[EAI Myanmar Special Commentary] ⑦ The 2021 Myanmar Crisis and International Human Rights

1. The Intersection of Human Rights-Friendly and Unfriendly International Societies

The coup d'état by the Myanmar military on February 1, 2021, was a significant international shock. It occurred amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and shortly after the inauguration of U.S. President Biden, whose administration was seen as crucial for future changes in international politics. For those who anticipated a new international order following the Trump era, the military coup in Myanmar, where democracy was imperfectly taking root, and the indiscriminate massacre of innocent civilians posed a grave challenge to the liberal international order. However, from the perspective of international human rights, the Myanmar situation was not an entirely new phenomenon. The international political landscape surrounding human rights in 2021 was a period where human rights-unfriendly and friendly environments coexisted.

Firstly, as an unfriendly environment, liberal values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democracy have retreated in various regions globally. This was evidenced by the European refugee crisis resulting from the Syrian civil war, Brexit, and the rise of populism centered around strongmen in countries like Hungary, Poland, and the Philippines, which exhibited authoritarian tendencies. Notably, Trump's policies, including strict immigration controls, his close engagement with dictators like Putin and Kim Jong-un, and the withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council, exacerbated the human rights situation in the United States. Furthermore, human rights were used as a tool to attack China in the US-China conflict, while China, in turn, attacked the universality of human rights by emphasizing their relativity and particularity. Both before and after COVID-19, nations increasingly reverted to national interest-centric, self-centered approaches, and mercantilism re-emerged in trade and commerce.

However, this unfriendly environment was not the sole characteristic of international politics. Upon taking office, Biden declared the restoration of American democracy as his top priority and abolished inhumane immigration policies. Internationally, value-oriented diplomacy, emphasizing human rights, was evident through the U.S. rejoining the UN Human Rights Council, lifting personal sanctions against the International Criminal Court prosecutor investigating war crimes in Afghanistan, and releasing information related to the murder of Saudi dissident journalist Kashoggi. Moreover, independent of both the U.S. and China, the international community has seen the development of international human rights and humanitarian norms, including transitional justice and the responsibility to protect, as well as international humanitarian and criminal law. This clearly represents a human rights-friendly environment, different from the past, implying that numerous mechanisms are in place to sufficiently improve the situation in Myanmar if the international community possesses the will to do so. The Myanmar crisis was thrown into this intersection of these two currents.

2. Protracted Struggle and the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus

As of January 2022, the death toll from the coup in Myanmar has reached 1,398. Notably, 102 people died on March 27, 2021 alone (Assistance Association for Political Prisoners [AAPP] 2022). The military has engaged in indiscriminate shootings against unarmed protesters, civilians, children, and women resisting the coup, followed by mass arrests, detentions, and torture. To date, 8,376 individuals have been arrested, and 507 have been convicted (AAPP 2022). Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief, labeled the unarmed protesters as engaging in "terrorism that undermines the nation's stability and security," and the military threatened through state-run television that protesters "must learn that they are at risk of being shot in the head and back" (MRTV, March 26, 2021).

The Myanmar crisis shows no signs of resolution even after a year. The most significant agreement was the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus adopted in Jakarta last April. This consensus includes an immediate cessation of violence, the commencement of constructive dialogue for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, mediation by the ASEAN Chair's special envoy, humanitarian assistance, and visits to Myanmar by the special envoy and a delegation. Given that Myanmar is an ASEAN member and ASEAN plays a crucial role in regional politics, this agreement holds considerable significance. Myanmar did release 1,316 political prisoners and 4,320 detainees in October (Human Rights Watch 2021). However, the amnesties were insufficient, and no further meaningful progress has been made to date. During this process, ASEAN displayed divisions, leading to skepticism about its role.

As the Myanmar crisis has dragged on, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) against the military has continued, and in April, the National Unity Government (NUG) and the People's Defence Force (PDF) were formed. The international community has also pressured the military by urging a resolution to the Myanmar crisis in multilateral forums, including the UN. Although the UN Security Council faced difficulties in adopting a resolution due to opposition from China, Russia, India, and Vietnam, it convened four presidential statements, two Arria-formula meetings, and several consultative meetings. The UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council also pressured the Security Council by adopting resolutions. The United States led joint statements by the chiefs of staff of 12 countries condemning the coup and joint statements by G7 nations. In October, along with South Korea, Timor-Leste, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union urged Myanmar to immediately implement the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.

3. From Condemnation and Solidarity to Non-Interference and Strategic Exploration

Nations have responded diversely to the situation in Myanmar. First, the United States swiftly condemned the military junta immediately after the coup, urging it to cease the indiscriminate assault and killings of protesters. Having long imposed sanctions on Myanmar, the U.S. reinstated them following the coup. U.S. policy can be broadly divided into four categories. First, statements condemning the military junta for undermining democracy and violating human rights were issued in the names of the President, Secretary of State, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Second, financial sanctions, entry restrictions into the U.S., and prohibitions on withdrawing assets from U.S. banks were imposed on individuals in the military junta who led the coup. This was an expansion of the individual sanctions imposed after the 2017 Rohingya genocide. Third, as a relatively effective measure, a significant portion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) was redirected to support Myanmar's civil society. Fourth, efforts were made to adopt joint statements and meaningful resolutions in multilateral forums such as the UN. However, these policies, prioritizing value diplomacy, have not yet proven highly effective or decisive.

Myanmar is a strategically and economically important country for China. In January 2020, just before the COVID-19 pandemic, President Xi Jinping made a state visit. Xi met with both the military commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing, and the then State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, maintaining a balance. Reflecting this, China immediately asserted non-interference in internal affairs after the crisis erupted, urging "both sides to resolve differences." Following the same logic, China obstructed the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions and attempted to obscure the violence of the coup and the military's responsibility in other documents, such as presidential statements and press releases, through dilution tactics. In April, Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlined "three supports and three rejections" regarding the Myanmar situation, opposing "inappropriate intervention" by the Security Council and the "stirring up of chaos by external forces" (CHINAMFA 2021). After the ASEAN five-point consensus was reached, China supported the "gradual implementation" of the agreement, aiming to maintain the status quo. However, China also has friction with the military junta over Myanmar's ethnic minority issues and ideological conflicts.

South Korea issued a relatively swift and strong condemnation of the Myanmar situation. Immediately following the coup, the President, Prime Minister, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued multiple statements denouncing the military junta. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice engaged in multiple meetings with the Myanmar Ambassador and Myanmar nationals residing in South Korea, represented by high-ranking officials such as ministers and vice ministers. Following the indiscriminate killing of children and women on March 28, the government strongly condemned the "barbaric violence that continues despite repeated calls from the international community" and "once again strongly urged the immediate cessation of unacceptable acts of violence against its own citizens." Simultaneously, a joint task force of relevant ministries announced coercive sanctions. These included suspending new exchanges and cooperation in defense and security sectors, prohibiting the export of military supplies and strictly scrutinizing the export of strategic materials for industrial use, re-evaluating development cooperation projects other than those directly related to people's livelihoods or humanitarian aid, and planning special humanitarian stay measures for Myanmar nationals residing in the country.

4. The Dilemma of International Human Rights Cooperation: The Myanmar Military Adheres to Sovereignty and Non-Interference Principles

The protracted Myanmar crisis, showing no signs of resolution even after a year since its outbreak, carries significant implications for international human rights cooperation. Key factors influencing whether a state committing human rights abuses accepts external human rights pressure include the government's need for domestic and international justification, the acceptability of relevant norms to developed countries, and the clarity and universality of the norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The Myanmar military junta, more than any other government, had a need to secure domestic and international legitimacy after the coup. Furthermore, the human rights violated by the international community—the prohibition of indiscriminate killing, detention, assault, and torture of innocent civilians—are extremely clear, universal norms respected in developed countries. However, despite these favorable conditions, the Myanmar military junta has not yielded to external human rights pressure for nearly a year.

This demonstrates the divergent aims of the Myanmar military junta. The junta has justified the coup and human rights violations domestically and internationally by focusing on federal integration and social stability rather than human rights protection. Such attempts have occurred in ASEAN countries like Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia, and as seen in the case of Thailand, there have been precedents accepted within ASEAN. Moreover, the model pursued by the Myanmar military junta is not Western Europe, which guarantees citizens' rights and respects democratic institutions and procedures, but rather China, which prioritizes preventing social chaos and focusing on economic development, even at the cost of suppressing and disregarding human rights and democracy. Viewed in this light, the norms that resonate more clearly and universally with the Myanmar military junta are not human rights principles but the principles of sovereignty or non-interference in internal affairs. These principles are norms that are generally accepted within ASEAN and actively supported by China, making them strongly felt within the region.

Furthermore, the Myanmar military junta has endured the situation with unexpected resilience due to two factors. First, its material and social foundations, which should be vulnerable given the limited national capacity, are being sustained by the presence of ASEAN and China. Singapore and China, its largest trading partners, continue to trade with Myanmar. ASEAN member states such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand maintain authoritarian governments, indirectly providing legitimacy to the Myanmar military junta. The fact that Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand attended and congratulated the Myanmar military's Armed Forces Day ceremony in March, amidst ongoing civilian massacres, illustrates this point. Second, decisive sanctions have not yet been imposed on military-owned enterprises (Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, Myanmar Economic Cooperation), which are critical to the junta's finances. Notably, the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), a key source of revenue for the junta, is evading sanctions due to the lobbying and pressure from multinational corporations based in the U.S., Europe, India, and South Korea, such as Chevron, Shell, Total, and POSCO.

However, the stagnation of Western policy toward Myanmar is not solely due to corporate lobbying. Fundamentally, strong domestic political factors inherent in foreign policy are at play. Even in the United States, Biden won by a narrow margin against Trump, and the election results led to disputes over electoral integrity and the Capitol riot. There is a significant base of support for American nationalism, termed "Trumpism," within the U.S., and this force influences Biden's foreign policy. Biden's stated "foreign policy for the American middle class" also makes it difficult to focus on Myanmar, which is not strongly linked to national interests. Furthermore, the problematic withdrawal from Afghanistan in August exposed the vulnerabilities of U.S. foreign policy in democracy promotion. This has been observed in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, and recently in Hong Kong; it is difficult to achieve easily and can be a double-edged sword, potentially leading to political chaos and regional instability.

5. Potential for International Human Rights Cooperation: Starting with Unexpected Shocks!

As evidenced by the sharp decline in media coverage of the Myanmar situation, international attention is waning. The situation could worsen for two reasons. First, the prolonged nature of the crisis and the entrenchment of the status quo. The Myanmar military junta is accustomed to long-term international sanctions and continues to maintain relations with major trading partners such as China, Thailand, India, and Singapore. In addition to oil and gas, the cash flow generated from abundant timber, gems, and drug trafficking cannot be ignored. The junta's self-sufficiency may increase, and its resilience to international sanctions may strengthen, prolonging the crisis and solidifying the current situation. The junta has already postponed the elections, initially promised for one year after the coup, to at least two and a half years later.

Second, the outbreak of civil war and the resultant explosive outflow of refugees to neighboring countries. Concurrently, the traditional "four cuts" strategy—severing the flow of funds, food, intelligence, and personnel to rebel groups—has already resumed. The National Unity Government (NUG) declared a defensive war against the junta in September, and airstrikes, bombings, and arson by the junta have occurred in ethnic minority areas linked to them, leading to a rapid increase in refugees. If the situation in Myanmar deteriorates to the level of Syria, armed conflict among various political factions and the refugee crisis will become prominent. The focus may shift from the democratization or legitimate Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in Myanmar to "all parties" involved in the conflict, potentially eroding the legitimacy of the civil movement.

5. The Possibility of International Human Rights Cooperation: Beginning with Unforeseen Shocks!

Second, shocks originating from the military itself. The Libyan case demonstrates how Gaddafi's labeling of protesters as "cockroaches" was perceived by the international community as a precursor to genocide, prompting action from the Security Council. Similarly, the Myanmar military's policies and statements could generate shocks. Recent incidents, such as vehicles ramming into protesters causing casualties, and the discovery of 35 charred bodies, including children, clearly illustrate the brutality of the military.

In a state of shock, two factors play a crucial role. First, the role of public opinion and civil society. Even a former Singaporean diplomat, pessimistic about a peaceful resolution to the Myanmar crisis, identified public opinion, both domestic and international, as a turning point in U.S. foreign policy (Kausikan 2021). Shocking events, such as the Bosnian concentration camps or the death of Alan Kurdi, move public opinion. First, it influences politicians, governments, or parties sensitive to public opinion, shifting policy direction. It also mobilizes civil society, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs provide information and strategies to civil society within the country and pressure governments to change policy orientations. Internationally, they provide information to international organizations like the UN and advise on policy. The response of East Asian countries to the Myanmar crisis thus far indicates that not only government efforts but also the roles of public opinion and civil society have been important.

Second, the active participation of other relevant countries, including the European Union, Japan, India, Singapore, and Australia, in addition to ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, South Korea, and the United States, which have voiced concerns about the Myanmar situation. India, as a bordering country and a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, is already playing a significant role. Japan has also exerted informal influence by leveraging its close relationship with the Myanmar military junta and has applied pressure through ODA. The European Union and Australia have also participated in joint statements led by the United States. Their role will be even more critical in the future. The accusation that the Biden administration is strategically using human rights, a legacy of Trump, places a significant burden on it. Therefore, the EU and Asian democratic countries can pressure Myanmar, while the U.S. adopts a policy of supporting their actions. In this context, the existence of numerous international instruments for human rights, transitional justice, and the responsibility to protect is also a positive factor.■

Second, the active participation of other relevant countries, including the European Union, Japan, India, Singapore, and Australia, in addition to ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, South Korea, and the United States, which have already raised their voices regarding the Myanmar crisis. India, bordering Myanmar and serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, already plays a significant role. Japan has also exerted informal influence by leveraging its close relationship with the Myanmar military and has applied pressure through ODA. The European Union and Australia have also participated in joint statements led by the United States. Their role will become even more critical in the future. The accusation that the Biden administration is strategically using human rights, a legacy of Trump, places a significant burden on the U.S. Therefore, the European Union and Asian democratic countries could pressure Myanmar, with the United States supporting their actions. If the international community moves in this direction, the existence of numerous international instruments such as human rights, transitional justice, and the responsibility to protect will be a positive factor.■

Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). 2022. “Political Prisoners Post-Coup,” https://aappb.org/ (Accessed: January 4, 2022.)

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52(4): 887-917.

Human Rights Watch. 2021. “Myanmar: Prisoner Releases Fall Short: Deposed Political Leaders and Journalists Remain Detained,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/21/myanmar-prisoner-releases-fall-short (Accessed: January 4, 2022.)

Kausikan, Bilahari. 2021. “The Dangerous Impasse in Myanmar: For the United States, Patience Is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs, April 9, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/burma-myanmar/2021-04-09/dangerous-impasse-myanmar (Accessed: January 6, 2022.)

Myanmar TV Channels(MRTV), March 26, 2021.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, “Wang Yi on Myanmar Situation: 'Three Supports' and 'Three Avoids.'https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1866713.shtml (Accessed: January 4, 2022.)

■ Author: Kim Heon-jun_Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in International Relations and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota. He previously served as an Associate Professor and Senior Research Fellow at Griffith University in Australia and as a Visiting Assistant Professor at St. Olaf College in the United States. His related works include The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea, Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific, and “The Prospect of Human Rights in US-China Relations: A Constructive Understanding.”

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun_Research Fellow at EAI

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr