EAI Ukraine Issue Briefing] ② Was Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Inevitable?

On February 24, Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine under the name of a "special military operation." Although military tensions around Ukraine had been escalating since November of the previous year and there were specific warnings about the possibility of a Russian invasion, Russia's unilateral invasion of Ukraine shocked the world. As the war drags on longer than expected, international condemnation has poured down on Russia for disregarding the principles of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and extensive sanctions have been imposed.

Then why did Russia take the extreme measure of invading Ukraine? Did this happen because of Putin's dream of rebuilding the Soviet Union, or his ambition for the revival of a strong Russia? Or did it happen because Russia misjudged the situation, failing to properly predict the West's strong response and the Ukrainian people's resistance?

This issue brief aims to present the grounds for judging the current war as inevitable from Russia's perspective, analyze Russia's objectives in this war, and predict how future peace negotiations will unfold. Fundamentally, this paper emphasizes that Russia approaches the Ukraine issue entirely from a military-security dimension and views it within the framework of extremely realist great power politics. From this perspective, it can be understood that Russia's military action is not a "wrong" act based on the "madness of an individual" but a prepared and calculated action stemming from a strategy to maximize its own security national interests.

1. Why did Russia not limit its military operation to the Donbas conflict?

What is Ukraine to Russia?

Ukraine is one of the 15 countries that separated from the former Soviet Union. For Russia, these former Soviet countries are, or should be, under its sphere of influence. However, the reality is far from Russia's wishes. The Baltic states have already completely broken away from Russia's sphere by joining NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the European Union (EU), and Ukraine and Georgia are trying to follow suit. The problem is that Ukraine, with its vast territory (the largest in Europe excluding Russia), occupies a very important geopolitical position, bordering Russia to the east and EU/NATO countries to the west. Furthermore, Ukraine's access to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov makes it militarily strategic. Therefore, depending on which side Ukraine stands between the East and the West, the balance of power between the Western liberal democratic forces and the Russian authoritarian forces can be completely altered. This is why Russia cannot afford to leave Ukraine to its own devices. Following the Euromaidan events in Ukraine in 2014, Russia swiftly annexed Crimea, making the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea entirely Russian. It also left the Donbas conflict in eastern Ukraine, led by pro-Russian separatist forces.

The Donbas Conflict and Non-Implementation of the Minsk Agreements

The most noteworthy aspect of the current situation is that Russia's invasion is not limited to resolving the Donbas conflict. The Donbas conflict arose in 2014 when pro-Russian separatists declared the independence of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) in Ukraine and engaged in combat with the Ukrainian government forces. In contrast to the swift annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia did not "officially" intervene in the Donbas conflict at that time. Of course, it is true that Russian weapons and mercenaries were deployed to the Donbas region. In 2015, Russia signed the Minsk Agreements with Germany, France, and Ukraine[1] aiming to leave the Donbas region as an autonomous area within Ukraine.

Leaving the Donbas conflict unresolved in this manner could have two effects. First, if the Minsk Agreements were fully implemented, the Donbas region, having acquired autonomy, would voice pro-Russian and anti-European sentiments in Ukrainian domestic politics, providing Russia with a channel for indirect interference in Ukraine's internal affairs. Second, if the Minsk Agreements were not implemented, as seen in the current situation, it would provide Russia with an excuse to militarily attack Ukraine. In this sense, the Donbas conflict was a rather clever long-term strategy by Russia.[2]

Unfortunately, the Minsk Agreements have not been implemented as of 2022. The Ukrainian government argued that the disarmament of the separatist forces must precede any agreement, while the separatist forces insisted on guarantees of autonomous status first. After more than eight years, the Donbas conflict showed no signs of resolution. The problem is that as time passed, the Donbas separatist forces were increasingly put on the defensive due to the strong counterattacks by the Ukrainian government forces.

The current military operation could have been limited to resolving the Donbas conflict. According to the Russian military's explanation, two options were discussed: one limited to the Donbas conflict, and another expanding the scope of military operations to attack all of Ukraine. From the perspective of the Russian military, a war with limited objectives and limited projection of military force would have been much easier. However, Russia's decision was the latter, not the former.

NATO's Eastward Expansion and the Decision for Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine?

But why was the decision made for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Various reasons are cited, such as intoxication with Russia's past military victories (Russo-Georgian War, intervention in the Syrian Civil War), Putin's superego, or an underestimation of the Ukrainian military. However, strictly speaking, there are grounds for Russia's decision not to limit the Ukraine issue to the Donbas conflict. The key figures in the current Putin administration, largely composed of individuals from military and intelligence backgrounds, fundamentally view the world through a military-strategic lens. They place the Ukraine issue within a larger military-strategic map of confrontation between Russia and the US, or Russia and NATO. This is where the issue of NATO's eastward expansion arises.

Russia has consistently raised concerns about NATO's eastward expansion since its first and second enlargements in 1999 and 2004. Russia has maintained a position of absolute opposition to Georgia and Ukraine, which were part of the Soviet Union and share borders with Russia, joining NATO. When NATO discussed the possibility of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO under its Open Door Policy in 2008, Russia strongly protested. As seen in the letters Russia sent to NATO and the US in December 2021, Russia clearly regards Ukraine's potential NATO membership as the most serious issue. Therefore, the question we must ask is why NATO's eastward expansion (the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO) prompted Russia's military action at this point in 2022.

Is Ukraine a de facto NATO Member?

Some argue that Ukraine's NATO membership was impossible anyway due to the ongoing conflict, and therefore Russia's opposition to Ukraine joining NATO is merely an excuse.[3]This is true. However, upon closer examination, this statement is not entirely accurate. Why is that? What has been happening between Ukraine and NATO?

Ukraine is a NATO partner country, having signed a partnership agreement with NATO in 2006. While Ukraine has not yet obtained NATO membership, it was recognized as an "Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EOP)" in 2020, signifying a deepened bilateral relationship. The issue is that since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO has expanded significantly, beyond what would be expected of partner countries. Firstly, NATO and Ukraine have conducted large-scale military exercises annually since 2015,[4] with some exercises taking place on Ukrainian territory and territorial waters.[5]This means NATO forces are entering Ukraine, which Russia cannot help but be highly wary of.

Secondly, the United States and NATO have provided military equipment to Ukraine. The US began supplying lethal weapons during the Trump administration in 2017, and the Biden administration has more actively provided high-performance weapons such as Javelin missiles to Ukraine.[6] The amount provided by the US to Ukraine in 2021 alone was approximately $450 million.[7] Meanwhile, Ukraine imported dozens of Turkish-made unmanned combat drones, the "Bayraktar TB2," which inflicted significant damage on the Donbas separatists.

Thirdly, Western military advisors and instructors, including those from the United States, have trained the Ukrainian military. The Yavoriv base near the Polish border was a center where foreign military advisors from the US, Canada, and other countries trained Ukrainian forces. This base also served as a hub for joint military exercises between the Ukrainian military and NATO allies.

Fourthly, Ukraine has become closer to the United States since the launch of the Biden administration, and the two countries agreed to deepen strategic defense cooperation in 2021. In addition, reports emerged that President Zelenskyy was persuading the US to host US military bases in Ukraine.[8]

What does this mean? Professor John Mearsheimer assesses that although Ukraine is not a de jure NATO member, it was a de facto NATO member.[9] As a result, the Ukrainian military became much better trained and armed than in 2014. Furthermore, continuous combat experience in the eastern Donbas region transformed it into a qualitatively different military from the one that existed during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Therefore, from Russia's perspective, the military advantage of the Russian forces over the Ukrainian forces was being eroded over time. Russia judged that if the Ukraine issue could not be resolved diplomatically, it had to be resolved militarily, and it was better to do so now rather than later.

Russia's Position: A Provoked War

In addition, situations that would cause Russia to feel a more concrete sense of crisis began to unfold in Ukraine starting in 2020.

1. The Donbas Issue: Ukraine attempted to resolve the Donbas issue militarily, leveraging its improved military capabilities. In particular, attacks using Turkish drones were highly threatening and dealt a significant blow to the Donbas separatists. Ultimately, Russia realized that the Minsk Agreements were unlikely to be implemented and that the separatists were increasingly struggling to hold their ground against the Ukrainian forces without Russian military assistance.

2. The Crimean Issue: Starting in 2020, Ukraine and NATO began to re-raise the issue of Crimea, which was forcibly annexed by Russia. In fact, prior to this, Ukraine was primarily focused on resolving the Donbas conflict rather than the Crimean issue. However, in 2021, President Zelenskyy actively pursued diplomatic efforts for the return of Crimea, including hosting the "Crimea Platform" to secure international support for its return.[10] A more serious challenge came from NATO. On September 4, 2020, as part of a NATO exercise, a US B-52 bomber entered Ukrainian airspace for the first time in history and flew along the border of Crimea.[11] In June of the following year, the British destroyer HMS Defender violated Russian territorial waters near Crimea, leading to an incident where both sides fired shots and warning explosions.[12]

Considering the military-strategic importance of Crimea to Russia, Ukraine and NATO re-raising the Crimean issue poses a serious challenge to Russia, which had sought to make the annexation of Crimea a fait accompli. Russia believes that if the Ukrainian military is armed with more powerful NATO weapons in the future, or if Ukraine becomes a NATO member, Ukraine might take military action to reclaim Crimea. Therefore, Russia judges it better to force Ukraine to completely abandon Crimea now rather than later.

3. Possibility of Ukraine's Nuclear Armament: Russia is extremely wary of the possibility that Ukraine might develop its own nuclear weapons or deploy nuclear weapons targeting Russia within its territory. The core of Russia's military superiority lies in its nuclear weapons, and Ukraine's nuclear armament could severely undermine Russia's strategic nuclear superiority. Since Ukraine possesses a nuclear research institute with experimental reactors and nuclear power plants capable of extracting nuclear materials, Russia cannot overlook the possibility of Ukraine developing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, on February 20, four days before the Russian invasion, President Zelenskyy made a provocative statement, saying, "If security guarantees are not provided to Ukraine, we will reconsider the decision to abandon nuclear weapons in the past,"[13] further amplifying Russia's suspicions. President Putin, while ordering the special military operation, claimed that Ukraine was pursuing nuclear armament and that Russia could not tolerate this.[14]

Ultimately, Russia realized the future risks associated with a democratized Ukraine integrating into the Western world, becoming militarily better armed, and acquiring a status equivalent to that of a NATO member. In this context, Russia decided to carry out its military operation not just in Donbas but across the entire territory of Ukraine.

2. What are Russia's Military Objectives?

Prior to the current military operation, President Putin cited the "protection of the people of Donbas" as a pretext, but also presented the goals of "demilitarization" and "denazification" of "Ukraine." This implies that the current operation is not limited to resolving the Donbas conflict but fundamentally aims to resolve the "Ukraine issue."

Destruction of Military Infrastructure

First, Russia aims not only to make Ukraine abandon its ultimate goal of joining NATO but also to nullify many of the benefits it has enjoyed as a NATO partner country. This is the meaning behind setting "demilitarization" as a goal. In fact, demilitarization was something imposed on defeated nations like Germany after World War I and Japan after World War II. Therefore, demilitarizing Ukraine inevitably requires combat operations targeting the entire Ukrainian territory. To this end, Russia launched attacks on three fronts: northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Through this, Russia seeks to fundamentally block anything that could pose a military threat to Russia, whether from Ukraine itself or with support from NATO countries. What is important here is not the fall of cities but the destruction of Ukraine's military infrastructure. Consequently, military infrastructure such as military headquarters, ammunition depots, fuel storage facilities for military use, and military bases are destroyed. According to Russian statements, approximately 80 such facilities have been destroyed. Particularly mindful of the possibility of Ukraine's nuclear armament, Russia bombed the nuclear research institute in Kharkiv and seized the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants. The destruction of Ukraine's military infrastructure is a prerequisite for enforcing Ukraine's "demilitarization," and the fact that the Russian side stated that the "first phase" of the operation is nearly complete also signifies this.

Destruction of Civilian Infrastructure: Scorched Earth Policy and Refugee Crisis

In addition, Russia has besieged major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mariupol, and destroyed civilian infrastructure. Power, water, and heating facilities are being cut off, and urban industrial facilities and broadcast towers are being destroyed. In particular, the port of Mariupol in the southern Donbas region has been completely devastated by continuous bombing. The bombing of cities has led to a surge in civilian casualties and, consequently, millions of Ukrainian refugees. The provision of "humanitarian corridors" is also, in fact, accelerating the displacement of Ukrainian urban populations into refugee status. Currently, approximately 4 million Ukrainians have left Ukraine and entered the EU, including Poland. The displacement of the Ukrainian population into refugee status will ultimately lead to a reduction in Ukraine's population. Ukraine's population had already decreased by 10 million between the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the outbreak of the current war. If Ukraine's population further decreases by 5 to 10 million, Ukraine will truly be reduced to a small or medium-sized country. Furthermore, if Ukrainian refugees flood into the EU as a result of this war, the EU may suffer economic and political damage from the refugee issue in the future. In this sense, the "devastation" of Ukraine and the "refugee status" of the Ukrainian people can be considered Russia's unstated, hidden objectives.

Control of the Donbas Region and Southern Ukraine

Given that Russian-backed separatist forces controlled only about one-third of the Donbas region before the war, the Russian military will attempt to gain complete control of the entire Donbas region through this military operation. Russia has declared that it has entered the second phase of its military operation to demand the annexation or independence of the Donbas region in the future. Furthermore, to secure the safety of the Crimean Peninsula, Russia has seized the coast of the Sea of Azov, connecting Crimea to Donbas.

3. Prospects for Russia-Ukraine Peace Negotiations

Although the Ukrainian government and people are fiercely resisting the Russian military and the Ukrainian forces are performing better than expected, Ukraine faces the unavoidable reality of destruction of military and civilian facilities, civilian casualties, and displacement into refugee status. Despite the strong performance of the Ukrainian military and extensive Western support, the Ukrainian forces are ultimately unable to completely expel the Russian forces from their territory. Meanwhile, Russia is not halting its bombing of Ukraine even during ceasefire negotiations to gain leverage in negotiations with Ukraine. Therefore, in a broad sense, peace negotiations are likely to proceed in a manner that forces Russia's demands upon Ukraine.

Proposal for Ukraine's Neutralization

Russia has proposed a plan for Ukraine to become a neutral country. This is expected to include a ban on Ukraine joining military alliances, a prohibition on the stationing of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory, a ban on providing foreign military bases, and a prohibition on the import and deployment of foreign weapons. In other words, Ukraine would have to abandon its NATO membership aspirations, cease military cooperation with NATO, and remove weapons provided by NATO. Meanwhile, Ukraine's status as a non-nuclear state must be maintained. That is, the development or deployment of nuclear weapons would be prohibited. Ultimately, the proposal for Ukraine's neutralization is intended to preemptively block Ukraine from posing a military threat to Russia.

Ukraine seeks to conclude an international security guarantee treaty in return for accepting neutrality, to ensure its own security. Considering that existing neutral countries, such as Finland and Austria, received security guarantees from the United States and the Soviet Union, or the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France, respectively, Ukraine's demand for security guarantees is natural. Ukraine aims to receive security guarantees from a larger number of countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Israel, and wishes to enter into a security guarantee treaty predicated on the automatic intervention of these countries in the event of a security threat. However, the greater the number of involved countries and the more explicit the clauses mandating intervention in conflict, the more difficult it will be to reach an agreement on the treaty.

Resolution of Territorial Issues in Crimea and Donbas

Finally, Russia will seek to resolve territorial issues. Above all, it will attempt to make Ukraine recognize the permanent incorporation of Crimea into Russia. Meanwhile, the situation in the Donbas region will not revert to the level of the Minsk Agreements. By recognizing the independence of Donbas before launching the invasion, Russia has already declared its intention not to return the Donbas region to Ukraine. Currently, Russia is focusing on the complete control of this region, citing the "liberation" of the Donbas region as the objective of its second phase of military operations. If Russia concentrates its military forces, which were spread across various regions, in the Donbas region, the likelihood of the Donbas region falling under Russian control is very high.

Additional Territorial Demands?

Furthermore, Russia's territorial demands on Ukraine may extend beyond Crimea and Donbas. A realistic option Russia might pursue is to demand the territory in southern Ukraine known as "Novorossiya," located south of the Dnieper River. Indeed, the progress of Russian forces in this region is notable. Russia has occupied almost all of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov coastal areas from Crimea to Donbas, including Mariupol. Whether Russia will claim sovereignty over this entire region or only demand the belt region along the Sea of Azov coast will depend on future military developments and the intensity of Ukrainian resistance. Additionally, the possibility of demanding the demilitarization of the right bank of the Dnieper River, under the pretext of guaranteeing the security of Donbas and Crimea and preventing military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, cannot be ruled out.

4. Future Outlook

The negotiation process will be protracted. This is because the negotiations are not proceeding in a manner where both negotiating parties adjust their mutual interests through compromise from the outset. Rather, the negotiations are proceeding in a way that Russia, with its clear objectives, is imposing them on Ukraine. Of course, Russia's demands are extremely harsh and unacceptable for Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine will continue its utmost diplomatic and military efforts to avoid succumbing to Russia. However, as time passes, it is highly likely that Ukraine will gradually accept Russia's demands. Ukraine has already begun discussing the abandonment of NATO membership, the acceptance of the neutralization proposal (under certain conditions), and compromises regarding the Donbas region. While Ukraine will try to twist the situation to its advantage as much as possible and conduct negotiations in a way that is slightly more favorable to itself rather than in the manner Russia desires, this will not be easy.

The longer the war continues, the greater Ukraine's losses will be. While Russia's casualties are also much higher than expected in this process, this will not cause Putin to revise his plans. Russia's approach is to enforce its will, even at the cost of horrific human casualties. Of course, the situation could change if the war drags on and Russia's financial capacity to sustain the war is severely undermined by Western economic sanctions. With the Ukraine crisis as a catalyst, it appears we are returning to a highly realistic international order where the actions of great powers, enforcing their interests through military and physical violence, are once again unavoidable. The repercussions of the Ukraine crisis will not be limited to Russia and Ukraine and are expected to last for a long time. ■

<References>

Kang Gye-man, Kim Sung-hoon. 2021. "US Targeting Russia's Vulnerability... Closely Cooperating with Ukraine." <Maeil Business Newspaper>, September 2.

Kim Min-gyu. 2022. "Ukrainian President's Bombastic Statement: 'Considering Nuclear Armament if Security Guarantees Are Not Provided'." <AsiaToday>, February 20.

Park Ji-young, Kim Jin-wook. 2021. "Russia Fires Warning Shots at British Destroyer Entering Black Sea." <Hankook Ilbo>, June 23.

<Segye Ilbo>. 2017. "Trump First Approves Sale of Lethal Weapons to Ukraine." December 21.

Yoo Cheol-jong. 2021. "Ukraine Holds International Conference 'Crimea Platform' to Recover Crimea Annexed by Russia." <Yonhap News>, August 23.

Lee Yang-gu. 2022. "NATO is an Excuse? Former Ukrainian Ambassador Explains 'The Real Reason Putin Attacked Ukraine'." March 25.

Lee Eui-jin. 2022. "Russian Media Reports Ukraine Pursuing Nuclear Weapons." <Yonhap News>, March 6.

Jeon Kyung-woong. 2015. "Ukraine's Counterattack? Military Exercises with NATO." <New Daily>, April 1.

. 2022. "John Mearsheimer on Russia-Ukraine War & Who is responsible?" March 5.

"List of NATO exercises." Wikipedia.

. 2021. "US Provides Javelin Anti-Tank Missiles to Ukraine." December 13.

[1] The Minsk Agreements aim to recognize special status for Donetsk and Luhansk and disarm illegal armed groups within the Donbas region.

[2] Of course, Russia's initial plan was clearly that the implementation of the Minsk Agreements was the preferred scenario.

[3] Lee Yang-gu. 2022. "NATO is an Excuse? Former Ukrainian Ambassador Explains 'The Real Reason Putin Attacked Ukraine'." March 25.

[4] In 2015, the Ukrainian military sent troops to NATO's Fearless Guardian, Sea Breeze, and Rapid Trident exercises, conducting joint training for land, sea, and air forces. Jeon Kyung-woong. 2015. "Ukraine's Counterattack? Military Exercises with NATO." <New Daily>, April 1.

[5] NATO exercises hosted by Ukraine within Ukrainian territory and territorial waters include Rapid Trident 2015, Sea Breeze 2015, Rapid Trident 2017, Clear Sky 2018, Rapid Trident 2021, and Sea Breeze 2021.

[6] Unlike the Obama administration, which had limited support to non-lethal weapons, the Trump administration first approved the export of lethal weapons such as firearms and ammunition in 2017. The Biden administration provided Ukraine with 30 Javelin anti-tank missile systems and 180 Javelin missiles in October 2021. <Segye Ilbo>. 2017. "Trump First Approves Sale of Lethal Weapons to Ukraine." December 21; Kang Gye-man, Kim Sung-hoon. 2021. "US Targeting Russia's Vulnerability... Closely Cooperating with Ukraine." <Maeil Business Newspaper>, September 2.

[7]. 2021. "US Provides Javelin Anti-Tank Missiles to Ukraine." December 13.

[8] Kang Gye-man, Kim Sung-hoon. 2021. "US Targeting Russia's Vulnerability... Closely Cooperating with Ukraine." <Maeil Business Newspaper>, September 2.

[9] . 2022. "John Mearsheimer on Russia-Ukraine War & Who is responsible?" March 5.

[10] President Zelensky has stated that the conference will be held regularly until the return of Crimea is achieved and has opened a representative office in Kyiv to manage issues related to the return of Crimea and the Crimea Platform conference. Yoo Cheol-jong. 2021. "Ukraine Holds International Conference 'Crimea Platform' to Recover Crimea Annexed by Russia." <Yonhap News>, August 23.

[11] Additionally, as part of NATO exercises, two US bombers conducted a simulated attack training on Kaliningrad, Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania, on September 25. "List of NATO exercises." Wikipedia.

[12] Park Ji-young, Kim Jin-wook. 2021. "Russia Fires Warning Shots at British Destroyer Entering Black Sea." <Hankook Ilbo>, June 23.

[13] Kim Min-gyu. 2022. "Ukrainian President's Bombastic Statement: 'Considering Nuclear Armament if Security Guarantees Are Not Provided'." <AsiaToday>, February 20.

[14] Lee Eui-jin. 2022. "Russian Media Reports Ukraine Pursuing Nuclear Weapons." <Yonhap News>, March 6.

■ Author: Kang Yoon-hee_Professor, Department of Russian and Eurasian Studies, Kookmin University. Received a Bachelor's and Master's degree in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and a Ph.D. in Russian Regional Studies from the University of Glasgow, UK. Author of "Russia and World Politics" and numerous other papers. Recent papers include "The Armenian Question and European Great Power Diplomacy: Focusing on the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the Congress of Berlin," "Failure of Peaceful Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict," and "Institutionalization, Achievements, and Limitations of Russian Public Diplomacy." Main research areas include the diplomacy of Russia and CIS countries, international relations history, and civil movements.

■ Editor: Lee Seung-yeonEAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr